

THE
RHETORIC, POETIC,
AND
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
OF
ARISTOTLE,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

JOVE HONOURS ME, AND FAVOURS MY DESIGNS.

POPE'S HOMER'S ILIAD, Book 9th, v. 717.

LONDON:

Printed by A. J. Valpy, Tooke's Court, Chancery Lane,
FOR JAMES BLACK AND SON, TAVISTOCK STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.

1818.

Ga 112, 580

1875, March 22.
Request of
James Walker, D.D., L.L.D.
(A. U. 1814.)
President of Harv. Univ.
(Vol. I, II.)

ADVERTISEMENT

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

HAVING in the Introduction to this work said all that I deem sufficient respecting the nature and merit of the following works of Aristotle, I rejoice that I am able to adduce the testimony of **DR. COPLESTON**, now Provost of Oriel College, in favour of my translation of these treatises, as he is one of the brightest ornaments of the University of Oxford.

This testimony is contained in a letter to me, dated Oriel College, March 8, 1811, and is as follows :

“ You will not expect from me any of that microscopic criticism, in which the gentry we have been speaking of delight to indulge. *I perceive in your translation, wherever I examine it, that prime virtue of a translator, a complete subordination and subserviency to his original;—no tampering with the exact meaning in order to evade a difficulty, or to round a period. There is also a manly plainness and integrity which commands respect ; and I have seen enough to convince me that a student will derive satisfaction often, from the literal rendering you have adopted.*

“ The Introduction I read with particular attention, as also the Notes on the Poetic. Nothing can be clearer, more correct, or more philosophical, than the view you give of the true nature of all the subjects of these treatises.

Of dialectic in particular, it is wonderful how erroneous and confused the opinions of men in the present day are.

“Let me also add that your explanation of the celebrated definition of Tragedy strikes me as no less just than ingenious. Twining is ingenious ; but after all his diffuse dissertation, I used to feel dissatisfied. You have, I think, offered an admirable solution, although a little difficulty still hangs about the word *τοιούτων*. Your sense, however, I adopt as the best which has ever been proposed.”

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INTRODUCTION.

THE three treatises of which the present volume consists, have been deservedly considered by the ancients as ranking in the first class of the most exquisite productions of human wit; and even in the present frivolous age they maintain so high a degree of reputation, as to be studied at the University of Oxford. Indeed, so much penetration and profundity of thought are displayed in the composition of each, that the reader by whom they

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are thoroughly understood, will immediately subscribe to the encomium given to the Stagirite by the great Syrianus, *that he was the most skilful and the most prolific in his conceptions of all men*, (δεινοτατος και γονιμωτατος;) and also to the assertion of another of the ancients, which may be considered as the *ne plus ultra* of eulogy, *that he dipped his pen in intellect*.

I. With respect to Rhetoric, which forms the first of these treatises, it is very nearly allied to dialectic¹ properly so called, and which is the subject of the Topics of Aristotle; and, therefore, in order to explain the nature of rhetoric, it will be requisite to compare it with dialectic, and see in what they both agree, and in what they differ.

Dialectic then is denominated from disputing, and is the art of disputing; but rhetoric derives its name from speaking, and is the art of speak-

¹ Aristotle calls *dialectic*, that art which is explained by him in his Topics and Sophistical Elenchi.

ing. The art of disputing, however, consists in the ability of arguing on and defending each side of a proposed question. But the art of speaking consists in the ability of persuading the hearer to assent to either side of a question.

From this definition, it may be inferred that the subject of dialectic is every thing, so far as it is disputable with probability on each side; and that the subject of rhetoric is every thing so far as it can be influenced by persuasion.

In the second place, it may be inferred that dialectic and rhetoric agree in this, that each discusses every thing; that each discusses both sides of a question; and that each proceeds not from what is true, but from what is probable. For of the two parts of a problem contradictorily opposed to each other, the one is necessarily false; but dialectic and rhetoric discuss and defend each part of a problem. Hence they not only prove and defend what is true, but also what is false. As what is false, however, cannot be proved and defended from true, but only

from probable assertions, rhetoric and dialectic do not proceed from true but from probable arguments. They also agree in this, that each does not proceed from things that are proper or peculiar, but from such as are common. For if it were requisite that they should discuss any proposed problem from peculiarities, they would be confounded with all sciences. To which it may be added, that they ought to use principles adapted to discuss the proposed problems in each part, and that common principles alone possess this adaptation. Another reason is, that they ought to discuss things from principles known to all men, and known even to those who are ignorant of particular sciences.

Again, dialectic and rhetoric agree in this, that it is the business of each to deliver certain common places, or principles, from which we may be able to dispute on any proposed problem, or speak in a manner adapted to persuade on each side of a question. They likewise agree in this, that they are not sciences, but certain powers and faculties. For sciences

neither prove, nor persuade to the assent of, each part of contradiction, but that part only which is true, and is, therefore, demonstrable; but the power of effecting this is possessed both by dialectic and rhetoric. Hence, they are not sciences, but powers and faculties; for those things are properly said to be powers, which are equally affected to opposites.

Dialectic and rhetoric, however, differ in this, that it is the business of the former to dispute with probability before those who are partially wise; but of the latter, to speak in a manner adapted to persuade the multitude. And because it is usual to dispute with those who are partially wise, about universal problems, abstracting from particular circumstances of persons, places and times, &c.; but to dispute with the multitude about moral or political subjects, and about problems restricted to particular persons, places and times; hence dialectic for the most part discusses *universal*, and rhetoric *restricted* problems. They also differ in this, that dialectic employs a strict and contracted form

of arguing; but rhetoric a more ample and dilated form. And they differ in the third place in this, that dialectic employs arguments alone in proof of what it wishes to establish; but rhetoric for the purpose of persuading not only employs arguments, but likewise manners and passions, as Aristotle copiously evinces in the course of this treatise.

II. With respect to the Poetic, the next of the treatises, it is requisite to observe, that *poetry is the art of imitating in measured diction so as to produce delight*. The proximate genus, therefore, of poetry is, that it is an imitative art; and the difference, through which it differs from other imitative arts, is the mode of imitating. For as the other imitative arts imitate in different modes, poetry imitates by metre, or measured diction alone.

From this definition, explaining the nature of poetry, it may be briefly inferred what the subject of it is, and what its employment and end. The *subject* of poetry are *things, so far as*

they can be imitated in measured diction and produce delight. The employment of poetry is, the imitation itself. And the end is, the delight produced by the metrical imitation of things. Hence it follows that poetry ought especially to imitate those things, the imitation of which is most delightful. But the imitation of admirable and probable deeds is most delightful, and which, therefore, poetry ought principally to imitate. In order, however, to imitate these, it is requisite, in the first place, that it should devise admirable and probable deeds; and in the next place, that it should express them in admirable diction, such as is the metrical. Hence the labour of poetry ought especially to be conversant in these two things; first, in the invention of the fable, viz. of admirable and probable deeds; and secondly, in expressing such deeds in a measured diction which is eminently adapted to them, or in other words, which is eminently imitative of the several particulars.

It is much to be regretted that this treatise, which was perhaps originally only the first of

three books written by Aristotle on poetry, is all that is left of a work, the whole of which was doubtless as admirable as the part that remains. And the loss of the second and third books is particularly to be regretted, because there can be no doubt of Aristotle having treated in one of these books of the purification of the mind from depraved affections, and of the correction of the manners, as the principal and proper end, according to the antients, of right poetical imitation. I say this loss is particularly to be regretted, not only on account of the importance of the matter, and the very able manner in which it was discussed, but because an elucidation of the mode in which the mind is to be purified from depraved affections, would have fully solved a difficulty which occurs in the present treatise, and which has been insuperable to modern commentators. The difficulty I allude to is the assertion of Aristotle, *that the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from such-like passions.* For, according to the modern commentators on this treatise, the meaning of Aristotle is, that the

terror and pity excited by tragedy, purify the spectator from terror and pity. The reader, however, will find in a note on this passage in the following translation, that this cannot be the meaning of Aristotle, as it contradicts what he asserts in his Ethics; and I also trust that he will subscribe to the opinion of the translator, that Aristotle meant to say, *that the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy.* Thus in the Ajax of Sophocles, the terror and pity excited by the catastrophe, purify the spectator from anger and impiety towards divinity; and in a similar manner purification is effected in other tragedies.

Notwithstanding, however, the loss sustained by the want of the 2d and 3d books of the Poetic of Aristotle, I rejoice that there is still extant a most admirable account of the different species of poetry by Proclus, the coryphæus, next to Plato and Aristotle, of all true philosophers, whose honour will grow with increase of time, and whose fame will swim over the vast

extent of ages, when those,' by whom he has been defamed will be utterly forgotten. This account is extracted from his EXPLANATION OF THE MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, printed at the end of his Commentaries On the Timæus of Plato, which Fabricius, the best of all modern critics, calls OPUS ADMIRABILE; and the translation of it is as follows:

“ There are three lives in the soul, of which the best and most perfect is that according to which it is conjoined with the gods, and lives a life most allied, and through the highest similitude united to them; no longer subsisting from itself but from them, running under its own intellect, exciting the ineffable impression of *the one* which it contains, and connecting like with like, its own light with that of the gods, and that which is most uniform in its own essence and life, with *the one* which is above all

¹ Viz. All those whom Swift so admirably satirizes in his Tale of a Tub, under the appellation of *true critics*.

essence and life. That which is second to this in dignity and power, has a middle arrangement in the middle of the soul, according to which, indeed, it is converted to itself, descending from a divinely-inspired life, and placing intellect and science as the principle of its energy, it evolves the multitude of its reasons, surveys the all-various mutations of forms, collects into sameness intellect and that which is the object of intellect, and expresses in images an intellectual and intelligible essence. The third life of the soul is, that which accords with its inferior powers, and energizes together with them, employing phantasies and irrational senses, and being entirely filled with things of a subordinate nature.

“ As there are, therefore, these three forms of life in souls, the poetic division, also, supernally proceeds together with the multiform lives of the soul, and is diversified into first, middle, and last genera of energy. For of poetry, also, one kind has the highest subsistence, is full of divine

goods, and establishes the soul in the causes themselves of things, according to a certain ineffable union, leading that which is filled into sameness with its replenishing source; the former immaterially subjecting itself to illumination, but the latter being incited to a communication of light; thus, according to the Oracle, 'perfecting works, by mingling the rivers of incorruptible fire.' It also produces one divine bond, and a unifying mixture of that which is participated and the participant, establishing the whole of that which is subordinate in that which is more excellent, and preparing that which is more divine alone to energize, the inferior nature being withdrawn, and concealing its own peculiarity in that which is superior. This then in short is a mania better than temperance, and is distinguished by a divine characteristic. And as every different kind of poetry subsists according to a different hyperaxis, or summit of divine essence, so this fills the soul energizing from divine inspiration, with symmetry; and hence it adorns its last energies with measures

and rhythms. As, therefore, we say that prophetic fury subsists according to truth, and the amatory according to beauty, in like manner we say that the poetic mania is defined according to divine symmetry.

“ The second kind of poetry, which is subordinate to this first and divinely-inspired species, and which has a middle subsistence in the soul, is allotted its essence according to a scientific and intellectual habit. Hence, it knows the essence of things, and loves to contemplate beautiful works and reasonings, and leads forth every thing into a measured and rhythmical interpretation. For you will find many progeny of good poets to be of this kind, emulous of those that are truly wise, full of admonition, the best counsels, and intellectual symmetry. It likewise extends the communication of prudence and every other virtue, to those of a naturally good disposition, and affords a reminiscence of the periods of the soul, of its eternal reasons and various powers.

“ The third species of poetry subsequent to these, is mingled with opinions and phantasies, receives its completion through imitation, and is said to be and is nothing else than imitative poetry. At one time, it alone uses assimilation, and at another time defends apparent and not real assimilation. It considerably raises very moderate passions, and astonishes the hearers ; together with appropriate appellations and words, mutations of harmonies and varieties of rhythms, changes the dispositions of souls ; and indicates the nature of things not such as they are, but such as they appear to the many ; being a certain adumbration and not an accurate knowledge of things. It also establishes as its end, the delight of the hearers ; and particularly looks to the passive part of the soul, which is naturally adapted to rejoice and be afflicted. But of this species of poetry, as we have said, one division is *assimilative*, which is extended to rectitude of imitation, but the other is *phantastic*, and affords apparent imitation alone.

“Such then, in short, are the genera of poetry. It now remains to show that these are also mentioned by Plato, and to relate such particulars as are conformable to his dogmas respecting each. And, in the first place, we shall discuss those wonderful conceptions respecting divine poetry which may be collected by him who does not negligently peruse his writings. For these things being previously determined, it will I think be easy to assign apt reasons respecting the subsequent species. In the Phædrus then, he denominates this divine poetry, ‘a possession from the Muses, and a mania, and says, that it is supernally imparted to a tender and solitary soul; but that its employment is to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, according to odes, and the rest of poetry, and its end to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite transactions of the ancients.’ From these words, it is perfectly evident that he calls the original and first-operating cause of poetry, the gift of the Muses. For as they fill all the other fabrications of the Father of the universe, both

the apparent and unapparent with harmony and rhythmical motion, in like manner in the souls which are possessed by them, they produce a vestige of divine symmetry which illuminates divinely-inspired poetry. But since the whole energy of the illuminating power is in divine advents, and that which is illuminated gives itself up to the motions proceeding from thence, and abandoning its own habits, spreads itself under the energies of that which is divine and uniform, on this account I think he denominates such an illumination a *possession* and *mania*. He calls it a *possession*, because the whole illuminated soul gives itself up to the present effect of illuminating deity; and a *mania*, because such a soul abandons its own proper energies for the peculiarities of the illuminating powers.

In the next place, he describes the habit of the soul possessed by the Muses, and says it ought to be *tender* and *solitary*. For a soul hard and resisting, and inobedient to divine

illumination, is disposed contrary to the energy of divinely-inspired possession; since it thus rather subsists from itself than from that which illuminates, and is incapable of being properly impressed with its gifts. But a soul which is possessed by other all-various opinions, and is filled with reasonings foreign from a divine nature, obscures divine inspiration, mingling with the motions thence derived its own lives and energies. It is requisite, therefore, that the soul which is to be possessed by the Muses, should be tender and solitary, that it may be properly passive to, and perfectly sympathize with divinity, and that it may be impassive, unreceptive, and unmingled with respect to other things.

“ In the third place, therefore, he adds the common employment of such an aptitude, and of possession and mania from the Muses. For to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, is the province both of that which illuminates and that which is illuminated, and which gives completion to the same thing; the former moving

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supernally, and the latter spreading itself under the moving cause. . Excitation is indeed a resurrection and unperverted energy of the soul, and a conversion to divinity from a lapse into generation. But Bacchic fury is a divinely-inspired motion, and an unwearied dance, as it were, towards a divine nature, giving perfection to the possessed. But again, both these are requisite, that the possessed may not incline to that which is worse, but may be easily moved to a more excellent nature.

“ In the fourth place he adds, that the end of this divine poetry is to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite deeds of the ancients. Hence, he evidently testifies that human affairs become more perfect and splendid when they are delivered from a divine mouth, and that true erudition is produced in the auditors of such poetry. Not that it is adapted to juvenile tuition, but pertains to those that are already perfect in politic discipline; and require a more mystic tradition respecting divine concerns. Such poetry, therefore, instructs the hearers

more than any other, when it is divine, and when its divine nature becomes manifest to its auditors. Hence, Plato very properly prefers this poetry which subsists from the Muses in tender and solitary souls, to every other human art. ‘For the poet,’ says he, ‘who approaches to the poetic gates without such a mania, will be imperfect; and his poetry, so far as it is dictated by prudence, will vanish before that which is the progeny of fury.’ In this manner, therefore, does Socrates in the Phædrus instruct us in the peculiarities of divine prophecy, and the teletic art, and refer its first unfolding into light, to the gods.

“With these things, also, what he says in the *Io* accords, when he is discoursing with the rhapsodist about this species of poetry: for here he most clearly evinces that the poetry of Homer is divine, and, to others that are conversant with it, is the cause of enthusiastic energy. For when the rhapsodist says, that he can speak copiously on the poems of Homer, but by no

means on the writings of other poets, Socrates assigning the reason of this says, 'It is not from art that you speak well concerning Homer, but because you are moved by a divine power.' And that this is true is indeed perfectly evident. For those who do any thing by art, are able to produce the same effect in all similars; but those that operate by a certain divine power about any thing which subsists with symmetry, can no longer thus operate with respect to other things, which necessarily have the same power. Whence, also, a power of this kind is derived to the rhapsodist, which particularly connects him with Homer, but no longer with other poets. Socrates afterwards teaches us, using the stone which is vulgarly called Herculean, as a most perspicuous example of the most perfect possession from the Muses:—'This stone then,' says he, 'not only draws to itself iron rings, but inserts in them a power attractive of things similar, so as to enable them to draw other rings, and form a chain of rings or pieces of iron, depending one from another.'

“ Let us in the next place hear what Socrates adds similar to these things, respecting divine poetry:—‘ Thus then,’ says he, ‘ the Muse makes men divine; and from these men thus inspired, others catching the sacred power, form a chain of divine enthusiasts.’ Here, in the first place, he speaks of the divine cause in the singular number, calling it the Muse, and not, ~~as~~ in the Phædrus, a possession from the Muses, and a mania pertaining to their whole multitude, that he may refer all the number of those that are moved enthusiastically, to one monad as it were, the primary principle of poetry. For poetry subsists uniformly and occultly in the first mover, but secondarily, and in a revolved manner, in poets moved by that monad, and lastly, in a ministrant degree in the rhapsodists, who are led back to this cause through poets as the media. In the next place, by extending divine inspiration supernally, as far as to the last mixtures, he evidently at the same time celebrates the fecundity of the first moving principle, and most clearly evinces the partici-

pation of the first participants. For that poets should be able to excite others by their poems to a divinely-inspired energy, indicates that there is a most conspicuous presence in them of a divine nature. Consequent to these things, therefore, he also adds what follows respecting the possession of poets. 'The best epic poets,' says he, 'and all such as excel in composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not their admirable poems from the rules of art; but possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best Lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses to be sung.' And again afterwards he says: 'For a poet is a thing light, and volatile, and sacred; nor is he able to write poetry till he becomes divine, and has no longer the command of his intellect.' And lastly, he adds: 'Hence it is that the poets, indeed, say many fine things whatever their subject be, just as you do concerning Homer; but not doing it through any rules of art, each of them is able to succeed, from a divine destiny, in that species of

poetry only to which he is impelled by the Muse.’

“ In all these citations, therefore, Plato evidently establishes divine poetry in a divine cause, which he calls a Muse; in this emulating Homer, who at one time looks to the multitude, and at another to the union of the series of the Muses; as when he says, ‘O Muses sing,’ and ‘Sing me the man, O Muse.’ In the middle of this principle of enthusiastic motions, and of the last echoes’ of inspiration beheld in rhapsodists according to sympathy, Plato establishes poetic mania, moving and being moved, supernally filled, and transferring to others the illumination which originates from thence, and which imparts one conjunction to the last participants with the participated monad.

“With these things, also, we may co-harmonize

’ For *αποχημάτων* in the original, read *απηχημάτων*.

what is said by the Athenian guest in the third book of the *Laws*, concerning poetry, and what Timæus says respecting poets. For the former says, 'that the poetic genus is divinely-inspired; that it composes sacred hymns, and, with certain Graces and Muses, relates many things that have been truly transacted;' and the latter exhorts us 'to follow poets inspired by Phœbus, as being the sons of gods, and knowing the concerns of their progenitors, though their assertions are not probable, and are unaccompanied with demonstrations.' From all which it is easy to understand what the opinion of Plato was concerning divine poetry, and the poets characterized according to it; and that these are especially messengers of divine names, and are in an eminent manner acquainted with the affairs of their fathers. When, therefore, he takes notice of mythical fictions, and corrects the more serious part of the writings of poets, such as those respecting bonds, castrations, loves, venereal connexions, tears and laughter, we must say that he also especially testifies that

these things are properly introduced, according to the theory which is concealed in these symbols, as under veils. For he who thinks that poets are particularly worthy of belief in affairs respecting the gods, though they speak without demonstration from divine inspiration, must certainly admire divine fables;¹ through which they deliver the truth concerning divine natures. And he who calls the poetic genus divine, cannot also ascribe to it an impious and gigantic opinion respecting divine concerns. He likewise who evinces that the assertions of poets are attended with certain Graces and Muses, must entirely consider an inelegant, unharmonious and ungraceful phantasy, as very remote from the theory of divine poets. When, therefore, in his Republic he establishes by law that poetry, and the indication through fables, are not adapted to the ears of youth, he is very far from despising poetry itself, but removes the juvenile habit, as unexercised in the hearing of

¹ Instead of reading *τοῖς ἐν τοῖς μύθοις*, after *θαυμάσεται*, I read *τοὺς ἐνθεοὺς μύθους*.

such things from fiction of this kind. For, as he says in the second Alcibiades, ‘the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical, and is not obvious to the understanding of every one.’ And hence in the Republic, he clearly says, ‘that a youth is not able to distinguish what is allegory, and what is not.’ We must say, therefore, that he entirely admits inspired poetry, which he calls divine, and thinks it proper that those by whom it is possessed should be venerated in silence. And thus much concerning the first kind of poetry, which subsists from a divine origin in tender and solitary souls.

“ In the next place, let us contemplate that species of poetry, which has a scientific knowledge of things, and which energizes according to intellect and prudence; which unfolds to men many names concerning an incorporeal nature, and leads forth into light many probable dogmas respecting a corporeal subsistence; investigates the most beautiful symmetry in manners, and the disposition contrary to this;

and adorns all these with proper measures and rhythms. The Athenian guest says, that the poetry of Theognis is of this kind, which he praises beyond that of Tyrtaeus, because Theognis is a teacher of the whole of virtue, and which extends to the whole political life. For the one admits a fidelity which receives its completion from all the virtues, expels from politics that most true vice, sedition, and leads into consent the lives of those that are persuaded. But the other praises the habit of fortitude by itself alone, and exhorts to this those that neglect the other virtues. It will, however, be better to hear the words themselves of Plato: ' We have too the poet Theognis a witness in our favour, who was a citizen of the Megarensians in Sicily, for he says,

Who faithful in insane sedition keeps,
With silver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We say, therefore, that such a one will conduct himself in the most difficult war, in a manner

¹ See the 1st book of the Laws.

nearly as much superior to the other, as justice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are superior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions without the whole of virtue.' Here, therefore, he admits Theognis, as partaking of political science, and all the virtues.

“ But in the second Alcibiades, defining the most right and safe mode of prayer, he refers it to a certain wise poet:—‘ To me, says he, Alcibiades, it seems probable that some wise man or other, happening to be connected with certain persons void of understanding, and observing them to pursue and pray for things, which it were better for them still to be without, but which appeared to them good, composed for their use a common prayer, the words of which are nearly these: King Jupiter, grant us what is good, be it or not the subject of our prayers, and avert from us what is evil though we should pray for it.’ For the scientific man alone knows how to distinguish the separation

of good and evil, and a converse with a divine nature adapted to the middle habits of men. And on this account Socrates calls the poet that composed this prayer a wise man, as forming a judgment of the natures of those that prayed, neither through divine inspiration, nor right opinion, but through science alone, as regarding their habits and preserving that which becomes the beneficent powers of the gods. For to convert all of them through prayer to the one royal providence of Jupiter; to suspend the subsistence of good from the power of divinity; to obliterate the generation of true evils through the benevolence of a more excellent nature, and in short to assert that these things are unknown to those that pray, but are separated by divinity according to proper boundaries, is the work of wisdom and science, and not of any thing casual. Very properly, therefore, do we say that such poetry is wise and scientific. For the poetry which is able to assign right opinions to middle habits, must itself subsist according to perfect science.

“ In the third place, therefore, let us speak concerning imitative poetry, which, we have already said, at one time assimilates things, and at another expresses them according to appearance. The Athenian guest clearly delivers to us the assimilative part of this poetry ; but Socrates in the Republic describes its phantastic part ; and how these differ from each other, I mean the assimilative and phantastic species of imitation, the Eleatean guest sufficiently informs us :—‘ For I appear, says he, to perceive two species of imitation, one, the conjectural or assimilative art, which then especially takes place when some one gives birth to imitation by imparting to every particular such things as are fit in length, breadth, and depth, according to the symmetries of its exemplar, and besides these things, colours also. *Theæ.* Do not all imitators endeavour to effect this? *Guest.* Not those who perform or paint any great works. For if they were to impart to them the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the parts above would appear smaller, and

those below larger than is fit; through the one being seen by us afar off, and the other near. *Theæ.* Entirely so. Artists, therefore, bidding farewell to truth, do not produce in images truly beautiful symmetries, but those which appear to be so.' Very properly therefore, I think, does the Eleatean guest, at the end of the dialogue, wishing to bind the sophist by the definitive method, establish one part of the art effective of images to be assimilative, and the other phantastic; the one fabricating the image such as is the exemplar, the other preparing that which it produces to appear like that which it imitates. However, of assimilative poetry, the Athenian guest speaks separately in the second book of the Laws, where he treats of music which does not make pleasure its end, but a true and similar imitation of its exemplar; to which place we refer the reader.

“ But Socrates, speaking in this book of phantastic poetry, and having shown that a poet of

this kind is the third from truth and imitative, compares such poetry to a picture, which represents not the works of nature but of artificers, and these not such as they are, but such as they appear. Hence, he clearly evinces that the phantastic species of poetry regards pleasure alone, and the delight of those that hear it. For of imitative poetry, the phantastic falls short of the assimilative, so far as the latter regards rectitude of imitation, but the former the pleasure produced in the multitude from the energies of the phantasy. Such then are the genera of poetry, which are thought worthy of distinction by Plato; one, as better than science, another as scientific, a third as conversant with, and a fourth as falling off from right opinion.

“ These things then being determined, let us return to the poetry of Homer, and contemplate resplendent in it every poetic habit, and particularly those which regard rectitude and

beauty. For when he energizes enthusiastically, is possessed by the Muses, and narrates mystic conceptions about the gods themselves ; then he energizes according to the first and divinely-inspired species of poetry. But when he relates the life of the soul, the diversities in its nature, and such political concerns as pertain to it, then he especially speaks scientifically. Again, when he presents us with forms of imitation adapted to things and persons themselves, then he employs assimilative imitation. But when he directs his attention to that which appears to the multitude, and not to the truth of things, and thus seduces the souls of his hearers, then he is a poet according to the phantastic species. To illustrate what I mean, that I may begin from the last imitation of the poet, he sometimes describes the rising and setting of the sun, not as each of these is, nor as each is effected, nor imitating this in his verses, but as it appears to us through distance. This, then, and every thing of this kind, may be called the phantastic part of his poetry.

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But when he imitates heroes warring, or consulting, or speaking according to the forms of life, some as prudent, others as brave, and others as ambitious, then I should say that this is the work of assimilative poetry. Again, when in consequence of knowing either the diversity of subsistence in the parts of the soul, he unfolds and teaches it, or the difference between the image, and the soul by which it is used, or the order of the elements in the universe, viz. of earth, water, æther, heaven, or any thing else of this kind, then I should confidently assert that this originated from the scientific power of poetry. And after all these, when he teaches us concerning the demiurgic monad, and the triple distribution of wholes, or concerning the bonds of Vulcan, or the connexion of the paternal intellection of Jupiter with the prolific divinity of Juno, then I should say that he is clearly enthusiastic, and that such-like fables are devised by him, in consequence of his being possessed by the Muses. But Homer himself also manifests, in the bard De-

modocus, an energy originating from the gods, when Ulysses says of his song, that he began it impelled by a god, that he was divinely-inspired, and that the Muse loved him, or the god that is the leader of the Muses :

The Muse, Jove's daughter, or Apollo taught
Thee aptly thus the fate of Greece to sing,
And all the Grecians' hardy deeds and toils.¹

And that Homer by Demodocus intended after a manner to represent himself,² and introduced him as a pattern of his own calamities, is an opinion sufficiently celebrated. And the verses,

With clouds of darkness quench'd his visual ray,
But gave him skill to raise the lofty lay,

appear directly to refer to the fabled blindness

¹ Odyss. lib. 8. v. 488.

² Homer never expressly mentions himself; but, as Dio Chrysostom justly observes, " he speaks in reality like the prophets of the gods from an unapparent place, and as it were from the adytum, or secret recess of a temple." *αλλα τω οντι, ωσπερ οι προφηται των θεων εξ αφανους και αδυτου, ποθεν φθεγγομενος.*

of Homer. He, therefore, clearly contends that Demodocus says what he does say from divine inspiration. But it is well that we have mentioned Demodocus, and his divinely-inspired song. For it appears to me that the musicians who are thought worthy of being mentioned by Homer, unfold the above-mentioned genera of poetry. For Demodocus, as we have said, was divinely inspired, both in narrating divine and human concerns, and is said to have suspended his music from divinity. But Phemius, the Ithacensian bard, is principally characterized according to a mere knowledge of divine and human affairs. For Penelope says to him :

*Alluring arts thou know'st, and what of old
Of gods and heroes sacred bards have told.**

The third is the lyrist of Clytemnestra, who was as it seems an imitative poet, employed right opinion, and extended the melodies of

* *Odyss. lib. 1.*

temperance to that female. Hence as long as he remained with her, she perpetrated no unholy deed, in consequence of her irrational life being charmed to temperance by disciplinative song. The fourth musician, may be placed as analogous to the phantastic species of poetry; and this is that *Thamyris*, with whose song the *Muses* being indignant, are said to have caused it to cease. For he was conversant with a music much more diversified and sensible, and calculated to please the vulgar. Hence he is said to have contended with the *Muses*, as preferring a more various music to that which is more simple and more adapted to those divinities, and as falling from the benevolence of the goddesses. For the anger of the *Muses* does not refer any passion to them; but indicates the inaptitude of *Thamyris* to their participation. This then is the song which is most remote from truth, which calls forth the passions of the soul, and is phantastic, and neither possesses, with respect to imitation, right opinion, nor science. We may, therefore, be

hold all the kinds of poetry in Homer, but particularly the enthusiastic, according to which we have said he is principally characterized. Nor are we singular in this opinion, but as we have before observed, Plato himself in many places calls him a divine poet, the most divine of poets, and in the highest degree worthy of imitation. But the imitative and at the same time phantastic poetry, has a most obscure subsistence in Homer; since he never uses it, but for the purpose of procuring credibility from the vulgar, and when it is perfectly unavoidable. As, therefore, if a man entering into a well-regulated city, and beholding intoxication there employed for a certain useful purpose, should neither imitate the prudence in the city, nor its whole order, but intoxication itself alone, as in this case the city is not to be blamed as the cause of his conduct, but the peculiar imbecility of his judgment; in like manner I think tragic poets being emulous of the last species of Homeric poetry, should refer the principle of their error not to Homer, but to

their own impotency. Homer, therefore, may be called the leader of tragedy, so far as tragic poets emulate him in other respects, and distribute the different parts of his poetry ; imitating *phantastically* what he asserts *assimilatively*, and adapting to the ears of the vulgar what he composes scientifically. Homer, however, is not only the teacher of tragedy (for he is this according to the last species of his poetry,) but likewise of the whole of that which is imitative in Plato, and of the whole theory of that philosopher."

Proclus concludes his apology for Homer with observing as follows: "The reason," says he, "as it appears to me, that impelled Plato to write with such severity against Homer and the imitative species of poetry, was the corruption of the times in which he lived ; for philosophy was then despised, being accused by some as useless, and by others entirely condemned. On the contrary, poetry was then held in immoderate admiration ; its imitative

power was the subject of emulation; it was considered as adequate alone to disciplinative purposes; and poets, because they imitated every thing, persuaded themselves that they knew all things, as is evident from what Socrates says in this dialogue [the Republic]. Hence Plato, indignant at the prevalence of such an opinion, shows that the poetic and imitative genus wanders far from the truth, which philosophy, the saviour of souls, imparts. For from the same benevolent wish through which he accuses the sophists, and popular orators, as unable to contribute any thing to virtue, he also blames the poets, and particularly the composers of tragedy, and such imitators as devise that which may charm their hearers, and not that which may promote virtue, and who enchant but do not instruct the multitude. But he considers Homer as deserving a similar reprehension because he is the leader of this species of poetry, and affords to tragedians the seeds of imitation. For thus it was requisite to recal the men of his age from astonishment respecting poetry,

through an immoderate attachment to which they neglected true discipline. With a view, therefore, to the instruction of the multitude, to correct an absurd phantasy, and exhort to a philosophic life, he reprobates the tragedians, who were then called public preceptors, as directing their attention to nothing sane, and at the same time remits his reverence for Homer, and, ranking him in the same class with tragic poets, blames him as an imitator.

“Nor is it wonderful that the same poet should be called by him, both divine and the third from the truth. For so far as he is possessed by the Muses, he is divine, but so far as he is an imitator, he is the third from the truth.”

III. With respect to the third of these treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics, it is necessary to observe, that the subject of ethics, or moral philosophy, is moral entity, (viz. things which have a relation to moral actions) and moral ac-

tions themselves, and that it teaches the mode of living worthily. But moral actions are those through which a man becomes good or bad, that is, through which he becomes adapted or unadapted to obtain beatitude, which is the ultimate end of man. And to live worthily, is to live in a manner adapted to the attainment of the ultimate end, or beatitude.

In the first place, therefore, moral philosophy considers man with reference to himself, not physically but ethically, that is, so far as he is capable of being worthy or depraved, and can be well or ill disposed with relation to beatitude. In the second place, it considers the energies of man, not only his internal, but also his external energies, so far as they are capable of being good or bad. And in the third place it considers the objects of these energies, so far as they can be worthy or depraved.

Because, likewise, moral philosophy demonstrates many conclusions concerning moral en-

tity, on this account it is a demonstrative science. And because again, it not only considers practical truths about moral entity, that is, those truths which contribute to action, but likewise many speculative truths, the knowledge of which does not contribute to action but to science, hence it is partly practical and partly speculative, though it is more the former than the latter, because moral entity is more principally considered on account of action, than on account of science.

Though moral philosophy, however, is a practical science, yet it is not properly either prudence or art. It is not art, because art is *a habit effective in conjunction with true reason, about those things which contribute to particular ends*. Thus, statuary is a habit producing a statue in conjunction with *true reason*, that is, with *infallible precepts*. And poetry is a habit producing a poem with true reason; while at the same time neither a poem nor a statue is the ultimate end of man, but each is only a

particular end. But moral philosophy is *a habit practical in conjunction with true reason, about those things which contribute to the ultimate end of man.* It likewise delivers the true method, and infallible precepts of regulating the whole of our life, and all our actions, so as that we may obtain beatitude. Again, moral philosophy differs from prudence, because prudence is *a habit determining what this man should do, and what is now to be done, in order to the attainment of the ultimate end ;* but moral philosophy alone determines universally, what is to be done in order to obtain this end, and not what this man should do, and what should now be done.

Hence, we infer that moral philosophy is *the science of living worthily, or that it is a science defining the ultimate end of man, and teaching universally the mode by which a man ought to regulate the whole of his life, and all his actions, in order to the attainment of such an end.*

Of moral philosophy, likewise, there are three parts, one which considers man with reference to himself, another which considers him as connected with a family, and a third which considers him as a member of the community. For man is naturally not a solitary, but a social animal; because since one man is not sufficient to himself for the purposes of living, and of living well, but requires the assistance of other men, every man is naturally a part of a certain multitude, and ought to live in the society of other men. But the society to which all other associations may be reduced is twofold, the one imperfect and insufficient, which is the society of those who live in one house and family; the other perfect, and sufficient to itself, which is the society of those who live in a city or kingdom. To a perfect city, however, it is necessary that it should contain every thing requisite to the purposes of living and of living well. And as the end of every man is the felicity of that man, so the end of a family, is the felicity of the family, and of a city, the felicity of the city.

Hence, because moral philosophy is a science disposing a man to the ultimate end, it ought not only to dispose every individual of the human species to the attainment of this end, but likewise a family, and a city or kingdom. That part of moral philosophy, therefore, which teaches how the actions of every man, considered with reference to himself, are to be regulated in order to his attainment of beatitude, is delivered by Aristotle in the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; and also in the two books entitled the *Great Ethics*; and in the seven books of *Ethics to Eudemus*. That part which teaches how the actions of a whole family are to be regulated, in order to the attainment of the ultimate end, is called *economic*, and is delivered by Aristotle in his two books of *Economics*. And that part which teaches how the actions of a whole city and kingdom are to be regulated in order to obtain felicity, is called *politic*, and is delivered by Aristotle in the eight books of his *Politics*. Because, likewise, it is more divine to procure the good of a whole

city or nation, than of a man, or one family ; hence, the political part of moral philosophy is more excellent and divine than the economical part, or than the part which relates to man considered with reference to himself.

I shall only observe farther, that the Nicomachean Ethics are so inscribed, because they were written by Aristotle to his son Nicomachus ; that the reader will derive great advantage by occasionally consulting the translation of the Paraphrase of an anonymous Greek writer on these ethics, by Mr. BRIDGMAN, as this translation is at once *perspicuous*, *accurate*, and *elegant* ; and that Aristotle, in his moral treatises, has delivered a system of ethics in all its parts scientific and perfect.

THE
ART OF RHETORIC.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC reciprocates with dialectic [or logic]; for both are conversant with such particulars, as being common may after a manner be known by all men, and pertain to no definite science. Hence, all men in a certain respect participate of both these; for all men to a certain extent endeavour to examine and sustain an argument, to defend and accuse. With respect to the multitude, therefore, some of them do these things casually; but others through custom from habit. Because, however, this is possible in both ways, it is evident that these particulars may also be reduced to a certain method. For it is possible to survey the cause why some men render what they assert probable, from custom, and others from chance. But all men now will acknowledge that a thing of this kind is the work of art.

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At present, therefore, those who compose the arts of orations [i. e. who unfold the art of rhetoric,] explain only a small part of rhetoric. For credibility is the only artificial part of the art; but the other parts are additions. The rhetoricians, however, of the present day, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substantial part of credibility; but their attention is for the most part directed to things foreign to the purpose. For accusation, pity, anger, and such like passions of the soul, do not pertain to the thing itself [which is to be proved,] but to the judge. Hence, if all judicial processes were conducted in the same manner as they are at present in some cities, and especially in those that are governed by good laws, these rhetoricians would not have any thing to say. For with respect to all cities, some think it necessary that the laws should thus ordain; but this method is adopted by others, and they forbid rhetoricians to say any thing foreign to the purpose, in the same manner as in the Areopagus. And in this respect they think rightly. For it is not proper to pervert the judge, by exciting him to anger, or envy, or pity; since this is just as if some one should make the rule distorted which he intends to use. Again, it is likewise manifest that the only business of the litigant is to show that a thing either is, or is not, or that it has, or has not been done. But with respect to such things as the legislator has not defined whether they are great or small, just or unjust, these ought to be known by the judge himself, and he is not to learn them from the litigants. It is especially requisite, therefore, that laws which are rightly framed should define all such particulars as can be defined, and leave very little to be defined by the judge. And, in the first place, indeed;

this is requisite, because it is more easy to obtain one person, or a few, than many that are intelligent and wise, and who are able to act the part of a legislator and a judge. In the next place, the establishment of laws, is the effect of a survey from a long series of past time ; but judgments are the result of a survey from recent times ; so that it is difficult for those who judge to attribute what is just and advantageous in a becoming manner. That, however, which is the greatest [reason] of all is, that the judgment of the legislator is not conversant with particulars, but with future events, and universals ; but the judgment of the barrister and the judge is directed to present and definite circumstances ; with which love and hatred and private advantage are frequently conjoined ; so that they are no longer sufficiently able to survey the truth, but their own peculiar pleasure or pain darkens their judgment. With respect to other particulars, therefore, it is necessary, as we have said, that very little should be left in the power of the judge. But with respect to the enquiry whether a thing has been done or not, or whether it will or will not take place, or is or is not, it is necessary that this should be left to the judges ; for it is not possible that these things should be foreseen by the legislator.

If then this be the case, it is evident that those rhetoricians who define [other parts of an oration except credibility] such for instance as what the proem or the narration should contain, and each of the other parts,—these exercise their art in things foreign to the purpose. For in these they effect nothing else except delivering the method by which the judge may be influenced ; but they demonstrate nothing respecting artificial credibility ;

viz. whence some one may become enthymematic [or possess the power of discovering artificial proofs of that which is the subject of controversy]. Hence, though there is the same method respecting popular, and judicial orations, and the popular is better and more political than the method pertaining to contracts, yet rhetoricians of the present day are silent as to the popular method, but all of them endeavour to unfold the art pertaining to the judicial genus, because it is less advantageous in popular orations to assert what is foreign to the purpose; and a popular oration is less pernicious than a judicial discussion, but is more common. For in the former the judge decides about appropriate concerns; so that nothing else is necessary than to show that the thing is as the counsellor asserts it to be. In judicial processes, however, this is not sufficient, but it is requisite to pay attention to the hearer; for the decision is concerning things of a foreign nature. Hence, the judges, looking to their own advantage, and regarding their own pleasure, gratify the litigants, but do not decide with justice. Hence, too, as I have before observed, in many places the law forbids any thing foreign to the purpose to be said; and in these places this law is sufficiently observed by the judges themselves.

Since, however, it is evident that the artificial method is conversant with credibility; but credibility is a certain demonstration; for we then especially believe in a thing when we think it is accompanied with demonstration; and a rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme; and this in short possesses the greatest authority of all credibilities; but an enthymeme is a certain syllogism, and it is the province either of the whole, or of a certain part

of dialectic to pay attention similarly to every syllogism ; this being the case, it is evident that he who is eminently capable of surveying this, viz. from what propositions and how, a syllogism may be made, he will be especially enthymematic, in consequence of assuming what the particulars are with which enthymemes are conversant, and what differences they possess with respect to logical syllogisms. For it is the province of the same power to perceive truth, and what is similar to truth ; and at the same time, men are by nature sufficiently adapted to [the perception of] truth, and for the most part obtain it. Hence, he who sagaciously conjectures probabilities, is disposed similarly to him who perceives truth. That others, therefore, artificially discuss things foreign to the purpose, and why they especially incline to judicial precepts, is evident [from what has been said].

