We need to investigate the universal in particular. Now what is said by the name is a preliminary to every investigation, so it is important to note that 'universal', like other concrete terms, is taken in three ways. Sometimes it is taken for the subject: that is, for the thing of first intention to which the intention of the universal is applied. In this way, the universal is the first object of the intellect. Sometimes it is taken for the form: that is, for the thing of second intention caused by the intellect and applicable to things of first intention. It is in this way that the logician as such speaks of the universal. In the third way it is taken for the aggregate of subject and form, and that is a being per accidens, since it aggregates diverse natures that do not produce something one per se. In this way it is not an object of consideration for the practitioner of any art, since according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI [2, 1027^a20-26] there is no science of a being per accidens, since such a being is not definible. So the remaining discussion will deal exclusively with the universal taken in the second sense.

[Question 4: Is the universal a being?]

The question is whether the universal is a being.

1 It appears that it is not:

For according to Boethius, "whatever is, is because it is one in number." ⁽¹⁾ A universal is not one in number, since it is predicated of many. Therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, according to Aristotle in the Categories [ch. 5], everything that is other than primary substance either is said of primary substance or is in primary substance. The universal is other than primary substance, and it is neither said of primary substance nor in primary substance; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: only secondary substances are said of primary substances, according to Aristotle. ⁽²⁾ Since the universal is an accident, it is not a secondary substance. Nor is it in primary substances, since if it were, a primary substance would be universal -- in the same way that if whiteness is in something, that thing is white.

3 Moreover, the universal is either from nature or from the intellect. It is not from nature, since if it were, it would be singular and would be the terminus of a change. Therefore, it is from the intellect alone, and so it is a fictive item and therefore a non-being.

4 Arguments for the opposite view:

The universal is defined by Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17^a39-40], but there is no definition of a non-being; therefore, etc.

5 Moreover, according to Boethius ⁽³⁾ secondary substances are applied to primary substances; but a non-being is not applied to a being.

6 One must say that the universal is a being, since nothing is understood under the notion of non-being, since the intelligible moves the intellect. For since the intellect is a passive power according to Aristotle in De anima III [4, 429^a21-24], it operates only if its moved by an object. A non-being cannot move anything, since moving belongs to a being in actuality. Therefore, nothing is understood under the notion of non-being. And yet whatever is understood is understood under the notion of a universal. Therefore, that notion is not a non-being.

7 As for the first argument [in n. 1]: Boethius understands this as applying to that which exists apart from an operation of the intellect, and a universal is not of that sort.

8 The same sort of response applies to the second argument [in n. 2]: Aristotle understands this claim as subject to the same qualification.

9 One might object, however, that the argument reaches its conclusion through the claim that secondary substances are said of primary substances and accidents are in primary substances. But secondary substances, as Aristotle is speaking of them in this passage, do not exist apart from an operation of the intellect. Proof of the minor premise: at the beginning of the chapter Aristotle divides substance into primary and secondary. Now if that division is correct, it follows that the members, as he understands them in that passage, are opposed. But that which is a "secondary substance apart from an operation of the intellect" is not opposed to primary substance but is in fact identical with primary substance. Therefore, he does not understand this claim to hold of secondary substance as that which is a being apart from an operation of the intellect.

10 Therefore, the objection goes, the universal is said of primary substances.

11 In response to this objection, which contradicts the claim that only secondary substances are said of primary substances, I say that secondary substances as Aristotle is speaking of them in that passage are accidents. They are not real accidents, for which he offers the classification 'be-in', but intentional accidents, which of themselves belong to the classification 'said-of'. But the universal is something more general than secondary substance, since secondary substance implies a universal applied to something in the genus of substance.

12 To the third argument [in n. 3] I say that the universal is from the intellect. But I say that the claim "therefore it is a fictive item" does not follow, since nothing outside the intellect corresponds to a fictive item, whereas something external to the intellect corresponds to a universal, and it is by that external something that the intellect is moved to cause such an intention. For according to Boethius ⁽⁴⁾ a species is an attenuated likeness of individuals, and a genus is an even more attenuated likeness of species. So I say that the universal is effectively from the intellect, but it is materially or originally or occasionally from a property in the thing. Such is not the case for a fictive item, so the universal is not a fictive item.

[Question 5: Is the universal intelligible of itself?]

The question is whether the universal is intelligible of itself.

1 It appears that it is not.

For according to Aristotle in De sensu et sensato [ch. 6, 445^b16-17], "Nothing is in the intellect but what was first in the sense"; but a universal was never in the sense; therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, every passive power presupposes its object in actuality before its operation, since it is from the object that it receives its own actuality, in virtue of which it can operate. But the intellect does not presuppose the universal: it causes the universal, as the Commentator says on De anima II. ⁽⁵⁾ Therefore, etc.

3 Argument for the opposite view:

Whatever is defined is of itself an object of intellect. Now the universal is defined by Aristotle. ⁽⁶⁾ Therefore, etc.

