86. This insistence on the need for a close relationship of continuity between contemporary philosophy and the philosophy developed in the Christian tradition is intended to avert the danger which lies hidden in some currents of thought which are especially prevalent today. It is appropriate, I think, to review them, however briefly, in order to point out their errors and the consequent risks for philosophical work.
ECLECTICISM
The first goes by the name of "eclecticism," by which is
meant the approach of those who, in research, teaching and argumentation,
even in theology, tend to use individual ideas drawn from different
philosophies, without concern for their internal coherence, their place
within a system or their historical context. They therefore run the
risk of being unable to distinguish the part of truth of a given doctrine
from elements of it which may be erroneous or ill-suited to the task at
hand. An extreme form of eclecticism appears also in the rhetorical misuse
of philosophical terms to which some theologians are given at times. Such
manipulation does not help the search for truth and does not train reason
- whether theological or philosophical - to formulate arguments seriously
and scientifically. The rigorous and far-reaching study of philosophical
doctrines, their particular terminology and the context in which they
arose, helps to overcome the danger of eclecticism and makes it possible
to integrate them into theological discourse in a way appropriate to the
task.
HISTORICISM
87. Eclecticism is an error of method, but lying hidden within it can also
be the claims of historicism. To understand a doctrine from the past
correctly, it is necessary to set it within its proper historical and
cultural context. The fundamental claim of historicism, however, is that
the truth of a philosophy is determined on the basis of its
appropriateness to a certain period and a certain historical purpose. At
least implicitly, therefore, the enduring validity of truth is denied.
What was true in one period, historicists claim, may not be true in
another. Thus for them the history of thought becomes little more than an
archeological resource useful for illustrating positions once held, but
for the most part outmoded and meaningless now. On the contrary, it should
not be forgotten that, even if a formulation is bound in some way by time
and culture, the truth or the error which it expresses can invariably be
identified and evaluated as such despite the distance of space and time.
In theological enquiry, historicism tends to appear for the most part under the guise of "modernism." Rightly concerned to make theological discourse relevant and understandable to our time, some theologians use only the most recent opinions and philosophical language, ignoring the critical evaluation which ought to be made of them in the light of the tradition. By exchanging relevance for truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of satisfying the demands of truth to which theology is called to respond.
SCIENTISM [Comment by Dr.B.: This is very similar to Logical Analysis.]
88. Another threat to be reckoned with is "scientism." This is the
philosophical notion which refuses to admit the validity of forms of
knowledge other than those of the positive sciences; and it relegates
religious, theological, ethical and aesthetic knowledge to the realm of
mere fantasy. In the past, the same idea emerged in positivism and
neo-positivism, which considered metaphysical statements to be
meaningless. Critical epistemology has discredited such a claim, but now
we see it revived in the new guise of scientism, which dismisses values as
mere products of the emotions and rejects the notion of being in order
to
clear the way for pure and simple facticity. Science would thus be
poised
to dominate all aspects of human life through technological progress. The
undeniable triumphs of scientific research and contemporary technology
have helped to propagate a scientistic outlook, which now seems boundless,
given its inroads into different cultures and the radical changes it has
brought.
Regrettably, it must be noted, scientism consigns all that has to do with the question of the meaning of life to the realm of the irrational or imaginary. No less disappointing is the way in which it approaches the other great problems of philosophy which, if they are not ignored, are subjected to analyses based on superficial analogies, lacking all rational foundation. This leads to the impoverishment of human thought, which no longer addresses the ultimate problems which the human being, as the animal rationale, has pondered constantly from the beginning of time. And since it leaves no space for the critique offered by ethical judgment, the scientistic mentality has succeeded in leading many to think that if something is technically possible it is therefore morally admissible.
PRAGMATISM
89. No less dangerous is "pragmatism," an attitude of mind which, in
making its choices, precludes theoretical considerations or judgments
based on ethical principles. The practical consequences of this mode of
thinking are significant. In particular there is growing support for a
concept of democracy which is not grounded upon any reference to
unchanging values: whether or not a line of action is admissible is
decided by the vote of a parliamentary majority. (105) The
consequences of
this are clear: in practice, the great moral decisions of humanity are
subordinated to decisions taken one after another by institutional
agencies. Moreover, anthropology itself is severely compromised by a
one-dimensional vision of the human being, a vision which excludes the
great ethical dilemmas and the existential analyses of the meaning of
suffering and sacrifice, of life and death.
NIHILISM
90. The positions we have examined lead in turn to a more general
conception which appears today as the common framework of many
philosophies which have rejected the meaningfulness of being. I am
referring to the nihilist interpretation, which is at once the denial
of
all foundations and the negation of all objective truth. Quite apart from
the fact that it conflicts with the demands and the content of the word of
God, "nihilism" is a denial of the humanity and of the very identity of
the human being. It should never be forgotten that the neglect of
being
inevitably leads to losing touch with objective truth and therefore with
the very ground of human dignity. This in turn makes it possible to erase
from the countenance of man and woman the marks of their likeness to God,
and thus to lead them little by little either to a destructive will to
power or to a solitude without hope. Once the truth is denied to human
beings, it is pure illusion to try to set them free. Truth and freedom
either go together hand in hand or together they perish in misery. (106)
91. In discussing these currents of thought, it has not been my intention to present a complete picture of the present state of philosophy, which would, in any case, be difficult to reduce to a unified vision. And I certainly wish to stress that our heritage of knowledge and wisdom has indeed been enriched in different fields. We need only cite logic, the philosophy of language, epistemology, the philosophy of nature, anthropology, the more penetrating analysis of the affective dimensions of knowledge and the existential approach to the analysis of freedom. Since the last century, however, the affirmation of the principle of immanence, central to the rationalist argument, has provoked a radical requestioning of claims once thought indisputable. In response, currents of irrationalism arose, even as the baselessness of the demand that reason be absolutely self-grounded was being critically demonstrated.
POSTMODERNISM [similar to Existentialism]
Our age has been termed by some thinkers the age of "postmodernity." Often
used in very different contexts, the term designates the emergence of a
complex of new factors which, widespread and powerful as they are, have
shown themselves able to produce important and lasting changes. The term
was first used with reference to aesthetic, social and technological
phenomena. It was then transposed into the philosophical field, but has
remained somewhat ambiguous, both because judgment on what is called
"postmodern" is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, and because
there is as yet no consensus on the delicate question of the demarcation
of the different historical periods. One thing however is certain: the
currents of thought which claim to be postmodern merit appropriate
attention. According to some of [the postmodernists], the time of certainties is
irrevocably past, and the human being must now learn to live in a horizon
of total absence of meaning, where everything is provisional and
ephemeral. In their destructive critique of every certitude, several
authors have failed to make crucial distinctions and have called into
question the certitudes of faith.
This nihilism has been justified in a sense by the terrible experience of evil which has marked our age. Such a dramatic experience has ensured the collapse of rationalist optimism, which viewed history as the triumphant progress of reason, the source of all happiness and freedom; and now, at the end of this century, one of our greatest threats is the temptation to despair.
Even so, it remains true that a certain positivist cast of mind continues to nurture the illusion that, thanks to scientific and technical progress, man and woman may live as a demiurge, single-handedly and completely taking charge of their destiny.