But rhetoric is useful because things true and just are naturally more excellent than their contraries ; so that unless judgments are formed according to what is fit, what is more excellent will be vanquished by its contrary ; and this is a thing worthy of reprehension. Farther still, though we should possess the most accurate science, it is not easy when we speak to persuade some persons, by employing that science. For a scientific oration proceeds from discipline, and it is impossible from this [to persuade the unlearned,] but it is necessary [when addressing these,] to procure credibility, and frame arguments from such things as are common ; just as we have asserted in the Topics, respecting a conference with the multitude. Farther still, the power of being able to persuade contraries, [or the ability of disputing on each side of a question] is necessary, in the

same manner as in syllogisms, not in order that we may do both ; for it is not proper to persuade to what is base ; but that we may not be ignorant how contraries subsist, and that when another person employs those arguments unjustly, we may be able to solve them. No one, therefore, of the other arts syllogistically concludes contraries ; but this is alone effected by dialectic and rhetoric ; for both of them are similarly conversant with contraries ; though the things which are the subjects of their consideration do not subsist similarly, but always, as I may say, things which are true, and naturally more excellent, are more syllogistic, and adapted to procure persuasion. Besides, it is absurd, that it should be shameful for a man not to be able to give assistance to his body, and that it should not be shameful for him not to be able to assist himself by the reasoning power, which is more the peculiarity of man, than the use of the body. If, however, it should be objected that he who uses unjustly the rhetorical power, may injure others in a great degree, this objection is common to every thing that is good, except virtue, and especially to the most useful things, such as strength, health, riches, and military command. For he who uses things of this kind justly, may benefit others in the greatest degree, and by using them unjustly may effect the greatest injury.

That rhetoric, therefore, is not conversant with one certain definite genus, but resembles in this respect dialectic, and that it is useful is evident. It is likewise evident, that the employment of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to perceive on every subject what is adapted to procure persuasion, in the same manner as in all other arts. For it is not the business of medicine to produce

health, but to do every thing as much as possible which may procure it ; since the healing art may be well exercised upon those that are incapable of being restored to health. In addition likewise to what has been said, it is the province of the same power to perceive what is persuasive, and what appears to be so, just as it is the province of dialectic to discern what is a [true,] and what is only an *apparent* syllogism. For the sophistical art does not consist in the power [of reasoning,] but in deliberate choice; except that here indeed [viz. in the rhetorical art,] one man will be a rhetorician from science, but another from deliberate choice. There, however, [viz. in dialectic or logic,] the sophist, indeed, is from deliberate choice, but the logician is not from deliberate choice, but from the power [of reasoning.]

CHAPTER II.

Now, therefore, we shall endeavour to speak concerning the method itself, [i. e. the rhetorical art] and [show] how, and from what particulars we may be able to obtain the end proposed by this art. Again, therefore, as if defining from the beginning, let us discuss what remains. Let rhetoric then be *the power of perceiving in every thing that which is capable of producing persuasion ;*

for this is the employment of no other art; since each of the other arts is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is the subject of its consideration. Thus, for instance, medicine is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is salubrious and morbid; geometry, about the properties accidental to magnitudes; and arithmetic about number. The like also takes place in the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, appears to be able to survey about any given thing, what is adapted to produce persuasion. Hence, also, we say, that it does not possess an artificial power about any certain peculiar definite genus.

With respect, however, to things which procure credibility, some of them are without art, but others are artificial. And I call those without art, which are not devised by us, but exist prior [to all artificial invention,] such as witnesses, questions, writings, and other particulars of the like kind; but those are artificial which are capable of being procured methodically, and by us; so that it is requisite to use the former, and discover the latter.

Of the credibility, however, which is procured by argument there are three species. For one kind indeed consists in the manners of the speaker; another in the disposition of the hearer; and the third in the argument itself, in consequence of demonstrating, or appearing to demonstrate. Credibility, therefore, is procured through manners, when the oration is delivered in such a way, as to render the speaker worthy of belief. For about every thing, in short, we believe the worthy in a greater degree, and more rapidly; but in those particulars in

which an accurate knowledge cannot be obtained, and which are ambiguous, we entirely confide in [the decision of] the worthy. It is, however, requisite that this also should happen through the oration, and not [entirely] from any previous opinion respecting the speaker. For we must not admit what some teachers of rhetoric have asserted in their art, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasion; since nearly, as I may say, manners possess the most powerful and principal credibility. But credibility is procured through the hearers, when their passions are influenced by the oration; for we do not similarly form a judgment when we grieve or rejoice, love or hate; to which [species of credibility,] we assert that those who now deliver the art of rhetoric, alone direct their attention. Each of these particulars, however, will be elucidated by us, when we speak concerning the passions. But belief is produced through arguments, when we show what is true, or appears to be true from the probabilities pertaining to the several objects of enquiry. Since, however, credibility is effected through these things, it is evident that to obtain the three species of it [above-mentioned] is the province of him who is able to syllogize, who can survey what pertains to manners and the virtues, and in the third place what pertains to the passions, what each of them is, what quality it possesses, and from what particulars it is ingenerated [in the hearer,] and how; so that it happens that rhetoric is as it were something which grows upon dialectic and the discussion concerning manners, and it is just to call it political. Hence, rhetoric assumes the form of the political [science,] and those who profess it, do so partly through ignorance, partly from arrogance, and partly from other human causes. For it is a certain par-

tion and resemblance of dialectic, as we observed in the beginning of this treatise. For neither of them is the science of any thing definite, and which shows how a thing subsists, but they are certain powers of procuring arguments. And thus we have nearly spoken sufficiently concerning the power which they possess, and how they subsist with respect to each other.

With respect, however, to proof either real or apparent, in the same manner as in dialectic, one kind is induction, another is [a true] syllogism, and a third is apparent syllogism; thus, also, similarly in rhetoric; for example, indeed, is induction; but enthymeme is a syllogism. But I call enthymeme, indeed, a rhetorical syllogism; and example a rhetorical induction. All [rhetoricians], however, who procure belief by the proofs which they adduce, effect it, either by the examples which they bring, or by enthymemes; and in a certain respect, there is nothing else besides these. Hence, if in short it is necessary to point out any person or thing by syllogism or induction, (but this is evident to us from the analytics) it is necessary that each of those should be the same with each of these. But what the difference is between example and enthymeme is evident from the Topics. For there syllogism and induction are previously discussed; because if it is shown in many and similar things that what we assert is true, *there* indeed it is induction, but *here* it is example. When, however, certain things existing, something else besides happens from these, because these subsist either universally, or for the most part;—when this is the case, *there*, indeed, it is called syllogism, but *here* enthymeme. But it is evident that each form of rhetoric is benefited [by these two]. For

the like to what we have observed in the Methodical treatises takes place, also, in this treatise. For some orations are of the nature of examples, but others are enthymematic. And in a similar manner with respect to rhetoricians, some are delighted with examples, and others with enthymemes. Arguments, therefore, from examples are no less calculated to persuade [than others,] but those from enthymemes cause greater perturbation. But the reason of this, and how each of these [viz. of examples and enthymemes] is to be used, we shall hereafter explain.

Now, however, let us more fully and clearly discuss these very particulars themselves. For that which is persuasive, is persuasive to some one. And one thing, indeed, is immediately of itself persuasive and credible; but another, because it appears to be proved through things that are credible. No art, however, speculates that which is particular. Thus for instance, medicine does not speculate what is salubrious to Socrates or Callias, but what is so to such a one, or to such persons [in general]; for this is artificial. But particulars are infinite, and are not the objects of science. Nor does rhetoric speculate opinable particulars; such as what is the subject of opinion to Socrates or Hippias, but that which is the subject of opinion to such or such persons, in the same manner as dialectic. For dialectic, also, syllogizes, not from such things as are casual; since certain things appear [to be credible] even to those that are delirious; but dialectic syllogizes from such things as require to be developed by a reasoning process, and rhetoric from such things as are accustomed to take place in consultation. The employment, however, of rhetoric consists in

such particulars as are the subject of our consultation, and respecting which we have no art, and it is also conversant with such hearers as are incapable of perceiving [a conclusion which is deduced] through many [media,] or of syllogizing remotely, [i. e. who are incapable of a long series of reasoning.] But we consult about those things the subsistence of which appears to be possible in both ways, [i. e. which may subsist otherwise than they do.] For with respect to such things as cannot either in the past, or future, or present time, have a different subsistence, no one consults about these, conceiving that they thus subsist. For it is not possible for any one to consult otherwise than thus [about things of this kind.] But it is possible to syllogize and collect, some things, indeed, from such particulars as have been previously syllogistically inferred, but others from things not inferred by syllogism, but which require syllogism, because they are not probable. And it is necessary, indeed, with respect to these, that the consecution of the one should not be easy, on account of its length; for the judge is supposed to be simple; and that the other should not be adapted to persuade, because it does not proceed from things acknowledged, nor from such as are probable. Hence, it is necessary that enthymeme and example should be conversant with such things as for the most part admit of a various subsistence. And example, indeed, requires induction; but enthymeme, syllogism. It is, likewise, necessary that enthymeme and example should consist from a few things, and frequently from fewer than those from which the first syllogism consists. For if any one of these is known, it is not necessary to say any thing [farther;] since the hearer himself will add this. Thus for instance, for the purpose

of concluding that Doricus was victorious in that contest in which the victors were crowned, it is sufficient to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games; but there is no occasion to add that he was crowned because he conquered in the Olympic games; for this is known by all men.

There are, however, a few necessary things from which rhetorical syllogisms consist; for many of the particulars which are the subjects of judgment and consideration, may have a various subsistence, or subsist otherwise than they do; since men make their actions the subjects of their consultation and consideration. All actions, likewise, belong to the genus of things which are contingent, and no one of these, as I may say, is from necessity; but things which are for the most part accidental and contingent, must necessarily be syllogistically collected from other things which are of the like kind; and such as are necessary must be deduced by syllogism from necessary propositions. But this is evident to us from the *Analytics*. This then being the case, it is manifest that with respect to those things from which enthymemes are deduced, some, indeed, are necessary, but most of them are such as have a frequency of subsistence. For enthymemes are deduced from probabilities and signs; so that it is necessary each of these should be the same with each.¹ For the probable is that which subsists for the most part; but not simply, according to the definition of some persons. That, however, which is assumed respecting things which may have a various subsistence has the same relation to that to which the

¹ i. e. The propositions from which enthymemes are deduced are the same with probabilities and signs.

probable is directed, as universal to particular. But with respect to signs, one, indeed, has such a subsistence as some one of particulars to that which is universal; but another, as some one of universals to that which is particular. And of these signs, that, indeed, which is necessary, is an argument; but that which is not necessary, is anonymous according to difference. I call, therefore, those things necessary from which syllogism is produced; on which account, also, a sign of this kind is *tekmerion*, or an argument. For when rhetoricians fancy that what they say cannot be solved, then they think they have adduced an argument, as being something proved and definite. For *tekmar*, and *bound*, or *limit*, are the same, according to the ancient tongue. With respect to signs, however, that indeed which subsists as particular to universal, is just as if some one should say it is a sign that wise are just men; for Socrates was wise and just. This, therefore, is a sign; but what has been asserted though true may be solved; for it is unsyllogistic. The following, however, as, for instance, if some one should say, it is a sign that a certain person is diseased, for he has a fever; or that some female has been delivered, because she has milk, are necessary signs; and which are the only signs that are *tekmeria*. For these alone if true cannot be solved. But that which subsists as universal to particular, is as if some one should say, it is a sign that a certain person has a fever; for he breathes short and frequently. This, however, may be solved though it is true. For it is possible that one who has not a fever may labour under a difficulty of breathing. We have, therefore, now shown what the probable, a sign, and an argument, are, and in what they differ from each other. These, however, are more

clearly unfolded in the Analytics, where, also, it is shown from what cause some of them are unsyllogistic, but others are syllogistically deduced. And with respect to example, that it is indeed induction, and what the subjects are about which it is an induction, we have already shown. It is, however, neither as a part to the whole, nor as the whole to a part, nor as whole to whole; but that which is as a part to a part, and as the similar to the similar, when both are under the same genus, but the one is more known than the other, is example. Thus for instance, that Dionysius endeavoured to establish a tyrannical government, when he required a guard, is an example; for Pisistratus, who prior to him attempted the same thing, demanded a guard, and having obtained it, tyrannized [over the Athenians;] and Theagenes over the Megarensians. All such others, likewise, as are known [to have acted in this manner] become an example of Dionysius, with respect to whom it is not yet known whether he requires a guard with a view to a tyrannical government. All these, however, are under the same universal, viz. that he aspires after a tyranny who requires a guard. And thus we have shown what the particulars are from which the credibility that appears to be demonstrative is derived.

CHAPTER III.

WITH respect to enthymemes, however, there is a great difference, of which nearly all [the professors of rhetoric] are particularly ignorant, and which is conversant with the dialectic method of syllogisms. For some enthymemes pertain to rhetoric, just as some syllogisms subsist according to the dialectic method; but others pertain to other arts and faculties, some of which are in existence, and others are not yet discovered. Hence, they are not understood by those that hear them, and if rhetoricians employ them more than is fit, they relinquish their own art, and exchange it for some other. But what we have said, will become more evident, by a more copious discussion. For I say that dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms are those which are formed from propositions derived from certain places. And these are such as are conversant in common about things that are just and natural, and about political concerns, and many things which are specifically different; such for instance as the place respecting the more and the less. For we cannot in any greater degree syllogize from this place, or produce an enthymeme from it respecting what is just or natural, than respecting any thing else; though these things are specifically different. But peculiar or proper syllogisms are those which consist from propositions pertaining to each species and genus. Thus, for instance, the propo-

sitions respecting natural things are those from which neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism respecting ethics can be formed. And ethical enthymemes are those which are formed from propositions peculiar to ethical subjects, and from which physical enthymemes cannot be produced. The like, also, take place in every subject. And those [dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms,] indeed, do not render a man wise in any kind of discussion, because they are not conversant with any [definite] subject; but with respect to these [that are peculiar and appropriate,] in proportion as the selection of them is better, in such proportion will he who makes the selection latently produce a science different from dialectic and rhetoric. For if he should happen to meet with the principles [of any science] the peculiar syllogisms will no longer pertain either to dialectic or rhetoric, but to that science of which he possesses the principles.

Most enthymemes, however, are derived from those forms which are particular and proper; and a few of them are derived from common [places.] As in the Topics, therefore, so here the species and the places of enthymemes, from whence they are to be assumed, must be distinguished. But I call species, indeed, the peculiar propositions according to each genus; and places, those propositions which are similarly common to all genera. We shall, therefore, speak first concerning the species.

And in the first place we shall assume the genera of rhetoric, in order that we may ascertain how many there are, and with respect to these we shall separately assume the elements and the propositions. But the genera of rhetoric are three in number; for so many, also, are the

auditors of orations. For an oration is composed from three things, from the speaker, from the thing about which he speaks, and from the person to whom he speaks. The end, also, [of the speaker] is directed to this last; I mean to the hearer. But it is necessary that the auditor should either be a spectator or a judge; and that the judge should be a judge either of things past or future. He, however, who judges of future events, is as it were one who speaks in an assembly; but he who judges of past events, is as it were one who determines causes; and he who judges of the power [of the oration,] is as it were a spectator. Hence, there will necessarily be three genera of rhetorical orations, the deliberative, or that which pertains to counsel, the judicial, and the demonstrative. But of counsel, one part is exhortation, and another dehortation. For always, both those who privately give counsel, and those who publicly harangue, do one of these, [i. e. either exhort, or dissuade.] Of judgment, however, one part is accusation, but another defence. For those that are engaged in controversy must necessarily do one or other of these. But of the demonstrative, one part is praise, and another blame. There are, also, times appropriated to each of these, to him who gives counsel, indeed, the future; for he consults about future events, and concerning these either exhorts, or dissuades. But the time which is adapted to him who judges, is the past; for always concerning things which have been done, one accuses, and another apologizes. And to him who demonstrates, the most

¹ It must be carefully observed, that *demonstration* in rhetoric means only the *probable proof* of a thing, and not, as in science, a *sylogistic process* from self-evident principles, the conclusions of which process are always *necessarily true*.

appropriate time is the present ; for all those who demonstrate praise or blame according to existing circumstances. Frequently, however, they employ the past time for the purpose of recollecting, and they form a conjecture of future events.

But the end to each of these is different ; and as there are three persons there are three ends ; to him who gives counsel, indeed, the end is that which is advantageous and detrimental. For the advice of him who exhorts is directed to that which is better ; but he who dissuades, **dissuades from that which is worse ; and at the same time they assume other things with a view to this, viz. either the just or the unjust, either the beautiful in conduct, or the base.** But to those who judge in courts of judicature, the end is the just and the unjust ; and they also assume other things with a view to these. And to those that praise and blame, the end is the beautiful and the base in conduct ; and they likewise refer other things to these. **An indication, however, that the end to each of these, is what we have said it is, is this, that sometimes there is no controversy about other things.** Thus for instance, he who is tried will assert that the thing was not done, or that he has committed no injury ; but he will never acknowledge that he has acted unjustly ; for if he did, the trial would be unnecessary. In like manner, those who give counsel frequently admit other things, but will not acknowledge that they have advised what is disadvantageous, or that they have dissuaded from what is beneficial. Frequently, however, they are not at all concerned whether it is not unjust to enslave the neighbouring people, and those who have done them no injury. In like manner, also, those who praise, and those who

blame, do not consider whether the subject of their praise or blame has acted advantageously or perniciously, but frequently applaud him because, disregarding his own interest, he performed some worthy action. Thus for instance, they praise Achilles, because he gave assistance to his friend Patroclus, though he knew it was necessary that he should die himself [by giving this assistance,] and that it was in his power to live. But to Achilles, indeed, a death of this kind was more honourable; and to live, more advantageous.

From what has been said, however, it is evident that it is necessary to possess in the first place propositions about these things. For arguments (*tecmeria*), probabilities, and signs, are rhetorical propositions. For in short, syllogism is from propositions; but enthymeme is a syllogism consisting from the above-mentioned propositions.

Since, however, impossibilities cannot be performed either at present or in future, but this can only be asserted of possibilities; and since, likewise, it is not possible that things which are neither done, nor will be done, should be performed at present, or in future, it is necessary that he who counsels, he who judges, and he who demonstrates, should possess propositions concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done or not, and whether it will be or not. Farther still, since all those who praise and blame, who exhort and dissuade, who accuse and defend, not only endeavour to show the particulars we have mentioned, but also something which is great or small, good or evil, beautiful or base, just or unjust, whether they speak of these

things by themselves, or compare them with each other, this being the case, it is evident that it is requisite to have propositions concerning magnitude and parvitude, the greater and the less, the universal and the particular; such for instance as what is a greater or less good, an unjust, or a just action; and in a similar manner in other things. And thus we have shown what the things are concerning which it is necessary to assume propositions.

CHAPTER IV.

IN the next place, a distinction must be peculiarly made respecting each of these; as for instance, what the subjects of consultation are; with what demonstrative orations are conversant; and in the third place what the subjects are about which judgments are employed. In the first place, therefore, it must be assumed what the kind of good or evil is about which he who advises counsels; since he does not give counsel about all things, but about such as may happen to be or not. But with respect to such things as necessarily either are or will be, or which cannot possibly exist, about these there is no consultation. Hence, neither is there consultation about all contingent events. For there are some goods from nature, and some from fortune, which notwithstanding

they are contingent, and may or may not be, yet consultation contributes nothing to them. But it is evident that consultation is respecting such things as are naturally adapted to be referred to us, and the principle of the generation of which is in our power. For our attention is exerted thus far, till we find whether it is possible or impossible for us to perform such things.

Accurately, therefore, to enumerate the several particulars, and to distribute into species the subjects of popular discussion; and besides this, to determine according to truth as much as is possible concerning them, it is not necessary at present to investigate, because it is not the province of the rhetorical art, but of an art more allied to wisdom, and more true; for even now much more is attributed to rhetoric than pertains to its proper theorems. For that which we have before observed is true, that rhetoric is composed indeed from the analytic science, and from that political science which is conversant with morals; and it is partly similar to dialectic, and partly to sophistical arguments. In proportion, however, as any one endeavours to discuss either dialectic or rhetoric, not as powers, but as sciences, so far he ignorantly destroys the nature of them, by migrating through this attempt into the sciences of certain subject *things*, instead of alone making a transition into the powers or faculties of *words*. At the same time, we shall now speak of whatever it is indeed requisite to distinguish, and which leaves matter of consideration to the political science. For nearly the subjects which are discussed by all those who give counsel, are especially five in number; and these are, concerning wealth, war, and peace; and besides these, the defence of the country, exports and imports; and legislation.

Hence, it is requisite that he who is to give counsel about wealth, should know the revenues of the country, what they are, and how, if they are deficient, an addition may be made to them; and how, if they are too small, they may be augmented. It is likewise necessary that he should be acquainted with all the expenses of the city, and know how any unnecessary expense may be removed, and that which is greater [than is fit] may become less. For men not only become richer by an accumulation of property, but also by a decrease of expense. And these things may not only be surveyed from the experience of private affairs; but in order to give counsel about these, it is necessary to be skilled in what has been discovered by others.

With respect however to war and peace, it is necessary to know the power of the city, what the forces of it are at present, how great they may be, what the nature of the strength is which is possessed, and what addition may be made to it; and farther still, what wars the city has had, and how they have been conducted. And it is not only necessary that he who gives counsel should understand these concerns of his own country, but also those of the neighbouring countries. He should likewise be particularly acquainted with those cities against which it is thought fit to wage war, in order that peace may be made with the more powerful, and war undertaken against the less powerful, if requisite. He must also know the forces of these cities, whether they are similar or dissimilar. For in these, it is possible to be superior or inferior. It is likewise necessary for this purpose, that he should not only have surveyed the wars of his own country, but likewise the event of the wars of other countries.

For similars are naturally adapted to be known from similars.

Farther still, with respect to the defence of the country, it is requisite not to be ignorant how it may be defended, but to know the multitude of its defenders, and the form of the defence, and the places proper for garrisons. This knowledge, however, cannot be possessed by him who is unacquainted with the country. For such knowledge is necessary, in order that if the defence is less [than it ought to be] it may be increased; that if superfluous it may be taken away; and that garrisons may be formed in more appropriate places.

Again, it is requisite to know what expense is necessary to supply the city with provision, what the country will afford, and what must be supplied from abroad. What commodities are fit to be imported, and what exported, in order that conventions and compacts may be considered accordingly. For there are two descriptions of men with whom it is necessary the citizens should preserve themselves blameless, viz. with those that are more powerful, and with those that are beneficial to them [in a commercial point of view].

And it is necessary, indeed, to be able to survey all these particulars for the sake of security; and in no small degree for the purpose of understanding the business of legislation. For the safety of the city is in the laws. Hence, it is necessary to know how many forms of government there are, what kind of things are advantageous to each, and by what they are naturally adapted to be corrupted, both among things appropriate and contrary

to the polity. But I say, governments are corrupted by things appropriate, because all other polities except that which is the best, are corrupted by remission and intention. Thus for instance, a democracy, not only becomes more imbecile by remission, so as at length to arrive at an oligarchy, but it is also weakened by vehement intention ; just as an aquiline and a flat nose, not only arrive at mediocrity by remission, but likewise when they become very aquiline or flat, cause the nose to be so disposed, that it no longer appears to be a nostril. It is moreover useful for the purpose of legislation, not only to understand what is advantageous to a polity, by a survey of past events, but also to know the condition of other polities, and what is adapted to each. Hence it is evident that travelling is useful for the purposes of legislation ; since from hence the laws of nations may be obtained. But the knowledge of history is requisite to political counsels. All these particulars, however, are the business of politics, and not of rhetoric. Such, therefore, are the principal things which he who intends to give counsel ought to possess.



CHAPTER V.

LET us again, however, enumerate the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort or dissuade, both respect-

ing these, and other things. But nearly, both privately to each individual, and in common to all men, there is a certain scope, to which choice and aversion are directed; and this is, in short, felicity, and the parts of it. Hence, for the sake of an example, we shall assume what felicity is, and from what the parts of it consist. For all exhortations and all dissuasions are conversant with this, and with the things which contribute to it, and the contraries to this. For it is necessary to perform such things as procure this felicity, or a certain part of it, or which render it greater instead of less; and not to do those things which corrupt or impede felicity, or produce its contraries.

Let felicity, therefore, be [defined to be] *acting well in conjunction with virtue; or, a life sufficient to itself; or, the most pleasant life in conjunction with security; or, a prosperous condition of possessions and the body, together with a power of preserving and effecting these.* For nearly all men acknowledge that felicity is one, or more than one of these.

If, therefore, felicity is a thing of this kind, it is necessary that the parts of it should be, nobility of birth, an abundance of friends, and these such as are worthy men, riches, a numerous progeny, and a good old age; and besides these, the virtues of the body, such as health, beauty, strength, magnitude, agonistic power; glory, honour, and prosperity; virtue, or also the parts of it, prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. For thus a man will be most sufficient to himself, if both internal and external goods are present with him; for there are no other goods besides these. But internal goods, in-

deed, are both those which pertain to the soul, and those which pertain to the body ; and external goods are, nobility of birth, friends, riches and honour ; and besides these, we think it requisite that power and fortune should be present. For thus life will be most secure.

In a similar manner, therefore, we shall assume what each of these is. Nobility of birth then both to a nation and a city is when the people are indigenous or ancient, and their first leaders or commanders are illustrious men, and when many persons illustrious in those things which are the objects of emulation are the progeny of these. But private nobility is derived either from men, or from women, and a legitimate procreation from both. And in this nobility as well as in that of a city, it is requisite that the first authors of the race, should be illustrious either in virtue or in riches, or in something else which is honourable, and likewise that many illustrious men and women, young and old, should be the progeny of this genus.

With respect to a good and numerous offspring it is not immanifest what it is. But in a community, a good offspring is a multitude of young and worthy children ; who are worthy, indeed, according to the virtue of the body, as for instance, in magnitude, beauty, strength, and agonistic power ; and according to the virtue of the soul, in temperance and fortitude, which are the virtues of youth. Privately, however, the offspring is good and numerous, if the proper children, both male and female, are many and worthy. But the corporeal virtue of females is, beauty and magnitude ; and the virtues of their soul are, temperance and sedulity without illiberality. It

is requisite, therefore, to investigate both privately and publicly the existence of each of these virtues, in men and in women ; for where these virtues are wanting in the women, as is the case with the Lacedæmonians, such women are scarcely half happy.

The parts of wealth, however, are money, a great quantity of land, and the possession of farms ; and besides these, furniture, cattle, and slaves which are remarkable for their multitude, magnitude and beauty. All these possessions, likewise, ought to be secure, free, and useful. But those are more useful which are profitable ; those are free which are subservient to enjoyment ; I call those profitable which yield a revenue ; and those consist in enjoyment, in which nothing is estimable besides the use. But the definition of security, indeed, is for a man to possess what he has in such a place and in such a manner, that the use of it may be in his power ; and so that it may be his own property or not, when it is in his power to alienate it. But I call alienation giving and selling. In short, riches consist more in use than in possession. For the energy and the use of things of this kind are riches.

Renown is to be esteemed by all worthy persons, or it is the possession of a thing of such a kind as is desired by all men, or which many, or good, or wise men desire.

But honour is an indication of beneficent renown. And those, indeed, who have benefited others, are justly and especially honoured ; though he likewise is honoured who is able to benefit. But beneficence is that which either pertains to safety, and such things as are the causes

of existence, or to wealth, or to some other of those goods, the possession of which is not easy ; and this either entirely, or in this place, or at a certain time. For many persons obtain honour from things which appear to be small ; but the modes and the occasions are the causes of it. The parts of honour, however, are, sacrifices, eulogies in prose and verse, rewards, sacred groves, precedency in sitting, sepulchres, statues, and public salaries; barbaric honours, such as adoration by inclining the body, giving place, and gifts which are universally valued. For a gift is the donation of possession, and an indication of honour. Hence, the ambitious and the avaricious are desirous of gifts ; since gifts contain in themselves what each of these require. For possession is that which the avaricious desire, and it is also attended with honour, after which the ambitious aspire.

But the virtue of the body is health, and this in such a way as to render those who use the body, free from disease. For many persons are healthy, as Herodicus is said to be ; and yet no one will proclaim them to be happy on account of health, because [like Herodicus] they abstain from all or the greater part of human concerns. With respect to beauty it is different in every age. The beauty, therefore, of a young man is to have a body useful for the endurance of labour, viz. for the course, and for violent action, and which is also pleasing to the view. Hence, those that contend in the five games are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted both to violent action, and celerity. But the beauty of him who is in the acme of life, is to be capable of warlike labours, and to be terribly pleasing to the view. And the beauty of an old man, is to have a body sufficiently

adapted to necessary labours, but without pain, because he has none of those diseases with which old age is defiled. Strength, also, is the power by which a man moves another thing as he pleases; and it is necessary to move another thing, either by drawing, or impelling, or lifting, or compressing, or crushing; so that he who is strong is strong in all, or in some of these. But the virtue of magnitude is to excel the multitude in length, depth, and breadth, so that the motions of the body may not be rendered slower, by this excess [of magnitude]. And the agonistic virtue of the body is composed from magnitude, strength, and celerity; for he who is swift is strong; since he who is able to hurl forth his legs in a certain respect, and to move them with celerity, and to a great distance, is a racer. But he who can grapple and hold fast, is a wrestler. He who can drive another person away by a blow, is a pugilist; and he who can do both these, is a pancratiast. But he who excels in all these, is a pentathlian, or skilled in the five games.

A good old age, also, is, when age slowly approaches unattended with pain. For neither has a man a good old age, if he becomes rapidly old; nor if he becomes old with difficulty, but attended with pain. A good old age, however, consists from the virtues of the body and from the goods of fortune. For an old age which is neither free from disease nor strong, will not be impassive to maladies, and will not be unattended with pain, or possess longevity; nor can it be permanent without [the goods of] fortune. There is, however, another certain power of living long separate from strength and health. For many live long without the virtues of the

body; but an accurate discussion of these things is of no use at present.

But what the friendship of many and worthy persons is, will not be immanifest from the definition of a friend. A friend, therefore, is one who performs those things for the sake of his friend which he thinks will be beneficial to him; and he who has many such, has many friends; but he with whom such men are worthy persons has worthy friends.

Moreover, prosperity consists in those goods of which fortune is the cause that either all, or most, or the greatest of these befall us. But fortune is the cause of some things, indeed, of which the arts are the cause; and likewise of many and inartificial things, as for instance, such as those of which nature is the cause. Sometimes, however, it happens that these are preternatural. For art, indeed, is the cause of health; but nature of beauty and magnitude. And in short, those goods are from fortune which are attended with envy. Fortune, also, is the cause of those goods which are contrary to reason; as when all the rest of the brothers are deformed, and one alone is beautiful; or when all the rest did not see the treasure, and one alone discovered it; or when the next person happens to be pierced with an arrow, but this man escapes; or when only one person did not come to a place where others were accustomed to come, but others who only came to it at that time were destroyed. For all such circumstances appear to be the effect of good fortune.

With respect to virtue, however, because it is a topic

most adapted to applause, we shall then discuss it when we speak concerning praise. And thus we have shown what ought to be our aim in persuading or dissuading whether in reference to things present or future. For persuasion is contrary to dissuasion.

CHAPTER VI.

SINCE, however, the profitable is the scope proposed by him who counsels; but men counsel not concerning the end, but those things which refer to the end; and these are such as are advantageous to action; but that which is advantageous is good;—this being the case, the elements must be assumed of the good and the advantageous simply considered.

Let good, therefore, be that which is itself eligible for its own sake; and for the sake of which we chuse something else. Let it, also, be that which all things desire, or which all things desire that have sense or intellect, or would desire if they had. Let it, likewise, be such things as intellect dictates to every one; and whatever the intellect of each person dictates to each, this is the good of each. It is, also, that which when present causes its possessor to be well disposed, and sufficient to himself; and is self-sufficiency. It is, likewise, that which produces or preserves things of this kind; to which things of this kind are consequent; and which prevents the

contraries, and such things as are corruptive of these. But things of this kind are consequent to food in a twofold respect; either at once or afterwards. Thus, for instance, scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline; but life subsists at one and the same time with health. And the efficient causes have a threefold subsistence, some, indeed, [in the genus of the formal cause] as to be well is effective of health; others [in the genus of the efficient cause] as food is productive of health; and others [in the genus of the disposing cause] as exercise, because this for the most part produces health.

These things, therefore, being admitted, it is necessary that the assumptions of things good and the rejections of things evil should be good; for the non-possession of evil is at once consequent to the former; and the possession of good to the latter. The assumption, likewise, of a greater instead of a less good, [is consequent to these,] and of a less instead of a greater evil. For that by which the greater surpasses the less, becomes the assumption of the one, and the rejection of the other. It is, likewise, necessary that the virtues should be good. For those who possess them are from these well disposed, and become effective of and practically good. With respect to each virtue, however, what it is, and what quality it possesses, we must speak separately. It must also be admitted that pleasure is good; for all animals naturally aspire after it; so that things which are pleasant and beautiful are necessarily good; since these are productive of pleasure. But of things which are beautiful, some indeed are pleasant; but others are themselves eligible by themselves. That we may, however, speak of them severally, it is necessary that the following

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things should be good : felicity ; for it is eligible for its own sake, is sufficient to itself, and we choose many things for the sake of it. Justice, likewise, fortitude, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of this kind, [are necessarily good ;] for they are the virtues of the soul. This is also the case with health, beauty, and the like ; for they are the virtues of the body, and are effective of many things. Thus, for instance health, is effective of pleasure and life ; on which account, also, it appears to be most excellent, because it is the cause of two things which are most honoured by the multitude, viz. pleasure and life. Wealth, also, is good ; for it is the virtue of possession, and is effective of many things. A friend, also, and friendship are good ; for a friend is a thing eligible of itself, and is effective of many things. This is also the case with honour and glory ; for they are delightful, produce many things, and those things for which men are honoured, are for the most part attendant upon them. The power, likewise, of speaking and acting is good ; for all such things are effective of good ; and besides these, a good disposition, memory, an aptness to learn, sagacity, and every thing of this kind ; for these powers are productive of good. In a similar manner this is the case with all sciences and arts. Life itself, also, is good ; for though it were effective of no other good, yet it is eligible of itself. The just likewise is good ; for it is in common something profitable. And these things are in general acknowledged to be good.

With respect, however, to those things which are dubious, syllogisms are thus framed to prove that they are good. That is good, the contrary to which is evil. This is likewise the case with that, the contrary to which

is advantageous to enemies. Thus, if to be timid is especially advantageous to enemies, it is evident that fortitude is especially beneficial to citizens. And in short, the contrary to that which enemies wish, or with which they are delighted, appears to be beneficial. Hence, it was well said,

Sure Priam will rejoice.¹

This, however, is not always, but for the most part true. For nothing hinders but that sometimes the same things may be beneficial as well to our adversaries as to us. Hence, it is said that evils conciliate men, when the same thing is pernicious to both. That, also, of which there is no excess is good; but that which is greater than it ought to be is evil. That, likewise, is good, for the sake of which many labours have been endured, and much wealth consumed; for this is now an apparent good; and a thing of this kind is considered as an end, and as the end of many things. But the end is good. Hence it is said [by Juno,²]

And fame, indeed, to Priam will redound.

And [by Ulysses,³]

Longer to stay is shameful.

Whence, also, the proverb, "A water-pot at the door."⁴

¹ Iliad, 10.

² Iliad, 2.

³ Iliad, 2.

⁴ This was probably said of those, who after they had brought a vessel full of water from a distant fountain home, suffered it to fall from their hands and to be broken at the door of the house.

That, likewise, is good which is the object of desire to many persons, and which appears to be worthy of contention. For that which all men desire is good; and the many appear to be as it were all. That, also, is good which is laudable; for no one praises that which is not good. In a similar manner that is good which both enemies and bad men praise. For it is just as if all men acknowledged it to be good, if it is acknowledged to be so by those that are badly affected. For because it is apparent, it is acknowledged to be good; just as those are bad men whom our friends blame; and those are good men whom our enemies do not blame. Hence the Corinthians conceived themselves to be reviled by Simonides, for saying,

“ Ilium, however, does not Corinth blame.”

That likewise is good which is preferred by some wise person, or some good man or woman. Thus Minerva preferred Ulysses, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Paris, and Homer Achilles. And in short, things which are the objects of deliberate choice are good; but men deliberately choose to perform the things we have mentioned, and such as are evil to enemies, and good to friends. Things that are possible, also, are good; but these are twofold, viz. such as may be done, and such as may be easily done; and those things may be easily done, which are unattended with pain, or which may be effected in a short time. For that which is difficult is defined either by pain, or by length of time. Things, likewise, are good which are done according to our wish; but we wish either no evil, or less evil than good. But this will take place, if either punishment is latent, or small. Men also, wish to possess good which is their own property,

and which no other person possesses. They, likewise, wish to possess superfluities ; for thus they obtain more honour. And, also, things adapted to themselves ; but things of this kind are such as are fit, both according to genus and power. Things, likewise, which they fancy they are defective in, are the objects of their wish, though they should be little things. For they no less deliberately chuse to perform these. Also, things which may be easily effected ; for these are possible, as being easy. But those things are most easily effected which all men, or those that are similar, or those that are inferior, have performed rightly and well. Likewise, those things with which friends are gratified, or which are odious to enemies. And such things as those who admire them deliberately chuse to do. Likewise, those things in which men are ingenious and expert ; for they think they shall easily accomplish them with rectitude. Also, those things which no bad man will undertake ; for these are more laudable. And such things as are the objects of desire to men ; for these are not only delightful, but they also appear to be more excellent. Men, also, especially chuse to do those things to which they are most propense. Thus, for instance, victory is the object of choice to the warrior ; honour to the ambitious ; riches to the covetous ; and other characters after the same manner. Concerning the good, therefore, and the advantageous, credibility may from these things be derived.

CHAPTER VII.

BECAUSE, however, those [who counsel] and who acknowledge [the subjects of their deliberation] to be profitable, are frequently dubious with respect to that which is more profitable, it follows that we should in the next place speak concerning the greater good, and the more profitable. Let, therefore, that which exceeds be so much and something more; but let that which is exceeded be that which is inherent [in the thing which exceeds.] And that which is greater, indeed, and more, is always referred to that which is less; but the great and the small, and the much and the few, are referred to the magnitude of many things. And that which exceeds, indeed, is the great; but that which is deficient is the small; and in a similar manner with respect to the much and the few.

We call good, therefore, that which is itself eligible for its own sake, and not for the sake of another; that which all things desire; that which he who has received intellect and prudence would chuse; and that which is effective and preservative, or to which things of this kind are consequent. But that for the sake of which [other things subsist] is the end; and the end is that for the sake of which other things subsist; but that is good to any individual which with reference to him possesses these [definitions of universal good.] Hence, it is necessary that more goods should be a greater good than one or a

few goods, when the one good or the few are co-enumerated; for they transcend; but that which is inherent is exceeded. If, also, that which is greatest [in one genus] exceeds that which is greatest [in another,] the one genus will also exceed the other; and when one genus exceeds the other, that which is greatest in the one, will also exceed that which is greatest in the other. Thus, for instance, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, then in short men are greater than women; and if men are in short greater than women, the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman. For the excesses of the genera, and of the greatest things in the genera, subsist analogously. When, also, this thing is consequent to that, but that is not consequent to this, [the latter is a greater good.] But one thing is consequent to another either simultaneously, or successively, or potentially. For the use of the consequent is inherent in the use of the antecedent; and to live is, indeed, simultaneously consequent to the being well, but the latter is not simultaneously consequent to the former. And scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline. But it follows potentially that if a man be a sacrilegious person, he may commit a private theft; for he who robs a temple would also steal private property. Of two things, also, which exceed the same third, that which more exceeds is the greater; for it is necessary that it should exceed the other by that greater excess by which it exceeds the third. Those things, likewise, are greater which are effective of a greater good; for by this the efficient cause is greater. And in a similar manner that of which the efficient is greater, is also itself greater. For if that which is salubrious is more eligible than that which is pleasant, and is a greater good, health is also a greater good than pleasure. That, likewise, which is more eligible of itself, is a

greater good than that which is not eligible of itself. Thus, for instance, strength is a greater good than the salubrious; for the latter is not desirable for its own sake, but the former is, which is the characteristic of good. If, also, one thing is the end, but the other is not, [the former is the greater good.] For the latter subsists for the sake of another, but the former for the sake of itself; as, for instance, to be exercised is for the sake of the good condition of the body. That, likewise, which is in a less degree indigent of another, or of other things [is a greater good;] for it is more sufficient to itself. But that is in a less degree indigent which requires fewer things, or such as are more easily procured. When, likewise, this thing cannot subsist without that, or it is not possible it can be generated without it, but that can subsist without this, [then the latter is a greater good than the former; for it is more sufficient to itself;] because that which is not indigent of another is more self-sufficient; so that it is evidently a greater good. This is also the case, for the same reason, if one thing is a principle, but another is not; and if one thing is a cause, but another is not. For without cause and principle it is impossible for a thing to be, or to be generated. When, likewise, two things are principles, that which proceeds from the greater principle is greater; and also when there are two causes, that is the greater which proceeds from the greater cause. And vice versa, when there are two principles, the principle of the greater thing is greater; and when there are two causes, the cause of the greater thing is greater. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that in both ways a thing may appear to be greater. For if this thing is a principle, but that is not, this thing will appear to be greater than that. And, also, if this thing is not a principle, [i. e. if

it is the end,] but that is a principle; for the end is greater, and is not a principle; as Leodames, when he accused Callistratus, said, that he who advised did a greater injury than he who performed the deed; for it would not have been done had it not been advised. But, again accusing Chabrias, he said that he who did the deed acted more unjustly than he who advised it; for it would not have been done, unless there had been one who did it. For men give advice to others for the sake of this, viz. that they may act. That which is more rare, also, [appears to be a greater good] than that which is found in abundance; as for instance, gold than iron, though it is less useful. For the possession of it is greater because it is obtained with more difficulty. After another manner, however, the plentiful is a greater good than the rare, because the use of it surpasses [the use of the rare.] For that which is frequently, surpasses that which is rarely found; whence it is said [by Pindar,]

“ Water is the best of things.”

