In the last chapter it was shown that supernatural revelation is possible. God can impart knowledge, not only through the creatures which He has called into being, but also by immediate action upon the human intellect, or by symbolical representations that effect the senses, or by assuming human nature and conversing with man, even as one person converses with another. Absolutely speaking, God could make revelations, to each single individual of the human race, but as a matter of fact, such is not the course pursued by Divine Providence. As religion is meant not only for the individual, but for society as well, it would seem more appropriate that religious truths should be authoritatively announced to society in general, rather than be revealed to single individuals. Hence God is wont to select a limited number of persons to whom He makes special revelations, and then send them as His ambassadors to teach the rest of mankind.
This, however, requires that God should accredit these men in some special way, so that all may be able to recognize them as divine messengers, and have the fullest assurance that the doctrines announced by them are most certainly God's own word. Even as in human affairs no ambassador is received without proper credentials from his sovereign, so neither in things divine. Any one who claims to have received divine revelations, and to have been commissioned by God to announce them to his fellow men, must show his credentials before he can demand belief. Now these credentials are two in number, namely, prophecies and miracles. Both are of such a nature that they can proceed from no one but God, and therefore if they are advanced in confirmation of any claim, or in proof of any truth, that claim must be valid and that truth must be certain, because it is approved by God Himself, Who can neither deceive nor be deceived.
That this important point may be clearly understood, it may be well to illustrate it by means of a concrete example. For this purpose let us take the case of Lazarus, whom Christ is recorded to have raised from the dead. The incident is beautifully told by St. John, in the eleventh chapter of his Gospel. The main facts with which we are concerned are these: Lazarus, a man of great virtue, and, as it would appear, of considerable wealth and influence, fell sick and died. He was an intimate friend of Christ, as were also his two sisters, Mary and Martha. Christ had been sent for during the illness of His friend, but He stayed away purposely, in order, as the Evangelist tells us, to strengthen the faith of His followers by a most striking miracle. When He finally did arrive in Bethania, the home of His friends, Lazarus had been dead four days and was already buried. However, He assured the two sisters that their brother should rise again. So they led Him to the grave, and there, in presence of a large gathering of Jews who had come to console Mary and Martha, He ordered them to open the tomb. To this they objected on the ground that the body was already in a state of putrefaction; but as He insisted, they obeyed, and exposed the body to the eyes of the assembled multitude. Then "Jesus lifting his eyes, said: 'Father, I give Thee thanks that Thou hast heard me. And I know that Thou hearest me always; but because of the people who stand about have I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent me.' When He had said these things, He cried with a loud voice: 'Lazarus, come forth.' And presently he that had been dead came forth, hound feet and hands with winding bands; and his face was bound about with a napkin. Jesus said to them: 'Loose him, and let him go.' Many therefore of the Jews, who were come to Mary and Martha, and had seen the things that Jesus did, believed in Him." {1}
The truth of which there is question in this particular case, is stated in these words of Christ: "Father, . . . . . because of the people who stand about have I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent me." These words contain a direct appeal to God to confirm by miracle Christ's oft-asserted, divine mission. From the very beginning of His public career, Christ had claimed that He was the Son of God, sent by His heavenly Father to redeem the world. This claim He had to make good by signs and wonders that could be wrought only by divine power. As such a sign He selected, in the present instance, the restoration of a dead man to life. The miracle thus chosen could not be attributed to any created power, in as much as God alone can give back the life that was taken away by death. Christ had already worked many other miracles; He had fed five thousand persons with five loaves of bread;{2} He had given sight to the man that was born blind;{3} He had healed by a mere word a person who had for thirty-eight years been sick of an incurable disease;{4} He had walked on the storm-tossed sea as though it were dry land{5} -- all these signs had produced their effect upon His disciples and upon the people, and this effect He wished to confirm by the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Hence He took such special precautions to convince those present both of the reality of the miracle and of the purpose for which it was wrought, so that they could not help recognizing it as a sign from God. It was for this reason that He waited till the signs of corruption were plainly discernible in the body of Lazarus; it was for this reason that He gathered a large number of Jews around the open tomb, and told them explicitly that the miracle about to take place was intended as a sign from heaven in confirmation of His divine mission. Only when He had in this manner prepared the spectators, and had appealed to God as His Father, did He speak the words of divine power which restored the dead man to life. Hence the miraculous effect that followed, the evident restoration to life of one who had certainly been dead, placed the truth of Christ's claim beyond all possible doubt; for this effect could proceed from no one but God, and as it was wrought expressly for the purpose of confirming Christ's claim, God would have testified to a falsehood had the claim in question not been true. Yet God is infinitely truthful, and as such He can no more bear witness to a falsehood than He can cease to be God.
