Concerning the definition "genus is what is predicated of many [things that differ in species]," ⁽¹⁾ the first question is what is being defined here: an intention, or not?

1 It appears that it is not an intention:

For since an intention is an accident, it is not predicated in quid of a thing. But what is being defined here is predicated in quid of a thing. Therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, an intention is not predicated in quid except of this intention and that intention, which are only numerically different because they are only materially different; but a difference in species is a formal difference. But what is defined here is predicated in quid of many specifically different items; therefore, etc. The assumption is evident, since the intention of genus in animal and in color differs only in virtue of that to which it is applied accidentally.

3 Moreover, if the intention of genus is being defined here, then by parity of reasoning the intention of species is being defined a bit later on. So since these are disparate intentions, and a disparate item is not predicated of another disparate item, it follows that genus, as Porphyry is speaking of genus in this book, is not predicated of species. But Porphyry says just the opposite in the chapter "On species." ⁽²⁾

4 Moreover, in expounding the definition, Porphyry uses animal and man as an example. ⁽³⁾ Therefore, he understood the definition to apply to them; otherwise, the example would have been beside the point.

5 Argument for the opposite view:

The logician ought to define only what he considers per se, which is intention. Therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, since what is defined by someone is known by him in accordance with its what-it-is, and thus is known by him per se. Proof of the minor premise: What is primarily considered by the logician is something common that has one sense [intellectum], since a being per accidens is not knowable. Therefore, either that something common is a thing -- in which case, logic will be called a real science on the basis of what it primarily considers -- or else it is an intention, which is what we are claiming.

6 One reply to the question ⁽⁴⁾ is that what is defined here is a thing as falling under an intention, since that is how a thing is considered by the logician. And thus the replies to the arguments for both sides are evident.

7 An objection against this view: What is defined here applies [convenit] univocally to things of all genera, such as animal, color, figure, and so forth, since it applies to them according to the same name and the same definition. But it is impossible for any thing, in whatever way it is under an intention, to apply univocally to things of all genera. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: A thing cannot be signified by an more common name than 'being'. Therefore, if any thing-under-an-intention were univocal to all [things], then being under the intention of genus could be univocal to them, and thus there would be only one genus of things.

8 One view ⁽⁵⁾ is that the thing that is defined is not univocal but merely has a unity of proportion. Nonetheless, the mode under which the thing is defined is univocal with respect to diverse genera.

9 An objection: If what is defined here is a thing under an intention, it is a thing per accidens, since it is [a thing defined] on the basis of the fact that the intention accrues to [accidit] it. But "everything per accidens is reduced to something per se" ⁽⁶⁾ on the basis of which the other is spoken of per accidens. Therefore, since the thing is defined here only on the basis of the intention, it follows that what is defined per se is the intention.

10 Moreover, if the thing is defined per accidens because it is defined under an intention that is accidental to it, it follows that the thing is not defined at all, since a definition applies per se to the thing defined.

11 One should say, given the arguments made thus far, that a thing is not defined in any way. Neither is the aggregate [of thing and intention], since that is a being per accidens, and according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI [2, 1027^a22-26] and VII [5-6, 1031^a1-31] there is no definition of a being per accidens. Nor is a thing under an intention, since that will be either an aggregate, a thing, or an intention. What is defined is the intention alone. For what is defined is nothing other than that in which the definition is present per se in the first mode. And that is the intention alone, since the features put forward in the definition are intentional features, namely, "to be predicated of many" and so forth, which cannot hold of anything in the first mode other than an intention. Therefore, etc. Even so, an intention ⁽⁷⁾ can be signified either in the concrete or in the abstract. The name 'genus' signifies an intention in the first way -- properly, and qua intention -- since it is qua intention that genus is applicable to a thing. Therefore, genus is defined here in accordance with the way the name 'genus' signifies, that is, qua intention. By contrast, genus is to be defined by the metaphysician qua 'what it is'. ⁽⁸⁾

12 In order to deal with the arguments one needs to know that since "to be predicated" is an intention, it is per se of intentions but per accidens of things, whereas "being" is per se of a thing. One also needs to know that 'being' in things of first intention performs what 'to be predicated' designates in second intentions. From these two points follows a third: concrete nouns of second imposition with respect to 'to be predicated' supposit for their foundations or subjects with respect to being. From this it follows that an inference from designated predication to performed predication (in other words, from designated predication to being) does not hold per se in the same terms; but the inference from 'predicated per se' in intentions to being in the foundations is valid: for example: "A genus is predicated of the species; therefore, man is an animal." For in this what is designated in the first intention is performed in the second intention. The difference between a designated and a performed act is evident in many cases. For example: negation is performed by 'not' and designated by 'I deny'; an exclusion is performed by 'only' and designated by 'I exclude' (and the same for 'apart from' and 'I have excepted'). So this is how an argument ought to go: 'From the negation of the superior follows the negation of the inferior; therefore, if it is not an animal, it is not a man." In this argument what was first designated by 'follows' is then performed; 'not' performs what 'negation' signifies. The foundations, namely animal and man, are put in place of the intentions 'superior' and 'inferior'.

13 One might object to this as follows: 'Animal is predicated of man; therefore, man is an animal' is a valid inference in the same terms.

14 I say that the consequent can be true, but not because of the antecedent. It is, after all, quite clear that the consequent is per se and the antecedent per accidens. Now the more true does not have its truth from the less true. Therefore, the inference is not valid.

15 Alternatively, one could say that there are not the same terms in the antecedent and in the consequent, since in the antecedent the terms are understood as designated items are informed by intentions that can be predicated of them per se, whereas in the consequent they are substituted for items designated absolutely, to which those intentions are extraneous. And thus they are not the same terms, since such diversity is sufficient for a fallacy of the accident. ⁽⁹⁾ Therefore, it is also sufficient to diversify the terms, since the term that is varied in a fallacy of the accident is in fact two terms.

16 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that an intention is not the 'what' of a thing. Nonetheless, it is predicated in quid of a thing in such a way that 'in quid' qualifies the inhering item and not the inherence, ⁽¹⁰⁾ since 'to be predicated in quid' is an accident, since it is an intention, as the item defined is also.

17 I reply to the second argument [in n. 2] on the same basis: this intention 'genus' is not the 'what' of anything other than items differing in number. Nonetheless, it is predicated of items differing in species.

18 I reply to the third argument [in n. 3] on the same basis: genus is predicated of species even though the intentions are disparate; nonetheless, it is not the case that one of them just is the other.

19 To the fourth argument [in n. 4] I say that the same item that is designated by a definition in intentions is performed in things. And so Porphyry uses things as an example because they are more evident, not because they are what he was defining.

[Question 15: Is genus defined appropriately?]

The question is whether genus is defined appropriately.

1 It appears that it is not:

For every accident is defined through a substance, since substance precedes every accident, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [1, 1028^a32-34]. But nothing is put forward in this definition that pertains to substance. Therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, a concrete item is not defined; therefore, etc. The proof of the antecedent is drawn from Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [6, 1031^b19-30]: in what is said according to an accident, 'what it is' is not the same as that of which it is. He gives the example of "The musical is white." But whatever items are defined properly have a 'what it is' identical with themselves; therefore, etc.

3 Moreover, there is a proof from reason. What is defined is in a genus. But a concrete item is not in a genus, according to Aristotle in Topics III [1, 116^a21-24], where he says one ought to prefer "what is in a genus to what is not, as justice rather than what is just."

4 Moreover, definition is only of a species. Genus is not a species. Therefore, etc.

5 Moreover, this definition does not state genus and difference, which are required for a correct definition according to Aristotle in Topics VI [4, 141^b24-28].

6 Moreover, according to Aristotle in Topics VI [4, 141^a27-28], "a definition is given for the sake of knowing [the defined item]," and so it should be given on the basis of what is prior and better-known. Species is not like this, since it is either posterior to genus or simultaneous by nature, and so it is not prior or better-known.