And, in short, that which is procured with more difficulty [is a greater good] than that which is procured with facility; for it is more rare. After another manner, however, that which is procured with facility [is a greater good] than that which is procured with more difficulty; for it subsists as we wish it should. That, also, is greater, the contrary to which is greater. And, likewise, that of which the privation is greater. Virtue, likewise, is greater than what is not virtue, and vice than what is not vice;¹

¹ By what is not virtue, and what is not vice, Aristotle means the disposition to the *perfect habit* of virtue or vice; such for instance, as *continence* and *incontinence*, which are dispositions to *temperance* and *intemperance*, which are ends.

for the former are ends, but the latter are not. Those things also are greater, the works of which are more beautiful, or more base; and of those things of which the virtues and the vices are greater, the works also are greater; since such as is the subsistence of causes and principles, such also is the subsistence of events; and such as is the subsistence of events, such also is the subsistence of causes and principles. Those things, likewise, are greater, the excess of which is more eligible or more beautiful. Thus, for instance, to see accurately is more eligible than to smell [accurately]; for the sight is more eligible than the smell. To be a lover of friendship, also, is better than to be a lover of riches; so that to be a lover of friends is more beautiful than to be a lover of wealth. And on the contrary, the excesses of better things are better; and of more beautiful things more beautiful. This is also the case with those things of which the desires are more beautiful or better. For of greater things there are greater appetitions; and the desires of more beautiful and better things, are for the same reason better and more beautiful. Those things, likewise, of which the sciences are more beautiful or more worthy, are themselves more beautiful and more worthy. For such as is the subsistence of science, such also is the subsistence of that which is true. But each science is employed about its proper subject; and for the same reasons the sciences of more worthy and more beautiful things have an analogous subsistence. That, likewise, which either all, or many, or most prudent persons, or the most excellent characters have judged or do judge to be good or greater, necessarily thus subsists, or simply, or so far as they judge according to prudence. This, also, is common to other things. For every thing is such

according to substance, quantity and quality, as science and prudence assert it to be. This principle, however, we apply to good ; for good is defined to be that, which every thing that possesses prudence would chuse. It is evident, therefore, that that thing is a greater good which prudence says is more good. That, likewise, which is inherent in better things either simply, or so far as they are better [is a greater good ;] as, for instance, fortitude than strength. This is also the case with that which a better man would chuse, either simply, or so far as he is better ; such, for instance, as to be injured rather than to injure ; for this a more just man would chuse. That which is more delightful, likewise, [is a greater good] than that which is less delightful. For all beings pursue pleasure, and for the sake of it desire to be delighted. For these are the things by which good and the end are defined. But the more difficult is both that which is less painful, and that which is for a longer time pleasant. That which is more beautiful, also, [is a greater good] than that which is less beautiful. For the beautiful is either the delightful, or that which is of itself eligible. Such things, also, as men wish to be in a greater degree causes to themselves or their friends, are greater goods. This is likewise the case with things that endure for a longer, than with those that endure for a shorter time ; and with things that are more than with those that are less stable. For the use of the former exceeds in time ; but of the latter in the will. For we in a greater degree use that which is stable according to our will. Such things, also, as follow from co-ordinate and similar cases [are greater goods.] Thus, if an action which is accomplished with fortitude, is better and more eligible than that which is effected by temperance, fortitude also is

more eligible than temperance, and to be brave than to be temperate. That, likewise, which all men chuse is a greater good than that which all men do not chuse. And that which is chosen by many than that which is chosen by a few. For good was defined to be that which all beings desire ; so that what is more the object of desire will be a greater good. That, likewise, [is a greater good,] which is admitted to be so by those who controvert [what good is, or which enemies, or judges, or the skilful acknowledge to be so. For that which enemies admit, is just as if all men admitted, and that which the latter admit, is equivalent to what is granted by men excelling in power and knowledge. And at one time, indeed, that is a greater good of which all participate ; for it is disgraceful not to participate it ; but at another time, that of which no one, or of which a few participate ; for it is more rare. Things, likewise, which are more laudable are greater goods ; for they are better. And in a similar manner those things of which the honours are greater ; for honour is as it were a certain dignity. This is also the case with those things of which the punishments are greater. And likewise with those things which are greater, than such as are acknowledged or appear to be great. The same things, also, when divided into parts appear to be greater ; for the transcendency of many things becomes apparent. Hence, the poet says, that Meleager was persuaded [by his wife] to rise to battle [by enumerating the evils which happen from a captured city.]

She paints the horrors of a conquer'd town,
 The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown,
 The matrons ravish'd, the whole race enslav'd.*

* *Iliad*, 9, v. 588, &c. The translation by Pope.

This is also the case with composition and exaggeration, as may be seen in Epicharmus; and for the same reason as in division. For composition shows an abundant excess, and appears to be the principle and cause of great things. Because, however, that which is more difficult and rare is greater, occasions, also, and ages, and places, and times, and powers produce great things. For if [any one performs a deed] beyond his power, and beyond his age, and those that resemble him, or if in this way, or in this place, or at that time, it will have the magnitude of things beautiful, good and just, and of the contraries to these. Whence, also, the epigram on him who conquered in the Olympic games.

Some time ago so vulgar was my trade,
 With a rough sack on both my shoulders laid,
 From Argos to Tegea still I trudg'd,
 To sell my fish, till victor here adjudg'd.

And Iphicrates passes an encomium on himself by saying,

From whence came these?

That, likewise, which is spontaneous, or springs from itself, is greater than that which is adscititious; for it is more difficult: whence also the poet says,

Self-taught am I.¹

And also the greatest part of a great thing. Thus, for instance, Pericles in a funeral oration says, "That youth being taken away from a city, is just as if spring were

¹ These are the words of Phemius in *Odys.* 22.

taken away from the year." Those things, likewise, are greater which are useful in a greater necessity ; such as things in old age and disease. This is also the case with that of two things which is nearer to the end. That, likewise, which is good to a certain thing, is a greater good than that which being good simply is not good to it. And also the possible than the impossible. For the former is good to a thing itself, but the latter is not. The goods, also, which are in the end of life [are greater than others ;] for those things are in a greater degree ends which are near to the end. Things, likewise, which pertain to truth are a greater good than things which pertain to opinion. But the definition of that which pertains to opinion is *that which if it were latent no one would chuse*. Whence, also, it would seem that it is more eligible to be benefited than to benefit ; for the former would be chosen though it should be latent ; but to benefit latently does not seem to be a thing that would be chosen. Those things, likewise, are greater goods which we rather wish to be than to seem to be ; for they pertain more to truth. Hence, also, [the sophists ¹] say that justice is a small thing, because it is more eligible to seem to be than to be just ; but it is not so with health. That, also, is a greater good which is more useful for many purposes ; as, for instance, that which is more useful to life, to living well, to pleasure, and to the performance of beautiful actions. Hence, riches and health appear [to the vulgar] to be the greatest of things ; for these contain all the above-mentioned particulars. That also is a greater good which is more free from molestation, and is attended with pleasure ; for in this case there

¹ As Thrasymachus in the Republic of Plato.

are more goods than one ; so that the good is both pleasure and a privation of pain. That, likewise, of two things is the greater good, which being added to the same thing renders the whole a greater good. And those things which when present are not latent, are greater goods than those which are latent ; for the former tend to truth. Hence, to *be* rich will be considered as a greater good than to *seem* to be rich. That also which is lovely is a greater good ; and which to some things, indeed, is lovely when possessed alone ; but to others when possessed in conjunction with other things. Hence, the punishment is not equal to deprive him of an eye who has but one eye, and him that has two eyes ; for the former is deprived of that which is dear to him. And thus we have nearly shown from what forms it is necessary to derive credibility in exhorting and dissuading.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE greatest, however, and most powerful of all things, in order to the ability of persuading and counselling well, is to assume all polities, and the manners and legal institutes of each, and to distinguish what is advantageous to them. For all men are persuaded by that which is advantageous ; and that is advantageous

which preserves the polity. Farther still, the enunciation of him who possesses the supreme power, possesses the principal authority. But dominion is divided according to polities. For as many polities as there are, so many forms also are there of dominion.

There are, however, four polities, a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy; so that the supreme power and that which judges, will be either a part or the whole of these. But a democracy, indeed, is a polity in which the magistrates are distributed by lot. An oligarchy is a polity [in which the magistracy is distributed to the rich alone,] and therefore is distributed according to estates. An aristocracy is a polity in which magistrates are chosen according to their erudition; but by erudition I mean that discipline which is appointed by the law. For those who persevere in legal institutes, govern in an aristocracy. Hence, it is necessary that these should appear to be the best of men. But a monarchy is, as the name indicates, a polity in which one person has the supreme authority. And of this polity, that which is conducted according to a certain order is a kingdom; but that which is indefinite is a tyranny.

It is also requisite not to be ignorant of the end of each polity; for those things are chosen [in each] which pertain to the end. And the end, indeed, of a democracy is liberty; of an oligarchy wealth; of an aristocracy, whatever pertains to erudition and legal institutes; and of a tyranny safe-guard.

It is evident, therefore, that those customs, legal

institutes, and things advantageous which pertain to the end, must be distinguished, if the choice [of the several polities] is directed to this.

Since, however, credibility is not only produced through a demonstrative oration, but also through that which is ethical; (for we believe the speaker because he appears to be a person of a certain description, viz. if he appears to be worthy, or benevolent, or both these)—this being the case, it is requisite that we should possess a knowledge of the manners of each of the polities. For it is necessary that the manners of each should be most persuasive with reference to each. But these manners may be obtained through the same things. For manners become apparent from deliberate choice; but deliberate choice is referred to the end. What the particulars therefore are, to which the attention of those who exhort should be directed, as future or present; and from what forms credibility about that which is advantageous must be derived; and farther still, concerning the manners and legal institutes of polities; and through what things and how we may abound [with arguments,] all these have been unfolded by us as much as is sufficient to the present purpose. For these particulars will be accurately discussed in the Politics.

CHAPTER IX.

AFTER these things let us speak concerning virtue and vice, and the beautiful in conduct and the base; for to these the intention of those who praise and blame is directed. For it will happen that at the same time we speak about these, those things also will become manifest from which our moral character is formed, which is the second thing that produces credibility. For we may be able to gain the credit of being virtuous ourselves, and cause another person to do the same, from the same things. Since, however, it frequently happens that without being serious, and also seriously, we praise not only man or God, but also inanimate things, and any animal that may occur;—this being the case, propositions also respecting these must be assumed after the same manner, so that we must also speak concerning these, so far as is requisite for the sake of example.

The beautiful in conduct, therefore, is that which being eligible of itself is laudable; or which being good is delightful because it is good. But if the beautiful in conduct is this, it is necessary that virtue should be beautiful; for being good it is laudable. Virtue, however, is indeed a power, as it appears of imparting and preserving good: and a power of procuring many and great

benefits, and of imparting all things about all. But the parts of virtue are, justice, fortitude, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, prudence, wisdom. It is however necessary, that those virtues should be the greatest which are most useful to others, since virtue is a beneficent power. Hence, just and brave men are especially honoured; for fortitude is useful in war, and justice in peace. The next to these is liberality. For the liberal freely bestow their property, and do not contend about money, of which others are so eminently desirous. But justice, indeed, is a virtue through which every one legally possesses what is his own; and injustice is that through which a man possesses the property of others, contrary to law. Fortitude is that virtue through which men perform beautiful deeds in dangerous circumstances, in such a manner as the law commands, and those who possess this virtue are subservient to the law; but timidity is the contrary to this. Temperance is a virtue through which men are disposed towards pleasures in such a way as the law commands; but intemperance is the contrary. Liberality is the beneficent use of money; but illiberality is the contrary. Magnanimity is a virtue which is effective of great benefits; but pusillanimity is the contrary. Magnificence is a virtue effective of magnitude in expense; but pusillanimity and indecorous parsimony are the contrary. Prudence is the virtue of the reasoning power, according to which it is possible to give good counsel respecting the above-mentioned good and evil pertaining to felicity. And thus we have spoken sufficiently at present of virtue and vice, and the parts of them.

With respect to other things, however, it is not diffi-

cult to see [which among them are beautiful or base.] For it is evident that such things as are effective of virtue must necessarily be beautiful; since they pertain to virtue; and also those things which proceed from virtue. But things of this kind are the indications and works of virtue. Since, however, the indications, and such things as are the works or passions¹ of virtue, are beautiful, it is necessary that such things as are the works of fortitude, or are indications of it, or are bravely accomplished should be beautiful. This must also be the case with just things, and with works which are justly performed; but not with the passions of them. For in this alone of the virtues, that which is justly done is not always beautiful; but in being punished, it is more base to be punished justly, than to be punished unjustly. And in a similar manner with respect to the other virtues. Those things, also of which the reward is honour are beautiful; and likewise those things of which honour more than riches is the reward. And such eligible things as a man performs not for his own sake. Likewise such things as are simply good, such as what a man performs for his country, neglecting his own interest. Also things which are naturally good; and such things as are good, but not to their possessor. For things which are good to their possessor, are performed for his sake [alone.] This is likewise the case with such things as are more present with the dead than with the living. For those things which are present with a man when living, have in a greater degree a subsistence for his sake.

¹ By the passions of virtue, Aristotle means the effects resulting from the exercise of them, on others. Thus the effect resulting from the exercise of justice on another person, is the *passion* of justice.

And also with such works as are performed for the sake of other things ; for they have less of a subsistence for the sake of him who performs them. This likewise, is the case with such deeds as are well performed with respect to others, and not with respect to him who performs them, and also with respect to benefactors ; for this is just. The like may be said of benefits [conferred on others ;] for they are not attended with private advantage. This is also the case with the contraries to those things of which we are ashamed. For those who say or do, or are about to commit base actions are ashamed, as in the verses of Sappho when Alceus said to her,

Something I wish to say, but shame prevents.

Sappho replied,

If good and upright actions you desire,
And your tongue meditates no ill to speak,
Your eyes will never be suffus'd with shame,
But freely you will what is just reveal.

This is likewise the case with things about which men fearlessly contend ; for men are affected in this manner about things which tend to glory. The virtues, also, and the works of things which are naturally more worthy, are beautiful ; as, for instance, the virtues and works of man than those of woman. This is likewise the case with those things which procure more pleasure to others than to their possessor ; on which account the just and justice are beautiful. It is also beautiful to take vengeance on enemies rather than to be reconciled to them. For retribution is just ; but the just is beautiful ; and it is the province of a brave man not to be vanquished. Vic-

tory, likewise, and honour are among the number of things beautiful ; for they are eligible though they should be unattended with advantage, and they evince the transcendency of virtue. Public celebrations, also, of the memory of any one are beautiful ; and the greater they are the more beautiful. This is likewise the case with commemorations of the dead ; and also with those things which are attended with honour. Things too which possess a certain excellence, and belong to one person alone are more beautiful ; for they are more worthy of being remembered. This is likewise the case with possessions that are unfruitful ; for they are more liberal. Things, also, which are the peculiar property of individuals are more beautiful ; and likewise such things as are indications of what is laudable among those with whom we inhabit. Thus for instance, in Lacedæmon it is beautiful to wear long hair ; for it is a sign of liberty. For it is not easy for him who wears long hair to do any servile work.¹ It is also beautiful not to exercise any illiberal art ; for it is the province of a freeman not to live subservient to another person.

Things also which are allied to the beautiful are to be assumed,² as being the same with them, both with respect to praise and blame ; as if, for instance, we should call a cautious and animated person, timid and insidious ; a stupid, a good man ; and one who is insensible in the

¹ Because his long hair would be an impediment to servile offices.

² For the purpose of praising and blaming, we may not only use propositions, in which it is shown that something is truly beautiful or base, but also other places which have the power of causing a certain appearance of beautiful or base conduct.

endurance of injuries, a mild man. And after this manner we should always proceed from things which are consequent to that which is best ; so as to call him who is wrathful and furious, simple ; and him who is arrogant, magnificent and venerable. We may also praise those who err through excess, as if they were virtuous. Thus, for instance, we may call an audacious, a brave man, and a prodigal, a liberal man. For they will appear to be so to the multitude ; and at the same time a paradoxism will be made from cause. For if any one is prepared to encounter danger when there is no necessity for it, he will much more seem to be so prepared where it is beautiful to encounter it. And he who is profuse to any casual persons, will appear to be much more so to his friends ; for *to benefit all men is the excess of virtue*. It is likewise requisite to consider by whom any one is praised ; for as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians. It is necessary, however, to speak of that which is honourable among the several nations, as of a thing which actually exists ; as for instance, among the Scythians or Lacedæmonians, or the philosophers. And in short it is requisite to refer that which is honourable to the beautiful in conduct ; since it appears to approximate to it. This is also the case with such things as subsist according to fitness ; as if the deeds of a man are worthy of his ancestors, and of the deeds which he has already performed. For to make an addition to the honour already acquired, contributes to felicity, and is beautiful. This likewise will be the case, if besides what is becoming, a man conducts himself with a view to what is better and more beautiful ; as if being prosperous he is indeed moderate ; but in adversity, he is magnanimous ; or is better and more

affable, the more dignified his situation in life becomes. And a thing of this kind is that saying of Iphicrates,

Some time ago so vulgar was my trade,
With a rough sack 'on both my shoulders laid.

And also that [inscription] of Simonides, "A woman whose father and husband were the brothers of tyrants."

But since praise is derived from actions ; and the peculiarity of a worthy man is to act from deliberate choice, we must endeavour to show that he who acts, acts from deliberate choice. And for this purpose it is useful to render it apparent that a man has frequently thus acted. Hence, also, casualties, and events which result from fortune, must be assumed as pertaining to deliberate choice. For if many and similar things are adduced, it appears to be an indication of virtue and deliberate choice. But praise is an oration exhibiting the magnitude of virtue. It is necessary, therefore, to evince that actions are things of this kind [viz. that they proceed from great virtue.] An encomium, however, pertains to deeds ; but those things which surround him who is praised, pertain to credibility ; such as nobility and education. For it is likely that a good man will be the offspring of good parents, and that he who is thus educated will be a man of this kind. Hence, we celebrate those who act well ; but deeds are the indications of habit ; since we also praise him that has not acted, if we believe him to be a man of this kind. The predication, however, of beatitude and felicity, do not differ from each other, but they are not the same with praise and encomium ; but as felicity comprehends virtue, so the predication of felicity comprehends these.

Praise, however, and counsel have a common form. For those things which you may propound in giving counsel, these by transposing the diction will become encomiums. When therefore we know that we have to do, and what kind of a person a man ought to be, then it is necessary adducing these as precepts to transpose and convert the diction; such for instance, as that it is not proper a man should conceive magnificently of himself on account of the gifts of fortune, but on account of those things which he possesses from himself. And thus indeed what is said, will have the force of a precept. But the following will have the force of praise: He conceived magnificently of himself, not on account of the gifts of fortune, but of those procured by himself. Hence, when you praise see what it is that you propound, and when you propound, see what it is you praise. The diction, however, will necessarily be opposite, when that which impedes, and that which does not impede are transposed.

Frequently, also, many of those things may be used, which have an amplifying power; as whether a man acted alone, or first, or with a few, or whether he were the principal person in the action. For all these are beautiful. Praise likewise is increased from the consideration of times and seasons. For these have nothing in addition to what is fit. This is also the case with the consideration if a man has done a thing rightly; for this will be considered as a great thing, and not originating from fortune, but from himself. It likewise pertains to praise, those things which excite men [to virtue] and cause them to be honoured, were invented and prepared by him [whom we praise;] and upon whom the first

encomium was made. Thus, for instance, it happened to Hippolochus to have the first encomium, and to Harmodius, and to Aristogiton to have their statues placed in the forum. The like method also must be observed in amplifying the contrary to praise. When, likewise, you do not find in him whom you praise an abundance of things worthy of applause, compare him with others, which Isocrates did from his custom of writing declamatory orations. But it is requisite to compare him whom you praise with renowned men; for the oration has an amplifying power and is beautiful, if he is found to be better than worthy men. Amplification, however, deservedly falls upon praise; for it consists in transcendency; and transcendency is among the number of things beautiful. Hence, if you cannot compare him with renowned persons, yet it is requisite to compare him with others, [that are not renowned,] since transcendency seems to indicate virtue. In short, of those forms which are common to all orations, amplification, indeed, is most adapted to the demonstrative genus. For it assumes actions which are acknowledged, so that it only remains to add to them magnitude and beauty. But examples are most adapted to the deliberative genus, or that which consists in giving counsel. For we form a judgment by predicting future from past events. And enthymemes are most adapted to the judicial genus. For the fact [which is the subject of judicial discussion,] especially receives cause and demonstration, on account of its obscurity. And thus we have shown from what forms nearly all praise and blame are derived, to what we ought to look in praising and blaming, and from what particulars encomiums and opprobriums are produced. For these things being known, the contraries to

these are apparent ; since blame consists from the contraries [to praise and encomium.]

CHAPTER X.

In the next place we must speak of accusation and defence, from how many and from what kind [of places] it is necessary syllogisms should be made. It is necessary, therefore, to assume three things ; one, indeed, what the particulars are, and how many in number, for the sake of which men injure others. The second is, how they are effected. And the third is, what kind of persons, and in what condition they are [whom they attack.]

When we have therefore defined what it is to do an injury, we shall speak of what is next in order. Let then to do an injury be, to hurt another person voluntarily contrary to law. But law is either peculiar or common. And I call that peculiar, indeed, according to which when committed to writing, men act politically. But common law is such institutes, as though not committed to writing appear to be acknowledged by all men. Men also act willingly when they act knowingly, and without compulsion. With respect to such things, therefore, as they do willingly, all these are not per-

formed by them with deliberate choice; but all such things as they perform with deliberate choice, they do knowingly. For no one is ignorant of that which he deliberately chuses to do. The causes, however, through which men deliberately chuse to injure others, and to do evil contrary to law, are vice and intemperance. For if certain persons have depravity either in one, or in many things, with respect to that in which they are depraved they are also unjust. Thus for instance, the illiberal man is unjust in money; the intemperate man in the pleasures of the body; the effeminate man in sloth; but the timid man in dangers. For timid men through fear desert those that are in the same danger with themselves. But the ambitious man is unjust on account of honour; the hasty man from anger; he who aspires after conquest, from victory; the severe man through revenge; the imprudent man, because he is deceived about the just and the unjust; and the impudent man, through a contempt of renown. In a similar manner with respect to the rest, each is unjust in that which is the subject of his passion. These things, however, are evident partly from what has been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the passions.

It now remains to show for what reason, and in what condition men injure others, and whom they injure. In the first place, therefore, let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid, when we endeavour to do an injury. For it is evident that the accuser must consider how many and which of those things, which all men coveting injure their neighbours, are present with his adversary; and how many and which of these things are not present with the defendant. All men, therefore, do all things

partly on account of themselves, and partly not. And of those things which they do on account of themselves, some are performed by them from fortune, but others from necessity. And of those which are performed by them from necessity, some are violently, and others naturally effected; so that all such things as men do, not on account of themselves, are partly from fortune, partly from nature, and partly from violence. But such things as they perform on account of themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes, are partly from custom, and partly from appetite; and some indeed are from a rational, but others from an irrational appetite. But the will, indeed, is an appetite of good in conjunction with reason; for no one wishes any thing else than that which he conceives to be good. But the irrational appetites are anger and desire; so that all such things as men do, are necessarily performed by them from seven causes, viz. from fortune, force, nature, custom, reason, anger and desire. The division, however, of actions according to ages, or habits, or certain other things, is superfluous. For if it happens that young men are choleric, or prone to indulge desire, they do not perform things of this kind on account of their juvenile age, but on account of anger and desire. Nor yet on account of riches and poverty; but it happens to the poor indeed, to covet riches on account of their indigence; and to the rich to desire pleasures that are not necessary, through the power which they have of gratifying their desires. These, however, do not act on account of riches and poverty, but on account of desire. In a similar manner; also, the just and the unjust, and others who are said to act according to habits, do all things from these causes. For they act, either from reason, or from passion. But

some, indeed, act from manners and worthy affections; and others from the contraries to these. It happens, however, that things of this kind are consequent to such like habits, and such and such to others. For immediately, perhaps, worthy opinions and desires concerning pleasures, are consequent to the temperate man, on account of his temperance; but the contraries to these are consequent to the intemperate man. Hence, divisions of this kind must be omitted; but it must be considered what [desires or opinions] are usually consequent [to certain conditions.] For whether a man be white or black, or great or little, nothing follows of things of this kind. But it is of consequence, whether he is young or old, just or unjust. And in short, such accidents as cause a difference in the manners of men, are of consequence [as to the difference of their desires.] Thus, for instance, it makes a distinction, whether a man be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate. We shall, however, speak of these things hereafter.

But now let us speak of the rest. Those things then proceed from fortune of which the cause is indefinite, and which are not produced for the sake of any thing; and which have neither a perpetual, nor a frequent, nor an orderly subsistence. This, however, is evident from the definition of fortune. But those things are produced by nature, of which the cause is in themselves and is orderly. For they happen after the same manner, either always, or for the most part. For with respect to preternatural things, it is not necessary to consider accurately whether they are produced from a certain nature, or from some other cause. Fortune, also, may seem to be the cause of such like things. But those things are

effected by force, which are done by the agents themselves contrary to their desire or reason. Those things are effected by custom, which are done in consequence of having been frequently done. And those things are effected through reasoning, which are done with a view to advantage, as ranking among the above-mentioned goods, or as being an end, or as referring to the end, when they are performed on account of utility. For the intemperate, also, perform some things that are advantageous, yet not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure. And some men through anger and rage perform things which pertain to revenge. Revenge, however, and punishment differ. For punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers; but revenge is for the sake of the agent, that he may satisfy [his desire of vengeance.] In what we shall hereafter say, therefore, about the passions, it will be evident what the objects are with which anger is conversant. Such things, however, as appear to be pleasant are performed on account of desire. But both that which is done from use, and that which is done from custom, are delightful. For many things which are not naturally pleasant, when rendered familiar through custom, are done with delight. Hence, in short, all such things as men do on account of themselves, are either good, or apparently good, are either pleasing, or apparently pleasing.

Since, however, such things as men perform on account of themselves, they perform willingly, but such things as they do not perform on account of themselves, are done by them not willingly;—hence, all such things as they perform willingly, will either be good or apparently good, will either be pleasant or apparently plea-

sant. For I consider the liberation from evils, or from apparent evils, or the assumption of a less instead of a greater evil, in the number of good things. For in a certain respect these are eligible. And in a similar manner the liberation from things painful, or apparently painful, or the assumption of less instead of more painful things, rank among things which are pleasant.

CHAPTER XI.

WE must assume, therefore, how many and what things are useful and pleasant. Concerning what is useful, therefore, or advantageous, we have already spoken in the discussion of things pertaining to counsel.

Let us, therefore, now speak of what is delightful. But it is requisite to think that [rhetorical] definitions are sufficient, if, about the object which they define, they are neither obscure, nor inaccurate. Let it therefore be supposed by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a sudden and sensible disposition of the soul in a state conformable to nature; but that pain is the contrary. Hence, if pleasure is a thing of this kind, it is evident that the pleasant is that which is effective of the above-mentioned disposition. But that which is cor-

ruptive, or is effective of a contrary disposition, is painful.

It necessarily follows, therefore, that it is pleasant to accede to that which is according to nature, as being that which has a frequency of subsistence, and especially when those things which take place according to nature, have assumed their own nature. Those things also are pleasant which are done from custom. For that to which we are accustomed becomes now as it were natural; since custom is something similar to nature. For that which is *frequently* is near to that which is *always* done. But nature pertains to that which always, and custom to that which frequently takes place. That likewise is pleasant which is not violent; for violence is preternatural. Hence, also, necessities are painful; and it is rightly said,

Painful is every necessary work.

Sedulity, likewise, study, and strenuous endeavour are painful; (for these things are necessary and violent) unless we are accustomed to them. But thus custom renders them pleasant. And the contraries to these are pleasant. Hence, indolence, cessation from labour, freedom from care, mirth, recreation and sleep, are in the number of pleasant things. For no one of these is attended with necessity. Every thing likewise which we desire is pleasant. For *desire is the appetite of that which is pleasant*. Of desires, however, some are irrational; but others are attended with reason. But I call those irrational through which we do not desire things because we are rationally of opinion that they are proper

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for us. And desires of this kind are such as are said to be inherent in us naturally, as are those which exist through the body; such for instance as the desire of food, thirst and hunger; and also the desire of every kind of food. This is likewise the case with the desires of gustable substances, of venereal pleasures, and in short of tangible objects, and of what pertains to the smell of fragrance, to the hearing and the sight. But the desires attended with reason, are such as are the result of persuasion. For men desire to behold and possess many things from report and persuasion. Since, however, the being delighted consists in the sensible perception of a certain passion; but the phantasy or imagination is a certain debile sense; and both to him who remembers and him who hopes, a certain imagination is consequent of that which he remembers or hopes;—if this be the case, it is evident that pleasures are present with those that have strong memories and hopes, since sensible perception is also present with them. Hence, it is necessary that all pleasant things must either consist in the sensible perception of what is present, or in the remembrance of what is past, or in the hope of what is future. For present things are the objects of sensible perception, but past things are remembered, and future events are the subjects of hope. Things, therefore, which are preserved in the memory are pleasant, not only such as were then delightful when they were present, but some also which were then not delightful, if afterwards they are attended with the beautiful and the good. Whence, also, it is said [by Euripides,]

'Tis pleasant when from danger free,
To recollect past misery.

And also [by Eumæus in the *Odyssey*, Book 15.]

For he who much has suffer'd, much will know,
And pleas'd remembrance builds delight in woe.

But the cause of this is, that it is also delightful not to be in possession of evil. With respect however to such things as pertain to hope, those which when present appear greatly to delight or benefit, or [at least] to benefit without pain; and in short, such things as afford delight when present,—of these the hope and the remembrance are for the most part delectable. Hence, also, it is pleasant to be enraged; as Homer [in *Iliad*, 18.] says of anger:

Far sweeter to the soul than honey to the taste.

For no one is enraged with a circumstance which it appears impossible to revenge; nor are men at all enraged, or they are enraged in a less degree, with those that are far superior to them in power. A certain pleasure, likewise, is consequent to most desires. For men rejoice with a certain pleasure, either from remembering what they have obtained, or from the hope of what they may obtain. Thus for instance, those that in fevers are afflicted with thirst, are delighted with remembering how they have drunk, and with the hope that they shall again drink. Those also who are in love, are always delighted with some circumstance pertaining to the beloved object, when they converse, or write, and in short, in all their actions. For in every thing of this kind, by recollection they fancy that they have a sensible perception as it were of the object of their love. The beginning itself, likewise, of love is produced in all persons, when they are not only delighted with the beloved object when present,

but also with the recollection of it when absent. Hence, also, when they are afflicted from the absence of the object of their love, a certain pleasure is ingenerated in their grief and lamentation. For the pain which they feel arises from the beloved object not being present; but the pleasure from the remembrance and perception in a certain respect of this object, and of what he did, and what kind of a person he was. Hence, also, the poet says [of Achilles in Iliad, 23.]

Thus having said, he rais'd in ev'ry one,
An ardent wish his sorrows to bemoan.

Revenge likewise is pleasant. For that of which the frustration is painful, the obtaining is pleasant. But those who are enraged, are pained in a transcendent degree, if they cannot take revenge; but they are delighted with the hope of vengeance. To conquer also is pleasant, not only to those who are lovers of victory, but to all men. For there is an imagination of transcendency [in vanquishing,] of which all men possess the desire, either more or less ardently. Since, however, it is pleasant to conquer, those sports, also, must be delightful which relate to war, to playing on the pipe, and to verbal contests; for in these victory is frequently obtained. This is likewise the case with the games of dice, tennice, tables, &c. and in a similar manner with serious games. For some of these become pleasant from custom; but others are immediately pleasant, such for instance as every kind of hunting. For where there is contention, there also there is victory. Hence, the pleading of causes and contentious disputes are pleasant to those that are accustomed to, and are able to engage in them.

Honour, likewise, and reputation, are among the number of things most pleasant, because every one imagines that he is a man of this kind, and that he is a worthy person ; and more so when others assert this of him, whom he considers as persons of veracity. Such are neighbours rather than those that live at a distance ; friends, acquaintance, and fellow citizens, rather than foreigners ; such as are now in being, rather than such as are yet to be born ; the prudent rather than the imprudent ; and the many rather than the few. For it is more likely that the above-mentioned persons should speak the truth, than those of a contrary description. For with respect to such things as a man very much despises, as children or wild beasts, no one pays any attention to the honour or opinion of these, for the sake of the opinion itself ; but if he does it, it is for the sake of something else.

A friend, likewise, is among the number of delightful things ; for friendly love is delectable ; since no one is a lover of wine who is not pleased with wine. To be beloved, also, is delightful. For this causes the person beloved to imagine that he is a good man, which is desired by all men that are endued with sense. But to be beloved is for a man to be dear to another person, himself on account of himself. To be admired also by others is pleasant, on account of being honoured, [as the consequence of being admired.] To be flattered, likewise, and the flatterer himself are pleasant ; for a flatterer is an apparent admirer, and an apparent friend. To do the same things frequently, likewise, is delightful ; for what is customary is pleasing. Change also is pleasing ; for it is pleasant to return to a natural condition which is effected by mutation. For to remain always in the

same state, too much increases habit [and produces satiety.] Whence it is said [by Euripides in his *Orestes*,]

Sweet is the change of all things.

For on this account things which are performed through intervals of time are pleasant; and the sight of our acquaintance is pleasing after some time has elapsed. For this is a mutation from the present time; and likewise that is rare which takes place through an interval of time. To learn, also, and to admire are for the most part delectable. For in admiration there is a desire of learning [something;] so that what is admirable is the object of desire. But in learning there is a transition into a condition according to nature.¹ To benefit, likewise, and to be benefited are among the number of things delectable. For to be benefited is to obtain the objects of desire; but to benefit is to possess and transcend, both which are desirable. Because, however, it is pleasant to have the power of benefiting, hence, men are delighted in correcting the miscarriages of their neighbours, and in completing what is deficient. Since, also, to learn and to admire are delectable, those things must necessarily be pleasant which consist in imitation, such as painting, sculpture and poetry; and whatever is well imitated, though that of which it is the imitation should not be pleasing. For in this case, we are not delighted with the imitation, but with the reasoning by which we know what that is which is imitated; so that it happens that we learn something. A variety likewise of unexpected accidents, and narrow escapes from dangers, are delect-

¹ Because by learning we pass from ignorance to knowledge, which is a natural transition to such a reasonable being as man.

able; for all these are admirable. And because that which is according to nature is pleasant, but things which are allied are naturally conjoined with each other, hence all things that are allied and similar, are for the most part delightful; as man with man, horse with horse, and the young with the young. Hence, also, the proverb *sameness of age is delighted with sameness of age*; and, *always like to like*; and, *beast knows beast*; and, *always the blackbird to the blackbird*, and others of the like kind. Since, however, that which is similar and allied to any thing is delightful to it, but every man is especially thus affected towards himself, it necessarily follows that all men are lovers of themselves more or less; for such things [as similitude and alliance] are especially present with a man towards himself. But because all men are lovers of themselves, hence, those things which are their own, must necessarily be delightful to all men; such as their works, and their orations. Hence, for the most part they love their flatterers, and those that love them; they are ambitious, and love their children; for children are their own works. It is likewise pleasant to give completion to things which are deficient; for it now becomes our own work. And because it is most pleasant to govern, it is likewise delightful to seem to be wise. For to be wise is a thing of a ruling nature. But wisdom is the science of many and admirable things. Farther still, since men are for the most part ambitious, it necessarily follows that they are delighted to rule over and reprove their neighbours. It is likewise delectable to a man to be conversant with that in which he thinks he particularly excels; as Euripides also says, "To this he eagerly applies himself, bestowing the greatest part of every day upon it, in order that he may even surpass

himself." In like manner, because all recreation and relaxation is pleasant, and laughter also is among the number of things that are delectable, it necessarily follows that ridiculous things are pleasant, as well ridiculous men, as ridiculous speeches and works. Ridiculous things, however, are separately discussed by us in the treatise on Poetry. And thus much concerning things which are delectable. But things which are painful will be manifest from the contraries to these. Such, therefore, are the particulars for the sake of which men act unjustly.

CHAPTER XII.

LET US now consider what the condition is of men that do an injury, and who those are whom they injure. They are, therefore, then indeed [prepared to do an injury,] when they fancy the thing is possible to be done, and it is possible to be done by them, whether they can do it latently, or so as not to suffer punishment though it should not be done latently; or when they think that they may suffer punishment, indeed, but that the loss which they shall sustain by it, will be less than the gain which will accrue to themselves, or to those who are the objects of their care.

With respect therefore to what appears possible to be effected, and what not, this will be afterwards explained; for these things are common to all the parts of rhetoric. Those men, however, fancy themselves especially able to do an injury with impunity, who are able both to speak and act, and who are skilled in a multitude of [forensic] contests. Those, also, fancy they can escape with impunity who have a great number of friends, and especially, indeed, if they imagine themselves to be powerful in what we have mentioned; or if they are not, if their friends, or assistants, or accomplices are persons of this description. For through these they may be able to effect their purpose latently, and without suffering punishment. This will also be the case, if they are the friends of those that are injured, or of the judges. For friends are careless of injuries, and are reconciled before prosecution. The judges, also, are willing to gratify their friends, and either entirely acquit them, or inflict a small punishment. But those are adapted to be concealed, who have a disposition contrary to the alleged crimes; as for instance, a feeble man, when accused of striking another, and a poor and deformed man when accused of adultery. This is also the case if the crime is committed very openly, and in the eyes of all men, because in short no one would think it to be true. Or if the crimes are so great, and so many, as not to have been committed by any one person before. For men are not aware of such injuries; since all men shun those that are accustomed to act ill, in the same manner as they shun diseases; but no one avoids him that has not yet been afflicted with disease. Those, likewise, think they shall be concealed, who injure those who have none, or those who have many enemies. For if they injure the former

they fancy they shall be concealed, because they are not suspected; but if they injure the latter, that they shall be concealed, because it seems incredible that they would attack those who are aware of them, and because they might urge in their defence, that they did not make the attempt [because they were certain they should find resistance.] The like may be said of those who are provided with the means of concealment, or of some place, or mode of escape which is at hand; and also of such, who if they cannot conceal themselves, can put off the cause by delay of justice, or by corrupting the judges. This too may be said of those who, if they are amerced, delay or buy off the payment, or who through poverty have nothing to lose. And of those whose gains are apparent, or great, or near; but their punishments either small, or unapparent, or at a distance. Likewise where the punishment is not equal to the profit, as appears to be the case in a tyranny. And also with those that gain by the injury, but are only disgraced by the punishment. And also with those to whom the contrary happens, that the injuries procure them a certain praise, as if it should happen, as it did to Zeno, that a man in avenging an injury, at the same time revenges an injury done to his father or mother; but the punishments are either a fine or banishment, or something of this kind. For both these do an injury, whether it be done this way or that, though they are not the same persons, but contrary in their manners. Those, likewise, [are audacious in committing injuries,] who have frequently either been concealed, or not been punished. This is likewise the case with those who have frequently failed in their attempts; for in things of this kind, in the same manner as in war-like concerns, there are some who are still prepared to

renew the fight. And also with those to whom the delightful is immediately present, but the painful follows afterwards; or gain is immediate, but punishment posterior. For the intemperate are persons of this description; but there is intemperance with respect to all such things as are the objects of desire. Those, likewise, [confidently do an injury] to whom on the contrary the painful is immediately present, or punishment, but the delightful and the advantageous are present afterwards and later. For the continent, and those who are more prudent, pursue things of this kind. This is also the case with those who may seem to have acted from fortune or necessity, from nature, or from custom; and in short, who have erred, but have not done any injury: The like too may be said of those who have been able to obtain an equitable decision; and of such as are in want. But men are in want in a twofold respect; either as being in want of necessaries, as is the case with the poor; or as being in want of superfluities, as is the case with the rich. Those also [are prone to do injuries] who are renowned, and also those who are very infamous. The former, indeed, because it will not be supposed that they have done an injury; and the latter because they will not become at all more infamous [by doing the injury.] Under these circumstances, therefore, they attempt [to act unjustly.]

CHAPTER XIII.

MEN, therefore, injure those who possess things of which they are in want, whether they pertain to the necessities, or to the superfluities of life, or the enjoyment [of pleasures.] They also injure those that live at a distance, and those that live near them; for the plunder of the latter is rapid, and the punishment attending the injury done to the former is slow; as was the case with those who plundered the Carthaginians. Men likewise injure the unwary, and those who are not on their guard, but are credulous; for it is easy to deceive all these. They also injure the indolent; for it is the province of a diligent man to avenge the injuries he has received. And likewise the bashful; for these do not contend about gain. They also injure those who have been injured by many, and who do not avenge the injuries they have received, as being according to the proverb the Mysian prey. Likewise those whom they have never, and those whom they have frequently injured. For both these are incautious; the former, indeed, as having never been injured, and the latter because they expect to be injured no more. Also those who are or may easily be scandalized; for persons of this description, neither deliberately chuse [to avenge an injury] being afraid of the judges, nor are able to persuade [others that they have been injured;] among the number of which are those who are

hated and injured. Likewise, men injure those against whom there is a pretext, either because they themselves, or their ancestors, or friends, have acted ill, or would have acted ill, either to themselves, or to their ancestors, or to those that are under their protection. For, as the proverb says, *Depravity only wants a pretence*. Men, also, injure both their enemies and friends; for to injure the one is easy, and the other pleasant. Likewise those who are without friends, and who are not skilful in speaking or acting. For these either do not endeavour to revenge the injury they have received, or they become reconciled, or they finally effect nothing. Also those who derive no advantage in waiting for judgment and recompence, such as foreigners and handicraft tradesmen; for these are satisfied with a small recompence for the injuries they may have received, and such men easily cease from prosecution. Men likewise injure those who have already done many injuries to others, or who have done such injuries as they now suffer. For it seems to be something near to the not doing an injury, when any one suffers such an injury, as he is accustomed to do to others. I say, for instance, as if a man should chastise him who acted insolently towards others. They also injure those who have acted ill, or who have wished to do so, or have this wish at present, or intend to do an injury hereafter. For it is attended both with the pleasant and the beautiful; and this appears to be near to not acting unjustly. Men likewise injure those, in injuring whom they gratify their friends, or those whom they admire, or love, or their masters, or in short those with whom they live, and from whom they expect to obtain some good. Also those whom they have falsely accused, and their friendship with whom is dissolved. For things of this kind

appear to be near to the doing no injury, as was the case between Calippus and Dion. They likewise injure those who unless they were injured by them, would be oppressed by others, as if with these there was no longer any place for consultation; as Anesidemus is reported to have written to Gelo, when Calabria would have been depopulated by him, that he had anticipated him, as if he intended to have done the same thing himself. Also those, to whom if they have injured them they may do many things justly by way of satisfaction; as Jason of Thessaly said, it is necessary to act unjustly in some things, in order that we may be able to do many just things.

Men likewise act unjustly in those things, in which all or many persons are accustomed to act injuriously; for they fancy they shall obtain pardon for thus acting. Also in those things which can easily be concealed. But things of this kind are such as are easily consumed, such as esculent substances; or which are easily changed, either in their figure, or colour, or temperament; or which may easily be concealed in many places. But things of this kind are such as are portable, and which may be concealed in small places; and which also resemble many things which he that did the injury possessed before. Men likewise commit injuries in those things which those who are injured are ashamed to disclose; such as insolent and indecent behaviour towards the wife of a man, or towards himself, or his children. They also injure others in those things, which show the prosecutor to be a contentious person; but things of this kind are such as are of small consequence, and for which pardon is granted. And thus we have

nearly shown how men are capacitated when they do an injury, in what things they act unjustly, what kind of men they injure, and on what account.

CHAPTER XIV.