And so in all similar cases; whenever miracles (and the same holds good of prophecies) are advanced in confirmation of any claim, or in proof of any truth, that claim must be valid, and that truth must be certain, because it is approved by God Himself, Who can neither deceive nor be deceived.
Rationalists and infidels cannot help admitting the force of this argumentation, and therefore they endeavor to deny the possibility of miracles and prophecies. They do not and cannot prove that miracles and prophecies are impossible, yet they leave nothing untried to create the impression that said impossibility is an established fact. So rabid are some of these gentlemen in regard to this point, that they will let slip no opportunity of referring to belief in miracles as the very height of folly. It is nothing unusual to find in newspapers and magazines, and even in books, expressions like these: "No man of education believes any longer in miracles." "It has been agreed upon by all men of intellectual ability that miracles are impossible." And yet when we take the trouble to inquire who these men of education and intellectual ability are, we find in nine cases out of every ten that their education has been one-sided, and that their intellectual ability is but ordinary. Nay, not unfrequently are they men whose knowledge of nature is as shallow as their ignorance of philosophy is profound; men who are no more qualified to pronounce on the possibility of miracles than the coal-heaver is able to calculate the intricate motions of the heavenly bodies. Yet they are glib of tongue and facile of pen, and by much talking and scribbling they cause no end of mischief. Vast multitudes of people, who never think for themselves, hear or read these reiterated statements, and thoughtlessly make the implied views their own. Hence many so-called Christians speak of belief in miracles as something to be regretted. Hence, also, we find that non-Catholic denominations relegate the miraculous elements of Christianity to the background. Devoid of tile strength which a conscious possession of the truth alone can give, they dare not face the storm which these misnamed scientists and self-styled advanced thinkers have conjured up. And yet Christianity must stand or fall with the possibility or impossibility of miracles. If the miraculous events to which the Founder of Christianity appealed in confirmation of His divine mission, are not true miracles, then Christianity is based on falsehood, and the sooner it is overturned the better.
In view of this, therefore, it is all-important to emphasize the possibility of miracles; they are the proper credentials of supernatural revelation, and of their very nature place said revelation within reach of all.{6} I say the possibility of miracles, for though prophecies are generally treated as a special proof of revelation, they are, nevertheless, but a species of miracles, and their possibility will readily be granted, if that of miracles be proved. Now, the easiest way to prove that miracles are possible, would be to demonstrate that they have been wrought in the past, for that which has been done must certainly be possible, since all are agreed that no one can do the impossible. Still, though there be hundreds of miracles, the reality of which can no more be called in question than the best attested historical facts,{7} as we shall see in the next chapter, it seems preferable in the present instance to prove the possibility of miracles from their own nature, so that the vain boasts of infidels regarding their knowledge of nature's laws may be put in the true light.
By a miracle we understand a sensible effect contrary to the ordinary course of the laws of nature, surpassing all created power. This definition is generally accepted, both by men who believe in miracles and by men who reject them as impossible. Hence if it can be shown that the given definition implies nothing that is contrary to reason, it must perforce be admitted that miracles are possible, since there exists a God of infinite power, Who can do whatever involves no contradiction.
A miracle, therefore, must satisfy these three conditions: First, it must be a sensible effect, that is, it must be an event or an occurrence which can be perceived by the senses, just as any other fact that happens in nature. The reason of this is found in the fact that a miracle is intended to attract the attention of beings who ordinarily derive their knowledge from sense observation. Second, it must be an event that is opposed to the ordinary course of nature's laws, and that, partly at least, for the same reason; because whatever happens in accordance with the laws of nature, is but little calculated to arrest men's attention. Third, it must be an occurrence that can be brought about only by divine power; because a miracle is supposed to be a sign from God, about the origin of which there cannot be the least doubt.