4 One must say that the universal is intelligible of itself. This is evident as follows. The primary object of intellect, "what a thing is," is understood under the notion of a universal. Now that notion is not essentially identical with the "what a thing is"; rather, it is an accidental mode of the "what a thing is." Therefore, the intellect can cognize the difference between its primary object and that mode, since it can distinguish between any things that are not essentially the same. But every power that of itself cognizes the difference between two things cognizes each of the two under its proper notion, according to Aristotle in De anima II [2, 426^b15-23] -- that's how he proves that there is a common sense. Therefore, the intellect can cognize that mode or notion of a universal of itself and under its proper notion. In this way, by reflection, the intellect cognizes itself and its own operation and mode of operation and the other things that are in it.

5 In response to the first argument [in n. 1], it was said above [in q. 3, n. 25] that Aristotle understands this as applying to the primary object of intellect, which is the "what" of a material thing.

Alternatively: he understands it in accordance with the sensory nature -- that is, as applying to sensibles. And the universal is not that sort of thing.

6 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the possible intellect is a passive power, and it does presuppose the universal, which is its object. But the agent intellect does not presuppose the universal, since it is not a passive power. And the universal is not the object of the agent intellect. Rather, its object is the "what a thing is" in phantasms, and the universal is its end.

[Question 6: Does the universal have any properties?]

The question is whether the universal has any properties.

1 It appears that it does not.

For a property of the universal cannot be singular, since if it were, it would not be convertible with the universal; therefore, any property of the universal is itself universal. Therefore, it is not distinct from the universal whose property it allegedly is. But that is absurd, since a property does not express the being of that whose property it is, according to Aristotle in Topics I [4, 101^b19-23].

2 Moreover, if the universal has some passion, that passion will be in that universal "in every case, in it alone, and always." ⁽⁷⁾ Therefore, that passion will be a property. But that is absurd, since if it were a property, it would be contained under property, which is a species of universal, and it will be convertible with the universal itself, which is absurd.

3 Moreover, an accident is not the subject of an accident, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [4, 1007^b2-4]; the universal is an accident; therefore, etc.

4 Moreover, every passion is less a being than its subject. Now what is less a being than a being of reason is a non-being. So since the universal is a being of reason, its passion would have to be a non-being.

5 Porphyry argues for the opposite view. ⁽⁸⁾ He identifies some commonality among all five universals. Hence it is evident that they share some property. Now if that property is in them univocally, it will be through some common character that is in them, and so it will be the passion of that common character. For if that passion is univocal, its primary subject will be univocal, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I [28, 87^a38-39]. Therefore, such a passion belongs primarily to the universal itself.

6 The right answer is yes. The reason is that a fully adequate definition expresses the essence of whatever is defined. So if something is in an item convertibly, and that something is not among the things put forward in the definition of the item, it inheres as a passion in that item. Now something is in the universal in just this way. For if the correct definition is that "the universal is what can be predicated of many," as put forward in De interpretation I [7, 17^a39-40], then what is put forward in Posterior Analytics I [I.19, 100^a6-8] -- namely, that the universal is a one in many and of many -- will be convertible with the universal but not part of its essence. And vice versa: if the latter is the correct definition of the universal, then the former will be a property. And thus from the definition of the universal either of these features of the universal can be demonstratively concluded and thus known scientifically.

7 To the first argument I say that the passion of the universal -- call it a -- is universal: not because it is essentially identical with its subject, but because 'universal' is applied to it as a mode of it, and 'a is universal' will be a denominative predication.

8 Now one might object that a subject is not predicated denominatively of an accident and does not express a mode of it. Therefore, neither does 'universal' express a mode of its passion.

9 I say that 'universal' can be taken either as what or as mode. The argument [in n. 8] reaches its conclusion by taking 'universal' in the first way.

10 On this same basis I say to the second argument that it is a property denominatively but is not contained under property. For it is possible, especially in intentions, for something to be convertible with the genus but denominated from the species.

11 To the third argument I say that an accident is not the primary subject of an accident that it underlies and supports. Only a substance is like that. Nevertheless, an accident can be the proximate and immediate subject of an accident, since it is the ground of inherence [ratio susceptiva] through which the other accident is in the substance: for example, a surface is the subject of whiteness. It is in this way that there is among accidents the subject of a passion.

12 To the fourth argument I say that there are many gradations in beings of reason, just as there are in beings of nature, since a mode of understanding is less a being than an intelligible being. Hence, what is less a being than a being of reason in the lowest gradation is a non-being, but the property that is convertible with the universal is not of that sort.

[Question 7: Is the universal the subject of Porphyry's book?]

Now that we have seen that the universal meets the conditions for the subject of a science -- namely, that it is a being [q. 4], that it is definible [q. 6, n. 6], and that it has passions that can be demonstrated of it [q. 6, n. 6] -- the question is whether the universal itself is the subject of Porphyry's book.