LET us now distinguish between all unjust and just deeds first beginning from hence. Just and unjust deeds, therefore, are divided with reference to two laws, and with reference to the persons to whom they relate in two ways.

But I call law either proper or common. And the proper, indeed, is that which the several [cities and nations] have established among themselves. And of this law, one part is not written, but the other part is written. But common law is that which is according to nature. For there is something which is just, and something which is unjust in common naturally, and which all men prophetically pronounce to be so, though they have no communion nor compact with each other. And this the Antigone of Sophocles appears to intimate, when she asserts that it is just to bury Polynices, though forbidden to do so [by Creon the king,] because this is naturally just :

_____ nor could I ever think,
 A mortal's law of power or strength sufficient,
 To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
 Immutable, eternal, not like these,
 Of yesterday, but made ere time began.

And as Empedocles says with respect to not slaying that which is animated. For this is not indeed just to some persons, but not just to others,

But a fixed law in all men's breasts, where'er
 Heaven's light immense shines thro' wide-ruling air.

And this is also confirmed by Alcidas in his Messeniæ oration.

The persons, however, to whom the just and the unjust are referred, are distinguished in a twofold respect. For what ought and what ought not to be done is either referred to the community, or to one individual of the community. Hence, also, with respect to unjust and just deeds, it is possible to act justly and unjustly in two ways; viz. towards one definite person, or towards the community. For he who commits adultery, or strikes a man, injures some definite person; but he who does not fight [for his country,] injures the community.

Since, therefore, all unjust deeds receive a twofold division, and some have a reference to the community, but others to different private persons, after repeating what it is to be injured, we shall explain the rest. To be injured, therefore, is to suffer unjustly, by those who act voluntarily; for we have before defined the injuring another person to be a voluntary deed. Since, however, he who is injured is necessarily hurt, and is hurt unwill-

lingly ; what hurts are, indeed, is evident from what has been before said. For good and evil have been already essentially distinguished ; and voluntary deeds are such as men perform knowingly. Hence it is necessary that all crimes should either be committed against the community, or against an individual, and this either by one who is ignorant, or by one who is unwilling, or by one who acts willingly and knowingly.

And of these crimes, some are the result of deliberate choice, but others are the effect of passion. Concerning the crimes therefore which are produced from anger, we shall speak when we discuss the passions. And we have already shown what are the objects of deliberate choice, and how men are disposed with respect to them.

Since, however, frequently men who confess that they have done a thing of which they are accused, either deny the name by which the accuser calls the deed, and inscribes the accusation, or deny the thing which is signified by the inscription ; as for instance, that the thing was taken, indeed, but not stolen ; and that such a one gave the first blow, but did not act insolently ; and associated with the woman, indeed, but did not commit adultery with her ; or that he committed a theft, but not sacrilege ; (for he took nothing consecrated to divinity) or that he broke up land, but not belonging to the public ; or that he discoursed with the enemy, but did not betray his country ; on these accounts, it will be requisite to define what theft, insolent conduct, and adultery are, in order that if we wish to show these offences were committed or not, we may be able to declare what is

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just. Every thing, however, of this kind pertains to the question whether the thing is unjust and wicked, or is not unjust; for depravity and acting unjustly consist in deliberate choice. But appellations of this kind presignify deliberate choice; as for instance, insolent conduct and theft. For it does not follow that he who strikes another acts entirely insolently towards him, but then only if he strikes him for the sake of insulting him, as for instance, with a view to disgrace him, or to please himself. Nor does it entirely follow that if a man receives any thing latently, that he has stolen it; but if he takes it away with a view to the detriment of him from whom he takes it, and of his own advantage. The like also takes place in other things, in the same manner as in these.

Since, however, there are two species of just and unjust things; for some indeed are written, but others are not committed to writing; of those indeed which are proclaimed by the laws we have already spoken.

But of those which are not committed to writing there are two species. And of these, some indeed consist in the excess of virtue and vice, in which are disgrace and praise, ignominy and honour and gifts; such for instance, as to be grateful to a benefactor, to benefit him who benefits, to be ready to give assistance to friends, and other things of the like kind.

But others are a supplement to the proper and written law. For the equitable appears to be just; and the equitable is that which is just, besides what is enjoined

in the written law. This, however, happens partly against the will, and partly with the will of the legislators. Against their will, indeed, when [the crime] is latent. But with their will when they are unable to define the thing; and it is necessary, indeed, to assert universally that the thing does not thus subsist always, but for the most part. Legislators also omit certain things willingly, which it is not easy to determine on account of their infinity; as for instance, [when they ordain a punishment] for striking a man with iron, they omit to determine the quantity and the quality of the iron. For life would not be sufficient to enumerate things of this kind. If, therefore, any thing is indefinite; but it is requisite to make a law concerning it, the legislator must necessarily promulgate the law simply. Hence, if a man having a ring on his finger lifts up his hand against, or strikes another person, according to the written law, indeed, he is guilty, and acts unjustly; but in reality, he does not act unjustly [by striking him with his ring;] and this is the equitable. If then what we have said be equity, it is evident what kind of things are equitable and not equitable, and also what kind of men are not equitable. For those things are equitable in which it is necessary to grant pardon. It is likewise equitable not to estimate errors and injuries as deserving equal punishment, nor errors and misfortunes. But misfortunes are such things as happen contrary to expectation, and not from depravity. Errors are such things as do not happen contrary to expectation, and are not from depravity; but injuries are such things as are not effected contrary to expectation, but proceed from depravity. For what proceeds from *desire*,¹ emanates from depravity. It is likewise

¹ When the whole soul is considered as divided into *reason, anger,*

equitable to pardon human [frailties.] Also not to direct our attention to the law, but the legislator. And not to look to the action, but to the deliberate intention of him who did it. Nor to a part of a thing but the whole. Nor to consider what kind of a person a man is now, but what he always was, or for the most part. It is also the province of an equitable man rather to remember the good than the evil which he has received from another; and to be more mindful of the good which he has received, than of the good which he has done. Also to endure the being injured, patiently; and to be more willing that a controversy should be decided by words than by deeds. He is likewise more desirous that a thing should be decided by arbitration than by the suffrages of judges. For an arbitrator looks to the equitable; but a judge looks to the law. And recourse is had to an arbitrator for the sake of this, viz. that the equitable may prevail. And thus much concerning the equitable.

and *desire*, the last of these parts is that irrational appetite which is solely directed to external objects, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them; just as anger is an appetite directed to the avengement of incidental molestations.

CHAPTER XV.

THOSE injuries, however, are greater which proceed from greater injustice. Hence, also, [sometimes] the least injuries are attended with the greatest [injustice.'] Thus for instance, Callistratus accused Melanopus for having defrauded the builders of the temple of three sacred vessels of an inconsiderable value. But the contrary takes place in justice. These, however, are the greatest injuries, because they transcend in power. For he who stole these three sacred vessels, would have committed any other unjust act. Sometimes, therefore, the injury is thus greater; but sometimes it is judged [to be greater] from the harm that ensues. That injury also is considered as greater, to which no punishment is equal, but every punishment is less than it deserves. And likewise that for which there is no remedy; because it is difficult and impossible to apply such a remedy. Also that for which the sufferer can obtain no recompence; for the evil is incurable; since justice and punishment are the remedies [of injuries.] Likewise, if the

¹ Sometimes injuries, though they are the least, because they are conversant with the smallest things, are seen to proceed from the greatest habit of injustice, and on this account they are the greatest.

sufferer and he who is injured, cannot endure the attendant ignominy; for in this case he who did the injury deserves to be punished in a still greater degree. Thus Sophocles when pleading for Euctemon, because he who had been used insolently slew himself, said, that he who had done the injury ought not to be punished in a less degree, than he had punished himself who had been injured. The injury likewise is greater which a man does alone, or the first of all men, or with a few associates. The injury, also, is considered as greater which is often committed. And also that for the prevention of which laws and punishments have been explored. Thus in Argos those are punished, on whose account some new law is established, or a prison is built. The injury likewise is greater which is more brutal; and also that which is more premeditated. Likewise that which excites in the hearers of it, terror rather than pity. And rhetorical formulæ, indeed, are of this kind, viz. that a man has subverted or transgressed many just things, such as oaths, pledges of faith, and conjugal vows; for this is an exuberance of many injuries. And, also, that a man has committed an injury there where those that act unjustly are punished; as is the case with false witnesses. For where will not he do an injury who commits one in a court of justice? Likewise, that a man has done an injury which is attended with the greatest shame. And that he has injured him by whom he has been benefited; for such a one multiplies injuries, because he acts ill, and likewise does not act well. Also, the injury is greater which a man does against the unwritten laws; for it is the province of a better man to be just, not from necessity, [but voluntarily.] - Written laws, therefore, are [observed] from necessity, but this

is not the case with unwritten laws. But after another manner the injury is greater which is committed against the written laws. For he who acts unjustly in those things in which he may be terrified by punishment, will much more act unjustly in those things for which no punishment is ordained. And thus much concerning a greater and a less injury.



CHAPTER XVI.

It follows in the next place that we should discuss what are called inartificial credibilities; for these are peculiar to forensic orations. But they are few in number, viz. the laws, witnesses, compacts, examinations, and an oath.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak about laws, how they are to be used, both by him that exhorts, and him who dissuades, by him who accuses, and him who defends. For it is evident, that if the written law indeed is contrary to the affair, the common law must be used, and equity, as being more just. And it is also evident that the best decision will then be given, when the written laws are not entirely used. The equitable, likewise, always remains and never changes, and this too is the

case with common law ; for it is according to nature ; but written laws are frequently changed. Hence, also, it is said in the *Antigone* of Sophocles, (for *Antigone* says as an apology, that she had acted contrary to the law of *Creon*, but not contrary to the unwritten law.)

— nor could I ever think,
 A mortal's law, of power or strength sufficient,
 To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
 Immutable, eternal, not like these,
 Of yesterday, but made ere time began.
 Shall man persuade me, then, to violate,
 Heaven's great commands, and make the gods my foes ?

It is likewise evident that the just is something true and advantageous, but not that which seems to be so ; so that what is written is not law ; for it does not perform the work of law. It may likewise be said that a judge is like an assayer of silver and gold ; for it is his province to distinguish what is truly just from what is adulterate. And, also, that it is the business of a better man rather to use unwritten than written laws, and to abide by their decision. It must likewise be considered whether the law [in force] is contrary to a law which is approved, or is itself contrary to itself ; as when the one law commands all contracts to be firmly observed ; and the other forbids any contracts to be made contrary to law. It must also be considered, whether the law is ambiguous, so that it may be distorted, and then it must be seen to what part the just is to be adapted, or the advantageous, and afterwards the law is to be used. If, also, the things for which the law was established no longer remain, but the law itself remains, this we must endeavour to render manifest, and thus the law must be opposed by showing [that things being changed, the law also is to be changed

and abrogated.] But if the written law is adapted to the occasion or the fact, then it must be said as the result of the best decision, that the law was established not for the sake of judging contrary to law, but in order that he may not be perjured who may happen to be ignorant what the law says. It must likewise be asserted, that no one chuses that which is simply good, but that which is good to himself. And that it makes no difference whether laws are not established, or are not used. Likewise, that in other acts it is of no advantage to dispute against the masters of them. Thus for instance, it is not expedient for one who is sick to dispute against the prescriptions of the physician; for the error of the physician is not so injurious, as it is to be accustomed to disobey a ruler. To endeavour likewise to become wiser than the laws, is that which is forbidden in celebrated laws. And thus much concerning laws.

With respect to witnesses, however, there are two kinds; for some are ancient; but others modern. And of the latter, some are partakers of danger, but others are exempt from it. But I call ancient witnesses the poets, and other illustrious persons whose judgments [and opinions] are manifest. Thus the Athenians made use of Homer as a witness about Salamis; the Tenedians of Periander the Corinthian, against the Sigœans; and Cleophon made use of the elegies of Solon against Critias, in order that he might show that the family of Critias was formerly contumacious. For otherwise Solon would never have said,

Bid Critias with his yellow locks,
His father's will obey.

Such, therefore, are the witnesses about things that are past. But with respect to future events those who interpret oracles are witnesses; as for instance, Themistocles, when he said that the wooden wall [mentioned by the oracle] signified that the Athenians must betake themselves to their ships. Proverbs also are witnesses. Thus, if some one should deliberate whether he should form a friendship with an old man, the proverb testifies what he is to do, which says, *Never confer a benefit on an old man.* Thus, also, for him who deliberates whether he shall slay the children, whose parents he has likewise slain, there is this proverb, *He is a fool who having slain the father leaves the children.* Modern or recent witnesses, however, [who have no share in the danger,] are such as being illustrious have given a decision [in a court of justice.] For the judgments of these men are useful in the confirmation of what is doubtful. Thus Eubulus, in a court of justice, employed against Chares, what Plato had said against Archibius, *That it was common in the city for men to acknowledge themselves to be depraved.* Those also are recent witnesses, who partake of the danger [of being punished] if they appear to have given false evidence. Persons, therefore, of this description are alone witnesses in things of this kind; viz. whether the thing has been done or not; and whether it is, or not. But they are not witnesses concerning the quality of the thing; as, whether it is just or unjust, advantageous or disadvantageous. Remote witnesses, however, are most worthy of belief in things of this kind; but the ancients are most worthy of belief; for they cannot be corrupted. The credibility, however, derived from witnesses [is to be employed as follows.]

When, indeed, there are no witnesses, it is necessary to judge from probabilities; and this it is to employ the best decision. Probabilities, also, cannot be corrupted by money; and they are not condemned for giving a false testimony. But he who has witnesses ought to say to him that has not, that witnesses may be tried and punished, but probabilities cannot. [It may also be added,] that there would be no occasion for witnesses, if arguments from probabilities were sufficient. Testimonies, however, are either concerning ourselves, or concerning our opponents; and some, indeed, are concerning the thing itself; but others concerning the manners of persons. Hence, it is manifest that we can never be in want of useful testimony; for if the testimony does not relate to the thing, it will either be favourable to the defendant, or adverse to the plaintiff. But the testimony respecting manners, will either evince our probity, or the depravity of our opponent. Other particulars, however, respecting a witness, whether he be a friend, or an enemy, or neither, whether he be a man of reputation, or an infamous character, or neither, and whatever other differences there may be of the like kind, must be derived from the same places from which enthymemes are derived.

With respect to compacts, an oration is so far useful as it increases or diminishes [their authority;] or so far as it renders them credible, or unworthy of belief. For it is favourable to the speaker to show that the compacts possess credibility and authority; but the contrary is favourable to the opponent. The same arguments, therefore, are to be employed in showing that compacts

are worthy or unworthy of belief, as we have employed in the affair of witnesses. For such as those persons are who have subscribed and signed the compacts, [with respect to being worthy or unworthy of belief,] such also are the compacts. When, however, it is acknowledged by the litigants that compacts were made, if this acknowledgement is appropriate, the authority of the compacts is to be increased; for a compact is a private law, and is of a partial nature. And compacts, indeed, do not give authority to the law; but the laws give authority to legal compacts. And in short, the law itself is a certain compact; so that he who disbelieves in and subverts a contract, subverts the laws. Farther still, many contracts and voluntary transactions are effected by compacts; so that if compacts lose their authority, the intercourse of men with each other must be subverted. Other things, also, which are adapted to the confirmation of compacts, the orator will perceive by himself. But if the compacts are adverse to the cause, and favourable to the opponents, in the first place those are adapted to the purpose which some one may urge to invalidate the force of the contrary law; for it is absurd that we should think laws are not to be obeyed, which have not been established rightly but by fraud, and that we should not think it necessary to observe compacts [which have been rightly made.] In the next place it must be said that a judge is a dispenser of what is just; and therefore that his attention is not to be directed to the observance of the compacts, but to that which is more just. And the just indeed is not to be perverted either by fraud, or by necessity; for it has a natural subsistence; but compacts are made both by persons who are deceived, and those who are com-

pelled. In addition to these things, also, it is requisite to consider whether the compact is contrary to any written or common law, and to things just or beautiful; and besides this, whether it is contrary to any posterior or prior contracts. For either the posterior contracts are binding, but the prior have no authority; or the prior are right, but the posterior fallacious; and thus this contrariety of compacts may be employed with advantage. Again, it will be expedient to see whether the compacts are in any way adverse to the judges, and to direct the attention to other things of the like kind; for these things may in a similar manner be easily perceived.

Examinations, also, and torments are certain testimonies; and they seem to possess credibility, because a certain necessity is present with them. There is no difficulty, therefore, in perceiving what relates to these things, and in narrating what is contingent to them; as also in discussing those particulars, which if they are adapted to our purpose we may amplify [by asserting] that these alone are true testimonies. But if they are against us, and favourable to our opponent, then the evidence may be invalidated by speaking against the whole genus of examinations and torments. For men through compulsion no less assert what is false than what is true; since they endure in order that they may not speak the truth, and readily assert what is false, in order that they may be more swiftly liberated from pain. For collateral confirmation, also, it is requisite that examples should be adduced, with which the judges are acquainted.

With respect to oaths, however, there is a fourfold consideration. For we either give and take an oath ; or we do neither. Or we do the one, but not the other. And of these either an oath is given, but not taken ; or it is taken, but not given. Again, either we have sworn before, and are accused by our opponent of perjury, or the opponent swears and is accused of perjury. He therefore who does not offer an oath to his opponent [may say] that men are easily perjured ; and that his opponent if he should take an oath, would not restore the money, but if he did not take an oath, he should think the judges would condemn him. He may also add, that as the affair is dangerous, it is better to commit it to the judges ; for he believes in them, but not in his opponent. [He likewise who does not take the oath which is offered him, may say] that he does not take it, because he is unwilling to swear for money ; and that if he was a bad man he would take an oath ; for it is better to be deprived for the sake of something than for the sake of nothing. For by taking an oath he will obtain money, but otherwise not. His not taking an oath therefore will be the effect of virtue, and will not be the consequence of the fear of perjury. The saying of Xenophanes, likewise, may be adapted to this affair, that the challenge is not equal of an impious against a pious man, but is just as if a strong man should call upon a weak man to fight with him. He also who takes an oath may say that he takes it, because he confides in himself, but not in his opponent. And by inverting the assertion of Xenophanes he may say, that the challenge is equal, if an impious man offers, but a pious man takes an oath. And that it is a dreadful thing

he should not be willing to swear respecting those things for which he thinks it right that the judges should pass sentence on those that take an oath. But if he offers an oath, he may say that it is pious to be willing to commit the affair to the gods; and that there is no occasion [for his opponent] to require any other judges; since the judgment of the cause is committed to him through an oath. He may, likewise, say that it is absurd that his opponent should not be willing to swear concerning those things about which he requires others [i. e. the judges] to swear. Since, however, the manner in which we ought to speak, according to each [of these four modes,] is evident, it is likewise evident how we ought to speak according to these modes when combined; as for instance, if a man is willing indeed to take, but not to give an oath; or if he gives, but is unwilling to take it; or if he is willing both to give and take it; or is willing to do neither. For a combination must necessarily be made from the above-mentioned modes; so that arguments also must necessarily be composed from them. If, however, any one has before taken an oath, and which is contrary [to the present oath,] it must be said that there is no perjury. For to do an injury is a voluntary thing; but things which are done by violence and fraud are involuntary. Hence, therefore, it must be inferred that injury is committed in the mind, and not in the mouth. But if the opponent has before sworn, and is now unwilling to abide by his oath, it must be said that he subverts all things who does not adhere to what he has sworn; for on this account, also, judges that have taken an oath use the laws. And [it may likewise be said in the way of amplification,] shall we rejoice, indeed, that you judges

should abide in the decision which you have made, after taking an oath; and shall not we abide in the oaths which we have taken? And such other things as may be said for the purpose of amplification. And thus much concerning inartificial credibility.

THE
ART OF RHETORIC.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

SUCH, therefore, are the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort and dissuade, to blame and praise, to accuse and defend, and such likewise are the opinions and propositions which are useful in procuring credibility in these. For concerning these, and from these, enthymemes about each genus of orations are peculiarly derived.

Since, however, the rhetorical art is for the sake of judgment (for [the auditors of orations] judge of consultations, and justice is judgment) it is necessary that the orator should not only direct his attention to the oration, so as to consider how it may be demonstrative and credible, but he should also shew himself to be worthy of belief, and dispose his auditor to become a judge. For it

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is of great consequence in procuring belief, especially indeed in counsels, and afterwards in judgments, that the speaker should appear to be properly qualified, and that he should be well affected towards the auditors ; and besides this, if the auditors also are properly disposed. That the speaker, therefore, should appear to be properly qualified, is more useful in counsels [than in judgments ;] but for the hearer to be well disposed, is more useful in judgments. For the same things do not appear to those that love and hate, nor to those that are irascible and those that are mild ; but either they appear entirely different, or different in magnitude. For to the friend, he concerning whom he forms the judgment, will not appear to have acted unjustly, or will appear to have acted so in a small degree ; but to him who hates, the contrary will take place. And to him who desires, and is in good hope [of possessing what he desires] if that which is to come is pleasant, it also appears that it will be, and that it will be good ; but to him who has no desire, and no expectation of a thing, the contrary will take place.

There are three causes, therefore, through which men become worthy of belief ; for so many are the things through which we believe, besides demonstrations. And these are prudence, virtue and benevolence. For men are false in what they say, or in the counsels they give, either on account of all these, or on account of some one of these. For either they do not think rightly through imprudence ; or they do not speak what appears to be true, in consequence of their depravity ; or they are prudent and worthy, but not benevolent. Hence, it happens that those do not give the best counsels who know how to give them. And these are the only things through

which they fail. It is necessary, therefore, that he who appears to possess all these, should be considered by his auditors as worthy of belief. Whence, therefore, men may appear to be prudent and worthy, must be derived from the divisions of the virtues; for from the same things through which a man renders himself prudent and worthy, he may also cause another to become so. Concerning benevolence, however, and friendship we must now speak, in discussing what pertains to the passions.

But the passions are those things, on account of which men being changed, differ in their judgments, and to which pleasure and pain are consequent. The passions, therefore, are such as anger, pity, fear, and other things of this kind, and the contraries to these.

It is necessary, however, to give a threefold division to the particulars about each. I say, for instance, about anger [we should consider] how men are disposed when they are angry, what the things are at which they are accustomed to be angry, and what the quality is of the things which are the subjects of their anger. For if we only possess a knowledge of one or two, but not of all these, it will be impossible to excite anger [in the auditors.] And in a similar manner in the other passions. As, therefore, in what has been before said, we have delivered [appropriate] propositions, we shall likewise do the same in considering the passions, and divide them after the same manner.

CHAPTER II.

LET anger, therefore, be the appetite in man of apparent revenge in conjunction with pain, in consequence of a seeming neglect or contempt of himself, or of some one belonging to him.

If, therefore, anger is this, it is necessary that he who is angry should always be angry with some particular person ; as for instance, with Cleon, but not with man ; and that he is angry because Cleon has done or intended to do something to himself, or to some one belonging to him. It is also necessary that a certain pleasure arising from the hope of revenge, should be consequent to all anger. For it is pleasant for a man to fancy that he shall obtain the object of his desire ; but no one aspires after those things which appear to him to be impossible. He who is angry, however, aspires after things which it is possible for him to obtain. Hence it is well said [by Achilles'] concerning anger, that,

Anger increases in the mortal breast,
Sweeter than trickling honey to the taste.

For a certain pleasure is consequent to anger both on

¹ In Iliad, 18.

this account, and because the thoughts of those who are angry are entirely employed on revenge. The phantasy, therefore, or imagination which is then ingenerated in the soul, produces pleasure, in the same manner as the imagination which is ingenerated in dreams.

Since, however, neglect is the energy of opinion about that which appears to deserve no regard ; (for we conceive that both good and evil, and what contributes to these are worthy of attention, but such things as are nothing, or very trifling, we conceive to be of no worth whatever)—hence, there are three species of neglect, viz. contempt, insolence and contumely. For that which men despise they neglect ; since they despise that which they conceive to be of no worth ; and those things which are of no worth they neglect. He also who insults another person appears to despise him ; for insult is an impediment to the will of another person, not that he who offers the insult may derive a certain advantage himself, but that he may prevent the person insulted from deriving it. Since, therefore, he does not expect to derive any advantage himself, he neglects the other person. For it is evident that he does not apprehend any injury will accrue to himself from the insult ; since if he did, he would be afraid, and would not neglect [the person he insults ;] nor any advantage to the person insulted, which deserves to be mentioned ; for if he did, he would be anxious to make him his friend. He, also, who acts contumeliously towards another neglects him ; for contumely is to injure and pain another person in those things in which shame befalls the sufferer, and this not that any thing else may be done to him than what is done, but that he may receive pleasure from the act. For those who return an

injury do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. The cause, however, of pleasure to those that calumniate is this, that they fancy they excel in a greater degree by acting ill. Hence, young men and those that are rich are contumelious; for they fancy that they thus acquire a superiority to others. But ignominy pertains to contumely; and he who disgraces another neglects him. For that which is of no worth, has no honour either of evil or good. Hence, Achilles when angry says,

————— The affront my honour stains,
While he my valour's guerdon thus detains.¹

And,

Disgrac'd, dishonour'd, like the vilest slave.²

As being enraged on account of these things. Men also think it fit that they should be greatly honoured by those who are inferior to them in birth, in power, in virtue, and in short, in that in which they very much excel another person; as for instance, the rich man excels the poor man in money; the rhetorician excels in speaking him who is unable to speak; the governor him who is governed; and he who fancies himself worthy to command, him who deserves to be commanded. Hence, it is said,

Great is the wrath of Jove-descended kings.³

And,

For tho' we deem the short-liv'd fury past,
'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last.⁴

¹ Iliad, 9.

² Iliad, 9.

³ Iliad, 2.

⁴ Iliad, 1.

For men are indignant on account of their transcendency. Men, likewise, think that they ought to be greatly honoured by those by whom any one should think they ought to be benefited; but these are such as they have benefited, or do benefit, either they themselves, or some one belonging to them, or such as they do wish, or have wished to benefit.

It is now therefore manifest from these things, how men are disposed when they are angry, and with whom, and from what causes they are angry. For they are angry, indeed, when they are aggrieved. For he who is aggrieved desires something; whether he is aggrieved by any opposition directly made against him, as when a man is prevented from drinking that is thirsty; or if an opposition is not directly made against him, yet it appears to be made indirectly; or if any one acts contrary to him, or does not co-operate with him; or if any thing else disturbs him thus disposed,—from all these circumstances he is angry. Hence the sick, the poor, those that are in love, those that are thirsty, and in short those that desire any thing, and do not act rightly, are disposed to be angry, and are easily provoked, and especially with those that neglect their present condition. Thus for instance, the sick are angry with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their disease; the poor, with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their poverty; warriors with those that neglect them in warlike affairs; and lovers with those that neglect them in amatory concerns; and in a similar manner in other things. For each is prepared to exercise his anger against those that neglect them, by the inherent passion. Farther still, men are likewise disposed to be angry when

things happen contrary to their expectation. For that which is very much contrary to opinion is more grievous, just as what is very much contrary to opinion produces delight, if that which is wished for is accomplished. Hence, also, seasons and times, and dispositions and ages render it apparent what kind of persons are easily disposed to anger, and when and where; and that when they are most in these circumstances, they are most easily excited to anger.

Men, likewise, are angry with those that laugh at, deride and mock them; for by so acting they insult them. They are also angry with those that offend them in such things as are indications of contumely. But it is necessary that these should be things of such a kind, as are not directed to any other end, and are of no advantage to those that do them; for they appear to be done solely through contumely. Men also are angry with those that defame and despise things to which they are most devoted. Thus for instance, those that are ambitious of excelling in philosophy, are angry with those who speak contemptuously of philosophy; those who pay great attention to the form and beauty of the body, are angry with those that despise it; and in a similar manner in other things. This also is much more the case, if they suspect that they either do not at all possess these things, or do not firmly possess them, or do not appear to do so. But when they fancy they very much excel in those things for which they are reviled, they pay no attention to the scoffs of others. Men are likewise angry with their friends more than with those that are not their friends; for they think it is more proper that they should be benefited by them than not.

They are also angry with those who have been accustomed to honour, or pay attention to them, if they no longer associate with them as formerly; for they fancy that by so acting they are despised by them. They are likewise angry with those that do not return the kindness which they have received, nor make an equal recompense; and also with those who act contrary to them, if they are their inferiours; for all such things appear to be attended with contempt; the one indeed as of inferiours, but the other as by inferiours. They are also angry in a greater degree, if they are despised by men of no account; for anger was supposed by us to arise from undeserved neglect or contempt; but it is fit that inferiours should not despise their superiours. Men likewise are angry with their friends if they do not speak or act well, and still more so, if they do the contraries to these. Also, if they are not sensible of their wants; as was the case with the Plexippus of Antipho when he was angry with Meleager; for it is a sign of neglect not to be sensible [of the wants of a friend;] since those things are not concealed from us to which we pay attention. They are likewise angry with those that rejoice in their misfortunes, and in short with those who are not at all concerned when they are in adversity; for this is an indication either of hostility or neglect. Also with those who pay no attention to them when they are aggrieved; on which account they are angry with those who are the messengers of evil. And likewise with those who [willingly] hear or see their maladies; for in this case, such persons resemble either those who neglect them, or their enemies. For friends condole [with their friends] in their afflictions; and all men grieve on surveying their own maladies. They are likewise angry

with five kinds of persons by whom they are neglected ; with those with whom they stand in competition for honour ; with those they admire ; with those by whom they wish to be admired ; with those whom they reverence ; and with those by whom they are revered. For if they are neglected by any of these, they are in a greater degree angry. They are also angry with those who despise them, by injuring their parents, children, wives, and such as are in subjection to them, and whom it would be disgraceful in them not to assist. Likewise with those that are ungrateful ; for neglect or contempt from these is unbecoming. They are also angry with such as employ irony and dissimulation towards those who are seriously employed ; for irony pertains to contempt. Likewise with those that benefit others, but not themselves ; for this also indicates contempt, not to think a man deserving of that which all other persons are thought to deserve. Forgetfulness also is productive of anger, as for instance, of names, though it is but a trifling thing. For forgetfulness seems to be an indication of neglect ; since oblivion is produced from negligence ; and negligence is inattention. And thus we have shown who the persons are by whom anger is excited, how they are disposed, and from what causes others are angry with them. It is likewise evident that an orator ought to frame his auditors to such a temper as they are in when they are angry, and show that the opponents are guilty of those things which excite anger, and that they are such persons as men are accustomed to be angry with.

CHAPTER III.

SINCE, however, the being angry is contrary to the being placable, and anger is contrary to placability, the disposition of those that are placable must be considered, who those persons are to whom they conduct themselves with placability, and through what causes they become so. Let placability then be a remission and suppression of anger.

If, therefore, men are angry with those that neglect them, but neglect is a voluntary thing, it is evident that they will be placable to those who do none of these things, or do them unwillingly, or appear not to have done them voluntarily. They will likewise be placable to those who wish to have done the contrary to what they have done. And also to those who are such towards themselves, as they are towards others; for no one appears to neglect himself. Likewise, to those who acknowledge [their faults,] and repent of them. For considering the pain which they feel as a punishment for what they have done, they cease to be angry. But this is evident from what takes place in punishing servants; for we punish in a greater degree such of them as deny [the fault,] and contradict us; but we cease to be angry with such of them as acknowledge they are

punished justly. The cause, however, of this is that it is impudence to deny what is manifest; and impudence is neglect and contempt. We feel no shame, therefore, towards those whom we very much despise. Men are placable likewise to those who humble themselves towards them, and do not contradict them; for thus they appear to acknowledge that they are inferior to them; but those that are inferior are afraid; and no one who is afraid is negligent. But that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, is evident from dogs who do not bite those that prostrate themselves. Men also are placable to those that act seriously, when they are acting seriously themselves; for thus they appear to be thought by them worthy of attention, and not to be despised. Likewise to those who [if they have injured them in any respect, are afterwards] more grateful to them. Also to those that beg and intreat; for such persons are more humble. And to those, that are neither contumelious, nor scoffers, nor neglectful, either of any person, or at least not of the worthy, or of such as they themselves are. And in short, men become placable from causes contrary to those which excite to anger. They are likewise placable to those whom they fear, and reverence; for so long as they are thus disposed towards them they are not angry with them. For it is impossible at one and the same time to be angry with and afraid of a man. With those also who have done any thing through anger, they are either not angry, or they are angry in a less degree; for such persons do not appear to have acted from neglect; since no one who is angry is neglectful. For neglect is unattended with pain; but anger is accompanied with pain. They are likewise placable to those

that revere them, [because reverence is contrary to contempt.]

It is also evident that men are placable when they are in a disposition contrary to anger; as when they are in sport, when they are laughing, when they are at a festival, when they are successful, when they perform any business happily, when they are full; and in short, when they are without pain, experience a pleasure unattended with indolence, and are in good hope. They are likewise placable to those by whom they have not been molested for a long time, and through whom they have not been excited to recent anger; for time appeases anger. Vengeance also formerly inflicted on another person, has the power of appeasing a greater anger conceived against some one. Hence, Philocrates answered well, when a certain person said, the people being enraged, why do you not defend yourself? He replied, not yet. But when will you? When I see another person condemned. For men become placable, when they have consumed their anger upon another person; as it happened to Ergophilus; whom the people absolved, though they were more enraged against him than against Callisthenes, whom the day before they had condemned to death. Men also are placable towards those whom they have convicted. And likewise when they see those that are angry suffering a greater evil from their anger than they occasioned to others; for they conceive that such a one is punished for his anger. Also if they think that they themselves have acted unjustly and suffer justly; for anger is not excited against that which is just; since in this case they do not any longer fancy that they suffer undeservedly. But anger was said by us to be this, [viz.

to arise from a conception of unmerited contempt.] Hence, it is necessary that offenders should first be punished by words; for slaves also when thus punished are less indignant. Those likewise are placable who conceive that the persons on whom they inflict punishment will not perceive that they are punished by them. For anger is excited against individuals, as is evident from its definition. Hence, Ulysses [in his speech to Polyphemus] rightly calls himself Ulysses *the subverter of cities*; as if he could not have avenged [the injuries of Polyphemus] unless he made him sensible who it was that inflicted the vengeance, and for what it was inflicted. It follows, therefore, that we are not angry with those that are not sensible; nor any longer with those that are dead, because [we fancy] they have suffered the extremity of evils, and will not be pained by, or sensible of our revenge, which is the object of desire of those that are angry. Hence it is well said by the poet respecting Hector, who wished that the anger of Achilles towards him might cease when he was dead,

On the deaf earth his rage was spent in vain.

It is evident, therefore, that those who wish to render others placable must derive their arguments from these places. For those whose anger is to be appeased, must be rendered such persons as we have described; but those persons with whom others are angry must be shown [by the orator] to be such as are to be feared, or that they are worthy of reverence, or that they have deserved well of them, or that they injured them unwillingly, or that they are very much grieved for what they have done.

CHAPTER IV.

LET us now show who those persons are that are the objects of love and hatred, and why they are so, defining for this purpose what friendship is, and friendly love. Let, therefore, friendly love be defined to be, the wish that such things as are conceived to be good may fall to the lot of some one for his own sake, and not for the sake of him who forms the wish, and also the endeavour of him who forms the wish to procure such good to the utmost of his power. But he is a friend who loves, and is reciprocally beloved; and those persons conceive themselves to be friends, who think they are thus disposed towards each other.

These things, therefore, being supposed, it is necessary that a friend should be one who reciprocally rejoices in the good which befalls another person, and is naturally pained when that person is aggrieved, and this not on account of any thing else, but on account of the person himself. For all men rejoice when they obtain the object of their wishes, but are aggrieved if the contrary takes place; so that pains and pleasures are an indication of [good and bad] wishes. Those likewise are friends to each other, to whom the same things are good and evil. And also those who are friends and enemies to the same

persons and things ; for these must necessarily wish the same things ; so that he who wishes the same things to another as to himself, appears to be a friend to that person.

Men also love those that have either benefited them, or those that are under their care ; or if their kindness to them has been great, or has been cheerfully exerted, or seasonably, and for their own sake ; and also such as they think are willing to benefit others. They likewise love the friends of their friends, and those that love the same persons that they love, and who are beloved by those who are beloved by them ; who are likewise enemies to those to whom they are enemies, and who hate those whom they hate, and are hated by those who are hated by them. For the same things appear to be good to all these, and to themselves ; so that they wish the same good to them as to themselves ; which was the definition of a friend. Farther still, men love those who are beneficent to them in pecuniary affairs, and in those things which regard their safety. Hence they honour liberal, brave, and just men ; and they consider those to be such who do not live on the property of others. But men of this description are those that live by their own labour ; and among these are those that live by agriculture, and of others, especially manual artificers. They also love those that are temperate, because they are not unjust ; and for the same reason they love those that lead a quiet life unmolested by business. We likewise love those to whom we wish to be friends, if they appear to wish to be our friends. But men of this description are such as are good according to virtue, and are celebrated either by all men, or by the best of men ;

or by those who are admired by us, or by those who admire us. Farther still, men love those who are agreeable companions and with whom they can pass the day pleasantly. But men of this description are such as are ingenuous, who do not reprove the faults of others, and are not studious of contention nor morose; for all such persons are pugnacious; and those that are pugnacious appear to wish things contrary to the wishes of friends. They likewise love those that have elegant manners, and who can give and take a jest; for in both these, men strive to be facetious, as well those that are able to bear raillery, as those that are able to rail elegantly themselves. They also love those who praise the good things which they enjoy, and especially such among these as they are fearful should not be present to themselves. Likewise those who are neat in their appearance, in their dress, and in every thing pertaining to the whole of their life. Also those, who neither reprobate the faults committed by others, nor the benefits conferred on them; for both are attended with defamation. They likewise love those that neither remember injuries, nor are observers of the faults of others, but are easily reconciled. For such as they think they are towards others, they also think they will be towards themselves. They likewise love those that are not addicted to slander, and who know no evil, but only good, either of their neighbours or them. For a good man acts in this manner. Also those that do not resist them when they are angry, or seriously employed; for such like persons are pugnacious. Likewise those that are seriously disposed towards them, as for instance, such as admire them; consider them to be worthy; are delighted with them; and are especially thus affected in things in which they themselves parti-

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cularly wish to be admired, or to appear to be worthy, or pleasant persons. Men also love those that resemble themselves, and are engaged in the same pursuits, provided they are no impediment to them, and their subsistence is not derived from the same profession. For thus [what Hesiod says] will take place, viz. that *the potter envies the potter*. They likewise love those who desire things of which it is at the same time possible for them to be partakers; for if not, the same thing [which we have just noticed] will thus happen. They also love those towards whom they are so disposed as not to be ashamed of things which are base only according to opinion, and towards whom they are ashamed of things which are in reality base. And likewise those by whom they are ambitious to be honoured, or by whom they wish to be emulated, and not to be envied; for these they either love, or wish to be their friends. They likewise love those with whom they co-operate in the acquisition of some good, lest greater evil should hereafter befall themselves. And also those who similarly love their friends when absent and present; on which account all men love those who are thus disposed towards the dead. And in short, they love those who very much love their friends, and do not forsake them; for among the number of good men, they especially love those who are good in what relates to friendship. They likewise love those who do not act with dissimulation towards them; but men of this description are such as are not ashamed to speak of their own defects. For we have already observed that towards friends, we should be ashamed of things which relate to opinion, [i. e. which are base in opinion only, and not in reality.] If, therefore, he who is ashamed has not friendly love, he who

is not ashamed will resemble one who has friendly love. Men, likewise, love those who are not the objects of fear, and in whom they can confide ; for no one loves him of whom he is afraid. But the species of friendship are fellowship, familiarity, alliance, and things of the like kind. Beneficence also exerted towards another person is productive of friendship, as also are acting beneficently when it is not required, and not divulging favours when they are bestowed. For thus beneficence will appear to have been exerted for the sake of the friend, and not on any other account.

CHAPTER V.

WITH respect to enmity, however, and hatred, it is evident that they must necessarily be surveyed from contraries. But the things which produce enmity are, anger, injury either in word or deed, and calumny.

Anger, therefore, arises from what pertains to ourselves ; but enmity may exist independent of what has reference to ourselves. For if we conceive a man to be a person of a certain description, we hate him.

And anger, indeed, is always exerted towards particular persons, as for instance, towards Callias, or So-

crates ; but hatred is also exerted towards genera themselves. For every man hates a thief and a sycophant. And anger indeed may be cured by time ; but hatred is incurable. The former, also, desires to give pain ; but the latter is more desirous to do harm. For he who is angry, wishes [that he with whom he is angry] may be sensible of pain ; but with him who hates this is of no consequence. All painful things, however, are objects of sensation ; but those things which are especially evils, viz. injustice and folly, are in the smallest degree objects of sensation ; for the presence of vice is attended with no pain. And anger, indeed, is accompanied with pain ; but hatred is not ; for he who is angry is pained ; but he who hates feels no pain.

And the angry man, indeed, pities the subject of his anger, if many evils befall him ; but he who hates, feels no commiseration for the object of his hatred. For the former wishes that he with whom he is angry may reciprocally suffer what he feels ; but the latter wishes that the object of his hatred may no longer exist. From these things, therefore, it is evident, that it is possible [for an orator] to show who those are that are really enemies and friends, and to make those to be such who are not so. He may also dissolve the arguments by which his opponent endeavours to show that some persons are mutually friends or enemies ; and that when it is dubious whether a thing was done from anger, or from enmity, he may persuade the adoption of that part which some one may have deliberately chosen.

CHAPTER VI.

WHAT kind of things are the objects of fear, and how those that are terrified are affected, will be evident from what follows. Let fear, therefore, be a certain pain or perturbation arising from the imagination of some future evil, which is either of a destructive nature, or attended with molestation. For not all evils are the objects of fear; such for instance, as injustice or slowness; but such as are capable of producing great molestation or destruction; and these, when they are not remote, but seem to be near, so as to be imminent. For things which are very remote are not the objects of fear; since all men know that they shall die, yet because death is not near, they pay no attention to it.

If, however, fear is this, it is necessary that such things should be terrible as appear to possess a great power of destroying, or are productive of such harm as is attended with great molestation. Hence, also, the indications of things of this kind are terrible; for the object of fear seems to be near. For danger is this, viz. *the approximation of that which is terrible*. Things of this kind, however, are the enmity and anger of those who are able to effect something; for it is evident that they are both willing and able; so that they are near to acting [what

their enmity and anger may suggest.] Injustice, also, when it possesses power is the object of fear ; for the unjust man is unjust from deliberate choice. Virtue, likewise, when insulted and possessing power is to be feared ; for it is evident that vengeance, when it is insulted, is always the object of its deliberate choice ; but now it possesses power. The fear, also, of those who are able to effect something is the object of terror ; for such a one must necessarily be in preparation [for that which he dreads.]