7 Moreover, it is redundant to say 'several things differing'. I prove this as follows: 'differing' per se includes manyness as a species includes its genus. This is evident from Aristotle in Metaphysics V [9, 1018^a12-15] and X [4, 1055^a3-16]. Therefore, 'differing' taken concretely includes many. Therefore, to say 'many things differing' is redundant. And in this definition 'several' is used with the sense 'many'; or, if it used comparatively, it still signifies the same.

8 One reply to this argument ⁽¹¹⁾ is to say that redundancy involves placing an inferior before a superior of the same part of speech, not vice versa, since if the superior is put before the inferior, the inferior then gives the species of the superior.

9 Arguments against this reply:

In Topics VI [3, 141^a15-18], where he teaches the demolition of definitions on account of redundancy, Aristotle says this: "Again, if someone has added the particular when the universal has already been said," read: there is redundancy; "for example, if the just is said to be expedient, since the just is contained in the expedient" as the inferior in the superior. "Therefore, the just is excessive," that is, superfluous, in the definition, given that 'expedient' has already appeared in it. ⁽¹²⁾

Moreover, in the chapter of Metaphysics VII on the unity of definition, Aristotle says that there is redundancy in putting the superior difference before the inferior, as in "An animal having feet that is bipedal." Two proofs of this claim are given in that chapter:

One is based on the per se mode of knowing redundancy, which is to replace names with definitions. "For he had said nothing other than 'An animal having feet, having two feet'." ⁽¹³⁾

11 The same claim is also proved there through transposition: "Now it will be clear if someone transposes such definitions," and says, "a bipedal animal that has feet; for once 'bipedal' has been said, it is superfluous to say 'having feet'." ⁽¹⁴⁾ Therefore, the first formulation was a redundancy.

If these two techniques -- replacing names with definitions, and transposition -- are valid, they refute the aforementioned reply [in n. 8] in this case and in all others.

12 The argument for the opposite view is taken from Porphyry, as well as from Aristotle, who gives a similar definition of genus in Topics I [5, 102^a31-32].

13 One answer ⁽¹⁵⁾ to the question is that this is a description, not a genuine definition. And this is hinted at in the text where it says "and describing this." ⁽¹⁶⁾

14 But one could easily evade the question in this way for just about any definition. And that bit of text doesn't help, since the text also says "they assigned" -- in other words, they defined.

15 Moreover, further down in the chapter "On species," Porphyry says, "One must use the formula [ratio] of each in the definition of each." Now the formula that the name signifies is the definition. ⁽¹⁷⁾

16 Moreover, this formula is convertible with the item defined, as Porphyry proves; and it is not predicated of it as an accident, since the features put forward in this formula are of the same genus as the definition, since they are intentions. Now whatever in a given genus is predicated per se of another item in that genus is superior to that other item, since it is neither inferior nor disparate. Therefore, this formula is the definition.

17 Moreover, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [4, 1029^b12-22], a formula that is [composed] of items predicated per se in whose definition the subject does not appear, if it is convertible with the subject, is a definition. The definition now under discussion is like this, since the item defined does not appear in the definition of any of the components of the definition.

18 Moreover, it is predicated per se and convertibly. And it is not predicated as property, since if it were, this formula as a whole could itself be defined. Nor is it predicated as ultimate difference, since if it were, one would have to add the genus to it. But if one were to add 'universal', which is the genus of the item defined in this definition, there would be a redundancy. Therefore, this is a definition.

19 In answer to this question one should say that this is a genuine definition. That is shown in the following way: The formula of universal is "to be predicated of many," according to Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17^a39-^b1]. So "to be predicated of many" in the definition of genus states its genus. After that comes "items differing in species" and "in quid," which are per se differentias of the genus. Here is the proof: They divide per se the superior, i.e., "to be predicated of many"; therefore, they constitute per se the inferior to which the superior is appropriated through them. For "to be predicated of many" is divided per se into "items differing in species" and "items differing in number," since nothing is predicated per se of items differing in genus as such. It is also divided into 'in quid' and 'in quale' as through the primary modes of predicating. And it is evident that through these differences that divide ["to be predicated of many"], universal is contracted into genus, since a convertible formula is made in that way. Therefore, etc.

20 One reply ⁽¹⁸⁾ to the first argument [in n. 1] is that this is true of conjoined accidents, that is, those that determine their subjects -- they are called 'conjoined' in Metaphysics VII [5, 1030^b14-20]. Intentions, by contrast, do not determine a thing of any particular genus, since they are applied univocally to all.

21 Objections to this reply:

If a passion is univocal, so too is its subject, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I. ⁽¹⁹⁾ So if an intention is univocal in many genera, its subject will be too.

22 Moreover, if an actuality is univocal, so too is the potentiality [that corresponds to it], since potentiality is ordered per se to actuality. The subject is in potentiality to an accident in the way that matter is to form, since an accident has no matter other than matter 'in which'.

23 It can be said that Aristotle's claim [in n. 21] is true of a real passion that proceeds from the principles of its subject, which is what Aristotle is talking about in that passage -- in other words, one that can be demonstrated of its subject. But an intention, which is from the intellect as efficient cause, is not like that.

24 On the basis of this one can reply to the other objection [in n. 22] that this is true of a potentiality that is ordered per se to actuality. But the potentiality in the subject of an intention with respect to the intention itself is not like this, since an intention is not in a thing by nature but only as it is considered by reason.

25 Another objection: if there is no unity in this thing and that one, and this intention is univocal to them both, then the intention is not received from anything that is in this thing and that one. Therefore, it is fictive.

26 One reply ⁽²⁰⁾ is that some unity in the thing is sufficient, namely, unity of proportion, by which the intellect is moved to attribute this univocal intention to this item and to that. For color is related to whiteness in the same way that animal is to man.

27 An objection to this reply: the unity of univocation is great than unity of proportion, so the latter is not derived from the former.

28 It can be said that a lesser unity can be an occasion for receiving the greater unity, just not the total cause. So the unity in the thing is merely an occasion for the unity in the intention insofar as the intellect is moved by it. Nevertheless, the intellect, once moved, can cause the greater unity in the intention.

29 Alternatively, it could be conceded that it has a univocal subject, since although one and the same thing is not in diverse genera, one and the same thing as considered by reason can be in diverse genera, and it is only in this way that it is the subject of an intention.

30 Alternatively, it could be said in reply to the [first] preliminary argument [in n. 1] that it is true of accidents that have their being from the subject, since the only reason something is defined through substance is that it is through the substance. For the 'what it is' and the definition of anything in reality corresponds to the being of that thing. An intention, by contrast, does not have its being through its subject; rather, it has being from the intellect.

31 To the second preliminary argument [in n. 2] I say that a concrete item can be defined. I say that where Aristotle says otherwise, in Metaphysics VII [6, 1031^a19-21], what he is calling 'items said per accidens' are those that aggregate in themselves diverse natures -- for example, a white man. After all, he offers that example at the beginning of the chapter where he says "in things said according to an accident, for example, a white man." Therefore, everything said after that should be understood accordingly. So he says "The musical" for "The musical man." For 'musical' signifies in two ways.

32 To the next argument [in n. 3], from the Topics, it can be said that the just is not in the genus of virtue, so it does not make the one who has it good, as justice does. Nonetheless, it is in a predicable genus.

33 Alternatively: the most general genera of accidents are abstract, and the only items in them per se are abstracta, that is, items that receive such predication per se. Nonetheless, their respective concreta are per se in a genus with respect to each other, since they are related to each other as superior and inferior: and that is enough for them to be defined. But speaking without qualification, conreta are in a genus only through reduction, since the only reason they are in any category is that a hierarchy of concreta is reduced to a hierarchy of abstracta.