1 It appears that it is not.

For [if the subject of Porphyry's book is the universal, it must be] either the universal either (a) insofar as it is an intention or (b) insofar as it can be applied to a thing. Not (a), since in this way intention is treated by metaphysics. Here's the proof: the metaphysician treats everything qua being; consequently, he treats intention qua being. Therefore, he also treats intention qua intention, since intention qua intention is the same as intention qua being, just as man qua man is the same as man qua being. Not (b), since universal-insofar-as-it-can-be-applied-to-a-thing is a being per accidens, and there is no science of a being per accidens. ⁽⁹⁾

2 Moreover, every real science is of the universal, since "there is no science of singulars." ⁽¹⁰⁾ Therefore, this rational science is not of the universal.

3 Moreover, in this book he treats these five according to their proper notion by distinguishing and defining each on the basis of its properties and making no mention of the universal as such, with respect to either its 'what it is' or its passions. Therefore, these five are the subject, and not the universal.

4 Argument for the opposite:

This science is one; therefore, it has one subject. Therefore, these five are not the subject except insofar as they agree in one common [feature], which is the primary subject. And that is the universal.

[Question 8: Is 'universal' univocal with respect to the five predicables?]

A related question concerns the unity of these five as "universal." The question is whether 'universal' is univocal with respect to these five.

5 I argue that it is not.

Anything that is univocal with respect to many is related to them under some universal notion. Universal is not related to the five predicables under a universal notion. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: universal is not related to them under the notion of any of the five, since none of them agrees with the others, but instead each is distinguished from the others. But if it is related to them under some other notion, there will be a sixth universal.

6 One view ⁽¹¹⁾ is that it is related to the five under the notion of a genus, since it is predicated of them in quid, and they differ from one another in species.

7 But there is the following argument against that view. If the universal is the genus with respect to the five predicables, then each of them is a species. Therefore, genus [which is one of the five] is a species. This is false, since one opposed species is not predicated truly of another using the verb 'is'; but genus and species are disparate species under universal, if universal is held to be the genus of the five predicables.

8 Moreover, "a genus is not predicated of its species according to more and less," according to Porphyry in the chapter "On difference." But universal is predicated of the five predicables according to more and less, since a genus is more a universal than a species or differentia, since it is predicated of more things.

9 Argument for the opposite view:

Universal is predicated [of all five predicables] according to its name and notion; therefore, it is predicated [of them] univocally. The inference is clear from what Aristotle says at the beginning of the Categories [1, 1^a6-8). The antecedent is evident, since each of them is "apt by nature to be said of many," which is how Aristotle defines the universal in De interpretatione I [7, 17^a39-40].

10 One view ⁽¹²⁾ in response to Question 8 is that universal is analogous with respect to these five, since it is said per prius of genus and per posterius of the others, as is evident from the third argument offered for the negative answer [n. 8].

11 And in keeping with this response, one response given to Question 7 is that the universal is not the subject of Porphyry's book, but the five universals are, and that nevertheless the science is one on account of the unity of the first item to which the others are attributed, which is the genus.

12 An argument against this opinion: In every genus one species participates the nature of the genus more perfectly than another. That is why the natural scientist says that "equivocations lie hidden within a genus" (Physics VII.4, 249^a22-24). The logician, by contrast, puts forward a univocal genus on the basis of the unity of the notion. For example, at the beginning of the Categories [Aristotle says that] 'animal' is univocal to man and ox. Therefore, speaking in terms of logic, the universal can be the genus of these five, even if genus is in some way more perfect than the others.

13 Moreover, the answer to Question 8 [in n. 10] is incorrect, as is evident from the fact that at the beginning of Metaphysics VII [1, 1028^b7-8] Aristotle argues that because substance is the first being, "therefore we should exclusively, chiefly, and first engage in speculative reasoning about what is in this way." From this remark one takes it that in order to make determinations about many things that are spoken of by way of attribution to some first thing, it is enough to make a determination about that first thing. Accordingly, therefore, it would be enough for Porphyry to make determinations about genus alone.

14 Moreover, the argument of those who hold this view is invalid. Number, after all, is a multitude aggregated from unities, ⁽¹³⁾ and yet it is not said analogically of two and three, even though three is from more unities. Rather, number is predicated of two and three unqualifiedly univocally.

15 For this reason, and on account of the argument given above ⁽¹⁴⁾ [in n. 9] for the opposite view on Question 8, one must say that universal is predicated univocally of these five.

16 To the first argument [in n. 5] I say that the intention of genus is applied to [universal ⁽¹⁵⁾] with respect to these five. As for the claim that "each of them is distinguished from the others," that is true. Therefore, they are not predicated of each other by a performed predication, nor is anything predicated of one of them under the notion of another. But they are predicated of each other by designated predication, since the notion of genus is extraneous to universal when it is united to them [the five predicables] by the verb 'is', just as the notion of genus is extraneous to animal in the predication "Man is an animal."

17 As for the first argument against this view [see n. 7], I concede that each of them is a species, and it is not absurd for species of the same genus in accidents to be predicated of each other denominatively.