Since, however, the multitude are depraved, are vanquished by gain, and are timid in dangers, to be in the power of another person is a thing for the most part to be feared. Hence, those who have been eye-witnesses of any dreadful deed that has been perpetrated, are to be feared, lest they should divulge it, or desert [him by whom it was committed.] Those, likewise, who are able to do an injury, are always to be feared by those who are capable of being injured ; for men for the most part act unjustly when they are able. Those also are to be feared who either have suffered an injury, or think that they have ; for they always watch for an opportunity [of retaliating.] Those too are to be dreaded who would do an injury if they had the power ; for they are afraid of retaliation ; and it was supposed that a thing of this kind is the object of dread. Those, likewise, are to be feared who are competitors for the same things, and which both cannot at one and the same time possess ; for between men of this description there is always hostility. Those also who are objects of dread to more powerful men, are to be feared by us ; for they are more able to injure us than they are to injure the more power-

ful. For the same reason those persons are to be feared who are dreaded by men more powerful than themselves; and also those who have destroyed men superior to themselves in power; and those who have attacked men inferior to themselves; for either they are now to be dreaded, or when their power is increased. Among those that have been injured, likewise, and among enemies and opponents, such as are to be dreaded, are not those that are hasty and choleric, and who speak their mind freely, but those that are mild, who dissemble, and are crafty; for [what they are machinating] is obscure, or nearly so; and hence their designs are never manifest, because they are remote [from observation.]

With respect however to every thing that is dreadful, such things are more to be feared, the errors pertaining to which cannot be corrected; but it is either wholly impossible to correct them, or they cannot be corrected by those that have committed them, but by their adversaries. Those things also are to be feared for which there is no help, or in which assistance cannot easily be obtained. And in short those things are to be feared which when they do or shall happen to others, are lamentable in their consequences. With respect to things which are to be feared, and which are dreaded by men, these, as I may say, are nearly the greatest.

Let us now show the manner in which men are affected when they are afraid. If, therefore, fear is attended with the expectation of suffering some destructive evil, it is evident that no one is afraid who thinks that he shall not suffer any evil, and that no one dreads those things which

he does not think he shall suffer, or those persons through whom he does not imagine he shall suffer, nor then when he does not suspect [any evil to be imminent.] Hence, it is necessary that those persons should be afraid who imagine they shall suffer some evil, and from such persons, and in such things, and at such a time. Neither, however, those who are in very prosperous circumstances, and appear to be so to themselves, imagine they shall suffer any evil; (on which account such men are insolent, neglectful and audacious; and riches, strength, a multitude of friends, and power, produce such men) nor those who think that they have now suffered dreadfully, and whose hopes with respect to futurity are extinct, as is the case with those who are led to capital punishment. But it is necessary [where there is fear] that there should be some hope of safety, and of escaping the evils which occasion their anxiety; of which this is an indication, that fear makes men disposed to receive counsel, though no one consults about things that are hopeless. Hence, when it is necessary that the orator should excite fear in his auditors, he must show them that they are such persons as may suffer [many] evils, because others greater than them have suffered them. He must also show that men similar to themselves suffer or have suffered many evils, from those through whom they did not expect to suffer, and that they have suffered these evils and then when they did not imagine they should.

CHAPTER VII.

SINCE, however, with respect to fear, it is evident what it is, and it is also evident what the objects of terror are, and how men are affected when they are afraid, it is likewise manifest from these things what confidence is, what the kind of things are in which men confide, and how confident men are disposed. For confidence is contrary to fear, and that which is the object of confidence to that which is the object of dread. Hence, *confidence is a hope attended with imagination, that those things which may be salutary to us are near at hand, but that those things which are the objects of our dread, either do not exist, or are remote.*

But the things which are effective of confidence are, events of a dreadful nature, if they are remote, and such as may be confided in if they are near. Evils also which are imminent, if they may be corrected produce confidence; and this is likewise the case when many or great auxiliaries, or both these, against evils, are present.

Confidence also is produced, when there are neither any persons who have been injured by us, nor who have injured us. And when either, in short, we have no antagonists, or they have no power, or if they have power

they are our friends, or have received benefits from, or have conferred benefits on us. Confidence likewise is produced, when those to whom the same things are advantageous as are beneficial to us are many, or superior to us, or both these.

Those, however, that are confident in dangers are such as think they can accomplish with rectitude many things, without suffering any evil; or who, if they frequently fall into great dangers, escape from them. For men become void of perturbation in dangers in a twofold respect, either because they have not experienced them before, or because they have auxiliaries through which they may escape from them. For thus in dangers at sea, those who are unexperienced in its storms are confident they shall escape them; and also those who have assistance in themselves from their experience. Confidence likewise is produced when there is nothing to be feared from either our equals or inferiors, and those to whom we imagine ourselves to be superior. But we imagine ourselves to be superior to those whom we have either themselves vanquished, or those that are superior to, or resemble them. Men also are confident, if they think those things are present with them in a greater number, and in a greater degree, for which those who excel others are the objects of dread; and these are, an abundance of riches, strength of body, of friends, of country, of warlike apparatus, and either of all, or of the greatest of these. They are likewise confident if they have injured either no one, or not many, or not such as are the objects of fear. And in short, if they are well disposed with reference to what pertains to the gods, both as to other things, and to what is indicated by

signs and oracles. For anger is attended with confidence; and not to injure, but to be injured, is effective of anger; but divinity is conceived to give assistance to those that are injured. Men also are confident, when either having first attacked others, they neither do nor are likely to suffer any evil, or think that in so doing they have acted rightly. And thus much concerning things which are the objects of fear and confidence.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT kind of things, however, those are which are the objects of shame, and also those for which men are not ashamed, and towards what persons they are ashamed, and how they are disposed [when under the influence of this passion,] will be evident from what follows. But *let shame be a certain pain and perturbation with respect to evils either present, or past, or future, which apparently lead to infamy.* And *let want of shame or impudence be a certain contempt and impassivity with respect to these very same things.*

If, therefore, shame is that which we have defined it to be, a man must necessarily be ashamed of evils of such a kind as appear to him to be base, or to those whom he regards. But things of this kind are such deeds as proceed from vice; such for instance as, for a soldier to

throw away his shield [in battle] or fly ; for this proceeds from timidity. It is likewise base to deny a deposit ; for this is the effect of injustice. And also to lie with women with whom it is not lawful to lie, or where it is not proper, or when it is not proper ; for this proceeds from intemperance. It is likewise base, to seek after gain from minute, or disgraceful, or impossible things ; as from the poor or the dead ; whence also the proverb, *to take away from the dead* ; for this proceeds from a desire of base gain, and from illiberality. It is also base for a man not to assist others with money when he is able, or to assist in a less degree than he is able. Likewise for a man to receive pecuniary assistance from one less rich than himself, is base ; and for him to take up money at interest, and yet seem to beg ; to beg, and yet seem to demand ; to demand, and yet seem to beg ; to praise a thing, so as that he may appear to beg it ; and though repulsed, to persist no less in begging it. For all these are indications of illiberality. It is likewise base to praise a man to his face ; for this is a sign of flattery ; also to praise above measure what is good, but extenuate what is evil ; to condole immoderately with one who is afflicted ; and every thing else of a similar kind ; for these are indications of flattery. It is also base not to endure labours which more elderly or delicate men, or those that have greater authority, or in short those that are more imbecile endure ; for all these are indications of effeminacy. To be benefited likewise by another, and that frequently is base ; and also to reprobate the benefits conferred on another. For all these are indications of pusillanimity and an abject mind. It is also base for a man to speak of himself, and to promise [great things of himself ;] and likewise to attribute to himself the deeds of others ; for

this is a sign of arrogance. In a similar manner in each of the other ethical vices, works, and indications, the like may be found ; for they are base and shameful.

In addition to these things also, it is shameful not to participate of those beautiful things of which all men, or all those that resemble each other, or most men participate. But by men that resemble each other I mean, those of the same nation, city, and age, and who are allied to each other, and in short, those that are of an equal condition. For it is now base not to partake of these things ; as for instance, of such a portion of erudition, and of other things in a similar manner. But all these are more shameful when they are seen to happen to any one from himself ; for thus they proceed in a greater degree from vice, when a man is the cause to himself, of past, present, or future evils. Men likewise are ashamed of such things as lead to infamy and disgrace if they suffer or have suffered, or are to suffer them ; and these are such things as pertain to the ministrant services either of the body, or of base works, among the number of which is having the body abused. Things also are shameful which pertain to intemperance, whether voluntary or involuntary ; but things which pertain to violence are involuntary. For the endurance of such things unattended with revenge proceeds from sloth and timidity. These, therefore, and the like are the things of which men are ashamed.

Since, however, shame is an imagination with respect to ignominy, and shame, on account of ignominy itself, and not on account of the evils which attend it ; but no one pays any attention to opinion except on account of

those who form the opinion, men must necessarily feel shame in the presence of those whom they regard [when they have acted wrong.] But they regard those who admire them, and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, and with whom they contend for honours, and whose opinion they do not despise. They wish, therefore, to be admired by, and they admire those, who are in possession of some good which is honourable, or from whom they very much wish to obtain something which it is in their power to give them; as, for instance, is the case with lovers. Men, however, contend for honours with those that resemble themselves. But they pay attention to prudent men, as to persons of veracity; and men of this kind are such as are more elderly, and the erudite. Men also are ashamed of what is before their eyes, and is done openly; whence the proverb that *shame is in the eyes*. On this account they are more ashamed before those that are always present with them, and who pay attention to them, because both these are before their eyes. They are likewise ashamed before those who are not obnoxious to the same crimes as themselves; for it is evident that the opinions of the latter are contrary to those of the former. Before those also they are ashamed who are not disposed to pardon such as appear to act wrong; for that which a man does himself he is said not to be indignant with in his neighbours; so that it is evident he will be indignant with crimes which he does not commit himself. They are likewise ashamed before those who divulge to many persons [any thing they have done amiss;] for there is no difference between the not appearing to have done wrong, and the not divulging it. But those divulge [the faults of others] who have been

injured by them, because they observe their conduct, and also those who are given to defamation (for if they defame those who have not acted wrong, much more will they defame those that have.) Those also divulge [what they see or hear] who are attentive to the faults of others, such as those that deride, and comic poets; for in a certain respect they are given to defamation and are babblers. Men likewise are ashamed before those by whom they have never been repulsed, but have obtained what they wished; for they are disposed towards them, as towards persons whom they admire. Hence, also, they feel shame before those who have for the first time asked any thing of them, as not having yet done any thing by which they might lose their good opinion. Of this kind likewise are such as recently wish to be friends; for they have perceived qualities of the most excellent nature in us. Hence, the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans was well, [when they desired his friendship.] Among those likewise who were formerly known to us we feel shame before such of them as are not conscious [of any crime we may have committed.] Men also are not only ashamed of disgraceful things, but of the indications of such things. Thus for instance they are not only ashamed of the act of venery, but likewise of the indications of it; and not only when they do base things, but when they speak of them. In a similar manner, also, they are not only ashamed before the above-mentioned persons, but before those who may divulge their actions to them, such as the servants and friends of these. In short, men are not ashamed before those whose opinion with respect to veracity, is despised by many persons; for no one is ashamed before children and brutes. Nor are men ashamed of the same things

before persons that they know, and those who are unknown to them; but before those whom they know, they are ashamed of such things as are base in reality, and before those that are unknown, of such things as are legally base.

Men likewise when they are ashamed, are affected in the following manner. In the first place, when they are present with persons of such a description as we have showna those to be before whom they are ashamed; but these were such as are either admired by them, or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they are in want of something advantageous, which they will not obtain if they are without renown. Men also are ashamed when they are seen by such persons as these, as Cydias the orator said respecting the division of the lands in Samos; for he desired the Athenians to suppose that they were surrounded by the Greeks in a circle, not only as hearers, but as spectators of their decrees. And they are likewise ashamed, if such persons are near them, or are likely to be spectators of their actions. Hence, those that are unfortunate are unwilling to be seen by those that emulate them; for emulators are admirers. Men also are ashamed when they have any thing which disgraces the actions and affairs, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or of certain other persons, with whom they have any alliance; and in short, they are ashamed before those of whom they are themselves ashamed. But these are such persons as the above mentioned, and those who are referred to them, of whom they have been the preceptors or counsellors. They are likewise ashamed if there are other persons resembling themselves with whom they

contend for honorary distinctions; for from shame they both do and omit to do many things on account of men of this description. Men also feel more ashamed when they are about to be seen, and converse openly with those who are conscious [of their actions.] Hence, Antipho the poet when he was led to punishment by the command of Dionysius, on seeing those who were to be executed with him, having their faces covered as they passed through the gates of the prison, said, why do you cover your faces? Will any one of these see you to-morrow? And thus much concerning shame. But with respect to impudence, it is evident that we shall abound with what is to be said about it from contraries.

CHAPTER IX.

THOSE, however, to whom men are grateful, and in what they are grateful, or how they are affected when they are so, will be evident when we have defined what a favour or kindness is. Let a favour, therefore, be that *according to which he who possesses a thing, is said to confer a favour on him who is in want of it, not that he may receive any thing from him, nor that any advantage may accrue to the giver, but that he who is in want may be benefited.*

Arist.

VOL. I.

I

But a favour is great when it is conferred, either on one who is very much in want of it, or the favour itself consists of things which are great and difficult to obtain, or is bestowed opportunely, or when he who bestows it is the only one, or the first that bestows it, or who especially bestows it. Wants, however, are appetites or desires, and of these particularly such as are accompanied with pain when the desired object is not obtained. But of this kind, are such desires as love, and also those which take place in the maladies of the body, and in dangers; for he who is in danger desires, and likewise he who is in pain. Hence, those who relieve men that are in poverty or in exile, though the relief be but small, yet on account of the magnitude of the want, and the seasonableness of the relief, they confer a favour; as was the case with him who gave a mat [to a poor exile] in the Lyceum. It is necessary, therefore, that he who confers a favour must especially confer it in the above-mentioned circumstances; but if not in these, in such as are equal or greater.

Hence, since it is evident when and in what things a favour is to be conferred, and how those are affected that bestow a favour, it is likewise manifest that from hence, arguments must be derived for the purpose of showing that others are or have been in such like pain and want, and that those who relieved them in such want, relieved them by supplying what was mentioned.

It is likewise manifest whence it may be shown that a favour has not been conferred, and that no gratitude is due, either by evincing that it is or has been conferred for the sake of those that bestowed it; and that is not a

favour. Or it may be shown that it was conferred casually, or by compulsion. Or that a kindness was returned, but not conferred, whether knowingly or not; for in both ways one thing is given for another; so that neither in this way will it be a favour. What we have said likewise must be considered in all the categories. For it is a favour, either because this particular thing is given, or so much, or a thing of such a quality, or at such a time, or in such a place. But the signs [that a favour has not been conferred] are if less has been done than at another time. And if the same, or equal, or greater things have been conferred on enemies; for it is evident in this case, that these things have not been bestowed for our sakes. Or if things of a vile nature have been bestowed knowingly; for no one will acknowledge that he is in want of vile things. And thus much concerning conferring and not conferring a favour.

CHAPTER X.

LET US now show what pity is, how men that commiserate others are affected, and what things and persons are the objects of pity. But let pity be *a certain pain arising from an apparent destructive and dolorific evil which befalls some one undeservedly, and which he who*

feels this pain, or some one belonging to him may expect to suffer, and this when the evil is seen to be near.

For it is evident that he who will commiserate another person must necessarily be one who will think that either himself, or some one belonging to him, may suffer a certain evil, and such an evil as we have mentioned in the definition of pity; or an evil similar or allied to it. Hence, neither do those who consider themselves as utterly lost feel pity; (for they do not think they shall suffer any thing further than what they have suffered) nor those who fancy themselves exceedingly happy; for they insult [those that are in calamity.] For if they fancy that every kind of good is present with them, it is evident that they must also fancy they cannot suffer any evil; since a security from evil is among the number of goods. Those, however, who are compassionate are such as think they may suffer; and such as have suffered evils; and have escaped them. Likewise elderly men, on account of their prudence and experience. Those that are feeble, and those that are more timid. Also those that are erudite; for they accurately consider the mutability of human affairs. And those that have parents, or children, or wives; for they consider their evils to be their own. Those likewise are compassionate who are not overpowered with anger or confidence; for those that are pay no attention to futurity. And also those who are not insolently disposed; for those that are do not think they shall suffer any evil. But those are compassionate who exist between these. Nor again, are those compassionate who are very timid; for those who are terrified feel no pity, because they are occupied with their own passion. Those likewise are compassionate who

think that there are some worthy persons ; for he who thinks that no one is worthy will fancy that all men deserve to suffer evil. And in short, [a man is compassionate] when he is so disposed as to remember that such like evils have happened either to him, or to those belonging to him. And thus we have shown how those who compassionate others are affected.

What the things are, however, which they compassionate is evident from the definition. For all such painful and lamentable circumstances as are of a destructive nature, are subjects of commiseration. And, likewise, such evils as fortune is the cause of if they are great. But evils which are lamentable and destructive are, death, stripes, the maladies of the body, old age, disease, and the want of nutriment. And the evils of which fortune is the cause are, the privation of friends, a paucity of friends ; (on which account, also, it is lamentable to be torn from friends and familiars) deformity of body, imbecillity, and mutilation. It is also a subject of commiseration for some evil to happen there, where it was fit some good should have been done. And for a thing of this kind to happen frequently. Likewise for some good to be present, when no advantage can be derived from it ; as was the case with the gifts which were sent to Diopithis from the king [of Persia ;] for they were sent to him when he was dead. It is also a subject of commiseration, when no good happens to any one, or if it does happen, it cannot be enjoyed. These, therefore, and things of this kind, are subjects of commiseration.

But men compassionate those they are well acquainted

with, unless they are very much allied to them; for towards these, when they are about to suffer any evil, they are affected in the same manner as towards themselves. Hence, Amasis, when his son was led to death, did not, as they say, weep; but he wept when he saw his friend beg. For this, indeed, was an object of commiseration, but the former was a dreadful circumstance. For that which is dreadful is different from that which is commiserable, and has the power of expelling pity. It is also frequently useful to the contrary [indignation.] Men, likewise, feel compassion [for their familiars] when some evil is near them. They also commiserate those who are similar to themselves in age, in manners, in habits, in dignities, and in birth. For in all these it is more apparent that they may suffer the like evils. For, in short, it is here also necessary to assume that men feel pity for the evils of others, if they are such as they are fearful may befall themselves. Since, however, calamities which appear to be near, are the subjects of compassion, but such as happened *ten thousand years ago*, or which will happen *ten thousand years hence*, as they are neither the objects of expectation nor remembrance, are either not at all the subjects of compassion, or not in a similar degree; hence, those things which are represented by the same gestures, voices and apparel, and in short by the same action [as those who were in some calamity adopted,] are necessarily more pitiable. For they cause the evil which we commiserate to appear nearer, placing it before our eyes, either as that which will be, or which has been. Calamities, likewise, which have recently happened, or which will shortly happen, are for the same reason more pitiable. Signs, also, and the actions [which have been employed by miserable men,] are pitiable; such

as the garments which they have worn, and other things of the like kind. The species, likewise, and whatever else is of a similar nature, of those in calamity, as for instance, of those who are dying, are subjects of commiseration; and especially of those who in such circumstances are worthy men. For all these things, because they seem near, produce greater commiseration; because he who suffers, appears not to deserve these evils, and because the calamity is before our eyes.

CHAPTER XI.

To pity, however, that passion is especially opposed which they call indignation. For to the pain arising from adverse circumstances in which some one is undeservedly involved, the pain is after a certain manner opposed, which arises from the same manners, on account of the prosperity which some one unworthily obtains. And both these passions are the offspring of worthy manners. For it is necessary to condole and compassionate those who are undeservedly unfortunate in their affairs; and to be indignant with those who are undeservedly prosperous. For that which happens to any one contrary to his desert is unjust. Hence, also, we attribute indignation to the gods. Envy, likewise, may appear to be after the same manner opposed to pity, as being proximate to and the same with indignation. It

is however different from it. For envy also is a turbulent pain arising from the prosperity [of another person] but is not a pain arising from undeserved prosperity, but from the prosperity of one who is equal and similar to him who is envious. Both these passions, however, agree in this, that each is pained for the prosperity of another, because he is prosperous, and not because any evil arises from thence to the subject of these passions. For if this were not the case, one of these passions would no longer be envy, and the other indignation; but each would be fear, if pain and perturbation were produced, because some evil would befall the subject of these passions from the prosperity of another.

It is however evident that contrary passions are consequent [to these perturbations.] For he who is pained on account of the unmerited prosperity of others, will rejoice, or at least will be without pain, on account of the contraries to these, viz. those who are deservedly unfortunate. Thus for instance, no worthy person will be pained, when parricides and murderers are punished. For it is necessary to rejoice in the misfortunes of such persons. After the same manner, also, it is proper to rejoice in the prosperity of those who are deservedly fortunate. For both these are just, and cause a worthy man to rejoice; since it is necessary he should hope the same prosperity will also befall him which befel one who resembles him. And all these passions belong to the same manners.

But the contraries to these belong to contrary manners. For it is the same person who rejoices in the evils of another, and who is envious; since he who is pained

at that which befalls and is present with some one, must necessarily rejoice at the privation and destruction of that thing. Hence, all these passions are impediments to pity; but they differ from the above-mentioned causes; so that all of them are similarly useful for the prevention of pity.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning indignation, and show with what persons, and on account of what circumstances we are indignant, and how those who are indignant are affected; and afterwards, let us speak concerning the other passions. But from what has been said, it is evident [with what persons men are indignant.] For if to be indignant is to be pained on account of some one who appears to be undeservedly prosperous, in the first place it is evident, that we cannot be indignant on account of every good. For if a man is just or brave, or has any virtue, no one can be indignant with him; nor are those the objects of pity who are contrary to these. But men are indignant at riches and power, and things of this kind, of which, in short, good men are worthy. Nor are men indignant with those who possess any thing which is naturally good, such as nobility, beauty, and the like. Since, however, that which is ancient appears to be something proximate to what is naturally possessed, it necessarily follows that men are more indignant with those who possess the same good, if they have recently possessed it, and on account of this are in prosperous circumstances; for those who have recently become rich are the cause of greater molestation to others, than those whose wealth is ancient, and by descent. In a similar manner, also, rulers, powerful men, those who have numerous friends, and an ex-

cellent progeny, and whatever else is of the like kind, occasion greater molestation to others. And this is also the case if any other good befalls them on account of these things. For we are more indignant with those who are recently rich when they become rulers through their riches, than with those who have been for a long time in possession of wealth; and in a similar manner in other things. The cause, however, of this is, that those who have for a long time possessed wealth, appear to possess what is their own; but this is not the case with those who have recently become rich. For that which appears to have always been possessed, appears to be truly possessed; so that persons of the latter description, do not seem to possess what is their own. Because, likewise, any casual person is not worthy of every good, but there is a certain analogy and fitness; (since, for instance, the beauty of arms is not adapted to a just, but to a brave man, and illustrious marriages are not adapted to those who have recently become rich, but to those of noble birth)—hence, if a man is a worthy character, and does not obtain that which is adapted to him [so far as he is worthy,] we are indignant. We are likewise indignant when an inferior contends with his superior, and especially when he contends with him in that in which he is inferior. On this account it is said [by Homer,']

Hence did Cebriones in combat shun,
 T' engage the valiant son of Telamon;
 For his presuming pride offended Jove,
 That with a better man he durst his courage prove.

And we are also indignant if he contends with him in any thing else, [and not only in that in which he is inferior;] as if, for instance, a musician should contend

* Iliad, 11.

with a just man; for justice is a thing more excellent than music. From these things, therefore, it is evident what are the objects of indignation, and why they are so; for they are these, and things of a like nature.

But men are disposed to be indignant, if being worthy to obtain the greatest goods, they do not obtain them; for it is not just to think those persons worthy to obtain a similar good, who are not similarly worthy; [and when men of this description become the possessors of similar good, worthy men are indignant.] In the second place *good and worthy men are prone to be indignant; for they judge well, and hate what is unjust.* Those, likewise, are indignant who are ambitious, and who aspire after certain actions; and especially when they are ambitious about those things which others obtain, that are unworthy to obtain them. And in short, those who think themselves deserving of that good, which other persons think them not to deserve, are indignant with such persons, and especially when they obtain this good. Hence, men of a servile disposition, bad men, and those who are not ambitious, are not prone to indignation; for there is nothing of this kind, of which they think themselves worthy. From these things, however, it is manifest what kind of persons those are for whose misfortunes and evils, or the frustration of their wishes, we ought to rejoice, or feel no pain; for from what has been said the opposites are apparent. Hence, unless the oration so prepares the judges when their compassion is solicited, as to convince them that those who implore their pity are unworthy to receive it, and that those who do not implore it are worthy to receive it, it is impossible to excite pity in the judges.

CHAPTER XII.

IT is likewise evident what the things and persons are which occasion envy, and how those are affected that are envious, *if envy is a certain pain arising from apparent prosperity in the above-mentioned goods, when it happens to persons of a similar condition, not because this prosperity does not befall him who is envious, but because it falls to the lot of those who are the objects of envy.*

For those that envy are such as to whom certain persons are similar, or appear to be so; I mean, who are similar in birth, in alliance, in habit, in reputation, and external abundance. Men, likewise, envy who want but little of possessing every good. Hence, those who perform great actions, and are prosperous, are envious; for they fancy that whatever accedes to others is taken from themselves. Those also are envious that are remarkably honoured for a certain thing, and especially when they are honoured for wisdom, or felicity. Likewise, those who are ambitious, are more envious than those who are unambitious. Those also are envious who wish to seem to be wise, but are not so in reality; for they are ambitious of the honour which is attendant on wisdom. And in short, those are envious who are lovers of renown in

any pursuit ; for in this pursuit they are envious. The pusillanimous also are envious ; for all things appear to them to be great.

Hence, therefore, it is evident what the goods are which are the objects of envy. For envy is excited by those actions through which men pursue glory, contend for honour, and aspire after the good opinion of others. And nearly, in all such things as are the effects of good fortune there is envy. But this is especially the case in those things which men either desire themselves, or fancy they ought to possess ; or in those things, in the possession of which they are a little superior, or a little inferior to others.

It is likewise evident who the persons are that are the objects of envy ; for this was at the same time shown [from what has been said about those who are envious.] For men envy those who are near to them in time, in place, in age, and in renown. Whence it is said, "That which is kindred knows how to envy." Men also envy those with whom they contend for honour ; for they contend for honour with the persons above-mentioned. *But no one contends with those who lived ten thousand years ago, or with those who will exist ten thousand years hence, or with those who are dead ; nor yet with those who dwell at the pillars of Hercules ; nor with those to whom in their own opinion, or in the opinion of others, they are far inferior. Nor, in like manner, do they contend with those to whom they are much superior. Since, however, men contend for honour with their antagonists, and rivals, and in short with those who aspire after the same things, it is necessary that they should*

especially envy those persons. Hence, it is said [by Hesiod] *The potter envies the potter*. Those also who have scarcely obtained, or who have not at all obtained a thing, envy those who have rapidly obtained it. Men likewise envy those who, by obtaining or acting rightly in any thing, are a disgrace to them; but these are near and similar. For it is evident in this case that those who envy did not obtain the good [which those whom they envy obtained] through their own fault; so that this being painful produces envy. They also envy those who either have possessed these things, or who have obtained what it is fit for them to possess, or which they once possessed; and on this account the more elderly envy the younger. Those likewise who have spent much on the same thing, envy those who have spent little on it. It is also evident what the things and persons are in which men of this description rejoice, and in what manner they are affected. For as those who are not thus affected are pained, so those who are so affected are delighted with contrary circumstances, [i. e. they rejoice when they possess the good which those are deprived of who resemble themselves.] Hence, if the orator disposes the judges to be affected in the same manner as those are who are envious; and if he shows that those who implore pity, or desire to obtain a certain good, are such as we have said those are who are envied, it is evident that they will not obtain pity from their masters.

CHAPTER XIII.

IT is likewise from hence evident how they are affected who are emulous, and of what kind of things and persons they are emulous. For *emulation is a certain pain arising from the apparent presence of honourable goods, and which he who emulates may possess, as falling to the lot of those who naturally resemble him, so that he who is emulous is not pained that these goods are possessed by another, but that they are not possessed by himself.* Hence, emulation is equitable, and is possessed by equitable men; but envy is a depraved thing, and is possessed by depraved men. For he who emulates prepares himself through emulation for the attainment of good, but he who envies endeavours through envy that his neighbour may not obtain some good.

It is necessary, therefore, that those should be emulous who think themselves deserving of the good which they do not possess; for no one thinks himself deserving of things which appear impossible to be obtained. Hence, young men, and those who are magnanimous are emulous. Those likewise are emulous who possess such goods as deserve to be possessed by illustrious men; for these are

riches, numerous friends, dominion, and the like. For as they think it fit that they should be worthy men, they emulate the worthy who possess similar goods. Men also emulate those whom others think deserving of good. And likewise those whose ancestors, or kindred, or domestics, or nation or city are famous, are in these things emulous; for they think them to be appropriate to themselves, and that they are worthy of these.

If, however, honourable goods are the subjects of emulation, it is necessary that the virtues should be things of this kind; and likewise such things as are useful and beneficial to others. For benefactors and good men are honoured. Those goods also which are enjoyed by those who are proximate to us, are the subjects of emulation; such as riches and beauty, which are enjoyed more than health.

It is evident, therefore, who those persons are that are the subjects of emulation; for those who possess these and such like things are emulated. But these are the above-mentioned particulars, such as fortitude, wisdom, and dominion; for rulers have the power of benefiting many. Generals likewise, rhetoricians, and all who are able to effect things of this kind are objects of emulation. This also is the case with those whom many wish to resemble, or of whom many wish to be the familiars or friends; or whom many admire, or whom they themselves admire. And likewise with those whose praises and encomiums are celebrated by poets, or the writers of orations. Men, however, despise those who are deprived of these goods, and who are defiled with the contrary vices; for contempt is contrary to emulation, and

emulating to despising. But it is necessary that those who are so affected as to emulate certain persons, or be emulated, should despise those who have the evils opposite to the goods which produce emulation. Hence, they frequently despise such as are fortunate when fortune is present with them without honourable goods. And thus we have shown through what particulars the passions are ingenerated and dissolved, from which credibility is derived.

CHAPTER XIV.

IN the next place let us show what the manners of men are according to their passions, habits, ages and fortunes.

And the passions, indeed, I denominate anger, desire, and the like, concerning which we have spoken before.

But habits are the virtues and vices; and of these also we have spoken before, and have also shown what the objects are which every one deliberately chooses, and what the actions which he performs. The ages are youth, the acme of life, and old age. But I call fortune, nobility, wealth, power, and the contraries to these, and in short, prosperous and adverse fortune.

Arist.

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Young men, therefore, are prone to desire, and prepared to accomplish what they desire. Of all the desires pertaining to the body likewise, they are especially addicted to venereal pleasures, and are intemperate in these; but they are mutable, and rapidly become fastidious in their desires. They also desire vehemently, and quickly cease to desire. For their wishes are acute, and not great, so that they resemble the hunger and thirst of those that are sick. They are likewise prone to anger, are precipitately angry, are prepared to follow the impulse of passion, and are vanquished by anger. For in consequence of their ambition they cannot endure to be neglected, but are indignant if they conceive that they are injured. And they are indeed ambitious, but they are more desirous of victory; for youth aspires after transcendency; but victory is a certain transcendency. They are also more desirous of both these [i. e. honour and victory] than of riches. But they are in the smallest degree anxious about wealth, because they have not yet experienced the want of it, as it is said in an apophthegm of Pittacus upon Amphiarus. Young men likewise are not malevolent, but ingenuous, because they have not yet beheld much depravity. They are also credulous, because they have not yet been deceived in many things. And they are full of good hope; for in the same manner as men [are heated] who are intoxicated with wine, so young men are naturally hot; and at the same time they are full of good hope, because they have not yet been frequently frustrated of their wishes. They also live for the most part from hope; for hope indeed is of the future, but memory of the past; but with young men the future is long, and the past short. For in the morning of life they do not think that they should remember

any thing, but hope all things. They are likewise easily deceived for the cause already assigned; for they easily hope. They are also more brave; for they are irascible, and full of good hope; of which the former causes them to be fearless, and the latter confident; for no one who is angry is afraid, and to hope for some good produces confidence. They are likewise bashful; for they do not as yet apprehend other things to be beautiful in conduct than those in which they were instructed by law alone. And they are magnanimous; for they are not yet rendered abject by life, but are unexperienced in its necessities; and magnanimity consists in a man believing himself to deserve great things; and this is the province of one who entertains good hope. They likewise prefer beautiful to profitable conduct; for they live more from moral precepts than from reasoning; but reasoning is directed to that which is profitable; and virtue, to that which is beautiful. Youth also is a lover of friends and associates, more than the other ages, because it rejoices in society, and does not yet judge of any thing by its utility, so that neither does it seek for advantage in friendship. Youth likewise err in every thing in a greater degree and more vehemently, contrary to the precept of Chilo; for they do all things too much; since they love and hate too much, and in a similar manner with respect to every thing else. For they fancy and strenuously contend that they know all things; and this is the reason why they exceed in all their actions. They also injure others from insolence, and not malevolently. And they are compassionate, because they apprehend all men to be worthy and better than they are; for by their own innocence they measure others; so that they are of opinion they suffer undeservedly. They are likewise addicted to

laughter ; on which account also they are facetious ; for facetiousness is learned contumely. Such therefore are the manners of youth.

CHAPTER XV.

ELDERLY men, however, and those who have lost the vigour of age, are nearly for the most part endued with manners contrary to those of youth. For because they have lived many years, have been deceived in many things, and have erred, and because the greater part of human affairs is bad, hence they do not firmly assert any thing, and estimate all things less than is proper. They likewise *opine*, but *know* nothing ; and being involved in doubt they always add *perhaps*, and *it may be*. And in this manner they speak on every subject ; but they assert nothing stably. They are also illnatured ; for illnature consists in putting the worst construction on every thing. Farther still, they are suspicious from their incredulity, but they are incredulous from their experience. On this account, likewise, they neither love nor hate vehemently ; but according to the precept of Bias they love as if they should some time or other hate, and they hate as if they should some time or other love. They are also pusillanimous, because they have become

abject through length of years ; for they desire nothing great or illustrious, but those things only which are necessary to the support of life. They are likewise illiberal ; for one of the necessaries of life is property ; but at the same time from experience they know how difficult the acquisition of wealth is, and how easily it is lost. They are also timid, and are afraid of every thing beforehand. For they are affected in a manner contrary to youth ; since they are frigid, but youth is hot ; so that old age prepares the way for timidity ; for fear is a certain refrigeration. They are likewise lovers of life, and especially at the close of life, because desire is directed to that which is absent, and that which is wanted is especially the object of desire. They are also lovers of themselves more than is proper ; for this also is a certain pusillanimity. And they live with a view to what is advantageous, and not with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, more than is proper, because they are lovers of themselves. For that which is advantageous is good to an individual ; but that which is beautiful in conduct is simply good. They are likewise more impudent than modest ; for because they do not similarly pay attention to the beautiful in conduct and the advantageous, they neglect the opinion of others, as to their own actions. They are also despondent, on account of their experience [of human affairs ;] for the greater part of human concerns are bad ; and therefore, most of them tend to a worse condition ; and also on account of their timidity. And they live more from memory than from hope ; for the remainder of their life is but little ; but that which is past is much. And hope, indeed, is of the future, but memory is of the past. This likewise is the cause of their garrulity ; for they dwell on the narration of past

events, because they are delighted with the recollection of them. Their anger also is sharp, but imbecile. And their desires partly fail, and partly are weak ; so that they are neither prone to desire, nor disposed to act according to its impulse, but they act with a view to gain. Hence, those who are so far advanced in age appear to be temperate ; for their desires become remiss, and they are subservient to gain. They likewise live more from reasoning than from manners ; for reasoning is directed to that which is advantageous ; but manners are directed to virtue. They injure others also from malevolence, and not from insolence. Old men likewise are compassionate as well as young men, but not from the same cause ; for young men are compassionate from philanthropy, but old men from imbecility ; for they fancy that all evils are near them ; and this was the definition of a compassionate man. Hence, also, they are querulous, and are neither facetious, nor lovers of laughter ; for the querulous disposition is contrary to that which is addicted to laughter. Such, therefore, are the manners of young and elderly men. Hence, too, since every one willingly admits orations adapted to his manners, and which exhibit similar manners [in the orator], it is not immanifest what the manners are which an orator ought to express in his oration, so that they may be readily heard by the young or the old.

CHAPTER XVI.

WITH respect to those, however, who are in the acme of life, it is evident that their manners will be between those of youth and old men, so as to take away the excess of each. And they are neither very confident; for audacity is a thing of such a kind as confidence; nor very timid, but are disposed in a becoming manner with respect to both these. Nor do they confide in all men, nor disbelieve all men, but are more disposed to judge according to truth. And neither do they alone live with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, nor with a view to what is advantageous, but with a view to both. Nor are they inclined to parsimony, nor yet to luxury, but to that [mode of life] which is appropriate, and fit. They are also disposed in a similar manner with respect to anger and desire; and they are temperate in conjunction with fortitude, and brave in conjunction with temperance. For these virtues are distributed in the young and the old; since young men indeed are brave and intemperate, but elderly men temperate and timid. In short, the advantages which are distributed among the young and the old, subsist in conjunction in those who are in the acme of life; but such things as exceed, or are deficient in the young and the old, of these, that which is moderate and fit, [is possessed by men in the

vigour of their age.] But the body, indeed, is in its acme from thirty to five and thirty years of age, but the soul about the forty ninth year. And thus much concerning the manners of youth, and old age, and those who are in the acme of life.

CHAPTER XVII.

LET us in the next place speak concerning the goods derived from fortune, through which it happens that the manners of men become such as they are. The manners, therefore, of nobility are indeed such as render him who possesses it more ambitious; for all men when any good is present with them are accustomed to accumulate it; but nobility is a certain dignity of ancestors. But it is peculiar to those of noble birth to despise those who resemble their ancestors, [i. e. who have recently obtained those goods which their ancestors formerly possessed;] because remote renown is more honourable than that which is recently obtained, and is attended with greater glory.

A man, however, is noble from the virtue of lineage; but he is generous through not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestors;] which for the most part is not the case with men of noble birth, since many of them

are abject. For there is a fertility in the progenies of men, in the same manner as in the productions of the earth. And sometimes if the stock is good, illustrious men are for a time produced; but afterwards, there is again a remission of fecundity. The progeny, also, which possessed an excellent disposition degenerates into more insane manners, as was the case with the offspring of Alcibiades, and the elder Dionysius. But progeny of a stable disposition degenerate into stupidity and sloth; as was the case with the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

BUT the manners which are consequent to wealth may be easily seen by all men. For rich men are insolent and proud, and these manners they derive from the possession of wealth; since they are affected in the same manner as if they possessed every good. For wealth is as it were the test by which the worth of other things is estimated; on which account it appears that all things may be purchased by it. Rich men also are luxurious and boastful; luxurious, indeed, from their delicate mode of living, and the ostentation of their felicity; but they are boastful and of barbarous manners, because all men are accustomed to dwell upon that which is beloved

and admired by them; and because they fancy that others are emulous of that which is the object of their emulation. At the same time, however, they are deservedly thus affected; for many are in want of the riches which they possess, whence, also, that saying of Simonides respecting wise and rich men, in answer to the wife of king Hiero who asked him whether it was better to become a rich than a wise man; for he replied, that it was better to be a rich man; because wise men, said he, are seen waiting at the doors of the rich. They are also thus affected because they fancy themselves worthy to govern; for they fancy they possess those things for the sake of which government is thought worthy of being obtained. And in short, the manners of the rich are the manners of one who is stupidly happy. The manners of the wealthy, however, who have recently become rich, differ from the manners of those who have derived their wealth from their ancestors in this, that the former have all vices in a greater degree, and with more depravity; for wealth recently acquired is as it were a certain inerudition of riches. Rich men also injure others not from malevolence, but partly from insolence, and partly from intemperance; as when from the former they strike others, and from the latter commit adultery.

CHAPTER XIX.

THUS too, most of the manners pertaining to power are nearly evident ; for power has partly the same, and partly better manners than wealth. For men in power are as to their manners more ambitious and more virile than rich men, because they aspire after those employments which they are capable of performing through their power. They are likewise more diligent, as being compelled to direct their attention to things pertaining to power. They are also more venerable than severe ; for dignity renders them more conspicuous ; on which account they are moderate in their conduct. But venerableness is a mild and decorous gravity. And if they act unjustly, it is not in small affairs, but in things of great consequence.

Prosperity, likewise, as to its parts, has the manners of the above-mentioned characters, [viz. of the noble, the rich, and the powerful ;] for those prosperities which appear to be the greatest tend to these. And farther still, prosperity prepares us to abound in a good offspring, and in the goods pertaining to the body. Powerful men, therefore, are more proud and inconsiderate, on account of their prosperity. *Among the manners, however,*

which are attendant on good fortune, there is one which is most excellent, and it is this, that the fortunate are lovers of divinity, and are well disposed towards a divine nature ; for they believe in it [in a becoming manner,] in consequence of the goods proceeding from fortune.

And thus much concerning the manners of men according to age and fortune ; for the manners which are contrary to the before-mentioned, are evident from contrary [fortunes ;] viz. from the fortunes of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless.



CHAPTER XX.