With regard to the first condition there is no need of advancing any proof; for if events that happen in accordance with the laws of nature can be perceived by the senses, so also can events that are contrary to these laws. If the death of a person is a sensible effect, the restoration of that same person to life is not less so. If we can see that fire consumes the wood to which it is applied, we can equally well see when, under similar conditions, the wood remains unconsumed. Yet in the one case we have an effect that is in accordance with the laws of nature, and in the other, something occurs that is contrary to these laws. This point is so evident that no one has ever dreamed of raising any difficulty in its regard. Hence if miracles are impossible, it must be on account of the second or third condition.
Now the second condition postulates that an effect be produced which is contrary to the laws of nature, or, what comes to the same, the laws of nature must in a particular case be suspended, so that an effect may be produced which would be impossible if nature were left to its own operation. In order to judge of the possibility of such an occurrence, we must, first of all, understand well what is meant by the laws of nature.
If we consult scientists on this point, we find that they speak of the laws of nature as so many uniform modes of action, invariably observed by natural causes in the production of their proper effects. Thus, for instance, they say that it is a law of nature that fire burns, that bodies attract one another, that man is mortal, that the human body, once dead, never revives. Hence in general, according to scientists, the laws of nature are nothing else than the "whole collection of similar uniform acts grouped under a general proposition." Strictly speaking, however, these uniform acts in themselves are not laws, but rather the effects produced by laws. For a law is a principle of action, rather than the act itself. Thus, for example, the fact that property-holders pay taxes is not a law, but it is the result of a law which exists independently of the payment. The law itself is the will of the lawgiver duly promulgated, and imposing an obligation on the tax-payer. So also in nature, the fact that fire burns is not a law, but it is the result of a law from which combustion proceeds as a uniform fact. Hence the laws of nature must be the will of the Divine Lawgiver as expressed in natural causes. Now as these natural causes are devoid of freedom, the will of the lawgiver can find expression in them only by means of predetermined forces; so that the laws of nature are objectively nothing else than the forces with which God has endowed His creatures, and by reason of which they must, when left to themselves, always act the same way if placed under the same circumstances. Hence the constancy of the laws of nature has its ultimate reason in the will of God. This is the only reasonable explanation that can be given of these laws and their mode of operation, and neither philosopher nor scientist can pick a flaw in the reasoning of which this explanation is the inevitable result.{8}
Viewing the laws of nature, therefore, in this light, as we necessarily must, it is hard to see how any reasonable person can conscientiously object to the possibility of miracles. For miracles, as was stated above, are exceptions to these laws, and it certainly ought to be in the power of the lawgiver to make exceptions to the laws which he himself enacted. It is so in the case of human lawgivers, and why should it not be so when the lawgiver is a divine person? Is the Creator's dominion over His creatures less ample than the authority of an earthly ruler over his subjects? If the legislative body of a state can for good reasons exempt certain taxable property from the law of taxation, and thus in a particular case suspend the general law, why should not God for similarly good reasons be able to suspend in particular instances the laws which govern the actions of His creatures? The supposition of such an impossibility is plainly absurd.
Hence, considering the origin of these laws, we would certainly conclude that they admit of exceptions; and this conclusion is confirmed when we investigate the manner in which these same laws are reduced to act. Finite causes depend for the exercise of their natural powers on God's active concurrence. Not only must God sustain the acting cause in being, but He must physically co-operate with its activity, so that He has a direct influence upon the effect produced. This follows necessarily from the dependence of the creature on its Creator; for a being that is dependent in its essence must be dependent in its operation, else the effect would be superior to its cause, which is metaphysically impossible. To illustrate my meaning by an example. Fire has naturally the power to burn; that power it received from God at the moment of creation, when He determined the nature of chemical elements; but in order that fire may exercise this natural power, God must work with it, so that the resulting combustion depends both on the fire and on God's co-operation. If either one of the two partial causes be wanting, there can be no combustion, though all other necessary conditions be actually present. Hence if God withholds His co-operation, the law of nature, according to which fire burns when applied to combustible material, suffers an exception; something happens that is contrary to the course of nature's laws. And so in every other case where natural forces are at work, the moment God withholds His co-operation, these forces are unable to produce an effect, no matter what be the extrinsic conditions. If a stone be thrown up into the air, the attraction of the earth tends to draw it down again; but were God to cease co-operating with that attractive force, the stone would remain suspended in mid-air. Nor can it be said that God is not at liberty to withhold His concurrence, for as He freely established the course of nature's laws, so can He freely interfere with the same. His concurrence is, indeed, a necessary condition without which natural causes cannot act, yet it depends altogether on His own free will whether in any particular instance that condition shall be put or withheld. Nature depends on Him, not He on nature.