18 One might object that it is absurd for species of the same genus. For just as "Whiteness is blackness" is false, so too is "White is black."

19 But I say that this is not true universally. Even if perhaps that's how it is with absolutes, it's not the case with relatives. For example, a father and a son are identical. For just as the inference "He is the father of so-and-so; therefore, he is a father" is valid, by parity of reasoning the inference "He is the son of such-and-such; therefore, he is a son" is also valid. So if the antecedents are both true at the same time, so too are the consequents. In the same way, such relatives can be said of the same thing and of each other, but not as relative opposites, since they are only opposites with respect to one and the same thing. By contrast, they are relatives according to their common notion. For father is primarily relative to son; it is not the case the father-of-so-and-so is primarily relative to son-of-such-and-such. That's how things are in the case of "Genus is a species": it is not both genus and species with respect to one and the same thing.

20 Alternatively, it is said that predications like "Genus is a species" can be true by denominative predication. Any of these intentions can be taken as a 'what' or as a 'mode'. When it is that which is understood, it is a 'what'; when it is the notion under which something else is understood, then it is taken as a 'mode'. Therefore, second intentions are not opposed unless both are taken as 'what' or both are taken as 'mode'. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Now when "Genus is a species" is true, 'genus' is taken as a 'what', since it is understood by reference to universal, which is its genus, and 'species' is taken as a 'mode', since genus is understood under such a mode with respect to universal.

21 But if one infers from this that an opposite is being predicated of its opposite, one would commit the fallacy of a figure of speech by confusing a mode with a what and vice versa. For example, "Plural is singular" is true if 'plural' is taken as a 'what' and 'singular' as a 'mode', since what is signified by 'singular' is a mode of what is signified by 'plural', and there is no opposition.

22 Nonetheless, it is said that 'singular' expresses a 'what', because it is taken for its significate with respect to the subject, and 'plural' expresses a 'mode', since it is taken for its mode with respect to the predicate. For the predicate is not in it [as taken] for the thing signified. It does not matter for present purposes which of the two solutions is given.

23 To the other argument [in n. 8] I say that genus is not more a universal -- since 'more' expresses an intensification of the form of that to which it is joined -- but in some sense a greater universal, since it extends to more items, just as four is a great number than two but is not more a number than two. And in the same way one most-specific-species is not said to be more a species than another, even if it has more individuals falling under it.

24 To the first question one should say that the universal is the subject of this science. Now there are three principal conditions for the subject of a science. ⁽¹⁷⁾ The universal meets the first condition, since in this book what-it-is and that-it-is are presupposed as known. Nor would it be possible for any species of the universal to be known scientifically if one did not know what-it-is and that-it-is. But in this book its species are defined, and there was no need for a definition of the universal to be put forward, since the author assumes that the definition was adequately established by Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17^a39-^b1] or Posterior Analytics I [4, 73^b26-27]. That is why the author uses the formula [ratio] of universal, "to be predicated of many," in the definition of these universals.

25 It also meets the second condition for a subject, since if any passion univocal to these five is shown of them through the formula of universal, it is thereby shown of the universal itself as of the primary subject; and if in this book he demonstrates through the notion of universal that one of them is predicable of many, he thereby shows this of the universal, since the medium of demonstration is equated with a passion; otherwise there would be an absurdity. But that is what is done in this book, as is evident, since "differs from an individual" is demonstrated of genus through the particle "is predicated of many," and the assumption is that it can be demonstrated of the others in the same way.

26 The third condition is evident, since each of them is a species of universal, and universal is divided into these five by Porphyry, since once he has given a definition of the genus, he offers the division by way of further explanation of the genus. One member of the division is "to be predicated of many," by which he means the universal, which is subdivided into these five.

27 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that this division is not on the basis of opposites, since intention qua intention is applicable to a thing. For this reason I concede both members [i.e., both (a) and (b)], since they are identical.

28 As for the objection against the first alternative [(a)], it can be said that the metaphysician deals with all real being, not with rational being, which is the sort of being the universal is as it is being discussed here.

Alternatively, one might concede that the metaphysician deals with the intention qua being, but it doesn't follow that he deals with intention qua intention, since these are not the same. That's always what happens when the term repeated after 'qua' does not signify an essence absolutely. For example, 'the moveable qua moveable' is not the same as 'the moveable qua being'. On this basis it is evident that the example using 'man' is not analogous.

29 As for the objection against the other alternative [(b)] -- that it is a being per accidens -- I say that it is not a being per accidens in the way that an aggregate is, since the "thing" does not figure in the understanding of it as a part but as determining a relation. In this way an accident is understood in dependence on a substance, but nonetheless not as a being per accidens.

30 The response to the third argument is evident from what was said in the resolution of the question, etc.

[Questions 9-11

Question 9: Is the universal in the thing or in the intellect?]

The question is, given that the universal as it is spoken of here is an accident, in what subject is it: in the thing or in the intellect?