34 To the third preliminary argument [in n. 4] I say that genus is a species, as was said above in question 8. ⁽²¹⁾

35 The reply to the fourth argument [in n. 5] is evident through what was said in the resolution of the question [in n. 19], since the definition of genus states the genus and along with it the per se difference.

36 To the fifth argument [in n. 6] I say that an absolute can be known in itself through essential [features] and better-known items, and so other items should not be included in its definition. But something that depends per se -- in virtue of what it is -- on another cannot be known apart from that other, as is said in the Categories [7, 8^a35-37] concerning relatives. And that is why the correlative is included [in the definition]: not as something better-known, but because without it, the item defined cannot be known.

37 To the sixth argument [in n. 7] I say that 'differing in species' is exposition. It is not put forward in the definition as diverse parts of 'several', that is, as meaning that they are several because they differ in species.

[Question 16: Is 'Man is animal' true?]

Concerning the phrase "genus is predicated of species," the question is whether a genus is predicated of a species by a performed predication in the foundations of those intentions, so that 'Man is animal', and other such statements, are true.

1 It seems that they are not:

For a part is not predicated of the whole, according to Aristotle in Topics IV [5, 126^a27-29]. That's why he claims that it is a mistake to say a part is the genus. The genus is a part of the species, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [25, 1023^b24-25], in the chapter "On the whole." And here is the proof: what is a part of the definition is a part of the item defined; the genus is a part of the definition; therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, matter is not predicated of the item whose matter it is; genus is the matter of a species; therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, since matter is per se in potentiality to that whose matter it is. The composite is a being in actuality. The minor premise is proved on the basis of what Porphyry says in this chapter: "Genus is a principle of species." And so he says that this fits with the second signification. ⁽²²⁾ Now it is not a formal principle, since it does not distinguish one species from others, whereas a form does distinguish them. Neither is it an efficient principle, since it does not make the species to be in actuality. Neither is it an end, since the species is not on account of the genus, since the genus is more imperfect than the species. Therefore, it is a material principle. The same conclusion is evident on the basis of what Porphyry says in the chapter "On difference," ⁽²³⁾ where he argues for the second definition of difference on the basis of the claim that the difference has a likeness to form and the genus to matter.

3 One reply to this second argument is that genus is not matter but form, since according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [25, 1023^b17-25], all the parts of a definition are like forms. ⁽²⁴⁾ As for the claim that "a form distinguishes," that is true of the ultimate and completive form ⁽²⁵⁾; but a genus is not that sort of form.

4 And to the second dictum from Porphyry they ⁽²⁶⁾ say that it does not mean that the genus is matter, but that it is similar to matter in that it is determinate.

5 An objection to this view: Form is not predicated of the composite, just as it is not predicated of the matter, since form is incompatible with the composite by reason of the matter, by reason of which the composite is in potentiality.

6 By way of reply to this objection, it is said that form is twofold. There is form that is one of the two parts of the composite, and there is also form that is consequent to the composite. An example of the first is the soul; this sort of form is not predicated of the composite. An example of the second is humanity, which results from the composition of matter with form. The genus is this sort of form, and it is predicated of the composite.

7 An objection to this reply: The second sort of form is predicated of the composite only in the concrete. After all, "Man is humanity" is false. But in this way -- that is, in the concrete -- matter too can be predicated of the composite. Therefore, the first response, which denies that genus is matter and concedes that it is form, does not help salvage the claim that the genus is predicated of the species.

8 For this reason an alternative argument is given ⁽²⁷⁾ in response to both preliminary arguments. The claim is that a part, or matter in the abstract, is not predicated of the whole; but it can be predicated in the concrete of the whole, and in this way it is signified by the genus.

9 An objection: Every concrete term is denominative. Therefore, if the genus is predicated in the concrete of the species, it will be predicated denominatively. Proof of the first proposition: "'Denominatives' is the name given to terms that derive their name from another, with only a difference in case" ⁽²⁸⁾; all concrete terms are of this sort with respect to their abstract counterparts. The consequent is false, since a genus is predicated univocally of the species, and so it is not predicated denominatively, since those are disparate modes of predication. And the same conclusion is demonstrated in a similar way at the beginning of Topics II [2, 109^b4-7]

10 Moreover, every concrete term signifies a form as it inheres in a subject. No substance is in a subject, according to Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter "On substance." ⁽²⁹⁾ Therefore, nothing signifying a substance is concrete.

11 Alternatively, another response ⁽³⁰⁾ is that real matter or a real part is not predicated of the whole, whereas rational matter or a rational part is, and that's the sort of item the genus is.

12 An objection to this response: In Metaphysics VII [10, 1034^b20-24], Aristotle says, "As reason is to the thing, so are the rational parts to the parts of the thing." Therefore, by permutation, as the parts of the thing are to the thing, so are the rational parts to reason. But the parts of the thing, according to this view, are not predicated of the whole; therefore, neither are the rational parts.

13 Another response ⁽³¹⁾ follows Boethius ⁽³²⁾ in saying that in a definition the genus is a part, but in predication it is a whole.

14 An objection to this response: Insofar as the genus is included in the definition of the species, it is predicated of the species per se in the first mode, since the first mode is when [sic] a part of the definition, or the definition itself, is predicated of the item defined. Therefore, it is under the same notion both as it occurs in the definition and as it is predicated.

15 Moreover, whether in definition or in predication, it is either univocal or equivocal. If equivocal, then it is not the genus or an item in the definition. If univocal, then it signifies the same in both uses, and so it is a part either in both uses or in neither.

16 A further argument with respect to the principal question: The inference "Man is animal; therefore, humanity is animality" is valid; the consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. Proof of the inference: When there is per se predication in the antecedent, then the inference from concretes to abstracts is valid, since if the predicatio] is per se, then there is truth in the concretes by reason of the essence signified, not by reason of what is concreted. For in a predication that is per se in the first mode, the predicate predicates the subject's essence; but the essence abstracted from what is concreted is properly signified by an abstract [term]; therefore, [such a predication] is true in the abstract.

17 Moreover, this is made clear by way of examples. For although the inference "The musical is white; therefore, music is whiteness" is not valid, the inference "The white is colored per se in the first mode; therefore, whiteness is a color" is valid, since in virtue of the terms' mode of signifying, the same item is put forward in the consequent as is expressed per se in the antecedent. Proof of the falsity of the consequent: If humanity is animality, then by parity of reasoning humanity is rationality, since 'rational' is predicated per se of man just as much as 'animal' is. And from these two it follows in the third figure "therefore rationality is animality," which is false. Therefore, so is the major premise, since the minor premise follows from the major. Moreover, if the minor premise is false, it follows that the major premise is also false, since the argument is parallel in both cases.

18 Here is my proof that that conclusion is false. Every true predication in the abstract is per se in the first mode. ⁽³³⁾ "Rationality is animality" is not per se, since a genus is not predicated per se of the difference, according to Aristotle in Topics VI [6, 144^a29-31] and Metaphysics III [3, 998^b24-26]; therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: In Metaphysics VII [12, 1038^a9-15], where Aristotle sets out to show that a superior difference is included in the intelligible content [intellectu] of an inferior, he shows this on the basis of the claim that "clovenness of the foot is a sort of footedness" -- because, that is, it is a true predication in the abstract in which a superior difference is predicated of an inferior. ⁽³⁴⁾ But what is included in the intelligible content of another item is predicated of that item per se in the first mode.

19 Moreover, this is proved by argument: Abstracts signify an essence in and of themselves. Therefore, if one abstract term is truly said of another with the verb 'is', then this essence is that essence, and so the predicate is predicated essentially of the subject, since it is predicated per se in the first mode.

20 Moreover, another argument with respect to the principal question can be made on the basis of common middle terms. For where the genus is the predicate, the proposition is false. Likewise where the species is the predicate, since the subject and predicate are understood under opposed notions; therefore, the proposition is false. The inference is evident, since "Whiteness is white" is false for precisely that reason.