From what has thus far been said, it ought to be manifest that God can suspend the laws of nature, so that an effect, which should have resulted from the application of natural causes, did not so result; but can He also interfere with these same laws in such wise that there shall be produced a supernatural effect which is altogether positive in character? Undoubtedly; for as He is the author of nature, He must of necessity have power to elevate natural causes to modes of action that are beyond their own limited range, provided these actions be not in contradiction with the causes in question. God could not, for instance, bring it about that a dead human body, remaining dead, should see or hear, experience pleasure or pain, for that would imply a contradiction; but there is nothing whatever in the nature of things that prevents Him from reuniting a soul to the body from which it had departed, and thus call a dead man to life. As in the production of human beings, He disposes matter, through the agency of secondary causes, in such a way that it can be united to a spiritual soul, and through its influence develop into a perfect body; so can He also by His own immediate influence redispose the decaying corpse, so that it be again a fit habitation for the soul from which it had separated at the moment of death. The one requires on the part of God no greater power than the other; though the one is in keeping with nature's laws and the other is opposed to the same. So again, God cannot impart to human intelligence a comprehensive knowledge of all that is and all that can be, for such knowledge would imply omniscience, which is an attribute proper to the Divinity; yet He may without injury to man's nature impart to him a clear and certain knowledge of some future event, which no created intelligence, when left to itself, could possibly foreknow. Such a revelation of the future is, indeed, contrary to the laws that govern the actions of man's cognoscitive faculties; but it is not essentially opposed to these faculties themselves, and therefore it cannot be impossible to Him from Whom both faculties and laws have their being. Thus instances might be multiplied without end, where God, in virtue of His sovereign dominion over creatures, can produce sensible effects, positive as well as negative, that are contrary to the ordinary course of the laws of nature.
Hence if miracles are impossible, it must be on account of the third condition stated above, namely, that the effect produced in opposition to the laws of nature be such as to surpass all created power. And yet that this condition can cause no special difficulty is quite certain without any further proof, because the very fact that a given effect is contrary to the course of nature's laws is sufficient evidence that it can proceed from no one but God. This follows necessarily from the fact that such an effect is a suspension of a law enacted by God Himself; for no one can suspend a law except the lawgiver. In particular instances it may indeed be uncertain whether a given effect is really contrary to the laws of nature; but this opposition being once established, all further doubt concerning the origin of the effect in question is unreasonable. Even as in human laws no suspension is possible except as coming from the lawgiver himself, so also in laws that have been enacted by God. This follows from the very nature of laws, be they human or divine in their origin.
Aside, however, from this general principle, which proves that any effect contrary to the laws of nature must come from God, it may often be shown from the very nature of the effect produced that God is its author. Thus, for instance, if a person that was certainly dead is restored to life, no one would dream of saying that it was the effect of natural forces. We do not know all that nature may be able to do, but we know well enough that it has no power of restoring the dead to life; for the simple reason that no created power can take hold of a human soul and reunite it to the body from which it was parted in death. Or, again, we do not know what skilful physicians and surgeons may be able to accomplish, but we are quite certain that they cannot by a mere word give sight to a person born blind, or by a wave of the hand supply a limb which nature had failed to provide. Such actions require a power that is equivalently creative, and all creative powers lie beyond the sphere of natural forces. And this is, in fact, conceded by our adversaries themselves; for no matter how well the raising of a dead man to life may be attested, they refuse to believe it, and the reason which they give for their refusal is that such a thing as the dead being restored to life is clearly impossible. Well, if they hold that it is impossible, they must certainly concede that it surpasses the power of nature, because nature can hardly be expected to do the impossible. If, therefore, a man is really raised from the dead, it cannot be ascribed to natural forces.