1 I prove that it is not in the thing:

Every accident that is in a thing is either proper or common. If it is proper, it is present in individuals, although not primarily, since a proper accident is present per se in the species, and per se presupposes that it is present in all. If it is common, it is primarily in individuals. So if it were an accident in a thing, it would be primarily in individuals. This is false, since if it were primarily in individuals, the individual would be universal. Therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, the intellect is a passive power, according to Aristotle in De anima III [4, 429^a21-24]. Therefore, it does not act by transmitting something outside -- as is also true of the sense, as Aristotle says in Topics I [14, 105^b6-10]. So when it causes the universal, it does not transmit the universal outside itself. Therefore, the universal is not in some subject outside the intellect.

3 Moreover, according to the Commentator in De anima III [com. 5], what comes to be from intellect and the intelligible is more truly one than what comes to be from matter and form. Now form is not outside matter, nor vice versa. Therefore, neither is the intelligible outside the intellect, nor vice versa. Therefore, neither is the intelligible mode outside the intellect, Therefore, neither is the universal.

4 Arguments for the opposite view:

"Matter and the efficient cause do not coincide," according to Aristotle in Physics II [7, 198^a24-27]. The intellect is the efficient cause of the universal; therefore, it is not the matter. Therefore, neither is it the subject, since accidents do not have [matter from which] but only matter in which, ⁽¹⁸⁾ which is called their subject.

5 Moreover, according to the Commentator in De anima I [com. 8], "The intellect brings about universality in things"; therefore, universality is in the thing and not in the intellect.

6 Moreover, the subject of an accident is what it denominates. The universal denominates the thing, not the intellect. Therefore, etc.

[Question 10: Is "Man is universal" true?]

In connection with this, another question concerns the truth of "Man is universal" and other quite similar [statements] in which an intention is predicated.

7 I prove that they are false:

The subject signifies a genuine nature; therefore, it supposits that nature. The predicate does not predicate a genuine nature, since it also does not signify a genuine nature. Therefore, not a genuine nature is predicated of a genuine nature; therefore, an opposite is predicated of an opposite.

8 Moreover, if man is a species, and species is an intention, then man is an intention. The conclusion is false, and the minor premise is not, so the major premise is false.

9 Moreover, a true predication in the abstract is true per se in the first mode. "Man is a species" is not true per se in the first mode, and both the predicate and the subject are abstract. Therefore, the proposition is false.

10 Argument for the opposite view

Whatever a definition is predicated of, the item defined is predicated of as well. Now 'man' is predicated of many numerically different items[, and "predicated of many numerically different items" is the definition of 'species']. Therefore, man is a species and so a universal.

[Question 11: Are propositions like "Man is universal" per se?]

In connection with this, another question is whether such propositions are per se.

11 It appears that they are:

Whatever a definition is in per se, the item defined is in per se as well. Now 'man' is predicated per se of many numerically different items. Therefore, man is per se a species.

12 Moreover, what is intelligible per se is universal per se. Man is intelligible per se, since man is intelligible through his 'what-it-is', which is identical with man.

13 Moreover, universal belongs to man as abstracted from every accident; therefore, universal does not inhere in man as an accident. The antecedent is evident, since man as conjoined with accidents is singular.

14 An argument for the opposite view:

'Per se' presupposes that it holds of all. Therefore, if man is universal per se, every man is universal. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.

15 To the first question one must say that the universal is in the thing as in its subject, since the universal denominates the thing, not the intellect. But it is in the intellect as in its efficient cause and as cognized object in its cognizer.

16 But one must realize that the significate of a common term signifying a true nature can be considered in three way. First, according to its being in the supposits, which is called its material being; and in this way the common accidents are present in it. In the second way it is considered absolutely according to its quidditative being; and in this way the essential predicates are present in it. In the third way it is considered as it is apprehended by the intellect through an intelligible form. This is its cognized being, and in this way intentions are present in it.

17 For the intellect, considering the one nature of man in many and of many, is moved by some property found in the nature thus considered to cause an intention, and the intellect attributes that caused intention to the nature to which belongs the property from which the intention is taken.

18 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that the argument proceeds from the real accident that is present in the nature according to material being.

19 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the intellect does not contribute any property to the thing by changing the thing, since it is not a factive power. It can, however, contribute some property that implies a relation of the thing to the intellect, especially if [that property] is received from a property of the thing, as the intellect contributes modes of signifying to significant speech. These modes of signifying are in the utterance as in their subject, but they are from the intellect as their efficient cause.

20 As for the third argument, what the Commentator says cannot be understood as meaning that there comes to be one item composed of intellect and the intelligible: if that were the case, then the intellect would be composed of the quiddities of all sensibles. Instead, one must understand this to mean that the intellect in act more truly receives the predication of 'one' with the intelligible in act than does matter with form, since the intellect in act just is the intelligible in act, since the intellect by reflection can understand itself through the species of the intelligible in act. By contrast, matter is not the same as form just because it is in a composite with form.