21 Moreover, as the affirmation of ass is to the affirmation of animal, so is the negation of ass to the negation of animal. But the inference "Man is an ass; therefore, man is an animal" is valid, since the opposite of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent. Therefore, the inference "Man is not an ass; therefore, man is not an animal" is valid. The antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent.

22 Proof of the first proposition [i.e., the major premise of n. 21] from Posterior Analytics I [13, 78^b21-22]: If an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, the negation is the cause of a negation. Moreover, this is proved by argument: As the affirmation of ass is to its negation, so is the affirmation of animal to its negation. Therefore, by permutation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth. That this form of argument is a good one is evident from Aristotle in Prior Analytics II [22, 67^b28-29, 68^a4-5] in the chapter "Since, however, the extremes are exchanged." There he lays down two rules that manifestly contain this form of argument. Plus, he uses this form of argument in De interpretatione II [14, 23^a27-28], near the end, in order to answer the question beginning "Are contraries."

23 Moreover, what is predicated of man is either the 'animal' that is the same as man or the 'animal' that is other than man. If the same, then the same is predicated of itself; if other, then that other could not be predicated.

24 Moreover, if man is animal, then the whole nature of animal is in man, since otherwise man would be animal only secundum quid. But a whole is that outside of which there is nothing, according to Aristotle in Physics III [6, 207^a8-10]. Therefore, outside of man there is nothing of the nature of animal. Therefore, ass is not animal.

25 Moreover, if man is animal and animal is a genus, it follows that man is a genus.

26 One approach ⁽³⁵⁾ is to say that here there is a fallacy of the accident on account of a variation of the middle terms, since as animal is predicated of man it is understood according to its being in the supposits, or [in other words] its quidditative being; by contrast, as the intention [of genus] applies to it, it is understood according to the being that it has as it is compared to the intellect. These make for a shift [extraneitas] in the term.

27 An objection to this approach: Everything that is predicated properly is predicated under the notion of some universal. Therefore, if 'animal' is predicated properly in "Man is animal," it is predicated under the notion of some universal. Now it is not predicated under any notion other than that of genus. Therefore, that notion is not extraneous to animal as it is understood in "Man is animal."

28 One argument focus specially on the species: What is incorruptible is not predicated of the corruptible. The individual is corruptible, whereas according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [10, 1035^b4-31; 15, 1039^b20-1040^a5] the species is incorruptible. Therefore, etc.

29 An argument for the opposite is drawn from Porphyry in the chapter "On species," ⁽³⁶⁾ where he says that "all superiors are predicated of inferiors." And after giving the aforementioned definition, he gives the following example: "Animal is predicated of man, therefore of any given man."

30 Moreover, according to Aristotle in the Categories [5, 3^a17-20], secondary substances are predicated of primary substances. He proves this on the grounds that animal is predicated of man, and therefore also of any given man.

31 Moreover, the first mode of per se predication is when the definition or a part of the definition is predicated of the defined item. Therefore, "Man is animal" is per se in the first mode. Therefore, it is necessary. Therefore, it is true. The inferences are clear from Posterior Analytics I [4, 73^a34-38], and likewise the first antecedent.

32 Moreover, the inference "A man runs; therefore, an animal runs" is valid, as is said in the Categories [5, 2^b31-3^a6] before Aristotle states the properties of substance. And it is proved by argument. For the opposite of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent. Now every enthymematic inference is valid in virtue of some necessary middle by which it can be reduced to a syllogism. That middle in the present case is "Man is animal." Therefore, that is necessary, since every good inference is necessary. That a middle is necessary for the inference in the present case is evident from what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics [I.6, 6, 74^b26], and an inference is never valid except in virtue of the necessity of the middle. Therefore, in every enthymematic inference the middle must be necessary.

33 The same conclusion is proved on the basis of what Aristotle says in Prior Analytics I [1, 24^b22-24]: only a syllogism requires nothing additional in order to be necessary. Therefore, an enthymeme requires something additional.

34 Moreover, [the same conclusion follows from what is said in] Prior Analytics I [23, 40^b30-37] and Posterior Analytics I [3, 73^a6-11], where Aristotle says that nothing follows from one [premise]. That is, nothing follows sufficiently, unless another [premise] is supplied.

35 To this question one should say that a predication in which a superior is predicated of an inferior is universally true.

36 In order to resolve the first argument [in n. 1], note that a genus is taken from something material ⁽³⁷⁾ in a species and primarily implies that [something material] in virtue of its determinate intelligible content. Nonetheless, the genus does not signify that [something material] through the mode of a part but through the mode of a whole, and therefore it implies the whole consequently. In the same way, the difference primarily signifies something formal of the species from which it is taken, but it signifies the whole consequently, since it implies that something formal through the mode of a whole. For if both genus and difference primarily implied the same item, it would be impossible to avoid a redundancy in the definition, since if one replaced the names with definitions, ⁽³⁸⁾ the very same item (which would belong to the intelligible content of both) would be stated twice over. And if one or the other had its signification through the mode of a part, the predication that predicated it [of the species] would be false because of the incompatible mode.

37 Therefore, in reply to the first and second argument [in nn. 1-2] it can be said that matter or a part understood through the mode of a part is not predicated truly of the whole; nonetheless, understood through the mode of a whole, it can be predicated truly, as Avicenna ⁽³⁹⁾ shows through his example of 'handed' and 'headed', which signify diverse items. They primarily signify hand and head, but both consequently signify the whole because they signify the part through the mode of a whole. For example, 'handed' is expounded by 'having a hand', where 'having' does not belong to the significate of 'handed' but to its mode of signifying through the mode of the whole. For having-a-hand is not of a part but of a whole. In this way 'animal' is expounded by 'having sense' and 'rational' as 'having intellect'.

38 Now since the other responses stated above, except for the first, can be reduced to this one, one must respond to the objections made against them. And since the second response [in n. 8] concedes that the genus signifies the material part through the mode of a concrete -- a point on which these first two responses agree -- and on that basis the previous response is successful, one must reply to the arguments against the second response [in nn. 9-10].

39 As for the claim in the first argument [in n. 9] that "every concrete term is denominative," one must make a distinction. Just as the abstract is twofold ⁽⁴⁰⁾ -- what abstracts from the subject, and what abstracts from the form as it is in the supposit -- so too the concrete is twofold by way of opposite [to the abstract] -- what is joined with [concernit] the subject and what is joined with the supposit. The stated proposition is true of the concrete in the first sense, false of the concrete in the second sense.

40 The reply to the second argument [in n. 10] relies on the same distinction. A concrete term in the first sense signifies a form as it is in the subject, and [such a form] is merely among accidents: for example, 'white' with respect to whiteness. A concrete term in the second sense signifies a form as it is in the supposits, and in this way [such a form] is [also] among substances: for example, 'man' with respect to humanity.

41 As for the claim in the proof [given in n. 9] that every concrete term satisfies the definition of denominative, one must say that a substantial concrete term does not, since it does not differ from the corresponding abstract term only in its case (that is, only in its relation to the subject, which is how 'case' is understood in this claim). Rather, it differs with respect to the relation of the form to the supposit. ⁽⁴¹⁾

42 There is an alternative argument ⁽⁴²⁾ against the response [in n. 8] that concedes that matter is predicated in the concrete. According to this argument, 'animal' signifies the matter of man in the concrete in the same way that 'wood' signifies the matter of a chest in the concrete. Therefore, just as 'The chest is wood" ⁽⁴³⁾ is false, notwithstanding that concretion, so too "Man is animal" is false. The first proposition is evident, for just as 'animal' is concrete with respect to animality, so too is 'wood' with respect to woodenness.