THE use, however, of persuasive orations pertains to judgment ; for we no longer require arguments about things which we know, and of which we have formed a judgment. And though it be but one person alone whom the orator endeavours to exhort or dissuade, as is the case with those who admonish or persuade, yet that one person is a judge ; for he whom it is necessary to persuade, is, in short, a judge. And the like takes place, whether the oration is directed against the litigant, or against the hypothesis ; for it is necessary that an oration should be employed, and that the contrary arguments should be

subverted, against which, as against a litigant, the oration is made. A similar method must also be adopted in demonstrative orations; for in these the speech is directed to the spectators as to judges. In short, he alone is, simply speaking, a judge, who in political contests judges the subjects of investigation. For [in such contests] the manner in which things of a dubious nature subsist is investigated, and also those which are the subjects of consultation. Concerning the manners of politics, however, we have already spoken in what we have said about deliberative affairs; so that it is there explained in what manner, and through what particulars we may produce ethical orations. But since about every kind of orations there is a certain different end, and about all of them opinions and propositions are assumed, from which those who consult, demonstrate, and dispute, derive credibility; and farther still, since we have also discussed those particulars, from which it is possible to compose ethical orations;—it remains that we should discuss such things as are common. For it is necessary that all rhetoricians in orations [of every kind] should employ what pertains to the possible and impossible, and should endeavour to show that some things will be, and that others have been. The consideration, likewise, of magnitude is common to all orations; for all orations, whether they persuade or dissuade, whether they praise or blame, accuse or defend, employ diminution and amplification. But these things being determined, let us endeavour to discuss in common what pertains to enthymemes and examples, in order that by adding what remains we may bring to an end what we proposed from the first. Of things however which are common, amplification is most adapted to demonstrative orations, as we

have before observed ; but that which has been done is most adapted to judicial orations (for judgment is employed about these) ; and the possible and what will be done are most adapted to deliberative orations.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning things possible and impossible. If then it is possible for one contrary to be, or to be effected, it would seem to be possible that the other contrary also may be. Thus, for instance, if it is possible that a man may be restored to health, it is also possible that he may be diseased ; for there is the same power of contraries so far as they are contraries. And if one similar is possible, another similar likewise is possible. And if that which is more difficult is possible, that also which is more easy is possible. If, likewise, it is possible for a thing to be rendered good or beautiful, it is possible, in short, for that thing to be produced ; for it is more difficult for a beautiful house, than for a house simply, to exist. That also of which the beginning is possible the end is possible ; for nothing is effected, nor begins to be effected, of things which are impossible. Thus, for instance, it will never begin to be possible, nor will it ever be possible, that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with the side of the square. That of which the end, likewise, is possible, the beginning is possible ; for all things are produced from the beginning or principle. If that, also, which is posterior in essence, or in generation, is possible to be effected, this is likewise the case with that which is prior ; as, if it is possible for a man, it is also possible for a child, to be generated ; for the latter is prior to the former. And if it is possible for a child to be generated, it is likewise possible for a man ; for a child is the beginning,

[but man is the end of this generation.] Those things, also, of which the love or desire is from nature, are possible; for no one for the most part loves or desires things impossible. And it is possible for those things to be and to be effected, of which there are sciences and arts. Those things likewise are possible, the principle of the generation of which is in those things which we can compel, or persuade; and these are things than which we are more powerful, or of which we are the masters or friends. And of those things of which the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and of those things of which the whole, the parts also are for the most part possible. For if it is possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made, it is also possible for apparel to be made; and if apparel, it is likewise possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made. If, likewise, the whole genus is among the number of things possible to be effected, this is also the case with the species; and if with the species, likewise with the genus. Thus, for instance, if it is possible for a ship, it is also possible for a three-banked galley to be constructed; and if a three-banked galley, a ship likewise may be constructed. And if one of those things which are naturally related to each other is possible, the other also is possible; as if the double is possible, this is also the case with the half; and if the half, the double also. If, likewise, it is possible for any thing to be effected without art or preparation, it is much more possible for it to be effected through art and diligent attention; whence, also, it is said by Agatho,

Some things by fortune may effected be,
And some by art we do, and from necessity.

And if a thing may be effected by worse, or inferior, or more imprudent persons, it may also be much more effected by persons of a contrary description ; as likewise Isocrates said, that it would be a dreadful thing, if Euthynus should have learnt that, which he himself was unable to discover. But with respect to things impossible, it is evident that they may be obtained from the contraries to the above-mentioned particulars.

Whether a thing, however, has been done, or has not been done, must be considered from what follows. For in the first place, if that has been done, which is less naturally adapted to have been done, that will have been effected which is more naturally adapted to have been done.¹ And if that which was wont to be done afterwards has been done, that also has been done, which was usually done before ; as if a man has forgotten any thing, he has once learnt that which he has forgotten. And if a man is able and willing to do a thing he has done it ; for all men act, when they are willing and able ; since there is then no impediment to their acting. Farther still, if a man is willing to do a thing, and nothing external impedes him, he does it. And if he is able to effect any thing, and is angry, he effects it ; and this is likewise the case if he is able, and is under the influence of desire. For men for the most part do those things which they desire, and are able to effect ; depraved men, indeed, from intemperance ; but worthy men because they desire what is equitable. If, also, any one intended

¹ Thus it is more difficult to injure another person in deeds than in words. Hence, if some one has injured another in deeds, he has also injured him in words.

to do a thing, it is probable that he did it. And if such things are done as are naturally adapted to be done prior to a certain thing, or for the sake of it, [that thing has been done.] Thus, if it has lightened, it has also thundered. And if any one has endeavoured to do a certain thing, he has also done it. And if such things as are naturally adapted to have been done afterwards, or if that for the sake of which they are done has been effected, that also which is done prior to them, and for the sake of which they are done, has been effected. Thus, if it has thundered, it has lightened; and if a thing has been done, there has likewise been an endeavour to do it. With respect, however, to all these things, some of them are from necessity; but others for the most part subsist after this manner. And as to that which has not been done, it is evident that it may be shown not to have been done from places contrary to the before-mentioned.

Evidence, likewise, with respect to what will be done may be derived from the same things; for that which it is in the power and will of any one to do, will be done. This is also the case with things which any one is impelled to do from desire and anger, and reasoning in conjunction with power. Hence, if any one is impelled, or meditates to do a thing, it will be done; since for the most part things which are intended to be done are effected, rather than those which are not. If, also, those things are done which ought to have been done first, that likewise will be done, which ought to have been done afterwards. Thus, because before it rains the clouds ought to be collected, if the clouds are collected,

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it is probable it will rain. And if a thing has been done which is for the sake of something else, it is probable that the thing will be done for the sake of which the other was done; as if the foundation is laid, it is probable the house will be built.

With respect, however, to the magnitude and parvitude of things, the greater and the less, and in short things which are great and small, these will be evident to us from what has been before said; for in the discussion of the deliberative genus we have spoken concerning the magnitude of what is good, and in short, concerning the greater and the less. Hence, since in every oration the proposed end is good; as for instance, the useful, the beautiful, and the just, it is evident that through these, amplifications must be assumed in all orations. But besides these, to investigate any thing concerning magnitude simply and excess, is a vain discussion. For particulars are more useful [in the composition of orations] than universals. And thus much concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done, or has not been done, and will be, or will not be; and further still, concerning the greatness and littleness of things.

CHAPTER XXI.

IT now remains to speak about the credibility which is common to all [orations], since we have already spoken about the credibility which is peculiar. But there are two kinds of the credibility which is common, viz. example and enthymeme; for a sentence is a part of an enthymeme. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning example; for example is similar to induction; but induction is a principle.¹

But of examples there are two species; for one species indeed of example, is to speak of things that are past, but the other is, when we ourselves feign [something similar for the purpose of showing that which we wish to show.] And of this, one species is a parable, but the other fables like those of Æsop and the Africans. Example, however, is indeed a thing of the following kind, as if some one should say, "That it is necessary to make preparations against the Persian king, and not suffer him to subjugate Egypt; for prior to him Darius could not pass over [the Hellespont] till he had captured

¹ As in the sciences *induction* is employed as a principle for the purpose of proving universals, so in rhetoric *example* is employed in order to unfold them.

Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed into Greece." And again, "Xerxes did not attack Greece till he had captured Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed over into Greece; so that this king [of Persia] also, if he should take Egypt will pass into Greece. Hence, he must not be suffered to do this." But a parable is a Socratic similitude; as if some one should say, "That it is not proper magistrates should be chosen by lot; for this is just as if some one should choose *athletæ* by lot, so as not to select those who are able to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as if some one should choose by lot from a number of sailors, him who ought to be the pilot of a ship, as if it were proper that he should be chosen on whom the lot falls, and not he who is skilled in steering a ship." But a fable is such as that of Stesichorus against Phalaris, and of Æsop for a certain demagogue. For, when the Himerians had chosen Phalaris for their general with absolute authority, and were about to give him a guard for his body, Stesichorus after other things which he had said, addressed this fable to them, "That a horse [once] had sole possession of a meadow, but that a stag coming into it, and destroying the pasture, the horse wishing to be revenged of the stag, asked a man, if he should be able in conjunction with him to punish the stag. But the man answered, that he should be able if he would suffer himself to be bridled, and let him get on his back, armed with darts. The horse, therefore, having consented, the man, having got on his back, instead of taking vengeance on the stag, made the horse his slave. In like manner, said he, do you Himerians take care, lest wishing to be revenged of your enemies, you suffer the same things as the horse. For now you

have received a bridle, in having chosen a general with absolute authority ; but if you allow him a guard, and suffer him to get on your backs, you will immediately be enslaved by Phalaris." But Æsop, when pleading in Samos for a demagogue who was in danger of losing his life, said, "That a fox in passing over a river fell into a whirlpool, and not being able to get out of it, was for a long time in a miserable condition, and many canine flies adhered to his skin. But a hedgehog wandering along, as soon as he saw him, commiserating his condition, asked him whether he should drive away the canine flies from him. The fox, however, would not give his permission ; and being asked by the hedgehog why he would not, replied, because these indeed are now full of me, and draw but little blood ; but if you drive these away, others will come who are hungry, and will drink up the rest of my blood. Thus, O men of Samos ! said he, this man will no longer hurt you ; for he is rich ; but if you put him to death, other persons who are poor will succeed him, and by thieving the public property, will consume your wealth."

Fables, however, are adapted to popular harangues, and they have this good, that it is difficult to find things which have been similarly transacted ; but it is easy to find fables.¹ For it is necessary that he who is able to perceive similitude [in things] should compose fables in the same manner as parables, which it is easy to do from philosophy. It is easy, therefore, to introduce fables ;

¹ Fables excel examples taken from true histories in this, that it is difficult to find true histories, but fables may be easily ad-
duced.

but examples derived from history are more useful for the purposes of consultation; for future, for the most part, resemble past events.

But it is necessary that the orator should use examples as demonstrations when he has not enthymemes; for credibility is obtained through these. And when he has enthymemes, he should use them as testimonies, and should employ examples in the epilogues of the enthymemes. For examples, when they are proposed by themselves, ought to be similar to inductions; but induction is not adapted to rhetorical compositions except in a few instances. And examples when adduced in confirmation of conclusions are equivalent to testimonies. But a witness is every where adapted to persuade. Hence, he who introduces examples prior to enthymemes, must necessarily adduce many examples; but one example is sufficient for the purpose of confirming what has been proved by enthymemes. For a credible witness, though but one, is useful. And thus we have shown how many species there are of examples, and how and when they are to be used.



CHAPTER XXII.

WITH respect to gnomology, or the doctrine of a sentence, when we have shown what a sentence is, it

will then especially become evident, about what kind of things, and when, and to what persons, it is fit to employ sentences in orations. But a sentence is an enunciation, yet not about particulars, such as what kind of person Iphicrates¹ was, but about that which is universal; yet it is not about all universals, such for instance as that a right is contrary to a curved line; but it is about those universals with which actions are conversant, and those things which in acting are eligible or to be avoided. Hence, because enthymemes are nearly syllogisms about things of this kind, if the syllogism is taken away, the conclusions and the principles of the enthymemes are sentences. Thus for instance [what Medea in Euripides says is a sentence, viz.] “It does not become a man of a sound mind to educate his children so as to render them transcendently wise.” This, therefore, is a sentence. But the cause being added, and *the why*, the whole is an enthymeme; as for instance, [in the words of Medea,] “For besides the indolence which they thus acquire, they excite the baneful envy of their fellow citizens.” And also, “There is no man who is in all respects happy.”² And, “There is not any man who is free;”³ is a sentence; but the following words being added, it becomes an enthymeme, viz. “For he is either the slave of wealth, or of fortune.”

If, therefore, a sentence is what we have said it is, there are necessarily four species of a sentence. For it

¹ Iphicrates was an Athenian, who, though born in obscurity, by his industry and virtue ascended to the highest dignities of the state.

² Ex Schenobœa Euripid. in Prologo.

³ Ex Euripid. Hecubâ.

will either subsist in conjunction with an epilogue, or without an epilogue. Those sentences, therefore, require demonstration, which assert any thing paradoxical, or dubious; but those that assert nothing paradoxical, are without an epilogue. But of these, it is necessary that some indeed, in consequence of being previously known, should require no epilogue, such as for instance, "Health, as it appears to us, is the best of things to man." For thus it appears to the many. But other sentences as soon as they are spoken become manifest to those that consider them; such as, "There is no lover who does not always love."¹ Of sentences, however, which are with an epilogue, some indeed are the parts of an enthymeme; as, "It does not become a man of a sound mind." But others are enthymematic, yet are not a part of an enthymeme; which also are especially approved. These are sentences in which the cause of what is said is apparent; as in the following, "Being a mortal do not retain an immortal anger."² For to say, "It is not proper to retain anger always," is a sentence; but the addition, "Being a mortal," asserts the why or the cause. Similar to this also is the sentence, "It is fit that mortals should be wise in mortal, and not in immortal concerns."³

From what has been said, therefore, it is manifest how

¹ This is what Hecuba says to Menelaus in the Troades of Euripides.

² Thus Achilles in Pope's translation of the Iliad.

Why should (alas) a mortal man, as I,
Burn with a fury that can never die?

BOOK XIX.

³ See this assertion beautifully opposed by Aristotle in the 10th book of his Nicomachean Ethics.

many species there are of a sentence, and to what kind of things each is adapted. For in things of a dubious, or paradoxical nature, a sentence is not to be used without an epilogue, but either, an epilogue being added, the sentence must be used as a conclusion; as if any one should say, "I indeed, since it is neither proper to be envious, nor to be indolent, assert that erudition is not requisite;" or, this being previously said, the former assertions must be subjoined. But in things which are not paradoxical indeed, yet are immanifest, the why or cause must be most concisely added. And to things of this kind Laconic apophthegms and enigmas are adapted; as if some one should say what Stesichorus said among the Locrians, "That it is not proper to behave insolently, lest the grasshoppers should sing on the ground."¹ A sententious mode of speaking, however, is adapted to him who is more advanced in age; but what he sententiously says, must be about things in which he is skilled. Hence, it is unbecoming for one who is not so advanced in age to speak sententiously, in the same manner as it is for him to mythologize. But for a man to speak sententiously about things in which he is unskilled is foolish and inerudite; of which this is a sufficient indication, that rustics are especially sententious, and easily show that they are so. To assert, however, universally, that which is not universally true, is especially adapted to lamentation and amplification; and in this case, such sentences must be adduced either at the beginning, or when you demon-

¹ Stesichorus signified by this enigma, that if the Locrians behaved insolently to a powerful people, their country would be in danger of being laid waste by them, so that the trees being cut down, the grasshoppers (cicadæ) would be forced to sing on the bare ground.

strate. But it is requisite to employ sentences which are generally known and common, if they are useful [for the purpose;] for in consequence of being common, as being acknowledged by all men they appear to be true. Thus he who exhorts soldiers to encounter danger, though they have not sacrificed, may employ [what Hector says to Polydamas,]

Without a sign his sword the brave man draws,
And asks no omen but his country's cause.¹

And when those are exhorted to fight who are inferior to their opponents in force, it may be said,

In battle Mars to either side inclines.²

When any one likewise is exhorted to destroy the children of enemies, though they have done no injury, he may say, "He is a fool, who having destroyed the father spares the children." Farther still, some proverbs are also sentences; such as the proverb, "An Attic stranger." Sentences likewise are to be sometimes adduced, contrary to those which are generally received. But I mean by those that are generally received, such as "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much." And sentences contrary to these are to be adduced, when either the manners will from thence seem to be better, or when the thing is spoken pathetically. But a thing is spoken pathetically, if some one being enraged should say, "It is false that a man ought to know himself; for this man, if he had known himself, would never have solicited the command of the army." And the manners

¹ Iliad, 12.

² Iliad, 18.

will appear to be better, if it is said, "That it is not proper, according to the assertion of Bias, to love as if intending hereafter to hate, but rather to hate as if intending hereafter to love." It is necessary, however, to render the choice manifest by the diction; but if not, to subjoin the cause. Thus for instance, we may either thus speak, "That it is necessary to love, not as they say, but as if always intending to love; for the other [i. e. he who loves as if intending hereafter to hate] loves like a treacherous person." Or thus, "What is generally asserted does not please me; for a true friend ought to love as one who will love always. Not does that saying please me, Nothing too much; for it is necessary to hate vehemently bad men."

But these sentences afford great assistance to orations, one cause of which arises from the arrogance of the hearers; for they are delighted if any one speaking universally, happens to adduce opinions which they have formed about some particular things. My meaning, however, will be manifest from what follows; and at the same time it will be evident how these sentences are to be investigated. For a sentence is, as we have said, a universal enunciation; but the auditors are delighted when that is universally asserted, which they have preconceived partially. Thus for instance, if any one happens to have had bad neighbours or children, he will adopt the sentence, "That nothing is more troublesome than vicinity," and "That nothing is more stupid than the procreation of children." Hence, it is necessary to conjecture what the opinion of the audience will be about particulars, and afterwards to adduce universal sentences conformable to their opinion. And this is one

use which speaking sententiously ought to possess. But there is another use of it which is superior to this; for it causes orations to become ethical. And those orations are ethical in which the deliberate intention of the speaker is manifest. All sentences, however, effect this, because he who employs the sentence, speaks universally about things which are the objects of deliberate choice. Hence, if the sentences are good, they cause the speaker to appear to be one who possesses worthy manners. And thus much concerning a sentence, what it is, how many species there are of it, how sentences are to be employed, and what advantage they possess.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LET us now speak concerning enthymemes universally, after what manner they are to be investigated; and in the next place, let us show what are the places of enthymemes; for there is a different species of each of these. That an enthymeme, therefore, is a certain syllogism, and how it is a syllogism, we have before shown; and also in what it differs from dialectic syllogisms. For neither ought things remote to be collected, nor are all things to be collectively assumed; since the former will be obscure from their length; and the latter

will be nugatory, through speaking of things which are obvious. For this is the reason why the unlearned are more capable of producing persuasion among the crowd, than the learned, since as the poets say, "The unlearned speak more elegantly to a mob." For the unlearned speak of things common and universal, [which are adapted to the comprehension of the multitude;] but the learned speak of things which they know, and which are near. Hence, rhetorical enthymemes must not be composed from every thing which is probable, but from things of a definite nature; such as those things which appear probable to the judges, or which the judges admit. Nor is it requisite that these things should be approved by all the auditors, but it is sufficient if they are approved by the greater part of them. It is likewise requisite not only to collect from things which are necessary, but also from things which have a frequency of subsistence. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to assume, that concerning the thing of which it is requisite to speak and syllogize, whether by employing a political, or any other syllogism; concerning this it is necessary to possess all or some of the things which are inherent in it; for if we possess none of them, no conclusion can be made from nothing. I say for instance, how can we advise the Athenians to engage in war or not, unless we know what their power is, whether naval or land, or both; how great it is; what their revenue is; who are their friends and enemies; and farther still, what wars they have waged, and how they were carried on, and other things of the like kind. How likewise could we praise them, if we were not acquainted with the naval battle at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the deeds which

they performed for the Heraclidæ, or any thing else of the like kind? For all men praise others from beautiful transactions which exist, or appear to exist. In a similar manner, also, in blaming the Athenians, we must direct our attention to the contraries to these things, considering what particular of a contrary kind pertains to them, or appears to pertain to them; such as that they enslaved the Greeks, and subdued those who fought with them against the Barbarian, and behaved most intrepidly, viz. the Aeginetæ and Potidæatæ; and other things of the like kind, and whatever other crime may be laid to their charge. Thus too, both those who accuse, and those who defend, accuse and defend by directing their attention to inherent particulars; but it makes no difference whether we speak of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians; of God, or man. For he who advises Achilles, who praises or blames, accuses or defends him, must assume things which are inherent, or appear to be inherent, that from these he may in praising or blaming show whether any thing beautiful in conduct or base is inherent; in accusing or defending may show whether any thing just or unjust is inherent; and in advising, whether any thing advantageous or detrimental is present. The like method must also be adopted in every other thing. Thus for instance, in investigating whether justice is good or not, our attention must be directed to what is inherent in justice or in good. Hence, since it appears that this method is adopted by all men, whether they syllogize more accurately, or more remissly; for their assumptions are not derived from all things, but from such as are inherent in each particular, and through reasoning; since it is evident that it is otherwise impossible to prove what they wish to prove;—this being the case, it is obvious, as we have

shown in the Topics, that about each question in things contingent, and the time best adapted to them, it is necessary to have, in the first place, things of a more select nature. The investigation, likewise, must be made after the same manner in things of an unexpected nature, so that our attention must not be directed to the indefinite, but to things inherent, which are the subject of the oration. Of the things inherent, likewise, the greater part, and those which are nearest the subject, must be included in the oration; for by how much the greater the number of things inherent is which the orator possesses, by so much more easily will he prove that which he wishes to prove; and by how much more proximate [the particulars are which he details,] by so much the more appropriate will they be, and less common. But I call common things, indeed, such as to praise Achilles, because he is a man, and because he is among the number of demigods, and because he fought against Troy. For these particulars belong also to many others; so that praise of this kind no less pertains to Achilles than to Diomed. Things peculiar, however, are such as happen to no other person, than Achilles; such as to have slain Hector the bravest of the Trojans; and Cygnus, who being invulnerable prevented the Greeks from descending from their ships to the land; and that being very young he entered into the army, though he was not bound by an oath to fight against the Trojans. These, and other things of the like kind, are peculiar to Achilles. This, therefore, is one place of selection, and is the first topical place.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LET us now speak of the elements of enthymemes. But I call the same thing the element and place of an enthymeme. Let us however first speak of those things which it is necessary in the first place to discuss. For there are two species of enthymemes. And the first species contains ostensive enthymemes, which show that a thing is, or is not; but the other species is adapted to confutation. They differ also in the same manner as in dialectics an elenchus and syllogism differ. But an ostensive enthymeme, is when the conclusion is collected from things acknowledged; and the enthymeme adapted to confutation is, when things not acknowledged are collected in the conclusion. Nearly, therefore, places have been delivered by us about each of the useful and necessary species; for propositions respecting each have been selected. Hence, we have shown from what places it is requisite to derive enthymemes about good or evil, the beautiful or the base, the just, or the unjust; and in a similar manner places have been assigned by us concerning manners, passions and habits.

Again, therefore, it remains that after another manner we should assume universally concerning all [the three

genera of orations,] indicating which of them are adapted to confutation, and are ostensive, and what are the places of apparent enthymemes, but which are not enthymemes in reality, since neither are they syllogisms. But these things being rendered manifest, we shall discuss solutions and objections, and show whence it is requisite to adduce these against enthymemes.

One place, therefore, of ostensive enthymemes is from contraries; for it is necessary to consider whether one contrary is inherent in another; subverting, indeed, if it be not inherent; but confirming if it is inherent. For instance, [we may thus show] that to act temperately is good; for to act intemperately is noxious. Or as in the Messeniæ oration [of Alcidamas;] for if war is the cause of the present evils, it is necessary to correct those evils with peace. For [as a certain tragic poet argues in Greek senaries,] “If it is not just to fall into anger with those who have done evil willingly; neither is it fit, if any one has acted beneficently from compulsion, to be grateful to him.” But if to speak falsely is, among mortals, calculated to persuade, it is requisite to think that on the contrary many things are true, which are considered by mortals as incredible. Another place is from similar cases; for it is necessary that they should be similarly inherent, or not inherent. Thus from this place it may be shown that not every thing which is just is good. For if every thing just were eligible and good, every thing which is justly done would be eligible and good; but now to die justly is not eligible. Another place is from relatives. For if some one has acted well or justly, another has suffered well or justly. And if to command is just, it is also just to obey the command; as

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the publican Diomedon said about the tributes. "For, said he [to the people,] if it is not disgraceful in you to sell the tributes, neither is it disgraceful in us to buy them." And, if one man deservedly and justly suffers a loss, he who caused him to suffer it, acted well and justly. And if he who caused another to suffer a loss acted well and justly, he who sustained the loss, sustained it well and justly. In this place, however, it is possible to paralogize. For if a man died justly, he suffered justly; but perhaps not by you. Hence it is necessary to consider separately, whether he who suffered deserved to suffer, and whether he who did the thing deserved to do it, and thus to infer what is adapted and appropriate. For sometimes a thing of this kind is dissonant, and nothing impedes;¹ as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes.

"Did never any mortal hate thy mother?"

To which the answer is,

"Distinctly this must be considered."

Alphesibæa, also, inquiring, "How therefore have the judges condemned thee?" Alcmaeon answered,

"Of death deserving she was judg'd, but I,
'Twas said, could not have slain my mother."

Thus, likewise, on the trial of Demosthenes, and those who slew Nicanor, because they were judged to have

¹ That is, it may happen that a man was slain justly, and yet he who slew him, slew him unjustly.

slain him justly, it appeared that he was justly put to death. In like manner, when a certain person was slain at Thebes, it was inquired in the court of justice whether he had been unjustly slain; as if it were not unjust to slay him who deserved to die. Another place is from the more and the less; such as, if even the gods do not know all things, much less do men. For the meaning of this is, if the more is not inherent in that in which it ought to be more inherent, it is evident that neither will it be inherent in that in which the less is inherent. But this place, that he will strike his neighbour who strikes his father, depends on this, that if the less is inherent, the more also will be inherent.¹ And this place is useful for both purposes; viz. whether it be requisite to show that a thing is inherent, or is not. Farther still, if a thing is inherent neither more nor less; whence it is said, [in a certain tragedy,] “Is thy father to be pitied, because he has lost a son, and is not Oeneus to be equally commiserated, who has lost his son Meleager one of the most illustrious of the Greeks?” And that if Theseus did not act unjustly [in ravishing Helen,] neither did Paris. And if the Tyndaridæ [i. e. Castor and Pollux] did not act unjustly [in ravishing the daughters of Leucippus,] neither did Paris. Likewise if Hector did not act unjustly in slaying Patroclus, neither did Paris in slaying Achilles. And if other artists are not vile men, neither are philosophers. And if generals are not vile, because they are frequently conquered, neither are sophists. And that if a private person ought to be careful of your re-

¹ For it is less probable that a man will strike his father, than that he will strike his neighbour; *at least it was so in ancient times.*

noun, you also ought to be careful of the renown of the Greeks. Another place consists in the consideration of time; as is exemplified in what Iphicrates says in his oration against Harmodius. For said he, "If before I had done the thing, I had demanded a statue in case I did it, you would have granted it to me, and will you not grant it, now I have done the thing? You would not, therefore, when expecting a benefit promise a reward, and refuse it, when you have received the benefit." And again, for the purpose of persuading that the Thebans ought to permit Philip to pass through their land into Attica, it may be said, "That if he had made this request before he sent you assistance against the Phocenses, you would have permitted him. It is absurd, therefore, that because he then neglected [to ask permission,] and trusted you would grant it, that you should now deny it to him." Another place is taken from things said, and retorted on the speaker. And this mode is eminently useful, and was employed in [the tragedy of] Teucrus by Iphicrates against Aristophon, when he inquired of him whether he would have betrayed the ships for money? And when Aristophon denied that he would, Iphicrates afterwards said, "You therefore being Aristophon would not have betrayed them, and should I being Iphicrates have betrayed them?" It is necessary, however, that he who is opposed should appear to have acted more unjustly than the opponent; for if not, it would seem to be ridiculous, if any one had said this against Aristides accusing [who was in every respect worthy of belief,] and which ought to have been said against an accuser, who did not deserve to be credited. For in short the plaintiff ought to be considered as better than the defendant. He therefore who opposes another,

should always reprobate this. And universally, that which is said is absurd, when any one reproves others in things which he himself does, or would have done [if he could ;] or who persuades others to do those things which he himself does not do, nor would have done. Another place is derived from definition ; such for instance as, "That which is dæmoniacal is nothing else than either God, or the work of God ; but whoever thinks that it is the work of God, must necessarily think that there are Gods."¹ And as Iphicrates said [against a certain person named Harmodius,] "He who is the best of men is most generous or noble ; for there was nothing generous in Harmodius and Aristogiton, till they had accomplished some generous undertaking." He added, that he was more allied to [i. e. he more resembled] the ancient Harmodius. "For my works," said he, "are more allied to the works of Harmodius and Aristogiton than thine." And as in [the oration concerning] Paris, "All men will confess that those who are intemperate are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one body." Hence Socrates said that he would not go to Archelaus [king of Macedonia.] "For it is disgraceful," said he, "for him who has received a benefit not to be able to recompense him from whom he received it ; just as it is disgraceful in him who has been used ill, not to return the ill treatment." For all these, defining and assuming what a thing is, syllogize about the things which are the subjects of their speech. Another place is derived from multiplicity of diction, as in the Topics, [an argument is

¹ This is what Socrates says to his judges in the Apology of Plato, and is of itself sufficient to prove that Socrates was a polytheist, independent of a great body of evidence which might be adduced in confirmation of it.

derived,] from that which has a rectitude of subsistence [being multifariously predicated.] Another place is derived from division; as, if all men act unjustly for the sake of three things; for they act unjustly either for the sake of this, [viz. utility,] or for the sake of this, [viz. pleasure,] or for the sake of this, [viz. because they are enraged;] but for the sake of two of these they could not do the injury; and the opponents themselves confess they did not do it for the sake of the third. Another place is from induction; as from [the oration inscribed] Peparethia, in which it is said, "That women every where determine truly about the birth of children." For this is evident from what happened at Athens; since when Mantias the rhetorician was dubious about his son, his doubts were dissolved by the mother of the child. This likewise happened at Thebes; for when Ismenes and Stilbo contended which of them was the father of Thessalicus, Dodonis demonstrated that he was the son of Ismenes; and on this account Thessalicus was considered as the offspring of Ismenes. And again, from the law of Theodectes, if no one would commit his horses to the care of those who do not pay a proper attention to the horses of others, nor his ships to those who destroy the ships of others, and if the like takes place in all things, we ought not to commit our safety to those who have badly attended to the safety of others. And as Alcidas says, "That all men honour the wise." For the Parians honour Archilochus, though he blasphemed them; the Chians honour Homer, though he was not their fellow-citizen; and the Mitylenans Sappho, though she was a woman. The Lacedæmonians, also, though they were in the smallest degree philologists, made Chilo one of their senators. The Italians likewise

honoured Pythagoras; and the Lampsaceni buried Anaxagoras though he was a stranger, and honour him even now. Again, the Athenians by using the laws of Solon were happy; and the Lacedæmonians by using those of Lycurgus. The city of the Thebans, also, as soon as philosophers were their governors, became happy.

Another place is derived from the judgment made about the same, or a similar, or a contrary thing. And this indeed is especially the case, if it is the judgment of all men, and always; but if not, if it is the judgment of most men, or of all, or the greater part of wise men, or of good men. Or if it is the decision of those who are judges, or of those whom the judges approve, or of those against whom there is no judgment to be given, as of princes; or of those whose judgment it is not becoming to oppose, such as the gods, a father, or preceptors. [But of this place there are many examples,] and one is, what Autocles said against Mixidemides, "If it were well indeed for the venerable goddesses [the Furies] to plead their cause in the Areopagus, can it be improper for Mixidemides to do so?" Another is what Sappho said, "That to die is an evil; for the gods have judged it to be so; since otherwise, they themselves would die." Another is, what Aristippus said against Plato asserting something as he thought too positively; "But our associate, said he, meaning Socrates, affirms no such thing." Another example is that of Agesipolis, who at Delphi inquired of the god [Apollo,] having prior to this consulted the oracle of Jupiter Olympus, "Whether the son was of the same opinion as the father?" As if it were shameful for a son to dissent from his father.

Another is that of Isocrates concerning Helen, who shows that she was a worthy character, because Theseus judged her to be so ; and who also says the same thing of Paris, because the goddesses preferred [his judgment to that of other men.] He likewise asserts that Evagoras was a worthy character, “ because Conon when his affairs were adverse, leaving every one else, came to Evagoras.” Another place is from [the enumeration of] parts, as in the Topics [where it is inquired,] “ What kind of motion the soul is ;” for it is either this, or that, [viz. it must either be the motion which is a change in quality, or lation, or augmentation, or generation.]¹ An example of this place is from Theodectes in his oration in defence of Socrates [when he was accused by the judges ;] “ What temple has Socrates violated ? And what gods has he not revered among those whose honours are legally established by the city ?” Another place is from consequent good or evil. For since in most things it happens that some good and evil are consequent to them, we may employ consequent good for the purpose of persuading, praising, and defending, but consequent evils for the purpose of dissuading, blaming, and accusing. Thus for instance, [we may blame literary pursuits,] because envy is consequent to erudition, which is an evil ; and [we may also praise them] because they are attended with wisdom, which is a good. Hence, in the former case we may say that it is not proper to acquire erudition, because it is not proper to be envied ; and in the latter, that it is proper to acquire erudition ; for it is requisite to be wise. In this place the art of

¹ Viz. On the hypothesis that the soul is a motion of such a kind, as some one of the *corporeal* motions.

the rhetorician Calippus consists, to which he added what pertains to the possible, and other things, of which we have already spoken. Another place is, when about two things, and those opposed to each other, it is requisite either to exhort or dissuade, and to use the before-mentioned place in both ways. But it differs from that place in this, that there casual things are opposed; but here contraries only. Thus for instance, a certain priest would not suffer his son to speak in public. "For if," said he, "you speak what is just, men will hate you; but if what is unjust, the gods." It is necessary, however, on the other hand, to speak in public. For if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; but if what is unjust, men will love you. This, however, is the same thing with the saying, of *buying oil and salt*. And this argument may be retorted, when to each of two contraries good and evil are consequent, each being contrary to each. Another place is, because the same things are not praised openly and secretly; but just and beautiful things are especially praised openly, and privately men are more inclined to praise what is advantageous. One of these, therefore, we must endeavour to collect. For this place is the most principal of paradoxes. Another place is derived from analogy, and was used by Iphicrates. For when the Athenians wished to compel his younger son, because he was large, to engage in public service, Iphicrates said, "That if great boys were to be considered as men, little men should be decreed to be boys." And Theodectes in the law said, "You have made mercenaries, such as Strabaces and Charidemus, citizens, on account of their probity; but you have not made exiles of those among the mercenaries, who have acted nefariously." Another place is, when, in consequence of the

same thing following from two things, it is shown that the things from which it happens to follow are the same. As when Xenophanes said, "That those were similarly impious, who assert that the gods were generated, and those who assert that they die; for in both ways it happens that at a certain time the gods do not exist." And in short, that which happens from each, is always to be assumed as the same. [This place was also used by some one in the defence of Socrates; for he said,] "You are about to pass sentence, not on Socrates, but on his pursuit, whether it be requisite to philosophize." And, it may be said, "That to give earth and water is to become slaves; and that to participate of common peace is to do what is commanded to be done." But whichever of these is useful must be assumed. Another place is derived from this, that the same men do not always choose the same thing in a posterior or prior time, but conversely; as in this enthymeme. "If when we were exiles we fought, in order that we might return; shall we, having returned, fly, in order that we may not fight?" For at one time the Athenians chose to fight, that they might return to their country, and at another time they were unwilling to leave their country lest they should be obliged to fight. Another place is, when we affirm any thing to have been done on account of some cause, through which it might have been done, though it was not in reality done through it; as if one man should give something to another, in order that by [afterwards] taking it away, he may give him pain. Hence, also it is said [in a certain tragedy,] "The dæmon gives

* This example is taken from an oration of Lysias concerning the Athenians.

great prosperity to many, yet not with a benevolent intention, but in order that they may receive more conspicuous calamities." And in the *Meleager* of Antiphon, who [that he might praise Meleager] says, "There was a concourse of people from all Greece, not for the purpose of killing the boar, but that they might be witnesses of the valour of Meleager." Another example is from the *Ajax* of Theodectes, in which it is said, "That Diomed preferred Ulysses [as his associate in the nocturnal adventure,] not for the purpose of honouring him, but that he might have one to attend him who was his inferior." For it is possible he might have thus acted with this view. Another place is common both to litigants and counsellors, and consists in considering whatever pertains to exhortation and dissuasion, and for the sake of which things are done and avoided; for these are such as ought to be done when they are present. For instance, it must be considered whether a thing is possible, and easy to be effected, and whether it is beneficial either to a man himself, or to his friends; or whether it is noxious and pernicious to his enemies, or is at least attended with greater emolument than loss. And exhortations are to be derived from these places, and dehortations from the contraries. From the same places also accusations and defences may be derived; defence indeed, from those which pertain to dissuasion, but accusation from those which pertain to exhortation. And in this place the whole art of Pamphilus and Calippus consists. Another place is derived from things which appear indeed to be done, but are incredible, because they would not be credited, unless they were, or nearly were in existence; and this in an eminent degree. For whatever is done, is apprehended to be done, either be-

cause it has been truly done or is of itself credible, and probable. If, therefore, a thing is incredible, and not probable, it will be true that it has been done;¹ for it does not appear to have been done, in consequence of being probable and credible. Thus Androcles Pitheus accusing the law said, (the multitude being tumultuous whilst he was speaking) “The laws require a law to correct them.” For fishes also require salt, though it may seem neither probable, nor credible, that animals nourished in salt, should require salt. And olives require oil; though it may seem incredible, that those things from which oil is produced, should be in want of oil.

CHAPTER XXV.

ANOTHER place which is adapted to confutation, is derived from considering things which are not assented to; viz. from considering, if any thing is not admitted,

¹ When a thing partly appears to have been done, and partly seems incredible, from seeming to be incredible, it may be concluded that it has been truly done, by reasoning as follows: Whatever seems to have been done, either appears so because it is of itself credible and probable, or because it has truly been done. But this thing appears to have been done, and not because it is of itself probable, since it is rather very improbable. Hence, it appears to have been done, because it has truly been done.

from all times, actions, and speeches. And this, indeed, may be done separately in the person of the opponent; as, "He says that he loves you [Athenians,] and yet he has conspired with the thirty [tyrants against his country.]" And separately as to the person himself; as, "He says indeed, that I am litigious, but he cannot show that I ever sued any man." It may also be done separately both as to the person himself and his opponent; as, "And this man indeed never lent any money, but I have ransomed many of you." Another place is useful with respect to men and things that have been calumniated, but which do not appear to have deserved it; and this consists in assigning the cause of the paradox. For there is something which gave rise to the appearance. Thus for instance, a certain woman was calumniated with reference to her son; for in consequence of embracing him, it seemed as if she had connexion with the lad. But the cause of her embracing him being assigned, the calumny was dissolved. Thus too, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses says against Ajax, that though he is braver than Ajax, yet he does not seem to be so. Another place is derived from cause, which if it exists, the effect also exists; but if it is not, neither does the effect exist. For cause, and that of which it is the cause, subsist together, and nothing is without a cause. Thus Leodamas, in defending himself when Thrasybulus accusing him said, "That his name had been branded with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but the inscription had been erased by the thirty tyrants," replied, "That this was not possible; for if it had taken place, the thirty tyrants would have placed more confidence in him, in consequence of his hatred to the people having been inscribed on a pillar." Another place is from con-

sidering whether it was or is possible to advise, or do, or have done a thing better than it was advised to be, or is, or was done. For it is evident, that if it does not thus subsist, it was not done; since no one willingly and knowingly deliberately chooses what is bad. This place, however, is false; for frequently, it becomes afterwards evident how it was possible to have acted better, though this was before immanifest. Another place is derived from considering when something is intended to be done, contrary to what has been done. Thus Xenophanes when the Eleans asked him, "whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea, and lament her, or not," advised them, "If they thought her a goddess, not to lament her; but if a mortal, not to sacrifice to her." Another place is derived from accusing or defending errors. Thus for instance, in the *Medœa* of the poet Carcinus, some persons accuse her of having slain her children, because they no longer appear; (for *Medœa* erred in sending away her sons) but she defends herself by saying, "That [if she had intended to commit murder] she would not have slain her children, but Jason; for in not slaying Jason, she would have acted wrong, even if she had done the other thing [i. e. slain her children.] This place, however, and species of enthymeme, formed the whole prior rhetorical art of Theodorus. Another place is derived from name; as Sophocles [of a certain woman named *Sidero*],

'Tis clear thou *iron* art, and bear'st the name.

Thus also it is usual to celebrate the gods [from the signification of their names.] Conon likewise called *Thrasymbuhus*, *audacious*. And Herodicus said of *Thrasy-*

machus, "Thou art always *Thrasymachus* [i. e. *bold in fight.*] He also said of Polus, "You are always *Polus* [i. e. *a colt.*] Herodicus likewise said of *Draco* the legislator, "That his laws were not the laws of a man, but of a *dragon*; for they were severe." Another example is derived from what Hecuba says in [the *Troades* of] Euripides, when speaking of Venus, "And the name of the goddess [i. e. *Aphrodite*] is rightly derived from *aphrosune* [i. e. *folly.*] And as Chœremon [the comic poet] says, "*Pentheus* was so denominated from future *calamity.*" Those enthymemes, however, which are adapted to confutation, are more approved than those that are ostensive; because the former are short collections of contraries; but parallels are more obvious to the hearer. Of all syllogisms, however, as well those that are adapted to confutation, as those that are ostensive, those especially excite perturbation [in the auditors] which manifest themselves as soon as they begin to be enunciated, yet not because their meaning is superficial. For the auditors are at the same time delighted that they foresaw from the beginning what would follow. This likewise is the case with those syllogisms which are understood as soon as they are completely enunciated.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SINCE, however, it is possible that one thing may be a syllogism, and another not, but only appear to be so ; it is likewise necessary with respect to an enthymeme, that this should be, and that should not be, but should only appear to be an enthymeme ; since an enthymeme also is a certain syllogism.

But there are places of apparent enthymemes ; one indeed in the diction ; and of this, one part, as in dialectics, is, when though nothing is syllogistically concluded, yet at the last it is inferred : It is not therefore this, or that ; or it necessarily is this or that. What also is said in enthymemes contortly and oppositely, appears to be an enthymeme, [though it is not so in reality ;] for such a diction is the receptacle of enthymeme. And a thing of this kind appears to be from the figure of the diction. For the purpose however of speaking syllogistically in the diction, it is useful to produce the heads of many syllogisms, as, "These he saved, others he avenged, but he liberated the Greeks." For each of these is demonstrated from others. But from the conjunction of these something appears to be effected. Another place [of apparent enthymemes] is derived from equivocation ; as, if some one should say "that *μῦς*, *mus*, a mouse is a

worthy animal ; for the *mysterics* are the most honourable of all initiatory rites." Or, if some one making an encomium on a dog, should also comprehend in his encomium the celestial dog, or the god Pan, because Pindar says, "O blessed, whom the Olympian gods call the all-various dog of the great goddess." Or if it should be said, "That it is most *dishonourable* there should be no dog ; so that it is evident that a dog is *honourable*." And to say, "That Hermes is the most *communicative* of all the gods ; for he alone is called *common* Hermes." Likewise to say, "That *logos* speech is *most worthy* ; because good men are *worthy* not of riches, but of logos speech ;" for to be worthy of logos, is most simply predicated. Another place consists in speaking things which are separated, conjunctively, or things which are conjoined, disjunctively. For since [each of these modes of speaking] appears to be the same, though frequently it is not the same, it is requisite to adopt whichever of these is more useful. The first example of this place is that of Euthydemus, "To know, being in Sicily, that there is a three-banked galley in the Piræus." ¹ Another example is "That he who knows the elements of a verse, knows the verse ; for a verse is the same thing" [as the elements from which it is composed.] Another example of this place is, "That since twice so much of a thing is noxious, neither can the half of that quantity be said to be salubrious ; for it is absurd, if two things are good, that one of them should be bad." Thus, therefore, this place is useful for the purpose of confutation. But it is

¹ See Chap. v. Book ii. of the Sophistical Elenchi. This is only true disjunctively ; since it is asserted of some one who at one time was in Sicily, and at another saw the galley in the Piræus.

ostensive as follows ; “ For one good is not two evils.” In short, this place is paralogistic. Again, another example is that of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, “ That he deposed the thirty tyrants.” For this is conjunctive. Or what is said in the *Orestes* of Theodectes ; for it is from division, [or is disjunctive,] viz. “ It is just that she who killed her husband should die ; and it is also just that a son should revenge his father. It is just, therefore, that the mother [Clytemnestra] should be slain by the son [Orestes.]” For if these sentences are conjoined, the conclusion perhaps will no longer be just. In this [sophism] likewise, there is a fallacy of defect ; for it is not expressed by whom it is just that the mother should be slain.