21 To the second question I say that "Man is universal" is true in the way that has just been explained [viz., the third way of n. 16]. This accident is present in the thing because the definition of the intention is present in the thing in this way.

22 One might object: species is present in man insofar as 'man' is said of many [numerically different particulars]. But it is said of them precisely insofar as it is in them, and this is according to its material being. Therefore, the proposition is true in the first way.

23 To this I say that species is present in many insofar as 'man' is predicated of individuals, speaking of designated predication, not of performed predication: that is, not as it is identical with the supposits, which is the first alternative in the division.

24 To the first argument [in n. 7] I say that 'genuine nature' can be supposited in three ways. This does not mean, however, that the proposition must be distinguished [according to different senses], since diversity of supposition is consistent with unity of subject. But this is more a multiplicity of figure of speech, if there is such a thing. Therefore, the proposition is true without qualification, since insofar as the subject, 'man', supposits a true nature as it is related to the intellect, such an accident, 'species', is in it. For what is multiple according to figure of speech is not genuinely multiple, but only fantastically so. That's why "Socrates is a man" is not distinguished [according to different senses], even though it would be false if 'man' were taken as it is in "Man is a species."

25 To the second argument [in n. 8] I say that "Species is an intention" is false, just like "The white [thing] ⁽¹⁹⁾ is a color,"since 'species' implies denominatively something different from what 'intention' implies in the abstract.

26 One might object that if this is so, then "Species is intentional" is true, and thus it follows that "Man is intentional." -- In reply, it can be said that this is a fallacy of the accident, since 'species' with respect to man is taken as a mode, but with respect to intention it is taken as a what, since everything in its genus is a what.

27 To the third argument [in n. 9] I say that this is not a case of predication in the abstract, since 'species' is concrete and is predicated denominatively of the thing.

28 To the third question one should say that such statements are not per se. That they are not per se in the first mode is evident as follows: in the first mode a definition or a part of the definition is predicated of the item defined. But it is impossible for a thing of second intention to define a thing of first intention, ⁽²⁰⁾ since if that were possible, a thing would, according to its very essence, be in part from nature and in part from the intellect, and thus it would be from diverse non-ordered causes, and so it would not be essentially one. Therefore, it is impossible for any intention to be predicated per se in the first mode of a thing. Nor are they per se in the second mode, since an intention is not caused by the per se principles of the subject. Nor are they per se in the fourth mode, since the thing is not an efficient cause of the intention, but rather the intellect is. Nor are they per se in any mode, since if they were, the nature would be a sufficient cause of such an accident. Therefore, in whatever item that nature would be, that accident would be in it too -- which is false.

29 As for the first argument [in n. 11], I deny the minor premise.

30 One might object that if this is not predicated per se, then it is predicated per accidens. Therefore, "Man is an animal" is per accidens. And this response contravenes the generally accepted use of these terms.

31 In light of this objection I say that 'per se' in the minor premise can qualify either the inherence of the predicate "is predicated of many" or the item that inheres, i.e., the predicate. Taken in the first way, the minor premise is false and the conclusion that follows is false. Taken in the second way, the minor premise is true, but then the conclusion does not follow. Analogously, this is evident in the case of "An accident is a being per se." If 'per se' qualifies the inherence, the statement is true; if it qualifies the item inhering, it is false.

32 The reply to the second argument [n. 12] rests on the same distinction. The minor premise is true if 'per se' qualifies the item inhering, but then the major premise is false.

33 To the third argument [in n 13] I say that universal is present in man as man is abstracted from every real accident consequent on man according to material being, not as man is abstracted from every intentional accident.

[Question 12: Are there exactly five universals?]

The question is whether the number of universals is exactly five.

1 It appears that it is not.

For to be predicated is a property of the universal; so there are as many universals as there are predicates. But in Topics I [4, 101^b24-26] only four predicates are set forth; therefore, etc. By this same argument one could show that there are only three universals, since in that passage species and difference are not listed; therefore, they are not universals. One could also show that there are six, since definition is listed in that passage; therefore, in addition to these five, there will be a sixth universal.

2 Moreover, "in however many ways one opposite is spoken of, the other opposite is spoken of in just that many ways," according to Aristotle in Topics I [15, 106^b14-15]. Universal and singular are opposites. "Singulars are infinite" ⁽²¹⁾; therefore, so are universals.

3 Moreover, individual is universal, since it is predicated of many; and it is not one of the five, as is evident by examining them one by one. Therefore, etc.

4 Moreover, being is universal. And being is not a genus, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics III [3, 998^b21-28], since it is predicated per se of the differentia. Nor is being a species, since if it were, it would have some genus above it. Nor is it any of the other three universals, since they are predicated in quale, whereas being is predicated in quid of everything, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [2, 1003^b5-10].

5 The argument for the opposite is given by Porphyry.

One must say that there are exactly five universals. But this view is put forward in different ways.