43 To this one should say that 'animal' is concrete as to the supposit with respect to man, since man is its supposit. That's not how things are with 'wood' with respect to a chest. For although 'wood' is concrete with respect to woodenness, and therefore 'wood' is predicated of this wood, it is nonetheless not concrete with respect to the chest, since 'chest', with respect to the form that it principally signifies, is artificial. Now an artificial form is to a natural form as an accident is to its subject; and nothing, insofar as it is concrete, is concrete with respect to its accident. Hence, the two cases are not parallel, since in the present case ["The chest is wood"] what is signified is matter in the concrete that is is joined with the materiated item, whereas in the other case ["Man is animal"] that is not so.

44 As for the argument against the third response given above [in n. 12], I say that Aristotle's comparison is not to be understood as applying to "being predicated" but as applying to "determinately conveying." For just as the whole definition distinctly expresses the whole item defined, so too a part of the definition distinctly expresses just a part of the thing; but it is not the case that a part of the definition is predicated of a part of the thing in just the same way that the whole definition is predicated of the whole thing. For "Animal is rational" is false, so far as 'rational' is understood as the difference of man. So if the permutation is done according to "determinately conveying," I concede the conclusion; but the comparison is not legitimate on any other terms.

45 The fourth response [in nn. 13-14], that of Boethius, should be understood in the following way. In both definition and predication, genus is both a part and the whole. That is, it distinctly conveys the part through the mode of a whole. Nonetheless, by appropriation it is predicated because it is a whole (that is, it is predicated as having the mode of a whole); and by appropriation it figures in the definition because it signifies a part. For a definition ought to express distinctly the principles of the item defined, and what the genus distinctly expresses is a prt. Therefore, speaking in terms of appropriation, genus figures in the a defiition as a part; nonetheless, in itself genus is similarly both whole and part in both predication and definition.

46 As for the third preliminary argument [n. 16], I reject the inference ["Man is animal; therefore, humanity is animality"]. The reply to the proof is that the inference holds only from concrete terms said from their concretion with the per se subject. It does not hold in other cases.

47 To the fourth preliminary argument [nn. 16-19] I say that there are certain modes that are properly called modes of signifying, which belong to an expression [dictio] in virtue of imposition, and they are inseparable from the significate. For the significate, insofar as it is signified by such an expression, cannot be understood under the opposite of such a mode of signification without repugnance. For example, 'man', insofar as it is singular, cannot be understood under the plural mode.

There are other modes, properly called modes of understanding, which are in the significate only insofar as it is conceived under a certain mode. These are separable from the significate, since the significate, insofar as it is signified under such an expression, can be understood under the opposite of such a mode without repugnance, in the same way that these intentions are related to the items to which they are applied]. For 'man' can be understood under the opposite of this intention 'species' without opposition, as in "this man."

The first modes, which are inseparable from the significate insofar as it is signified by such an expression, do not abandon the significate with respect to any predicate whatsoever; and although the modes are not the items that are united [to make a statement], they are nonetheless formal principles under which the significates are united. Therefore, such repugnant modes cause falsity when they are with respect to the same significate, as in "Whiteness is white," not when they are with respect to diverse significates, as in "Man is white," since in the later [the modes] are not opposed.

The second modes are extraneous to the significates as united by the verb 'is'. For being is of a thing per se. These intentions are not in things per se, but insofar as they are compared to the intellect. Therefore, these modes are not united per se; nor are they formal principles under which the formal significates are united. Therefore, their repugnance does not cause falsity.

48 As for the fifth argument [n. 21], I reject the analogy, since it commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent. As for the first proof [n. 22], it must be said that Aristotle understands it as applying to precise causes, as he illustrates by example ⁽⁴⁴⁾: if "having lungs" is the cause of breathing, then "not having lungs" is the cause of not breathing. But the affirmation of a species is not the precise cause for inferring the affirmation of the genus. To the other argument [of n. 22] it must be said that the first analogy holds with respect to opposition. With respect to opposition, therefore, the inference holds only in a case of permutation; but by permutation the conclusion is reached that there is an analogy with respect to being antecedent and being consequent. [I have no clue what Scotus is saying here.]

49 To the sixth argument [23] one must say that the 'animal' that is predicated of man is indifferent to 'the same as man' and 'other than man'. Nonetheless, it is made true by the animal that is the same as man.

50 An objection: If 'animal' is predicated as it is indifferent to many, then any one [of those animals] can be predicated of [man].

51 I say that this inference is invalid, since the indifference is in the mode of a disjunction. From something related disjunctively to many does not follow from any given one of those many, since [the something related disjunctively] can be made true by any given one of them, as in the case under discussion.

52 The reply to the seventh argument [n. 24] is that the definition of 'whole' should be understood as follows: 'outside of which there is nothing' means 'which lacks nothing requisite for itself', as the nature of animal in man lacks nothing of the nature of animal. It doesn't mean that there is precisely that nature [and nothing else] in man.

53 The reply to the eighth argument [n. 25] is that it commits a fallacy of the accident, as was said above [in n. 26].

54 As for the argument against this reply [n. 27]: The claim that everything that is predicated is predicated under the notion of some universal is true of designated predication but not of performed predication, since the notion of universal is extraneous to something insofar as it is predicated in a performed predication that is made using 'is'.

55 There are two replies to the ninth argument [n. 28]. The first is that the per se common supposit includes only the designated nature of its common [something] and no accident, and for that reason it is not corruptible per se, just as it is not common per se. Rather, it is both corruptible and common secundum quid, that is, per accidens. [I really don't know what's going on here. Too much 'communis'.]

56 The other reply is that the species as it is in individuals is corruptible, but in and of itself it is incorruptible in virtue of its being always carried on through a succession of diverse individuals.

[Question 17: Is 'differing in species' appropriately included in the definition of genus?]

The question is whether the second phrase in the definition of genus, 'differing in species', is appropriately included.

1 It appears that it is not

For it is included in order to distinguish genus from species. But that does not happen, since the inference "Differing in species, therefore differing in number" is valid, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [6, 1016^b32-1017^a3] in the chapter "On one"; and 'differing in number' is included in the definition of species. But the antecedent is not distinguished from the consequent.

2 Moreover, this phrase is included in order to distinguish genus from property. But that does not happen. Therefore, it is included in vain. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is evident, since certain intermediate genera have properties: for example, number, figure, triangle, etc. So either those properties are predicated of items differing in species, and so my point is made, since the phrase in question would apply to property; or else they are not predicated of items differing in species, in which case they are not properties, since "a property is convertible with that of which it is a property." ⁽⁴⁵⁾

3 Moreover, if this phrase is appropriately included, then 'being predicated of items differing in species' is present per se in the item defined. And if this is so, then items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus. This is false; therefore, so is the first antecedent. The first inference is evident from the notion of the first mode of per seity.

4 Here is a proof of the second inference on the basis of an analogy to other relatives. Double is related per se to half; therefore, half is related per se to double.

The same thing is shown by argument. Nothing is said to be related per se except to its per se correlative. For if [something were related per se] to a per accidens correlative, then since there can be many [per accidens correlatives], the same [relative] would be said per se with respect to many. That is absurd, and for three reasons. First, it is contrary to authority, since in Metaphysics V [15, 1021^a31-^b2], in the chapter "On relation," Aristotle holds that it is absurd. Second, it contravenes the notion of a relative, since the "being" of a relative "is to be related to another." ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Therefore, being-related is of the essence of a relative. Now to diverse relata there are diverse relations; therefore, what is per se related to two items is not one essentially. Third, it contravenes the property of relatives, since they are "simultaneous in nature." ⁽⁴⁷⁾ For if a is said per se with respect to both c and b, then if c does not exist, a will not exist; and b, for its part, can exist; therefore, a will exist. Therefore, a will simultaneously exist and not exist.

Here is a proof of the falsity of the main consequent ["Items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"]. It is only intentions that are subordinated per se to a genus, since being subordinated is a feature of intentions, just as being predicated is; therefore, it belongs per se only to intentions. But those intentions differ only in virtue of the matter to which they are applied. Therefore, they differ only in number, not in species, since "a specific difference is a formal difference." ⁽⁴⁸⁾ Universally, however, the difference of accidents in virtue of their subject is only a material difference.