Another place consists in confirming or confuting by exaggeration. And this is when a man not showing that he has done a certain deed, amplifies the thing. For thus he causes it to appear either that he has not done the deed, when he who defends the cause amplifies, or that he did it when the accuser was enraged. Hence, it is not an enthymeme. For the hearer falsely collects that he has or has not done the deed, the thing not being demonstrated. Another place is derived from a sign ; for this also is unsyllogistic. As if some one should say, “ Lovers are advantageous to cities ; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus.” And, likewise, if some one should say, “ That Dionysius was a thief ; for he was a depraved character.” For this is unsyllogistic ; since not every depraved character is a thief, but every thief is a depraved character. Another place is derived from that which is accidental ; as in what Polycrates said of the mice, “ That they aided

[the city] by gnawing the bowstrings [of the enemy.]” Or if some one should say, that to be invited to supper is a most honourable thing ; for Achilles, in consequence of not being invited was enraged against the Greeks in Tenedos. But he, as being despised, was angry ; and this happened because he was not invited. Another place is derived from that which is consequent ; as for instance, in what is said of Paris, “That he was magnanimous ; for, despising an association with the multitude, he dwelt in mount Ida by himself.” For because magnanimous men are lovers of solitude, Paris also may appear to be magnanimous. And, “Since a certain person decorates himself, and wanders by night, he is an adulterer ;” because adulterers also are men of this kind. In a similar manner [it may be proved that] mendicants and exiles are happy. “Because mendicants sing and dance in temples ; and because it is permitted exiles to dwell where they please.” For because, these things are present with those that appear to be happy, those also to whom these things are present, may seem to be happy. There is here however a difference in the mode ; on which account this example falls into defect, [i. e. it is a fallacy of defect.] Another place is derived from that which is causeless as if it were a cause ; as when that which is done together with another thing, or after it, is assumed as if it had been done for the sake of it. And this place is especially used by politicians, as by Demades, who said, “That the administration of Demosthenes was the cause of all evils ; since war happened after it.” Another place is derived from a deficiency in the time when, and the manner in which a thing is done ; such for instance as this, “That Paris justly ravished Helen ; for the choice was given to Helen by her father [of

marrying whom she pleased.]” For perhaps this choice was not given to her always, but at first ; and the authority of her father over her extended so far as to this. Or as if some one should say, “That to strike free men is insolence.” For it is not entirely so, but when he who strikes was not provoked. Farther still, another place is when in litigious disputes, an apparent syllogism is produced from that which is simply, and that which is not simply ; as in dialectics, it is shown that non-being is being. For non-being is non-*being*. And it is also shown that what is unknown is the object of science. For the unknown is the object of science, because it is unknown, [i. e. because it is *known* that it is unknown.] Thus also in orations there is an apparent enthymeme, from that which is not simply probable, but is a certain probable thing. This probability, however, does not take place universally, as Agatho also says, “Perhaps some one may say that this is probable, that many things which are not probable happen to mortals.” For that which is unlikely happens. Hence, what is unlikely is likely. But if this be the case, that which is not probable is probable. This, however, is not simply true ; but as in contentious arguments a fallacy is produced, when a limitation restraining to a part, to a place, to time, or signifying relation, is not added ; so here that which is improbable is not simply probable, but is a certain probability. But the art of Corax is composed from this place. For whether the person be not obnoxious to the crime ; as he who is weak escapes an action for an assault ; for it is not likely that he committed an assault ; or whether he be obnoxious, as being a strong man, he has the same defence, unless a certain probability is apparent. And the like takes place in other things. For a man must

necessarily be obnoxious to the crime, or not. Both, therefore, appear to be probable; and the one is indeed probable [in reality;] but the other, not simply, but in the way we have shown. And this it is, to make the inferior argument to be the superior. Hence men were justly indignant with what Protagoras professed to accomplish. For what he announced is false, and not true, but is apparently probable, and exists in no art but in the rhetorical and contentious. And thus much concerning enthymemes, both the true, and the apparent.

CHAPTER XXVII.

It now follows that we should speak concerning the solutions of enthymemes. But it is possible to dissolve them by contrary reasoning, or by introducing an objection.

With respect to contrary reasoning, therefore, it is evident that it may be effected from the same places. For syllogisms are composed from things that are probable; but many probable things appear to be contrary to each other.

But objections are introduced, in the same manner as in the Topics, in four ways; for they are introduced either from the *same*, or from the *similar*, or from the

contrary, or from *the judgment and authority of others*. By an objection however being introduced from the same, I mean as if for instance the enthymeme should be concerning love, that it is a worthy thing, an objection may be made to it in a twofold respect. For either it may be said universally, that all indigence¹ is evil; or partially that it would not be proverbially said *Caunias love*,² unless there was also base love. But an objection is introduced from the *contrary*; when, if the enthymeme should be, "That a good man benefits all his friends;" it may be objected, "That neither does a bad man act ill towards all his friends."³ An objection also is introduced from *similar*s, when the enthymeme is, "That those who receive an injury always hate [the authors of it.]" For it may be objected, "That neither do those who are benefited always love [their benefactor.]" And objections which are introduced from the judgments of illustrious men, are as if the enthymeme were, "That it is requisite to pardon those who are intoxicated; for they err ignorantly." The objection is, "That Pittacus, therefore, does not deserve to be praised; for he should not have legally established greater punishments [for intoxication,] if he who is intoxicated errs [through ignorance.]" Enthymemes, however, are derived from four things; and these four are, the probable, example, *tecme-*

¹ This alludes to the definition of love given by Diotima in the Banquet of Plato; for she there defines love to be desire, and desire to be want.

² This alludes to the story of Biblis, who fell in love with her brother Caunus.

³ And, therefore, neither does a good man benefit all his friends, because a good man is with respect to beneficence, what a bad man is with respect to malevolence.

tion [i. e. a necessary sign,] and a sign [not necessary.] But those enthymemes which are collected from things that exist for the most part, or appear to exist, are derived from probabilities. Those which are derived from the similar, either from one, or many similar things, (when the orator assuming what is universal, syllogistically collects what is particular) exist through example. But those which exist through what is necessary and real, are through *tecmerion*. And those that exist through what is universal or particular, whether it really is, or not, are through signs [which are not necessary.] But a probable thing is that which does not exist always, but for the most part. Hence it is manifest, that enthymemes of this kind may always be dissolved, if an objection is introduced. The solution, however, is [sometimes] apparent, and not always true; for he who objects does not dissolve the enthymeme by showing that the thing is not probable, but by showing that it is not necessary. Hence, the defendant has always the advantage of the plaintiff; through this paralogsism. For since the plaintiff demonstrates through probabilities; but the solution is not the same [which shows] either that the thing is not probable, or that it is not necessary; and that which exists for the most part, is always liable to objection; (for otherwise it would not be a probability, but would be always necessary)—hence the judge, if this mode of solution is adopted, will think either that the thing is not probable, or that it must not be judged by him, in consequence, as we have said, of being deceived by false reasoning. For it is requisite that he should not only judge from things which are necessary, but also from probabilities. For this is to judge most judiciously. The solution, therefore, of an enthymeme is not sufficient, which shows that

a thing is not necessary, but it is requisite that the solution should also show, that it is not probable. But this will happen, if the objection rather shows that the thing for the most part subsists. It is possible, however, that a thing may happen for the most part, or frequently, in a twofold respect, viz. either from time, or from circumstances; but principally if from both. For if things which frequently happen thus subsist, this is more probable. But signs [which are not necessary,] and enthymemes derived through a sign, are solved in the way we mentioned in the first book. For that every such sign is unsyllogistic is evident to us from the analytics. Enthymemes, however, derived from examples are solved after the same manner as enthymemes derived from probabilities. For if we can adduce a contrary example in which the thing is not so, the enthymeme is solved, because the thing is not necessary, or because many things have happened frequently, and in a different manner. But if many things have happened frequently, and in this manner, then it must be contended either that the present circumstance is not similar, or is not similarly disposed, or has a certain difference. *Tecmeria*, however, [i. e. necessary signs,] and enthymemes which are of the nature of *tecmeria*, cannot be solved in consequence of being unsyllogistic. But this is evident to us from the analytics.¹ It remains, therefore, to show that what is said, [viz. that certain premises] do not exist. But if it is evident that the premises do exist, and that the enthymeme is derived from *tecmerion*, then the enthymeme becomes insoluble. For all things now become apparent from demonstration.

¹ See the Prior Analytics, Book II. Chap. 27.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

To amplify, however, and diminish, are not the elements of an enthymeme; for I call the same thing an element and place. For an element, as also a place, is that into which many enthymemes fall. But to amplify and diminish are enthymemes for the purpose of showing, that a thing is great or small, as likewise that it is good or evil, just or unjust, or any thing else. And all these are the things with which syllogisms and enthymemes are conversant; so that if no one of these is the place of an enthymeme, neither are amplification and diminution.

Neither are enthymemes which have the power of solving [the arguments of the opponent] any other species of enthymeme than those which are employed in confirmation. For it is evident that he solves [the arguments of his opponent,] who either shows [the contrary to what his opponent asserts,] or introduces an objection. But he proves the opposite. Thus, if one shows that a thing has been done, the other shows that it has not been done; and if one shows that it has not, the other shows that it has been done; so that here, indeed, there will be no difference; for both use the same enthy-

memes ; since they introduce enthymemes to show, that the thing is, or is not. An objection, however, is not an enthymeme, but (as we have shown in the Topics) it is to declare a certain opinion, from which it will be evident that the conclusion is not syllogistical, or that something false has been assumed. And thus much has been said by us respecting examples and sentences ; and in short respecting what pertains to the reasoning power, whence we may abound with [enthymemes,] and how we may solve them. It now remains to discuss what pertains to diction and order.

THE
ART OF RHETORIC.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

THERE are three things which it is requisite to discuss concerning an oration ; one, indeed, from what particulars credibility is derived ; the second, about diction ; and the third, in what manner it is requisite to arrange the parts of an oration. Concerning credibility, therefore, we have already spoken, and have shown from how many things it consists, and that it consists from three things. We have likewise shown what the nature is of these three, and why credibility consists from these alone. For all men are persuaded [to believe what they hear,] either because those who judge are themselves affected in a certain way, or because they conceive the speakers to be worthy of belief, or because the thing is proved. We have also spoken concerning enthymemes, and have

shown whence they ought to be derived ; for some things, indeed, are the species, but others the places of enthymemes. It now, however, remains to speak concerning diction. For it is not only sufficient to know what ought to be said, but it is likewise necessary to speak in a proper manner. And diction contributes greatly to the quality of the oration. The parts of rhetoric, therefore, were investigated [by the ancients] in that order in which they are naturally arranged. But from the nature of a thing, we ought in the first place to discover those things which are adapted to persuade. In the second place, these are to be disposed [i. e. expressed] by [an appropriate] diction. And that which is to be considered in the third place, and possesses the greatest power, though it has not yet been discussed by any one, is what pertains to pronunciation, or action. For this was but lately introduced into tragic poetry and rhapsody. For at first, the poets themselves acted the tragedies [which they composed.] It is evident, therefore, that with respect to rhetoric, there is a thing of this kind, in the same manner as with respect to poetry ; which has been discussed by certain other persons, and by Glauco the Teian.

Pronunciation, however, or action, consists in the voice, [and the principal artifice of action consists in knowing] how it is requisite to use it in each of the passions. Thus for instance, [it is necessary to know] when the voice should be loud, when soft, and when between both. How the tones of voice should be employed ; such as the acute, the grave, and the middle ; and what rhythms are adapted to each of the passions. For there are three things which the writers on pronun-

ciation consider ; and these are, magnitude, harmony, and rhythm. And as in poetical contests those who excel in action, for the most part obtain the prize, and the players now excel in it more than the poets themselves, thus also in forensic contests, through the depravity of politics, those orators gain their cause, who excel in action. The art, however, concerning rhetorical action has not yet been disclosed ; since, likewise, the art concerning diction was discovered late. And it appears to be but a slight thing, if it is well examined. But since the business concerning rhetoric pertains to opinion, we must pay attention to it, not as a thing possessing rectitude, but as necessary ; since it is just not to require more in an oration, than that it may neither give pain, nor delight. For it is just to contend strenuously for things themselves ; so that other things besides demonstration are superfluous. At the same time, however, diction is capable of producing great effects, as we have said, through the depravity of the hearer. Diction therefore possesses a certain small necessity in every discipline. For it is of some consequence with respect to the declaration of a thing, to speak in this, or in that manner ; yet it is not very important, but all these [i. e. whatever pertains to rhetoric,] depend on the imagination, and are referred to the hearer. Hence, no one teaches geometry in this way, [viz. so as to be solicitous about diction.] The art, therefore, concerning pronunciation, when it is employed, produces the same effect as acting on the stage. But some persons have endeavoured to speak a little concerning it, as for instance, Thrasymachus in his treatise On Compassion. And to be disposed to act is natural, and more inartificial ; but diction is artificial. Hence, again, rewards are given to

those who excel in it, in the same manner as to those rhetoricians who excel in pronunciation. For written orations possess greater strength from diction, than from the sentiments they contain. The poets, therefore, gave rise to diction, as it is natural they should. For names are imitations; and of all our parts, voice is the most imitative. Hence, the poets invented the poetical arts, viz. rhapsody, [or epic poetry,] and the art of acting, [or dramatic poetry,] and the other arts. Because, however, the poets, though they sing of frivolous things, appear to have acquired their renown from diction, on this account poetic diction, such as that of Gorgias, was introduced [by orators;] and even now many of the unlearned fancy that those persons speak most beautifully when they speak poetically. This, however, is not the case; but the diction of an oration, is different from that of poetry. And this is evident from the event. For the present writers of tragedies do not any longer employ the ancient poetic diction. But as from tetrameters they betook themselves to iambic verse, because this measure is of all others most similar to discourse; thus, also, they rejected such names as are foreign from familiar conversation. Those, likewise, who at present compose hexameter verses, have rejected the names with which the first [dramatic poets] adorned their verses. Hence, it is ridiculous for those to imitate these poets, who no longer employ that mode of diction. Hence, too, it is evident that we are not accurately to discuss every thing which may be said concerning diction, but only such things as pertain to rhetorical diction. For of poetical diction we have spoken in the treatise On Poetry.

CHAPTER II.

LET, therefore, what we have written in the Poetic be surveyed ; and let the virtue of diction be perspicuity ; of which this is an indication, that speech does not effect its proper work unless it renders manifest [the mind of the speaker.] Another virtue of diction is, that it be neither low, nor above its dignity, but appropriate. For poetic diction perhaps is not low, and yet is not adapted to an oration. But of nouns and verbs, such as are proper render the diction perspicuous. Such other names, however, as are mentioned in the Poetic, cause the diction not to be low, but ornamented. For the introduction of unusual words, makes the diction appear more venerable ; since men are affected in the same manner towards diction, as they are towards strangers, and their fellow-citizens. Hence it is necessary to render the dialect foreign. For we admire the language of foreigners ; and that which is admirable is pleasant. In metre, therefore, the poet does this frequently, and there it is appropriate ; for both the verse, and the subjects of the verse, are very remote from common occurrences ; but in prose much fewer foreign words are to be used. For there, if either a slave, or a very young man, or one

who speaks of very trifling things uses elegant language, it is more indecorous. But in the language of these persons, the becoming consists in an appropriate contraction and dilatation. Unusual words, however, should be introduced by the orator latently, and he should not seem to speak fictitiously, but naturally. For natural diction is adapted to persuade; but the fictitious has a contrary effect. For we avoid those who speak fictitiously as insidious persons, in the same manner as we avoid mixed wines. Thus, the voice of Theodorus was preferred to the voice of other actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, but the voice of the others appeared to be foreign. Unusual terms, however, will be well introduced latently, if he who frames a speech makes a selection from the accustomed dialect; which Euripides does, and was the first that showed the way to others.

But since an oration consists from nouns and verbs, and nouns have as many species as are enumerated in the treatise On Poetry; of these species, nouns taken from various tongues, or dialects, and also such as are double and fictitious, are seldom, and but in few places to be used. Where, however, they are to be used, and why but seldom, we shall afterwards show. For they produce a greater change in the language than is becoming. But the proper, the appropriate and metaphorical, are alone useful to prosaic diction; of which this is an indication, that all men [in common conversation] use these alone; for all men speak in metaphors, and in appropriate and proper terms. Hence it is evident, that if any one does this well, his diction will be foreign, and it may be latent

that it is so, and he will speak with perspicuity. But this was defined by us to be the virtue of a rhetorical discourse. Of names or nouns, however, the homonymous are useful to the sophist; for through these they deceive. But the synonymous are useful to the poet. I call, however, proper and synonymous terms, such as *to go* and *to walk*; for both these are proper, and synonymous to each other.

What, therefore, each of these is, how many species there are of metaphor, and that metaphors can do much both in poetry and prose, we have shown, as we have before observed, in the treatise On Poetry. But it is so much more necessary to labour about these in prose, because it has fewer aids than verse. A metaphor also especially possesses the clear, the pleasant, and the foreign, and it is not to be taken from another person.

It is necessary, however, to use epithets and metaphors that are appropriate; and this adaptation will be obtained from the analogous. But without this there will be an apparent indecorum, because contraries are especially conspicuous, when placed by each other. As a purple garment, therefore, becomes a young, but not an old man; for the same garment is not adapted to both; thus also certain metaphors and epithets are adapted to some things, but are not adapted to others. If likewise you are willing to praise, the metaphor must be derived from that which is better in the same genus; but if to blame, it must be derived from things which in the same genus are inferior. I say for instance, since contraries are in the same genus, to say, "That a beggar prays," and "That he who prays begs," because both are petitions,

Arist.

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it is expedient to do as we have said.¹ Thus Iphicrates called Callias, *Metragurtes*, or *collector to the mother of the gods*, and not *Dadouchos*, or *torch-bearer*. But Callias replied "That Iphicrates was not initiated, otherwise he would not have called him *Metragurtes*, but *Dadouchos*." For both these offices pertained to the goddess, but that of *torch-bearer* was honourable, and that of *collector* ignoble. The flatterers of Dionysius also employed the same artifice; for they called themselves *artists*. Both these words, however, are metaphors; the one, indeed, of things sordid, but the other the contrary. And robbers at present call themselves exactors. Hence, we may be allowed to say, "That he who acts unjustly errs; and that he who errs, acts unjustly; and also that he who steals, both takes, and robs." There is, however, an indecorum in what Telephus in Euripides says [of certain rowers] "That they reigned over oars, and descended into Mysia." For the word to reign is greater than the dignity of the matter [i. e. of an oar.] He does not therefore conceal his artifice. There is also an error in syllables, unless they cause the words to have a pleasing sound. And this error was committed by Dionysius, surnamed *Chalkous*, in his elegies. For he calls *poetry* "The *clangor* of Calliope," because both are vocal sounds. But the metaphor is bad, which is made from sounds that are not significant.

Farther still, nouns are not to be far-fetched, but things which are anonymous are to be denominated by words derived from things that are allied, and of the

¹ Viz. If we wish to praise him who begs, we must say that he prays; but if we wish to blame him, we must say that he begs.

same species, and which show as soon as they are uttered that they are allied; as in that celebrated enigma, "I saw a man agglutinating brass to a man with fire." For the passion is anonymous. But both are a certain addition. The enigma, therefore, calls the application of the cupping glass an agglutination. And in short, from enigmas that are well composed, good metaphors may be assumed. For metaphors have an obscure meaning; so that it is evident that an enigma if it is approved consists of metaphors that are well made. Metaphors also must be assumed from beautiful things. But the beauty of a name consists, as Lycimnius says, in sounds, or in the thing signified; and in a similar manner the deformity of a name. Farther still, there is a third thing, which solves a sophistical argument. For that which Bryson says is not true, "That no one speaks obscurely, since the same thing is signified by using this name instead of that." For this is false; since one name is more proper and more assimilated than another, and is more adapted to place the thing before our eyes. Again, this name and that signify a thing not similarly subsisting; so that thus also, one name must be admitted to be more beautiful or more deformed than another. For both names, indeed, signify the beautiful and the deformed; but not so far as beautiful, or so far as deformed. Or both signify the same things, but in a greater or less degree. Metaphors, however, are hence to be derived from things which are beautiful, either in the voice, or in the power [of signification,] or to the sight, or some other sense. But it makes a difference to say, for instance, "The rosy-finger'd morn," rather than, "The purple-finger'd," or, which is still worse, "The red-finger'd."

In epithets, also, appositions may be made from what is vile or base ; as, for instance, *the matricide*. But the apposition may be made from that which is better ; as, *the avenger of his father*. And Simonides, when he who conquered with mules, offered him a small reward, was unwilling to compose verses on the occasion, as disdain- ing to celebrate in verse *semi-asses*. But when he had given him a sufficient reward, then he sung,

Hail daughters of the steeds that fly
With feet like whirlwinds swift.

Though they were also the daughters of asses.

Farther still, a thing may be praised or blamed by employing diminutives. But diminution is that which renders both evil and good less. Thus Aristophanes in his *Babylonics* calls in derision *krusion* (a golden thing) *krusidarion*, and *imation* (a garment) *imatidarion*. He also calls *loidoria* (slander) *loidoremation*, and *nosema* (disease) *nosemation*. In both appositions, however, and diminutives, it is requisite to be cautious, and to observe a mediocrity.

CHAPTER III.

FRIGIDITY may be produced in diction in four ways. In the first place in double nouns [i. e. in compound words;] as in Lycophron when he says, “the many-fac’d heaven; the mighty-topp’d earth; and the narrow-mouth’d shore.” And as Gorgias calls some one, *a beggarly-mus’d flatterer*; and those who take an oath improperly, or properly, *epiorkesantas*, and *kateuorkesantas*. And as Alcidas [when describing some one who was in a rage,] “His soul was full of ardour, but his face was of a fiery colour.” And speaking of the promptitude of a certain person to fight to the last, he calls him *telesphoros*, or *enduring to the end*. He likewise calls the power of persuading, *telesphoros*; and the bottom of the sea *kuanochroon*, or *azure-coloured*. For all these expressions appear to be poetical from duplication. This, therefore, is one cause of frigid diction.

Another cause arises from the use of ancient words. Thus Lycophron calls Xerxes *pelorion*¹ *andra*, or *an*

¹ That *πιλωριον* is an ancient poetical word is evident from the following line, which is only to be found in the Manuscript Comment of Syrianus on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.

χασμα και μεγα χασμα πιλωριον ενθα και ενθα.

i. e. (speaking of Chaos) “It is a chasm and a mighty chasm, every way immense.”

immense man. And Sciron he calls; *sinnis aneer*, or a *pernicious man*. Alcidas, also, speaking of poetry, says no such *athurma*, or *puerile sport*, is useful to poetry. And speaking of nature he uses the expression *atasthalia* or *improbability*. And of a certain person, he says, "that he was exasperated with the untamed anger of his mind."

In the third place, diction may become frigid from using epithets, which are either long, or unseasonable, or frequent. For in poetry it is becoming to say, *white-milk*. But in prose, epithets are partly more unbecoming, and partly, if they are too frequent, they cause prose to appear to be verse. Epithets, however, are sometimes to be used in prose; for they render the diction more unusual, and cause it to be foreign. But mediocrity must be regarded in the use of them, since otherwise a greater evil is produced than by speaking casually. For casual diction is not good, but the other is bad. Hence, the writings of Alcidas appear to be frigid. For he uses epithets, not as seasonings, but as food; since they are so frequent in his writings, so great, and so apparent. Thus, for instance, he does not merely say *sweat*, but *moist sweat*. And he does not say that some one went to the *Isthmia* [or solemn games in honour of Neptune,] but *to the general assembly of the Isthmian games*. Thus too, he does not say *the laws*, but *legal institutes, the queen of cities*. Nor does he say *in running*, but *with the rapid impulse of the soul*. Nor *museum*, but *receiving the museum of nature*. And *the sad care of the soul*, [instead of merely saying *care*.] Nor does he say *favour*, but *the artificer of popular favour*. And [again he calls an orator] *the dispensator*

of the pleasure of the hearers: And, he did not hide himself in the branches, but in the branches of the wood. And, he did not cover his body, but the shame of his body. And, desire the anti-rival of the soul. But this is at the same time a double word, and an epithet; so that it becomes poetical. Thus too speaking of improbity he says, *the immense excess of improbity.* Hence, those who speak poetically produce the ridiculous and the frigid, by their indecorous diction, and also occasion obscurity by their garrulity. For garrulity dissolves perspicuity, when it is introduced to him who knows the subject, by the obscurity which it occasions. Men, however, use double, or compound words, when a thing is anonymous, and the words may be easily joined, such as *time-wasting.* But if this is done frequently, the diction becomes entirely poetical. Hence, a double diction [i. e. compound words,] are most useful to dithyrambic poets; for the language of these is sonorous. But ancient names and dialects are most adapted to epic poets; for epic poetry is venerable and superb. And metaphors are most adapted to iambs; for these, as we have before observed, iambic poets now use.

Again, in the fourth place, frigidity is produced in metaphors. For there are indecorous metaphors, some indeed, on account of the ridiculous; for comic poets also use metaphors. But others are indecorous from being too venerable and tragical. Metaphors likewise are obscure, if they are far-fetched; as those of Gorgias, who calls certain things, *green* and *sanguineous.* And, *you indeed have shamefully sown, and badly reaped these things.* For this is too poetically said. Thus too, Alcidas calls philosophy *the bulwark of the laws;*

and the *Odyssey* a beautiful mirror of human life. And again he says, "nothing of this kind introduces puerile sport (*αθυρμα*) in poetry." For all these metaphors, from the causes already mentioned, are unadapted to procure persuasion. But what Gorgias said on a swallow which dropped its excrement as it flew towards him, is the best of tragical metaphors; for he said, "This is shameful, O Philomel." For if he said this to the bird, the action was not shameful; but to a virgin, it was shameful. His defamation therefore was proper, because he alluded to what the bird had been, and not to what it then was.

CHAPTER IV.

AN image also is a metaphor; for it differs very little from it. For when Homer says of Achilles,

He like a lion rush'd,

it is an image. But when he says, *the lion rush'd*, it is a metaphor. For because both are brave, he calls Achilles metaphorically a lion.

An image also is useful in prose, though but rarely; for it is poetical.

Images, however, are to be introduced in the same manner as metaphors; for they are metaphors, differing in the way we have already mentioned.

But images are for instance such as what Androtion said on Idrieus, "That he resembled whelps freed from their chains." For they bite any one that falls in their way, and Idrieus when freed from his bonds was morose. And as Theodamas assimilated Archidamus to Euxenus, who was ignorant of geometry; and this from the analogous. For Euxenus is the geometrical Archidamus. Another instance of similitude is from the [5th book of the] Republic of Plato, "That those who in battle plunder the bodies of the dead, are similar to whelps who bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them." And [in the 6th book,] it is said of the people, "That they resemble a strong, but deaf pilot." And [in the 10th book] speaking of poetical measures, it is said, "That they resemble those who are in the prime of life, but without beauty. For these in the decline of life, and verses when they are dissolved, no longer appear the same." Another instance is that of Pericles on the Samians, "That they resembled children, who take their food crying." And on the Bœotians, "That they resembled flints; for flints are struck against each other, and the Bœotians fight with each other." Another instance is that of Demosthenes on [the Athenian] people, "That they resembled those who are sea-sick." And that of Democrates who assimilated "Rhetoricians to nurses, who swallow the food themselves, and anoint the children with the spittle." And again, that of Antisthenes, who assimilated Cephisodotus, who was a thin man, to frankincense, "which

delights while it consumes." For all these similitudes may be used, both as images, and as metaphors; so that it is evident that such words as are approved, and are used as metaphors, will also be images, and likewise that images are metaphors, which are in want of argument. It is always, however, necessary that a metaphor should be converted from the analogous, and be referred to the other part, and to things homogeneous. Thus if a cup may [from analogy] be called the shield of Bacchus, a shield also may appropriately be said to be the cup of Mars. From these things, therefore, an oration is composed.

CHAPTER V.

THE principle, however, of diction is to speak with propriety; and this consists in five things. And the first indeed, is in conjunctives,¹ if these are disposed in such a way as their nature requires, viz. so as to be placed in an order prior and posterior to each other. Thus for instance the conjunction *indeed*, and *I indeed*, require *but*, and *but he*. It must be remembered, how-

¹ Under conjunctions Aristotle also comprehends prepositions, articles, and the other parts of speech, which are distinguished from noun and verb.

ever, that conjunctions which correspond to each other, should neither be disjoined by a great interval, nor should have so many things interposed between them, that when a conjunction corresponding to a former one is given, the prior conjunction is forgotten ; for this is appropriate but in few places. Thus, “ *But I, after the thing was related to me, for Cleon came begging and entreating, went taking them along with me.*” For here, many conjunctions are inserted prior to the conjunction which was to have been assigned.¹ But if there is a great interval between *But I,* and *I went,* the sentence becomes obscure. One thing, therefore, requisite to correct diction is a proper disposition in the conjunctions. A second is, to call things by their proper names, and not to circumscribe them [by generic and common names.] A third is, not to use ambiguous words. But these precepts are to be observed, unless the contraries to them are preferred, which those do, who when they have nothing to say, pretend to say something. For men of this kind in poetry, thus speak ; as for instance Empedocles. For circumlocution deceives, if it be much, and the auditors are affected in the same manner as the multitude are by those who predict future events, since when they speak ambiguously, the vulgar assent to what they say. “ If Cræsus passes over the river Halys, he will destroy a mighty empire.” [But the reason why when we have nothing to say, we should use generic terms is] because in short, the error will be less, and on this account

¹ i. e. Since *I went* is referred to the words *but I,* many words are interposed, from the interposition of which, obscurity is produced.

diviners speak through the genera of a thing. For in the game of even and odd, he will be less likely to err who says that a number is even or odd in general, than if he determines what number is so. And he who predicts that a certain event will be, is less likely to err, if he only says that it will be, than if he assigns the time when it will be. Hence, those who deliver oracles, do not define the time when a thing will happen. All these generic and ambiguous names, therefore, are to be avoided, unless they are adopted for the sake of some such purpose, as we have mentioned. A fourth thing requisite to correct diction is, as Protagoras divided the genera of nouns into masculine, feminine, and instruments [or neuter,] to employ these rightly; as "She coming and discoursing departed."¹ A fifth requisite is to denominate rightly in many and few things; and in one thing; as, "But they coming, struck me."²

In short, it is requisite that what is written, should be so written as to be read and pronounced with facility. But this is not the case when there are many conjunctions; and when what is written cannot be easily pointed; and such are the writings of Heraclitus. For it is laborious to point the writings of Heraclitus, because it is immanifest what should be conjoined with the prior or posterior part; as in the beginning of his book. For he there says, "Of reason existing always men are

¹ It is difficult to illustrate this example in English, but easy in Latin. Thus to say, "illa vero reversa, et colloquuta, discessit," is right; but to say, "illa vero reversus, &c." is wrong.

² Thus too in Latin, to say, "illi vero reversi verberarunt me" is right; but "illi vero reversus, &c." is wrong.

ignorant;" since it is immanifest whether the word always pertains to the prior or to the posterior part. ¹

Farther still, a solecism is produced in composition, when to two words, another appropriate word is not conjoined. Thus to *noise* and *colour*, seeing is not a common [i. e. is not an appropriate] word; but *sensible perception* is common. The composition also is rendered obscure, from the insertion of much which is intermediate, unless the part which corresponds to the first part of a sentence, is immediately subjoined, and the rest added; as, "My intention was, after I had mentioned such and such things to him, to go." But this obscurity would be avoided by saying, "My intention was, after I had spoken to him, to go;" and then to add, "having mentioned to him such and such things."

CHAPTER VI.

THE following particulars contribute to the amplitude of diction: To use definition [or description] instead of a name; as instead of saying a *circle* to say, a *plane*

¹ i. e. It is dubious whether the meaning of Heraclitus is, *that men are ignorant of that reason which always exists*, or, *that men are always ignorant of the reason which exists*.

figure in which all lines drawn from the middle to the circumference are equal. But the contrary contributes to conciseness, viz. to use the name instead of the definition. Amplitude of diction is also effected, if when any thing disgraceful or indecorous is to be expressed, the name is used when the disgraceful thing is in the definition, but the definition, if it is in the name. It is likewise effected by rendering a thing manifest by metaphors, and epithets, avoiding at the same time what is poetical. And by causing one thing to be many, [i. e. by using the plural instead of the singular number,] which the poets do. For when there is but one part, they nevertheless say, "into the Achaian parts." And instead of saying, "the complication of an epistle," they say, "the complications of epistles." Amplitude is also effected, by separating what we can conjoin, as, "this woman, this our wife." But if we wish to speak concisely, we must say on the contrary, "this woman our wife." And it is effected by using a conjunction; but if we wish to speak concisely, we must not employ a conjunction, yet the sentence must not be unconnected; as in the first case, "Going and speaking to him;" and in the second, "Going, I spoke to him." The method of Antimachus likewise is useful for this purpose, viz. to enumerate particulars, which a thing does not possess, which he does, speaking of the hill Teumessus; for he says,

A little hill there is, expos'd to wind.

For thus we may amplify to infinity. And this may take place both in what is good, and what is bad, by enumerating what is not inherent, in whatever way it may be

useful to the oration. Hence, also, poets derive the words, *chordless*, and *lyreless* melody; for these words are derived from privations. But what we have just said, is adopted in metaphors, taken from the analogous; such for instance as to say, "That the sound of a trumpet is a lyreless melody."

CHAPTER VII.

DICTION, also, will possess what is decorous, if it is pathetic and ethical, and analogous to the subject matter. But the analogous is effected by neither speaking of things grand and magnificent slightly, nor of abject things, venerably, [and magnificently;] nor giving ornament to a vile appellation. For if this is not adopted, the composition will appear to be a comedy; which is the case with that of Cleon. For some things which he writes, are just as if a man should say, "A venerable fig."

Diction becomes pathetic, by reciting insolent behaviour in the language of an angry person. But when conduct has been impious and shameful, then the diction becomes pathetic, by speaking indignantly, and cautiously; ¹

¹ i. e. As if not daring to disclose such nefarious conduct.

and when conduct has been laudable, this is effected by speaking with admiration. But in things of a lamentable nature, the pathetic is produced by a humble diction. And the like method must be adopted in other things. Appropriate diction, also, persuades to the truth of a thing. For the soul of the auditor is deceived by false reasoning, in consequence of conceiving that the orator speaks the truth ; because the auditors are thus affected in such-like orations. Hence, they fancy that things are as the orator says, though they are not so. The auditor, likewise, becomes similarly affected with him who speaks pathetically, though he should say nothing to the purpose. Hence, many astonish the hearers, by the tumultuous manner in which they deliver their orations.

Moreover, ethical diction is a demonstration from signs, because this when appropriate is consequent to every genus and habit. But I mean by genus, indeed, age ; such as a child, or a man, or an old man ; [sex,] as man or woman ; [and nation,] as a Lacedæmonian, or Thessalian. And by habits, I mean those things which produce the variety of conditions in life ; for the lives of men are not such as they are according to every habit. If, therefore, the diction has appellations adapted to the habit, it will become ethical. For a rustic and a well-educated man, will not say the same things, nor speak after the same manner. But the auditors are somewhat affected by that figure, which the writers of orations abundantly use ; as, "Who does not know this ? All men know it." For the auditor, from shame, confesses that he participates of that knowledge, of which every one else partakes.

Opportune, however, or not opportune use is common to all the species. But the remedy in every hyperbole is that celebrated advice [self-correction ;] for it is necessary that the orator should correct himself. For the thing then appears to be true, [though it may seem to be incredible,] because the incredibility of it is not concealed from the orator. Farther still, every thing analogous is not to be used at once ; for thus the artifice will be concealed from the hearer. I mean, for instance, that if the names are harsh, yet must not the voice, or countenance, or other appropriate things, be such as to express that harshness ; otherwise, it will become manifest what each of these is. But if the names are harsh, and the voice or countenance is not adapted to such names, the artifice will be latent. If, therefore, soft things be spoken harshly, and harsh things gently, they will lose the power of persuading. But epithets and compound words, if they are numerous, and especially such as are foreign, are adapted to him who speaks pathetically. For we pardon the orator, who when enraged calls some evil *heaven-reaching*, or *immense*. These epithets, also, and compound words, may be used by the orator, when he has already moved the auditors, and inspired them with a divine fury, either by praising or dispraising, or by exciting them to anger or love, which Isocrates does in his *Panegyric*, towards the end, where he has the words "fame and memory." And "those who endured." For those who are agitated with a divine fury, speak things of this kind, so that the auditors admit what is said, in consequence of being similarly affected. Hence, this form of diction is also adapted to poetry ; for poetry partakes of divine inspiration. Either, therefore, this

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form of diction must be adopted [in the cases already mentioned,] or irony must be employed, as it was by Gorgias, and Socrates in the *Phædrus* of Plato.

CHAPTER VIII.

WITH respect, however, to the figure of diction, it is necessary that it should neither be metrical, nor without rhythm. For metrical diction is not calculated to persuade. For it appears to be feigned, and calls the attention of the auditor from the subject of the oration; since he is led to expect a metre similar to the former. As, therefore, when the cryers proclaim to the people [when a slave is manumitted by his master,] "What patron will he who is manumitted chuse?" the boys antecedently to the cryer exclaim, "Cleon;"—[thus if the oration were metrical, the auditors would preoccupy the orator, and would foresee what he ought to say.] But the diction which is without rhythm is indefinite. It is necessary, however, that it should be bounded, though not by metre. For the infinite is unpleasant and unknown; and all things are bounded by number. But the number of the figure of diction is rhythm, of which metres are the segments. Hence, it is necessary that an oration should have rhythm, but not metre or measure; for if it has, it

will be a poem. It should not, however, possess rhythm accurately, but only to a certain extent.

Of rhythms, however, the heroic indeed is venerable and sonorous, and requires harmony. But the iambic is the diction of the multitude. Hence, in speaking, iambs are uttered the most of all measures. But it is necessary that the prose of an oration should be venerable and very exciting. The Trochaic measure, however, is more analogous to swift dancing. But this is evident from tetrameters, which are a voluble rhythm.¹

¹ Heroic feet, i. e. dactyls and spondees have an even ratio, or in other words, the ratio of one to one. For a short syllable contains one time, a long syllable contains two times; but a spondee consists of two long syllables; and therefore consists of two syllables measured by an equal time, and consequently has an even proportion. A dactyl consists of three syllables, the first long, the second and third short; but a long syllable contains two times; two short syllables contain two other times; and therefore a dactyl also consists of three syllables, of which the two posterior are measured by an equal time with the first syllable, and consequently a dactyl has an even proportion. An anapest, which is an inverted dactyl, has the same proportion, since it has the two first syllables short, and the third long. The heroic rhythm, therefore, of dactyls and spondees, on account of its equability is full of majesty, is sonorous and magnificent, and requires harmony. Hence, it is not sufficiently adapted to prose, which ought to be without harmony, and ought to be less sonorous and less magnificent. Iambics, which consist of two syllables, the first short, and the second long, and the opposite to them, trochaics, which have the first syllable long, and the second short, have a duple ratio. For a long syllable contains two times, and a short syllable one time; but iambics and trochaics consist of a long and a short syllable. Hence, they consist of two syllables, of which one has to the other the ratio of two to one, and consequently they have a duple ratio. Of these, the iambic rhythm is very much adapted to familiar conversation, and therefore the diction of the multitude for the most part consists of iambics. The rhythm, how-

The pæan therefore remains, which was employed by orators, and originated from Thrasymachus; yet they

ever, which is adapted to prose, ought to be more grand and grave than that which is adapted to the familiar diction of the vulgar; and hence, neither is the iambic rythm very fit for prose. And the trochaic rythm has too much concitation, as is evident from tetrameters, which because they for a great part consist of trochees, possess a very exciting power, and almost run. Hence, this rythm does not accord with the majesty of prose.

The foot follows which is called pæan, because it was used in the hymns of Apollo, who was denominated Pæan. But a pæan is a foot consisting of four syllables, one long, and the remaining three short. If the first syllable is long, it is called a first pæan; if the second is long, it is called a second pæan; if the third, a third pæan; and if the fourth, a fourth pæan: But Aristotle, here, alone distinguishes the first and fourth pæan; and omits the other two. Thrasymachus used the first pæan in prose, whom others followed; but they could not explain what is the nature of this rythm, and what ratio it contains. This, therefore, we must endeavour to explain. A pæan, then, is a foot the third in order, and contains the third ratio, viz. the sesquialter, which is the ratio of three to two. The reason of this is, because it contains four syllables, one long, and three short. But a long syllable contains two times; and three short syllables contain three times. Hence, the short syllables have to the long syllable, the ratio of three to two, i. e. a sesquialter ratio. Hence, too, a pæan ranks as the third foot. For in the first place are spondees, dactyls, and anapests, which contain the even ratio of one to one; in the second place are iambics and trochaics, which contain the duple ratio of two to one; and in the third place are pæans, which contain the sesquialter ratio of three to two. As, therefore, dactyls, spondees, and anapests, and other rythms containing an even ratio, are not adapted to prose, because they are too sonorous and magnificent; and as iambic and trochaic rythms, and other rythms containing a duple ratio, are also not adapted to prose, because they are less sonorous and magnificent than is requisite; but the sesquialter ratio is a medium between the even and the duple ratio, for it exceeds more than the even, and less than the double;—this being the case, it

were unable to say what it was. But the pæan is the third in order, and follows the above-mentioned measures; for it is in the ratio of three to two; but of the others, the one [i. e. the heroic] is in the ratio of one to one; but the other [i. e. the iambic and trochaic] in the ratio of two to one. The sesquialter, however, is consequent to these two ratios; and the pæan consists of this ratio. The other rythms, therefore, are to be rejected, from the above-mentioned reasons, and because they are metrical; but the pæan is to be assumed; for from this alone of all the rythms we have mentioned, metre is not produced; so that it is especially latent.