6 One approach understands the adequacy of these five in the following way. Universal signifies either substance or accident. If it signifies substance, it signifies either the whole or a part. If it signifies a part, it signifies either the material part, and so it is the genus, or the formal part, and so it is the difference. If it signifies the whole substance, then it is the species, since "the species expresses the whole being of the individuals." ⁽²²⁾ If it signifies an accident, then it signifies either a convertible accident, and so it is the property, or a non-convertible accident, and so it is the fifth universal. Therefore, since it is not possible to signify anything that can be said of many otherwise than in one of these ways, there are no universals other than these five.

7 Objections to this approach: Since universals are second intentions, they are accidental to things of first intention. But nothing is distinguished per se according to that to which it is accidental, and so intentions are not distinguished per se according to things. But the logician treats intentions per se. Therefore, this division is not appropriate for logic.

8 Moreover, all universals are found in the genus of accident. Therefore, the dichotomy between signifying substance and signifying accident is not a proper distinction to make.

9 That's why there is another defense of their adequacy based on "being ordered." The claim ⁽²³⁾ is that this book is ordered immediately to the Categories, where the topic is what can be ordered in a genus. So here Porphyry is speaking of universals insofar as they can be ordered in a genus. And thus the adequacy of the five predicables is established as follows. There can be an internal ordering of things that are in the same genus or an ordering of things that are in one genus to things that are in another. Within a single genus there can be a direct order according to 'above' and 'below', and thus there are two universals, namely genus and species; or an indirect order, and thus there is the difference above the species indirectly and below the genus. But there is also an ordering of accidents -- either of convertible or of non-convertible accidents -- to substances, and in accordance with this ordering there are the other two universals.

10 Objections to this approach: Insofar as items can be ordered in a genus according to 'above' and 'below', they can serve as predicates and subjects. So really this view is treating the five universals insofar as they can serve as predicates and subjects.

11 Moreover, each item in this argument is defined by 'to be predicated' or something equivalent to that.

12 Moreover, if the discrepancy between this book and the Topics is to be accounted for in this way, ⁽²⁴⁾ then difference ought to be listed in the Topics rather than here, since the difference has the character of what can be predicated more than of what can be ordered.

13 Moreover, an individual can be ordered per se in a genus. Therefore, even though an individual does not properly serve as a predicate, it would still have to be put forward here as a sixth universal, since according to those who make this argument, this book is not about universals insofar as they can serve as predicates.

14 Moreover, just as accidents have an order to their subject, which is a substance or another accident, so too does a subject have an order to an accident. Therefore, two universals can be derived from the subject in accordance with its twofold ordering to the accident, just as two universals can be derived from the accident.

15 On account of these three [!] arguments, this approach should be rejected. One should say instead that the adequacy of the five predicables is established on the basis of "to be predicated" as follows. To be predicated is divided into 'in quid' and 'in quale' as into per se differences, since these are the primary modes of predication. To be predicated in quid is to for the essence to be predicated of the subject in the mode of an essence, i.e., in the mode of something subsisting, not in the mode of something denominating. But this happens in two ways. First, one might predicate the whole essence of the subject, and in this way we have the species. For if something were in the essence of an individual apart from the essence of the species, two individuals [of the same species] would differ essentially; and on the basis of the differences derived from this extra something in this individual and that one, a species could be divided formally and an individual could be defined, which is absurd. Second, one might predicate part of the essence of the subject, and in this way we have the genus. For if the genus expressed the whole essence of the species, it would be sufficient to define the species, and the difference would be superfluous.

16 To be predicated in quale is to be predicated in the mode of something denominating, which happens in two ways. The first is that something predicates the essence of the subject in the mode of something denominating; in that case it is predicated in quale substantiale, and in this way we have the difference. "For the difference is a quality of a substance," according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [9, 1018^a13-17]. The second is that something predicates an accident in the mode of something denominating; in that case it is predicated in quale accidentale. [This sort of predication in turn happens in two ways.] Either it predicates a convertible accident that issues from the principles of the subject, and in this way we have the property; or it predicates a common accident, and in this way we have the last universal. Porphyry explains how he understands this accident in the course of making the distinctions by which he explains his definition of genus. ⁽²⁵⁾

17 Therefore, since "to be predicated of many" happens only in these five ways, which are the per se divisions of "to be predicated of many," which is the formula of universal itself, it follows that universal is divided into exactly these five. And this division appears to be appropriate, since it divides the formula of the genus [viz., universal] by per se differences. And from this division is evident not only the adequacy of these five universals but also their order and the explanation for their order as given by Porphyry in his treatment of them.

18 One might object to this approach as follows. If Porphyry is treating these five insofar as they can be predicated, and Aristotle speaks of them in the same way in Topics I, then it appears that there is no way to resolve the discrepancy between the two treatments. -- But the answer to this objection will become clear in the course of replying to the preliminary arguments.