5 Porphyry defends the opposite view. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

6 In reply to this question one must say that the phrase is appropriately included, since that phrase provides the difference by which the genus 'universal' descends into the species 'genus'. For the intelligible nature of universal is "to be predicated of many," which is divided per se into "many in species" and "many in number." And the former is included [in the definition] because the defined item is relative per se.

7 One reply ⁽⁵⁰⁾ to the first argument [n. 1] is to say that genus qua genus is not predicated of many items differing in number; rather, it is accidental [to genus that it is predicated of many items differing in number], just as one and the same item can be both genus and species under extraneous notions.

8 An objection to this reply: Insofar as something is predicated of items differing in species, it is predicated of items differing in number; therefore, it is not predicated extraneously [of items differing in number]. The antecedent is evident, since 'differing in number' follows from 'differing in species'; and the consequent is predicated of the antecedent with reduplication.

9 Therefore, it can be said that the definition of species should be understood restrictively: "differing only in number"; and thus it does not follow from "differing in species.' ⁽⁵¹⁾

10 Alternatively, it can be said that the species is predicated immediately of items differing in number, whereas the genus is not; the genus is predicated of them with the species as intermediate. ⁽⁵²⁾

11 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that there is not a property of anything insofar as it is a genus, but [only] insofar as it is a species; and in this way it is convertible with that [of which it is the proprium] insofar as it is predicated of items differing in number. The argument for the assumption is that there is a property of something only insofar as it is by nature apt to be a subject of demonstration, and that is the case only insofar as it is a species, since it is only insofar as a species that it is defined. For one must presuppose of a subject both what it is and that it is, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I [1, 71^a11-16]. But insofar as it is defined, it has a genus and differentia, and thus it is a species.

12 One reply to the third argument [n. 3] is that 'items differing in species' is understood as meaning 'different species', which, however, do not differ in species, as the argument shows. ⁽⁵³⁾

13 Alternatively, one can deny the second inference ["If 'being predicated of items differing in species' is present per se in the item defined, then items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"], on the grounds that per se is being related to different relata in the antecedent and the consequent.

14 If one concedes the inference, the final consequent ["items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"] can also be conceded. And with this, that those items that are subordinated per se to a genus differ only in number, since items differing in species do not differ in species but only in number, understanding 'items differing in species' in the subject for the supposits of that which is differing in species, which [supposits] are items differing in species. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ For a common term in the plural is predicated of many supposits simultaneously. And in that case 'items differing in species' is understood as expressing a 'what' with respect to the supposits. But those supposits are not items differing in species, insofar as 'items differing in species' expresses a mode (just as 'genus' is a genus as 'genus' expresses a 'what', not as it expresses a mode); rather, they are species. In this way the difference is not a difference but a species. Thus, many genera -- that is to say, many supposits of a genus -- are not many genera -- that is to say, items to which 'genus' is applied as a mode. Nor is there opposition of a mode to a 'what' or vice versa.

[Question 18: Does one genus require many species?]

The question is whether a genus necessarily requires many species.

1 It appears that it does:

For that is included in the definition of genus; therefore, it is of the essence of genus.

2 Moreover, in the chapter "On species" Porphyry writes, "one genus, but a plurality of species." ⁽⁵⁵⁾ He proves it thus: "The division of a genus is always made into a plurality of species." It can be proved like this: A genus, by its very nature, is divided by opposed differences; now either difference, added to the genus, constitutes a species. Hence, Boethius concludes in The Book of Divisions ⁽⁵⁶⁾: "Therefore, there cannot be fewer than two species under a genus."

3 Moreover, according to Topics IV [4, 125^a22-24], if a species is predicated of equally many items as the genus, the species is abolished, because it is put in the place of a genus.

4 Moreover, in another discussion ⁽⁵⁷⁾: "Since there is a plurality of species for every genus . . ." And later ⁽⁵⁸⁾: if a genus is destroyed when the species is destroyed, the genus is improperly assigned. And later ⁽⁵⁹⁾: the species ought to be predicated of fewer items than the genus is. And there are many authoritative passages to this effect: in Metaphysics VII [12, 1038^a6-9] and in the logical works of Boethius ⁽⁶⁰⁾ and Porphyry. ⁽⁶¹⁾

5 Arguments for the opposite view:

Genus is to species as species is to individual. Now a species does not require many individuals, so neither does a genus require many species. The minor premise is evident in the cases of the sun, the phoenix, and similar species.

6 According to one view, ⁽⁶²⁾ the analogy fails, since it is of the nature of genus to be divided by opposed differences, which together with the genus constitute at least two species. But that is not how a species descends into individuals.

7 An objection to this view: What is stated equally in something's definition is equally essential to it. But "differing in number" is stated equally in the definition of species as "differing in species" is stated in the definition of genus. Therefore, etc.

8 One reply to the question ⁽⁶³⁾ is that a genus, whether it is taken for the intention or for that to which the intention is applied, does not require many species, either in actuality or in potentiality.

9 Here is the proof as regards the intention of genus: That intention is related to the intention of species. So as long as one species exists, there is a genus, since relatives are simultaneous in nature.

10 There is a similar proof as regards the foundation of the intention: That foundation is a material 'what' in the species. Now it is impossible for something to exist without its material. Therefore, it is impossible for a species to exist unless the genus exists in that way. Nonetheless, just as a universal aptitudinally requires many, since it is defined as what is "apt by nature to be predicated of many," so also it is required for the intelligible nature of genus that it be said aptitudinally of items differing in species.

11 On this basis one can reply to the arguments [of nn. 1-4].

All the authoritative passages must be understood in terms of aptitude, not in terms of either actuality or potentiality. Now aptitude differs from potentiality. For aptitude is something's inclination -- or at least non-repugnance -- in and of itself with respect to something, whereas potentiality is an ordering to actuality. Consequently, there can be potentiality without aptitude: for example, it is possible for the heavy to be above, and yet it is not by nature apt to be there, since being above is repugnant to the heavy in and of itself. And there is aptitude without potentiality, as a blind man is apt for seeing. For one speaks of a privation of something only when what is deprived is by nature apt to possess it, according to Aristotle in the Categories and in Metaphysics V [22, 1022^b22-31], in the chapter "On privation." Yet it is not possible for a blind man to see, since "there is no getting from privation to possession." ⁽⁶⁴⁾ Thus, it is not repugnant to any universal, insofar as it is in virtue of its form, to be said of many; yet this aptitude can be impeded, in that there are not many items for it to be said of.

12 An objection to this way of speaking: It seems to be beside the point, since it seems to proceed in terms of intentions, as if it were being supposed that there is one intention of species that is related to the genus, and the worry were whether the intention of genus exists [given only one intention of species that relates to it]. But that's not the question. For genus is primarily related to species, not to this or that species. Hence, it is accidental to a genus that it is related in this way to many. Nor is the question whether the nature of a genus exists if the nature of a species exists. Rather, the question is whether, if there are not many items to which the intention of species is applied, but instead only one -- call it b -- the intention of genus is applied to that nature to which it would be applied if the intention of species were applied to many natures -- say, b, c, and d -- with respect to that nature, namely, a. And if the question is understood in this way, neither element of the proposed response is on point.

13 Moreover, it doesn't even seem to be true, since it is impossible for something to be apt to be said of many species unless those many species can be apprehended by the intellect through diverse [intelligible] species. But if they can be conceived in this way, then there are many species of the genus in actuality, since this is the actuality of a nature insofar as it is said to be a species: its being actually conceived by the intellect through an intelligible species. For it is according to this that the intention of species is attributed to it.