Consequently the definition of miracles, in practice admitted by all, contains nothing that is contradictory, or impossible to omnipotent power; and therefore we are forced to admit, that if God sees proper to work a miracle, there is nothing whatever that can prevent Him from doing so. Men, whose interest it is to eliminate all that is supernatural, may contend that miracles are impossible; but reason tells a different story. Hence we find that whatever objections are urged against the possibility of miracles, they are the merest cavilings, arising either from a misapprehension of nature's laws, or from a desire to rule the Creator out of His own creation. Take, for example, the famous objection of Hume, which is so often referred to as the strongest argument ever urged against miracles, and which he himself predicted would make miracles impossible as long as the world endured. "A miracle," he says, "is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."{9}
Apparently this objection has some force; and yet if we examine it a little more closely, it falls all to pieces. First of all, the assertion contained in the major premise, namely, that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, is only partially true. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature only in the sense that it is an exception to these laws; it is not a violation in the strict sense of the term; for a lawgiver cannot violate the laws which he himself enacted; he can for good reasons suspend them, but such suspension is not a violation. However, as the objector did not take advantage of this blunder, we may let it pass; the real fallacy of the argument occurs in the minor premise, where it is stated that a firm and unalterable experience has established, that is, made known the laws of nature. This statement is not only false, but takes for granted the very thing that is to be proved. If the experience which established the laws of. nature is unalterable, of course, miracles are impossible, but that is precisely the point at issue; is that experience unalterable? How do you prove it? A mere assertion does not make it such. Let us suppose that up to this moment it had been the uniform experience of all mankind, that there had been no exception to any law of nature, could that experience ipso facto be called unalterable? By no means. It would indeed be a uniform experience, but not necessarily unalterable. It would prove that the laws of nature, when not interfered with by a higher power, are constant; it would also prove that up to this moment no higher power had interfered with these laws; but nothing more. With regard to the possibility or impossibility of any future interference it would afford no proof whatever. Hence the very thing to be proved is foolishly taken for granted, and what wonder if a foolish conclusion follows?
Besides, the statement that the experience which established the laws of nature is firm, that is, without exception, is absolutely false. There are hundreds of cases as firmly established as the most certain facts in profane history which show that there were exceptions to these laws; hence the experience which established the laws of nature is neither absolutely uniform nor firm. On the contrary, it is an experience that is full of gaps and interruptions, and thus proves conclusively, not only the possibility, but even the actual occurrence of miracles. Consequently, the objection which was supposed by its author to prove the impossibility of miracles, on the score that there is always a full proof against them, only proves his own ignorance or bad faith.
And so with all other arguments that have ever been excogitated by infidels and Rationalists. They but show that their authors have neither a clear understanding of the nature of physical laws, nor a due appreciation of the paramount importance of honesty in argumentation. Hence miracles are certainly possible, and as they are of their very nature visible manifestations of God's infallible word, no better credentials could be asked for in order to establish the certainty of supernatural revelation.
{1} John XI, 41-45.
{2} Matth. XIV, 17.
{3} Mark. X, 52.
{4} John V, 7.
{5} Matth. XIV, 26.
{6} Concerning this point, J. J. Rousseau made the very pertinent remark: "The first proof of divine revelation is the nature of the doctrine proposed, the second is the character of the organs of revelation, the third consists in miracles, which, as an expression of divine power, run counter to the ordinary course of nature. This is without doubt the most conspicuous, the most evident, the most striking proof; it does not call for long discussion and protracted investigation, and is particularly calculated to make a strong impression upon the masses of the people." Lettre III de la Montagne.
{7} As an instance we may cite the miracles of Lourdes, many of which have been thoroughly investigated by a committee of physicians and scientists, with the result that they have been set down as occurrences that cannot be explained on any natural grounds. For detailed information the reader may profitably consult the work of Georges Bertrin, entitled, Lourdes.
{8} When Huxley says that "a law of nature, in the scientific sense, is the product of a mental operation upon the facts of nature which come under our observation, and has no more existence outside the mind than colour has," his statement is indeed scientifically correct, but, like many other scientific statements, it is philosophically very unsatisfactory. The "facts of nature" are necessarily based upon some acting cause, and in our "mental operation" upon these facts we cannot leave that cause out of count. Hence if we wish to investigate the constancy of nature's laws, we must not confine ourselves to the observation of uniformly occurring facts,. but must determine, as far as that can be done, the intrinsic nature of the causes from the uniform operation of which these facts proceed.
{9} Hume's Works, ed. 1770, Vol. III, p. 178. A striking refutation of this objection is found in Newman's Grammar of Assent, pp. 306, 307.