19 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that in Topics I Aristotle distinguishes predicates on the basis of whether they predicate the essence or not, or convertibly or not. Distinguished in this way, there are no predicates other than the four he puts forward there. In Porphyry's book, by contrast, even though universals are considered on the basis of "to be predicated," they are not considered with respect to the same thing as in Aristotle. After all, only one of the five is predicated convertibly; three predicate the essence non-convertibly, but [they are distinguished] on the basis of their being predicated in quid or in quale, as was said above [in n. 15]. He doesn't mention the difference there because, as had been said there, ⁽²⁶⁾ the difference is reduced to the genus. For it predicates the essence of the subject non-convertibly. That's why in Topics IV [5, 127^b37-128^a30], where he explains how to construct and deconstruct the genus, he explans this also for difference. There is also an ultimate specific difference that is converted with the species, which is predicated of it reciprocally, which is to be reduced to the definition. And perhaps on account of this diversity of diferentias he did not mention the differentia in connection with any one predicate.

He doesn't list the definition there because it does not have some one mode of being predicated in quid or in quale. He doesn't list the species there because it is either reduced to the definition, since the definition is a property of the species, or rather to the genus, since it is predicated essentially and non-convertibly of what it is predicated of. And that is why in Topics IV [3, 123^b1] there are considerations of constructing and deconstructing puzzles concercning species just like genus. Alternatively, species is not a predicate of a dialectical proposition, since it is common only with respect to the singular. For in Topics I [11, 105^a3-4] Aristotle excludes from the consideration of dialectic those things that are evident to the sense: "it is not appropriate for it to treat just any proposition, but only that which an ignorant person is unsure of -- someone who needs argument, not punishment or sense." Now the least common is species, and so it is more appropriately the subject rather than the predicate in a dialectical proposition.

20 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the sense of that proposition is this: "However many significates there are of one opposite, there are that many significates of the other opposite," assuming that one is the opposite of the other according to every signification -- not that however many supposits there are of one opposite, there are that many supposits of the other. So this proposition is irrelevant to the question at hand.

21 To the third argument [in n. 3] I say that the intention individual is a species. I explained above in question 8 [qq. 7-8, nn. 6-8, 17-23] how one intention is predicated of another.

22 To the fourth argument [in n. 4] I say that being is equivocal; therefore, it is not predicated [praedicatur], that is, "said before another" [prae alio dicitur]. For what is prior to another is univocal. Therefore, being is not a universal.

23 One might object that being is univocal if taken as the genus of substance. Therefore, being is a universal, and it is not one of these five, as was argued above [in n. 4].

24 The thing to say is that it is still equivocal with respect to three items. For it is impossible for something univocal to be predicated per se in the first mode of species and differentias, or of one differentia and another opposed differentia, through a superior differentia that is predicated univocally -- since if this were possible, there would be species of the species of which there are differences, which is impossible. Therefore, being in substance is equivocal as it is said of species in a genus and of the differentias, on the one hand, and [as it is said] of opposed differentias[, on the other]. This is why Avicenna ⁽²⁷⁾ concludes that there are three primary beings in each genus but not that there are three predicates, since the two hierarchies of differences in every genus are reduced to the hierarchy of species.

1. Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] I.10 (CSEL 48: 162).

2. Aristotle, Categories 5, 2^b29-31.

3. Actually Avicenna, Metaph. I tr. 1 c. 2.

4. Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] I.11 (CSEL 48:166), says something a bit like this, but Themistius, De an. I (CLCAG I:8-9), is much closer.

5. Averroes, De an. I com. 8.

6. Aristotle, De interpretatione I.7, 17^a39-40.

7. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De proprio'.

8. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere'.

9. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.2, 1027^a20-26. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 6, q. 2.

10. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.15, 1039^b27-1040^a5.

11. That of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 2 c. 9.

12. Ibid.

13. This is an almost verbatim echo of the definition given in Euclid's Elements VII def. 2.

14. Reading "Propter hoc et rationem supra positam" with D and R, against the critical edition's "Propter hoc ad rationem suppositam."

15. All the manuscripts read 'sibi', 'itself', which under normal circumstances should refer to "intention of genus." I take it that circumstances are never quite normal when Scotus is writing Latin, and surely 'sibi' stands for "universal." Thus the claim is that universal is a genus with respect to the five predicables.

16. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Praed qq. 37-38, n. 43.

17. See q. 3, n. 13.

18. Cf. John Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 9, q. 14, n. 111.

19. The Latin term, album, unambiguously denominates something concrete - the white [thing] - as opposed to whiteness, albedo, in the abstract.

20. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 5, q. 4, n. 27.

21. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De specie'.

22. Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus I.4.

23. Cf. Anonymous, Porph. q. 8 (cod. Berolin. SB lat. f. 624, f. 5rb.

24. The text given in the critical edition is "si non datur diversitas inter hunc librum et librum Topicorum," but I cannot figure out how to make sense of that reading. My conjecture in the text represents a plausible reading of some of the numerous variants.

25. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De differentia'.

26. Aristotle, Topics I.3, 101^b18-19.

27. Avicenna, Logica pars I c. 8.