14 Moreover, if x is by nature apt to be said of many items differing in species, it follows that many items [differing] in species are apt to receive the predication of x. So if the aptitude [appealed to in n. 11] is sufficient for a genus, the exactly similar aptitude for participating [in the genus] is sufficient on the part of the species. Therefore, if something is a genus in actuality on account of such an aptitude, the many items that participate in the genus aptitudinally will be a species in actuality. Therefore, every genus has many species in actuality. The assumption is evident, since equal being suffices for each of two correlatives, since they are simultaneous in nature.

15 Another possible reply to the question is that for the intelligible nature of genus what is required is that the genus have many species in actuality: not many species that exist in actuality or in potentiality, but merely many species that are actually conceived through an intelligible species received from individuals that exist at some time or other; and that [these species] actually have an aptitude for participating in a genus, since such actuality belongs to them insofar as they are called species of a genus.

16 A reply to the argument for the opposite view [n. 5] is that species likewise require many individuals aptitudinally.

17 By way of defending the first reply [nn. 8-10], one can reply to the first argument [n. 12] against that response as follows: if the intention of species is applied to this nature alone, the intention of genus is still applied in a prior way to that nature that is in this matter, since when that nature is conceived, it has less of the intelligible content than that which is the species, and it descends into the species through the difference. And in this way the reply is on point.

18 As for the second argument [n. 13]: [one can reply] that being able to be conceived by the intellect is not sufficient for there being a species of some [genus]; [what is sufficient is] that in its intelligible content there is a genus with respect to which it should be said to be a species. That is not true of those many items with respect to which there is an aptitude of the genus to predicated of them. Nonetheless, if a genus that at one time was said is in this way apt to be said of them, and they are conceived by the intellect through the same species through which they existed at that time, they are many species in actuality, which actuality is required for a species in actuality, since the genus is included in their intelligible content at that time, as it also was when they existed.

19 As for the third argument [n. 14]: one can deny the first inference on the grounds that the form of the sun is, as far as that form itelf is concerned, by nature apt to exist in matter other than that in which it exists. Nonetheless, there is no other matter that is by nature apt to receive such a form. For if this line of argument were valid with respect to aptitude, there would always be aptitude in both of the extremes, and thus there would always be potentiality in both of the extremes, since the only thing that keeps aptitude in one extreme from being potentiality is a defect of aptitude in the other extreme.

20 Note that one can hold unqualifiedly that a genus is not apt to be said of many unless they are conceived by the intellect [in such a way that] the genus is included in their intelligible content. And such items are species in actuality, whether they exist or can exist or not. [So one can hold that such a] genus has many species in actuality.

[Question 19: Is 'in quid' appropriately included in the definition of genus?]

The question is whether the third phrase of the definition of genus, 'in quid', is appropriately included.

1 It seems that it is not:

For that is predicated in quid which is an appropriate response to a question asked per quid, as is evident from Porphyry's proof. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ But genus as defined here is not like that, since whether the question is about the thing or about the intention of the species, genus as it denotes an intention is not an appropriate answer. But what is defined here is genus as an intention, as was said above [q. 14, n. 11]. Therefore, etc.

2 Moreover, this phrase is included in order to distinguish genus from difference, according to Porphyry. But it cannot do that, so it is included in vain. Proof of the minor premise: A superior difference is predicated per se in the first mode of an inferior difference, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [12, 1038^a10-15]; and it is not predicated as difference, since if it were, the superior would descend through itself into this inferior difference; therefore, the superior is predicated of the inferior in quid.

3 Moreover, it is included in order to separate genus from accident. But that doesn't happen, since accident is predicated in quid, since "in every genus one must ascertain the 'what'," according to Aristotle in Topics I [9, 103^b35-37].

4 An argument for the opposite view is given by Porphyry. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

5 It must be said that this phrase is included appropriately, since 'to be predicated' is divided by 'to be predicated in quid' and 'to be predicated in quale' as into the primary modes of being predicated. Therefore, universal descends into species through these two. Now genus is not predicated in quale, so it is predicated in quid.

6 One must understand that to be predicated in quid is to predicate the essence through the mode of essence. This is a characteristic of the genus, since the genus is taken from the material part and therefore predicates the essence through the mode of a substrate, which is the mode of essence. By contrast, the difference is taken from the formal part and therefore predicates the essence through the mode of something informing, and therefore in quale.

7 An objection to this resolution of the question: if to be predicated in quid is to be predicated through the mode of essence, then "Man is rock" is a predication in quid.

8 Moreover, if to be predicated in quid is to predicate the essence through the mode of essence, and that mode is not univocal with respect to things of diverse genera -- since essence too is not univocal with respect to things of diverse genera -- then the phrase 'in quid' does not apply to things of diverse genera. Therefore, genus as defined here is also not univocal with respect to all those genera.

9 I say that to be predicated in quid is to predicated the essence through the mode of essence, and that rock or another disparate [predicate] is not predicated of man through the mode of essence, since it is not predicated of man. For only an abstract term is predicated of the items contained under it, and regarding them it is evident that they are predicated in quid. It is also univocal, even if essence is not univocal, since it is sufficient for a univocal term to be predicated that the essence is similarly related in this predication and in that, since "to be predicated" indicates a relation.

10 To the first argument [n. 1] I say that there is a twofold question concerning species taken as an intention: "What is it?" and "What is predicated [of it]?" The proper question in intentions is what is predicated [of it], and it is appropriate to reply to this question with the genus as defined here. Thus, to someone who asks "What is predicated of species?" the correct answer is "The genus." If the question is asked using 'is', it is proper to the foundations, and through a performed predication the foundation of the genus is predicated in quid of the foundation of the species.

11 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that the difference is not predicated in quid of something with respect to which it is the difference, but of something with respect to which it is the genus, since the superior [difference] is a genus with respect to the inferior.

12 An objection to this reply: It would follow that in every genus there are three most general [genera]: that of the species [plural] and that of the two diffferences.

13 Moreover, if the inferior difference is a species, then it is has the superior difference in itself as genus, plus another difference superadded [to the superior difference]. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, that [superadded] difference will be a species with respect to the superior difference, and it will have another difference, which cannot be in another genus, since if it were, a non-substance would be prior to a substance. Therefore, if one goes on in this way, there will be infinitely many differences in the genus of substance, and so nothing will be knowable, since there will be no arriving at the first of those differences.

14 To this objection [nn. 12-13] one must say that the whole hierarchy of differences is reduced to the hierarchy of species.

15 To the third preliminary argument [n. 3] I say that nothing is predicated in quid of that with respect to which it is an accident, but it is predicated in quid of that with respect to which it is genus. For example, color is not predicated in quid of substance, but it is predicated in quid of whiteness, with respect to which color is a genus.

[Question 20: Is genus a principle of species?]

The question is whether genus is a principle of the species.

1 It appears that it is not:

For one and the same item is not both principle and principiated, since principle and principiated are distinct. But genus is the same as species. Therefore, it cannot be a principle of species. The major principle is evident, and there are two proofs for the minor premise. The first is this: According to the Philosopher, ⁽⁶⁷⁾ a genus is nothing "beyond the things that are species of the genus," and for that reason the genus is predicated per se of the species. For "Man is an animal" is per se. But what is predicated per se of something is not distinct from it. Therefore, it is the same as it.

2 Moreover, a genus is a whole with respect to a species; therefore, it is not a principle of a species. Proof of the inference: a principle is more simple than the principiated, whereas a whole is more composite than that of which it is [composed]. And the antecedent is evident from what the author [Porphyry] says in the text: "A genus is a whole with respect to the species." ⁽⁶⁸⁾

3 An argument for the opposite view is what the author says in the text when comparing the third signification of genus with the first. He says there ⁽⁶⁹⁾ that just as genus said in the third way is a principle of species, so also genus said in the first way is a principle of multitude.

4 The correct answer to the question is yes, if one takes 'genus' for the nature in which the intention of genus is founded, and not for the intention itself. This is made clear in the following way: Genus is an essential princple for cognizing a species; therefore, it is an essential principle of species. Proof of the inference: A definition that makes its defined item known expresses the essential principles of the defined item, which is only the species, properly speaking, since nothing is properly defined except a species. The antecedent is evident on the basis of what the Philosopher says in Topics VI [1, 139^a24-35].

5 But it is important to realize that "essential principle of a species" is twofold: (1) according to the thing -- that is a part of the thing in its existing, such as matter and form; (2) according to reason -- that implies the same thing under an indeterminate mode that the species implies in a determinate mode; and if this is imposed in order to designate that thing, it does so insofar as it is taken either from the matter or from the form. Now a genus (say, animal) is not a principle of a species (say, man) in the first way, according to the thing; for if it were, the genus would not be predicated truly of the species. Therefore, it is a principle of the species in the second way. And so if one ought to define man -- since giving a definition is an act of reason -- then 'animal' ought to be included in its definition as a principle according to reason, as should 'rational'. Now in the thing, the nature of matter is extraneous to the nature of form in such a way that neither can be said of the other. Likewise, in reason the intelligible content of the genus is extraneous to the intelligible content of the difference, even though the same thing is implied by both. For 'animal' signifies the same as 'man', apart from the determination of the ultimate form; and 'animal' signifies this through the mode of a 'what' and a per se being, and therefore, according to Porphyry, ⁽⁷⁰⁾ it is predicated in quid. 'Rational', by contrast, signifies the very same item with a determination of the ultimate form, but through the mode of a 'what sort' and of something denominating. Therefore, in reason [as opposed to in the thing], the concepts of the genus and the difference are extraneous.

6 And on account of the arguments it is important to realize that this is the difference between rational parts and parts according to the thing. For although both signify parts of the whole, parts according to reason signify parts of the whole through the mode of the whole, whereas parts according to the thing signify parts of the whole through the mode of a part. For example, the genus of man, i.e., animal, is a part of man according to reason. For from its first imposition it is imposed in order to signify a part of man, i.e., having a sensitive soul. Nonetheless, since it signifies that part through the mode of a whole and not through the mode of a part, it is predicated truly of man. But that's not how things are with a part according to the thing. For bronze, which is a material part of the statue, signifies a part through the mode of a part; therefore, it cannot be predicated of the statue.

7 On this basis one should reply to the arguments [nn. 1-2] that it is not absurd for one and the same item to be both the whole and a part in diverse ways. That is why Boethius says in the Book of Divisions ⁽⁷¹⁾ that in predication the genus is the whole, but in the definition it is a part.

1. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.15-18).

2. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.9-10).

3. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.21-25).

4. Given by Albert the Great in Liber de praedicabilibus III c. 3 (Borgnet I 46a) and William Arnaldi in Porph. (f. 5va).

5. That of Andrew of Cornwall in Porph. q. 7. Andrew, unlike Albert, maintains that what is defined per se in the definition of genus is an intention; even so, Scotus seems to think Andrew allows the thing too great a role.

6. Aristotle, Physics II.6, 198^a5-9.

7. The critical edition has 'intention' in mention quotes, but I take it that Scotus is saying that the name 'genus' signifies an intention in the concrete, not that it signifies 'intention' in the concrete.

8. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 7, nn. 14-25.

9. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Soph. El. qq. 43-44, n. 14.

10. See qq. 8-11, n. 31, for this distinction.

11. Given by Lambert de Latiniaco, Logica (formely attributed to Lambert of Auxerre).

12. Scotus's quotation from Aristotle is so elliptical as to be nearly unintelligible. The passage reads as follows: "Again, if a [definition] has added the particular when the universal has always been said [there is redundancy]: for example, if [one were to define] mercy as the mitigating of what is expedient and just. For the just is something expedient, so it is contained in the expedient. Therefore 'just' is excessive, for [the definition] has stated the universal and then added the particular."

13. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.12, 1038^a21-23.

14. Ibid., 1038^a30-31.

15. Given by Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] II c. 4.

16. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere'.

17. Scotus here is not quite quoting Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.4, 1029^b12-22, and very nearly quoting Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. IV lect. 16.

18. Given by Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. VII lect. 4.

19. Actually Posterior Analytics II.28, 87^a38-39.

20. Given by Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 7.

21. qq. 7-8, n. 20.

22. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.12-13). Porphyry acknowledges three significations of 'genus'. The second signification is "the origin [principium] of each person's birth," and the third (which Porphyry notes is the one philosophers talk about) is "that to which a species is subordinated." In the passage to which Scotus is referring here, Porphyry notes that this third and philosophically important sense fits with the second sense because genus in the third sense "is a kind of principle [principium] for the things under it."

23. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De differentia' (Busse 11.12-17)

24. Cf. In Metaph. 7, q. 16, n. 41.

25. Cf. Lect. 1, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 121-123; Ord. 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 159.

26. Guillelmus Arnaldi, Porph. (f. 6va), Petrus de Alvernia, Porph. (cod. Paris. bibl. nat. lat. 16170, f. 85rb),

27. Cf. Peter of John Olivi, Quaestions logicales q. 11 (Brown 360) and Nicholas of Cornwall, Porph. c. 'De genere' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christi 293, f. 71ra

28. Aristotle, Categories 1, 1^a13-14.

29. Aristotle, Categories 5, 3^a7-10.

30. Defended by Peter of John Olivi in Quaestions logicales q. 11 (Brown 361), and Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 6 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 87ra).

31. Cf. Nicholas of Cornwall, Porph. c. 'De genere' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christi 293, f. 71ra).

32. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 38).

33. See above, q. 1, n. 9.

34. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 17, nn. 21-22.

35. That of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 3 c. 3 (Borgnet I 46b).

36. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 7.2-3 and 13-14).

37. Cf. Duns Scotus, Lect. 1, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 121-123; 1, d. 8, q. 1, nn. 102-103; Ord. 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 159, 161; 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 105-107.

38. See above, q. 15, n. 10.

39. Cf. Simiplicius, In Praedicamenta praed. 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹ 272); Duns Scotus, In Metaph . 7, q. 19, n. 60.

40. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 17, n. 22; 3, q. un., nn. 11-2.

41. Duns Scotus, In Praed. q. 8, nn. 14-33.

42. Offered by Simon of Faversham, Porph. q. 29 (Mazzarella 56), and Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 6 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 87ra).

43. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.7, 1033^a16-19. In English we might very well say "The chest is wood," but in Latin, as in Aristotle's Greek, the word used here for 'wood' cannot be used to mean "wooden" or "of wood."

44. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.13, 78^b16-27; cf. Robert Grosseteste, Anal. post. I.12 (Rossi 193).

45. Auctoritates Aristotelis (Hamesse 301); resp. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De proprio' (Busse 12.20-21).

46. Aristotle, Categories 7, 8^a32-33.

47. Aristotle, Categories 7, 7^b15-16.

48. See above, q. 14, n. 2.

49. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.15-18)

50. We do not know who gave this reply.

51. This is the view of Avicenna, Logica pars I c. 9 (Venice 1508, f. 7va).

52. This is the view of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus IV.1 (Borgnet I 58b), and Nicholas of Cornwall, Porphyry. c. 'De specie' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christ 293, f. 71ra-72ra).

53. I am not at all certain about this passage.

54. Or about this one.

55. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 2 (Busse 7.1-3).

56. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 8).

57. Aristotle, Topics IV.3, 123^a30.

58. Aristotle, Topics IV.5, 125^b37-38.

59. Aristotle, Topics IV.5, 126^a2.

60. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 8); In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] II c. 4 (CSEL 48:179).

61. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.10-13).

62. Defended by Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 3 c. 3 (Borgnet I.47b), tr. 4 c. 6 (Borgnet I.74b).

63. Cf. Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 8 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 88ra).

64. Aristotle, Categories 10, 13^a32-34.

65. Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.13-14).

66. Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.14-19).

67. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.12, 1038^a6-9.

68. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 8.1-2).

69. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.12-14).

70. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.15-17).

71. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 38).