At present, therefore, orators use only one pæan, and that at the beginning of their oration. It is necessary, however, that the end should differ from the beginning. But there are two species of pæans opposite to each other; of which, one is adapted to the beginning of an oration, in which way also it is used by orators. But this is that pæan, in which the first syllable is long, and the other three are short; as

Δαλογικὸς ἔστι Λυκίαν,

i. e. "Delos begotten, or Lycian," [speaking of Apollo.]

follows that the pæan rythm is especially adapted to prose, as being less grand than the heroic, but grander than the iambic rythm, and having a middle situation between both. The truth of this is confirmed by considering, that in prose we ought to avoid metre, and should use a rythm especially adapted to concealment. But heroic and iambic rythms are metrical, and are so manifest that they cannot be concealed. The rythm, however, of pæans is not metrical, and may be concealed. Hence, we ought principally to use the pæan rythm in prose, though we may also sometimes employ other feet.

[where there are two pæans :] And,

Χρυσόκρημα Ηκάτι, παῖς Διός.

“ O golden-hair'd Hecate, daughter of Jove.”

But in the other pæan, on the contrary, the first three syllables are short, and the last is long ; as

Μεῖς δὲ γὰρ ὕδατα ἔ' ἀλάλιον ἠφαιεῖσι τοῖς.

i. e. “ Night concealed after the land, the water and the ocean.”

This pæan, however, terminates the course of the oration. For a short syllable, because it is imperfect, causes the oration to be mutilated. But it is necessary that it should be amputated by a long syllable, and that the end of it should be manifest, yet not from the writer, nor from a paragraph, but from the rythm. And thus we have shown that diction ought to have a proper rythm, and should not be without rythm ; and also what the rythms are, and how those subsist, that produce a proper rythm in diction.

CHAPTER IX.

It is necessary, however, that diction should either be diffuse and one by a bond, as the dilatations in dithyrambics ; or that it should be periodic, and similar to the antistrophes of the ancient poets. Diffuse diction, therefore, is ancient, as in the work of Herodotus the Thurian, the beginning of which is, "This is the exposition of history, &c.;" for this, formerly, all writers used, but at present it is not used by many. But I call the diction diffuse, which has of itself no end, till the thing which is discussed be brought to a conclusion. This diction is however unpleasant, on account of the infinite ; for all men wish to see the end of a thing. Hence, racers in the turnings [round the goal,] are out of breath and faint ; but prior to this, when they have a prospect of the goal, their labour is not so extreme. Such, therefore, is diffuse diction.

But periodic diction, is that which consists of periods. I call, however, a period, diction which has of itself a beginning and end, and a magnitude which may easily be perceived. But diction of this kind is pleasing, and easily learnt. It is pleasing, indeed, because it subsists in a way contrary to that which is boundless ; and be-

cause the hearer always fancies he obtains something, because there is always something for him which is bounded. But it is unpleasant where nothing is foreseen, and nothing effected. It is also easily learnt, because it may easily be remembered. But it may easily be remembered, because this diction has number in the periods. Hence, all men remember verse more easily than prose; for it has number by which it is measured. It is necessary, however, that a period should contain a complete, and not a mutilated and abrupt meaning, as in the iambs of Sophocles.

Calydon, the land where Pelops reign'd.¹

For the contrary might be thought to be true, by a division of the period; as in the above instance it would seem that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

With respect to periods, however, one is in the colons or members, but the other is simple.

But the period which is in the colons, is a perfect and distinct diction, and in which what is pronounced admits of easy respiration, and does not consist in a division, like the above-mentioned period of Sophocles, but is whole and entire. A colon, however, is one part of this period. But I call the period simple which consists of one colon. It is necessary, however, that the colons and the periods should neither be curtailed, nor prolix.

¹ The sense here apparently is, that Calydon is the soil or land over which Pelops formerly reigned, and therefore pertains to Peloponnesus, though it does not, but to Ætolia. The sense, therefore, is abrupt and mutilated.

For when the periods are very short, they cause the hearer to stumble frequently. For the mind of the hearer being impelled farther to the end which he had proposed to himself, stumbles as it were, when the orator stops short. But prolix periods cause the auditors to be left by the orator; just as those who in walking pass beyond the boundaries of their walk; for they leave their companions behind. In a similar manner, periods which are long, become themselves an oration, and resemble diffuse diction. Whence that jest of Democritus the Chian upon Melanippides, who dilated in his writings instead of making antistrophes. "This man frames evil for himself, in framing evil for another. But to dilate much, is the worst of evils to him who does it." For a thing of this kind may be aptly said, to those who use long colons. Very short colons, however, do not become periods. These, therefore, hurry away the auditor with them precipitately. But of periodic diction, which consists of many colons or members, one kind is distinct, and the other opposite. And the distinct, indeed, is such as [the beginning of the Panegyric of Isocrates;] "I have often admired those who collected public assemblies, and instituted the Gymnastic contests." But the opposite is that which consists of many colons, and in which either the same thing is composed with contraries, or contraries are composed with contraries; as, [in the Panegyric of Isocrates,] "The Athenians benefited both those that remained at home, and those that followed; for they acquired more for those that followed them, than they possessed at home; and they left sufficient for the support of those that stayed behind." Here the contraries are *staying* and *following*, *sufficient* and *more*. [And again in the same oration,] "So that

to those who were in want of money, and to those who were willing to enjoy it, &c." Here *enjoyment* is opposed to acquisition. Farther still, "It frequently happens in these things, that prudent men are unfortunate, and the imprudent are prosperous." And, "Immediately, indeed, they obtained the rewards of brave men, and not long after they became masters of the sea." Another example is, "He sailed indeed through the continent; but walked through the sea.—He joined the Hellespont, but dug through mount Athos." And, "Being citizens by nature, but by law deprived of a city. For some of them, indeed, perished miserably, but others were shamefully preserved." And, "Privately, indeed, they used Barbarian servants, but publicly overlooked many of their allies that were in slavery." And, "To have them when living, or leave them when dead."* Or what a certain person said against Pitholaus and Lycophon in a court of justice, "They sold you, indeed, when they were at home; but when they came to us they were themselves bought." For all these instances make the above-mentioned periodic opposite diction. Diction, however, of this kind is pleasing, because contraries are most known, and when placed by each other are more known; and also because they resemble a syllogism. For an elenchus [or syllogism of contradiction,] is a collection of opposites. A thing, therefore, of this kind is antithesis.

But *adequation* takes place when the colons or members are equal; [as, "The father died in battle, the son was married at home."]

* All the above examples are taken from the Panegyric of Isocrates.

And *assimilation* is, when both the colons have similar extremes. But it is necessary that they should have similar extremes, either in the beginning or the end. And the beginning indeed has always [similar] nouns; but the end has the last syllables similar, or cases of the same noun, or the same noun. In the beginning, indeed, the similar extremes are such as in the following instances. "He received *land* from him, but it was *uncultivated land*." And

Appeas'd with gifts, and mollify'd with words:¹

But the similar extremes in the end are, "They did not think that he had brought forth a boy, but that he was the cause of his birth." "In great cares, and in little hopes." Cases of the same noun, are such as, "But he deserves to have a brazen statue, though he is not worthy of brass, [i. e. of a brazen coin."²] And an instance of the repetition of the same noun is, "You while he was living defamed him, and now he is dead write ill of him." But an instance when there is a similitude alone in the last syllable is, "What evil have you suffered, if you have seen an indolent man?"³ A period also may have all these at once, so as not only to consist

¹ This instance is from the 9th book of the *Iliad*, and is what Phoenix says to Achilles.

² This is said of a most abject man.

³ The instances adduced by Aristotle are obvious in Greek or Latin, but not in English. Thus the first instance, "He received land from him, but it was uncultivated land," is in Latin, "*Agrum accepit quodammodo ægrum,*" hoc est sterilem. And, "They did not think that he had brought forth a boy, but that he was the cause of his birth," is in Latin, "*Non puerum peperisse, sed ejus causam extitisse,*" in which instance the last syllables are similar.

of opposite, but also of equal, and similarly ending colons. The beginnings, however, of periods are nearly [all of them] enumerated in our Theodectean Rhetoric. There are likewise false oppositions, such as Epicharmus made, "Then I was one of them, then I was with them."

CHAPTER X.

THESE things, therefore, being discussed, let us now show whence polite and the most approved diction is derived. To speak politely, therefore, is the province of an ingenious man, or of one who is exercised [in elocution.] But to show [the sources] from whence polite diction is derived belongs to this method, [i. e. to rhetoric.] We shall, therefore, unfold and enumerate what they are.

Another instance is, when the colons end in cases derived from the same noun: as, "He deserves to have a brazen statue, though he is not worthy of brass," i. e. "Est profecto dignus ænea statua, qui non est dignus ære." The fourth instance is, when the same word is repeated, as, "You while he was living, defamed him, and now he is dead write ill of him," i. e. "Tu cum viveret dicebas male, et nunc in eum scribis male." And the fifth instance is, when the similitude is only in the last syllable as, "What evil have you suffered, if you have seen an indolent man?" i. e. "Quodnam passus es malum, si hominem vidisti ignavum?"

Let the beginning, therefore, be this: to learn easily is naturally delightful to all men; but names signify something. Hence such names as cause us to learn, are most pleasing. Foreign tongues, therefore, are unknown; but proper words we know. Metaphor, however, especially causes diction to be polite. For when the poet¹ says that "Old age is stubble," he produces in us learning and knowledge through the genus, [i. e. through the agreement of old age and stubble;] since both produce a defloration. The images, therefore, of poets produce indeed the same thing; and hence, if they are well employed, the diction will appear to be polite. For an image, as we have before observed, is a metaphor, differing from it in the collocation; on which account it is less pleasing because it is a longer [simile;] and it does not say this thing is that. Hence in a metaphor the mind does not investigate the similitude; [i. e. its attention is not diverted from the object to which it is directed.] That diction, therefore, and those enthymemes must necessarily be polite, which cause us to learn or produce in us knowledge rapidly.

Hence, neither are superficial enthymemes approved; (for we call those enthymemes superficial, which are manifest to every one, and which require no investigation) nor such as when produced, are not understood; but those only render the diction polite, which are understood as soon as they are uttered, though there was no previous knowledge of them, or which shortly after lead us to the knowledge of something, of which we were ignorant. For by the latter enthymemes discipline is as

¹ Odyss. lib. 13.

it were produced, but by no means by the former. Enthymemes, therefore, of this kind are approved, from the sense or meaning of the diction.

Urbanity, however, is produced in the figure or form of the diction, if contraries are opposed to contraries, as [in the Oration of Isocrates de Pace,] “And they thought that the *peace* which is common to the other Greeks, was *war* to their own private affairs.” For here war is opposed to peace.

Urbanity also is produced in names or words, if they are metaphorical; and the metaphor is neither foreign, for this is difficult to understand; nor superficial, for this does not affect the hearer. Farther still, urbanity in diction is produced, if the thing itself is placed before the eyes; for it is more necessary to see what has been, than what will be done. It is requisite, therefore, to pay attention to these three things, viz. metaphor, antithesis, and energy.

As, however, there are four kinds of metaphors, those are most approved which subsist according to analogy; as when Pericles said, “That youth perishing in battle was taken away from the city, just as if some one should take away the spring from the year.” And as Leptines said of the Lacedæmonians, “That the Athenians should not suffer Greece to be deprived of its other eye.” Thus too Cephisodotus, when Chares was anxious to give an account of the Olynthiac war, said indignantly, “That while he endeavoured to give the people an account of his conduct, he kept them in a furnace.” And the same person once exhorting the Athenians to forage in Eubœa,

said, "It was necessary that the decree of Miltiades should proceed [to the Euboic expedition.] And Iphicrates, when the Athenians had made a league with Epidaurus, and the sea coast, said indignantly, "That they had deprived themselves of the viatica of war." And Pitholaus, called the Athenian ship which was denominated *Paralus*, the club (ropalon) of the people. He also called Sestus,¹ the granary of the *Pyræum*. Pericles, likewise, exhorted the Athenians to destroy *Ogina*, as the ophthalmy of the *Piræum*. And Meroacles, naming a certain worthy person, said, "That he was in no respect more depraved than this person, for with respect to him, he had taken three per cent. interest, but that he himself had taken ten per cent."² And the iambic of Anaxandrides upon his daughters that were a long time before they married, "The virgins have passed beyond the appointed day of wedlock."³ To these may be added, what Polyæctus said on one Speusippus who was [a restless man and] apoplectic, "That he could not be quiet, though he was bound by fortune in the Pentesyringian⁴ disease." Ceph-

¹ This was a town of the Hellespont, from which every year the Athenians brought a great quantity of corn into the *Pyræum*.

² In order to understand this example, it is requisite to observe, that the word *τετρες* employed here by Aristotle signifies both *usury* and a *son*. The meaning, therefore, of the passage is, that Meroacles, who had ten sons and was accused as a depraved usurer because he had taken ten per cent. annually for the education of his ten sons, named a certain worthy man who had three sons, and took three per cent. annually for their education.

³ This metaphor is taken from a term of law relative to a court of justice, i. e. *intra diem judicii non stetisse*.

⁴ The *Pentesyringus* was an instrument in which there were five holes, and in which the head, arms and feet of defendants were so fixed, that they could not by any means move themselves. Because,

sodotus likewise called *three-banked gallees, various baking-houses.*¹ But the dog [i. e. Diogenes] called *taverns, the Attic Phiditia.*² And Asion said, "That the Athenians had *poured forth* their city into Sicily;" for this is a metaphor, and places the thing before the eyes. Asion adds, ["That the Athenians had so poured forth their city into Sicily,] that Greece vociferated." For this also is after a manner a metaphor, and places the thing before the eyes. Cephisodotus also exhorted the Athenians to beware "That they did not make their assemblies hostile congresses." And Isocrates said, "[That the sophists addressed themselves] to those who *run together* in the public assemblies." And as in the funeral oration [of Lysias,] "It was but just that Greece should cut off her hair on the tomb of those who died at Salamis, because her liberty was buried with their virtue." For if he had said, "That it was but just Greece should weep, in consequence of virtue being buried [with those who died at Salamis,]" it would have been [only] a metaphor, and the thing would have been placed before the eyes. But the words "liberty was buried with virtue," have a certain antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, "The path of my oration is through the midst of the transactions of Chares." For this is a metaphor according to analogy; and the words, "through the midst," place the thing before our eyes. And to say, "To call on dangers to give assistance to dangers,"

therefore, apoplexy renders a man immoveable, Polyuctus called Speusippus *pentesyringus*.

¹ Because as baking-houses supplied the city with bread, so the three-banked gallees supplied it with corn.

² The *Phiditia* were the banquets or suppers of the Lacedæmonians.

is to place the thing before the eyes, and is a metaphor. Another instance is that of Lycoleon in defence of Chabrias, "Neither will you revere his suppliant brazen statue?" For this is a metaphor in the present time, but not always, and places the thing before the eyes. For he being in danger, the statue supplicates for him; and supplication is attributed to an *inanimate* statue, which is the property of an *animated* thing. And, "A monument of the works of the city." And, "They meditated by every possible way to have groveling conceptions." For to meditate is to increase something. And again, "That God enkindled the light of intellect in the soul." For both [light and intellect] accord in illuminating. And, "For we do not dissolve war, but defer it." For both *deferring* and *a peace of this kind* signify something future. And to say, "That the compacts of peace are a trophy much more beautiful than those which are procured in war. For the latter are obtained for things of small consequence, and through one fortune; but the former, for every battle."¹ For both [a trophy and a compact] are indications of victory. And "That cities through the censure of men suffer great punishment."² For punishment is a certain just injury.

¹ This instance is taken from Isocrates in Panegyric concerning the abject manners of the Persians.

² This also is from the Panegyric of Isocrates, where he speaks of the Greeks of his time, who made a peace which was neither firm, nor lasting.

³ This also is from the same oration of Isocrates.

⁴ The analogy here consists in this, that as those who violate the laws suffer a detriment in money, through fine, thus cities when they are badly conducted suffer through censure a detriment in honour.

And thus we have shown how polite diction may be derived from metaphor according to the analogous, and from placing a thing before the eyes.



CHAPTER XI.

LET us now show what we mean by placing a thing before the eyes, and what is to be done in order to effect this. I say then, that those words place a thing before the eyes which signify things energizing. Thus for instance to say "That a good man is a square," is metaphorical; for both a good man and a square are perfect; but it does not signify energy. But to say "Possessing a flourishing acme,"¹ signifies energy. Likewise to say, "But you as liberated," indicates energy. And,

Then with impetuous feet forth rush'd the Greeks.²

Here the word *impetuous* is energy, and a metaphor.³ Thus too energy is every where exhibited by Homer,

¹ Both this and the instance that follows it are taken from Isocrates.

² From the Iphigenia of Euripides.

³ Because it is taken from the energy employed by runners in the act of running.

who speaks of inanimate things as animated, through a metaphor. But to produce energy in every thing [as he does,] is very much applauded; as in the following instances,

Back on the ground then roll'd the shameless stone. ¹

And,

The arrow flew. ²

And,

Longing to strike. ³

And,

Trojan and Grecian darts in earth then stood,
And long'd to gorge themselves with human blood. ⁴

And,

The furious pointed dart then pierc'd his breast. ⁵

For in all these instances, because the things are animated, they appear to energize. For to be *shameless* and *furious*, &c. are energies. But Homer has added these through metaphor from analogy. For as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is an impudent person to him whom he impudently torments. Homer, likewise, in his celebrated

¹ From *Odyss.* 11, where the labour of Sisyphus is described.

² From *Iliad*, 19.

³ This is from the same place as the above, in which Homer attributes to an arrow the vital energy of desiring.

⁴ *Iliad*, 15.

⁵ From the 15th *Iliad*, where Homer, speaking of a dart hurled by Menelaus, ascribes to it fury.

images attributes to inanimate things the proper energies of such as are animated, as,

Th' afflicted deeps tumultuous mix and roar ;
The waves behind impel the waves before,
Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore.¹

For he makes every thing moving and living ; but energy is imitation. Metaphors, however, ought to be derived, as we have before observed, from things familiar and not obvious ; just as in philosophy, it is the province of a sagacious man to survey the similar in things very different from each other, as Archytas says, " That an *arbiter* and an *altar* are the same thing ; for he who is injured flies to both these." Or if some one should say " That an *anchor* and *cremastra* are the same thing,"² For both perform an office which is in a certain respect the same ; but they differ in this, that the one is fixed above, and the other beneath. To say also that cities are anomalous [is another instance of an appropriate metaphor taken from things very dissimilar.] For as a superficies is said to be anomalous because one part rises above another, so a city may be said to be anomalous when some of the citizens in it surpass others in power.

Polite diction, however, is for the most part effected through metaphor and previous deception. For the diction which not only causes us to learn something of which we were before ignorant, but also something about which we had been before deceived, is more polite and

¹ Iliad, 13, The translation by Pope.

² A *cremastra* was a hook fixed in the ceiling of a house so that things might be suspended from it, and it resembled an anchor.

pleasant, since the mind passing from error to truth is delighted, and says to itself, "How true is this which I have learnt! I was in an error." Of apothegms, likewise, those are polite, which imply something different from what the words at first seem to signify; as that apothegm of Stesichorus, "That the grasshoppers would sing to them on the ground."¹ Good enigmas, also, are for the same reason pleasing; for they cause us to learn something, and are metaphorical; and, as Theodorus says, "It is pleasing to say something new." But this is effected, when what is said is paradoxical, and (as he says) is not conformable to prior opinion; but as in ridiculous assertions is slightly transformed. This likewise is capable of being effected by jests, in which the letters of the words are somewhat changed; for these [pleasantly] deceive the hearer. And also in verse; for something is said different from what the hearer expected.

"He walk'd along, with *chilblains* (*χιμειλα*) on his feet." But the hearer expected it would have been said that he had *sandals* (*πεδιλα*) on his feet. This kind of jest, however, ought to be immediately manifest. Paragrams, or jests formed by the mutation of letters are produced, when that is not signified which the word at first sight seemed to signify, as that jest of Theodorus upon Nikon the harper. For [Nikon having been vexed by a certain person,] Theodorus deriding him said *βραττη σε*, which appears as if he had said, "*He dis-*

¹ This was said by Stesichorus of the Locrians, and signified that their country would be so desolate, that no tree would remain, on which the grasshoppers could ascend, so that they would be forced to sing on the ground.

turbs you," θραττει σε, and deceives the hearer. For in reality he said, "He makes you a Thracian."¹ Hence, this is pleasing to him who learns [the true meaning of what is said.] For unless the hearer apprehended that Nicon was a Thracian, the jest would not appear to be polite. Thus, also, to say Βουλει αυτον περσαι, seems at the first view to signify "Are you willing to vex him?" [But the true meaning is, "are you willing to make him a favourer of the Persians, and a betrayer of the Greeks?"]

It is requisite, however, that each sense of the ambiguous word should be adapted to him of whom it is said. Another example is such as the following: "The *arche* of the sea was not to the Athenians the *arche* of evils; for they derived advantage from it."² And as Isocrates says, "The *arche* of the sea was to the city [i. e. to the Athenians] the *arche* of evils." For in both these instances the real meaning is different from what at the first view it appears to be, and the hearer knows that what is asserted is true. For to say that *arche* was *arche*, is to say nothing to the purpose; but this is not what is said in the above instances; nor is that denied which is asserted, but the word has another meaning. In all these instances, however, if the word is appropriately employed, whether it be an homonymous word, or a metaphor, then the diction is proper. As if [the name of some one were Anaschetus (ανασχετος)] and it should be said that *Anaschetus* is not *anaschetus*,

¹ By this he wittily insinuated that the mother of Nicon was a Thracian servant.

² For the word αρχη *arche* signifies both *dominion* and *the beginning*.

[i. e. *importunate* ;] for he who says this, denies the homonymous signification of the word. And this is appropriately effected, if the word is always used twice. Again, "O *hospes* [i. e. guest,] you will not become more *hospes* than is requisite." And, "it is not necessary that hopes should always be hopes." For this also is foreign. The same thing also is effected in the celebrated saying of Anaxandrides, "It is a beautiful thing to die, prior to having done any thing deserving of death." For this is the same thing as to say, "It is worth while to die, when not deserving to die." Or, "It is worth while to die, when not deserving of death, or not doing things worthy of death." The form of diction, therefore, is the same in these instances ; but in proportion as they are shorter, and contain a greater opposition, in such proportion they are more elegant and pleasing. The cause, however, of this is, that we in a greater degree learn something from opposition ; and that this is more rapidly effected by brevity. But it is always necessary that the person should be present on whom the thing is said, or that it should be rightly said, if the assertion is true, and not superficial ; for these two things may exist separately. Thus for instance, to say, "It is necessary to die free from all faults ;" and "It is requisite that a worthy man should marry a worthy woman," [is true,] but is not politely said. But to say, "It is worth while to die, when not deserving to die," is both true, and politely said. The diction, also, will appear to be more polite, the more it contains of those things from which politeness is derived ; as, if the words are metaphorical, and metaphors of such a kind, and if there is antithesis, adequation and energy.

Images, likewise, as we have before observed, are always after a manner approved metaphors; for they are always derived from two things, in the same manner as an analogous metaphor. Thus we say that *a shield is the cup of Mars*, and that *a bow is a stringless harp*. When we thus speak, however, the assertion is not simple. But to say that *a bow is a harp*, or *a shield a cup*, is a simple assertion. They assimilate, however, as follows: as, a player on the flute to an ape; ¹ and a short-sighted man to a trickling lamp; for in both there is a contraction. But images are celebrated when they contain a metaphor. For it is to assimilate, to say that *a shield is the cup of Mars*; that *a ruinous building is a worn-out garment*; and that *Niceratus*, according to the assimilation of Thrasymachus, *was Philoctetes bit by* [the poet] *Pratys*. For Thrasymachus said this, in consequence of seeing Niceratus vanquished by Pratys in a poetical contest, and through this neglecting his person. In these similitudes, however, poets fail unless they are proper, even if they are celebrated. I mean, for instance, when they say,

He carries legs like parsley bent,

And,

As Philammon with Corycus ² yok'd
In contest.

¹ For apes sit in a contracted posture with their hands on their mouth; and players on the flute, while they inflate it, seem to imitate apes.

² Philammon and Corycus were two athletes, neither of whom was easily vanquished by the other. The similitude, however, is

And all such things are images. But that images are metaphors, has been frequently observed by us.

Proverbs likewise are metaphors from species to species [i. e. in which one species is predicated of another on account of agreement in the same genus.] Thus of him who expects to derive advantage from a certain thing, if he should afterwards suffer a loss from it, it is said, *as the Carpathian the hare.*¹ For both suffered the evil we have mentioned. And thus we have nearly assigned the cause whence and why diction is polite.

Celebrated hyperboles also are metaphors; as of one who had contusions on his face, "You would have thought him to be a basket of mulberries;" for the part under the eyes is red; but this hyperbole is much too great. An hyperbole, however, may differ from an hyperbole in the diction; as, instead of saying "Philammon yoked in contest with Corycus," it might be said, "You would have thought it was Philammon fighting with Corycus." And instead of saying, "He carried legs as distorted as parsley," it might be said, "I should have thought that he had not legs but parsley, they are so distorted." Hyperboles, however, are puerile; for they

unapt, through which two athletæ contending with each other with equal powers are compared to two oxen drawing the same yoke. In the Oxford edition it is *τη κορυνη* instead of *τη Κορυνη*, as if Philammon was yoked in contest with a kind of ball, instead of being yoked with *Corycus*.

¹ We are informed by Pollux (lib. 1.) that once there were no hares in the island Carpathus, and that the Carpathians, finding that animal was very good food, brought a male and female hare into their island. Because, however, hares are very prolific, they mul-

indicate a vehement [motion of the soul.] Hence, they are especially used by those who are angry. [Thus Achilles, in Iliad 9, speaks hyperbolically, when he says he is not to be appeased by the gifts of Agamemnon,]

Tho' bribes were heap'd on bribes in number more,
Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore.

And,

Atrides' daughter never shall be led,
An ill-match'd consort to Achilles' bed ;
Like golden Venus though she charm'd the heart,
Or vied with Pallas in the works of art.

The Attic rhetoricians, also, especially use hyperboles ; on which account it is unbecoming in an old man to speak hyperbolically.

CHAPTER XII.

IT is however requisite not to be ignorant that a different diction is adapted to each genus of orations. For

tiplied so exceedingly in a short time, as to destroy all the fruits of the land to the great detriment of the Carpathians. Hence, it came to be said proverbially of all those who suffered a loss from any thing from which they expected to derive advantage, *As the Carpathian the hare.*

graphic and *agonistic* diction [i. e. the diction employed in *writing* and *at the bar*] are not the same; nor forensic, and that which is employed in popular harangues.

But it is necessary to know both these kinds of diction. For to know the one, is to know how to speak properly; and by a knowledge of the other, we are not compelled to be silent, when we wish to impart something to others, which those suffer who do not know how to write. But *graphic* diction, or the diction pertaining to writing, is indeed most accurate; but the *agonistic*, or that which belongs to the bar, is most adapted to action. Of this latter, however, there are two species; one ethical, but the other pathetic. Hence, also, players chuse dramas of this kind, and poets chuse such like players [to act their fables.] Those poets, likewise, are most approved, whose fables delight, not only when acted, but also when read; such as those of Chæremon, whose diction is as accurate as that of any writer of orations; and among the dithyrambic poets, those of Licymnicus. When orations also are compared with each other, those which are written, will appear when recited in forensic contests to be jejune. On the other hand, those orations which when publicly delivered are heard with applause, if they are perused when written, will appear to be unpolished and inaccurate; the reason of which is, that they are [merely] adapted to forensic contests. Hence, those which are adapted to action, when deprived of action, in consequence of not accomplishing their proper work appear to be jejune. Thus, for instance, disjointed sentences, and frequent repetition, are rightly rejected in the diction pertaining to writing; but

rhetoricians use these in the diction which belongs to the bar ; for both these are adapted to action. This repetition, however, ought to be delivered with a change of the voice ; which as it were prepares the way for action ; as, “ He it is who robbed you ; he it is who deceived you ; he it is who at last endeavoured to betray you ;” as Philemon the player also did, whilst he acted in the *Geronotomaria* of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak ; and also in the prologue of the play called *the Pious*, where *I* is frequently repeated. For if such repetitions are not accompanied with action, the actor [according to the proverb,] will seem to carry a beam. The like also must be observed with respect to disjointed sentences ; such as, *I came, I met him, I requested him*. For it is necessary that these should be accompanied with action, and not, as if only one thing was said, pronounced with the same manner, and the same tone of voice. Farther still, disjointed diction possesses something peculiar ; since in an equal time many things appear to be said. For the conjunction [or connective copula] causes many things to be one ; so that if it is taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one thing will be many. Hence, he amplifies who says, “ I came, I spoke to him, I supplicated him much ; but he seems to despise whatever I have said, whatever I do say.” Homer also intends to do this, when speaking of Nireus [in the 2d book of the *Iliad*,] he says,

Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore,
Nireus, whom Aglæe to Charopus bore,
Nireus, in faultless shape and blooming grace,
The loveliest youth of all the Grecian race.

For he, of whom many things are said, must necessarily

be frequently mentioned. If, therefore, he is frequently mentioned, many things also appear to be said of him. Hence Homer, though he has only mentioned Nireus in one place, amplifies from paralogism,¹ and mentions him here, though he did not intend to mention him in any other place afterwards.

The diction therefore adapted to popular harangues perfectly resembles *sciagraphy*; ² for the greater the number of the spectators, the more remotely is such a picture to be seen. Hence, in both accuracy is superfluous, and both become worse through it. But judicial diction is more accurate; and it is requisite that the diction should be still more accurate, which is addressed to one judge; for this is the least thing in rhetorical diction. For that which is appropriate to, and that which is foreign from a thing, are more easily perceived. In this case, also, contention is absent; so that the judgment is pure. Hence, the same rhetoricians are not celebrated in all these kinds of diction; but where action is especially necessary, there accuracy is in the smallest degree requisite. And where voice, and especially a loud one is required, there action is necessary.

¹ Homer, by thrice repeating the name of Nireus, causes us to think that much will be said of him in the Iliad, and therefore by this repetition, though he no where else mentions him in the whole Iliad, yet he so impresses the name and renown of Nireus on the memory of the reader, as if much would be said of him.

² *Sciagraphy* was by the Greeks denominated a picture, which is only adumbrated and not coloured. Pictures of this kind, when seen at a great distance, seem to be perfected, but if inspected when near, they then appear to be only, what they are in reality, adumbrated.

Demonstrative diction, therefore, is most proper for writing; for demonstrative orations are composed in order that they may be read. But judicial diction is the next in order. It is however superfluous to divide diction into the pleasing and magnificent. For why may it not as well be divided into the temperate and liberal, or into any other ethical virtues. For it is evident that the particulars already mentioned will render it pleasing, if the virtue of diction has been rightly defined by us. For why ought it to be perspicuous, and not abject, but decorous? since it will not be perspicuous either if it be verbose, or concise; but it is evident that the medium between these is appropriate. The particulars, also, before-mentioned, render diction pleasing, if usual and foreign words are well mingled together, and likewise rythm, and that which is calculated to persuade from the decorous. And thus much concerning diction, as well in common about every, as in particular about each genus.



CHAPTER XIII.

It now remains that we should speak concerning the order of diction. But there are two parts of an oration; for it is necessary to speak of the thing which is the sub-

ject of discussion, and then to demonstrate. Hence, it is impossible for him who narrates a thing not to demonstrate, or that he should demonstrate without previous narration. For he who demonstrates, demonstrates something, and he who propounds, propounds for the sake of demonstrating. Of these [necessary parts] of an oration, however, the one is the proposition, but the other the confirmation; in the same manner as in the sciences, one thing is a problem, but another a demonstration. But the division which rhetoricians now make is ridiculous. For narration belongs to a forensic oration. But in the demonstrative and deliberative genus, how can there be an oration such as they say there is, or those things which are urged against the opponent? Or how can there be a peroration of things demonstrative? The proem, however, the comparison, and the repetition, then take place in orations to the people, when there is altercation; (for in these there is frequently accusation and defence;) but not so far as there is consultation in these. But neither does peroration belong to every forensic oration; for it is not requisite, when the oration is short, or the thing can easily be remembered; since in this peroration it would happen that something would be taken away from the length of such an oration. The necessary parts of an oration, therefore, are proposition and proof.

And these, indeed, are proper or peculiar parts. But the most numerous parts of an oration are, the proem, the proposition, proof, and peroration. For what is said against the opponent, pertains to proof; and the comparison is an amplification of our arguments, so that it is a certain part of the proof; for he demonstrates some-

thing who does this. Neither the proem, however, nor the peroration is a part of the proof; but each is subservient to recollection. If, therefore, any one makes a division of things of this kind, like the followers of Theodorus, narration, pre-narration, supernarration, confutation and superconfutation, will be different from each other. It is necessary, however, that he who speaks of a certain species and difference of a thing, should give a name to it; for if not, it will become vain and nugatory. And this fault of needlessly introducing new names was committed by Lycimnius in his Art of Rhetoric, when he speaks of irruption, aberration, and ramification.



CHAPTER XIV.

THE proem, therefore, is the beginning of an oration; which in [dramatic] poetry is the prologue; and in playing on the pipe the prelude. For all these are principles or beginnings, and as it were preparatory to what follows. And the prelude, indeed, is similar to the proem of the demonstrative kind of orations. For as those that play on the pipe connect the prelude with the beginning of the song; thus, also, in demonstrative orations, immediately after the orator has mentioned what

he wishes to say, it is necessary to collect aptly with it what is to follow; of which all rhetoricians adduce as an example, the proem of Isocrates in his oration in praise of Helen. For Isocrates begins his encomium with blaming the sophists, which has nothing in common with the praise of Helen; and yet because he has aptly conjoined it with the argument, he has obtained praise. But the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from praise or blame; as in the proem of Gorgias to his Olympiac oration, "O Greeks, this is a thing worthy of general admiration." For he praises those who instituted the public spectacles. Isocrates on the contrary blames them, "Because they honoured indeed with gifts the virtues of the body; but appointed no reward for wise men." The proems also of demonstrative orations are derived from counsel and advice, such for instance as, "That it is requisite to honour good men; on which account he [the orator] has undertaken to praise Aristides." Or [as he who wrote an oration in praise of Paris;] for he says "That it is neither requisite to praise those who are celebrated, nor those who are of no account, but those who are good, and at the same time obscure men, such as was Paris the son of Priam." For he [who thus begins his oration] is one that gives counsel. Farther still, the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from forensic proems; but this is from things pertaining to the hearer, if the oration is concerning something paradoxical, or difficult, or much celebrated, so as to require pardon from the auditors; such for instance as the proem of Chœrilus, "But now since all things are divulged." The proems, therefore, of demonstrative orations are derived from these things; viz. from praise and blame; from exhortation

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and dissuasion, and from those things which are referred to the hearer. It is necessary, however, that the proems should either be foreign, or appropriate to the oration.

With respect to proems of the forensic kind, it is necessary to assume, that they are able to effect the same thing as the prologues of dramatic, and the proems of epic poems. For dithyrambic proems are similar to those of the demonstrative kind; as, "On account of thee, and thy gifts or spoils." But in dramatic and epic poems, the proems are a specimen of what is to follow, that the reader may foresee what the subject of them is, and that his mind may not be kept in suspense. For that which is indefinite causes the mind to wander. The poet, therefore, who delivers into the hands of the reader the beginning of his poem, makes him follow with attention the rest of it. Hence, Homer,

The wrath of Peleus' son, O goddess, sing.

And,

*The man for wisdom's various arts renown'd,
Long exercis'd in woes, O Muse, resound.*

And another poet,

*Again, O Muse, inspire my verse, and sing
How from the Asian land a mighty war
Spread over Europe.*

Tragic poets also indicate respecting the drama, though not immediately, as Euripides does, yet they indicate what it is in the prologue, as Sophocles [in the *Œdipus*,]

Polybius was my father.

And after the same manner Comic poets. The most necessary and proper office, therefore, of a proem is this, to unfold the end for the sake of which the oration was composed ; on which account, if the end is manifest, and the subject matter is trifling, the proem must be omitted. Other species of proems, however, which are used by orators, are remedies, and things of a common nature. And these are derived from the speaker and the hearer, from the subject matter, and from the opponent. From the orator, therefore, and the opponent, those proems are derived which pertain to the dissolving or making an accusation. But these must not be similarly employed [by the plaintiff and defendant]. For by the defendant, what pertains to accusation must be introduced in the beginning, but by the plaintiff at the end, of the oration. But for what reason, it is not immanifest. For it is necessary that the defendant, when he is about to introduce himself, should remove all impediments, so that he must dissolve the accusation at the beginning of his speech ; but the opponent should be criminated by the plaintiff at the end, in order that the hearers may remember the better. What, however, pertains to the auditor consists in rendering him benevolent to the orator, and enraged with the opponent. Sometimes, also, it is advantageous to the cause, that the auditor should be attentive, and sometimes that he should not ; for it is not always beneficial to render him attentive. Hence, many orators endeavour to excite laughter in their hearers. A summary account of a thing also contributes to celerity of apprehension ; and this is likewise effected by the orator's appearing to be a worthy man. For the audience are more attentive to men of this description. But they are attentive to great things,

to things pertaining to themselves, to admirable, and to delightful things. Hence, it is necessary to inform the audience that the oration will be concerning things of this kind. On the contrary, if the orator wishes the audience not to be attentive to the cause, he must say that the subject matter is a thing of small consequence, that it does not pertain to them, and that it is a troublesome affair. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that all such things are foreign to the oration; for they pertain to a depraved hearer, and to one who attends to what is foreign to the purpose. For if he were not a person of this description, there would be no occasion for a proem, except so far as it is requisite to give a summary account of the affair, in order that the oration, as a body, may have a head. Farther still, to render the audience attentive, if it should be requisite, is common to all the parts of an oration; because universally the audience are less attentive to what is said in the progress, than in the beginning of the oration. Hence it is ridiculous to endeavour to procure attention in the beginning of the oration, because then all the hearers are especially attentive. Hence, attention is to be procured wherever occasion offers; [by saying, for instance] "Give me your attention; for this business is not more mine than yours." And, "I will relate to you a transaction of such a nature, that you have never heard of any thing so dreadful, or so admirable." But this is, as Prodicus says, when the audience are drowsy, to promise to say something to them from his demonstration, estimated at fifty drachms.¹ It is evident, however, that the proem is referred to the

¹ Prodicus boasted that he had a demonstration which would render those who used it victorious in all causes, and he was accustomed to teach it for fifty drachms.

auditor, not so far as he is an auditor; for all orators in the proems either criminate, or dissolve fear; as [from the *Antigone* of Sophocles,] “I will tell, O king, though it was not my intention to have come hither as a messenger.” And [from the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides,] “Why do you preface?” A proem also is necessary when the cause is bad, or appears to be bad; for in this case it is better to discuss any thing else than to dwell upon the cause. Hence, servants do not [directly] reply to the question they are asked, but their answer is circuitous and prefatory. But we have shown whence it is requisite to render the audience benevolent, and have explained every thing else of this kind. Since, however, it is well said [by Ulysses to Minerva, in *Odyss.* 14,] “Give me as a friend, and a man to be pitied, to reach Phœacia’s land,” it is necessary to pay attention to these two things.¹ But in proems of the demonstrative kind, it is necessary to make the auditor fancy, that either himself, or his race, or his pursuits, or something else belonging to him, is praised together with the person who is the subject of the oration. For what Socrates says in the *Menexemus* of Plato, is true, “That it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians, but among the Lacedæmonians.” But the proems of popular orations are derived from those of the forensic kind; for these have not naturally any themselves; since the audience are well acquainted with the subject. And the thing itself is not in want of any proem, but a proem is here requisite either on account of the orator or the opponents, or if the audience should not think the affair

¹ viz. That the defendant may appear to be a good man, and to deserve commiseration.

of just so much consequence as it is, but of greater or less consequence. Hence it is necessary either to criminate the opponent, or to dissolve the accusations against him, and either to amplify or diminish the affair. But for the sake of these things a proem is requisite. Or a proem is necessary for the sake of ornament; since without this the oration will appear to be carelessly composed. And such is the encomium of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any previous extension and graceful movement of his arms [like the Athletæ before they engage,] he immediately begins, "Elis, a happy city."

CHAPTER XV.

WITH respect, however, to the dissolution of crimes objected by the opponent, one mode is derived from those things through which the ill opinion of the audience may be removed; for it makes no difference whether this opinion arises from what is said, or not; so that this mode is universal. Another mode consists in obviating such particulars as are dubious, either by showing that the thing which is the subject of doubt does not exist, or that it is not noxious, or that it is not noxious to this person, or that it is not so pernicious [as the opponent contends it to be,] or that it is not unjust, or that it is not greatly so, or that it is not disgraceful, or that it is a thing of small consequence. For things of this kind are the sub-

jects of contention. And this mode was adopted by Iphicrates against Nausicrates. For he confessed that he did what he was accused by Nausicrates of having done, and that he did harm to the person, but did not act unjustly. Or he that has injured another, may say that he has made him a compensation ; so that if what he did was noxious, yet it was beautifully done ; if painful, yet it was beneficial ; or something else of the like kind may be said. Another mode consists in showing that the deed [which is objected to as a crime] was an error, or happened from misfortune, or from necessity. Thus Sophocles said, " That he trembled, not, as his accuser said, that he might seem to be an old man, but from necessity ; for he was not willingly eighty years of age." An excuse also may be made by asserting that the deed was not done with a view to that end it is said to have been done by the opponent. Thus he who is accused of having injured another person may say, " That it was not his intention to injure him, but that the injury was accidental. And that it would be just to hate him, if the injury had been done by him voluntarily. Another mode consists in considering whether the opponent himself, or some of his kindred, have now, or formerly, been involved in the crime which he objects to the defendant. Another mode consists in showing that those also are involved in the crime, whom the opponent confesses not to be obnoxious to the accusation ; as, if the opponent should confess that this man, though he is an adulterer, is pure in his conduct, then this and this man also will be pure. Another mode consists in showing that if the opponent has accused others falsely before, it is probable that he now falsely accuses the defendant. Or if it is shown that those who are now accused, have been at

another time falsely accused ; for then it is probable that now also they are falsely accused. In order, likewise, to remove a bad opinion, it may be said, that the same persons, who at another time have been suspected of a crime, though no one has accused them, have been found to be innocent. Another mode consists in reciprocally criminating the accuser ; for if the accuser is unworthy of belief, it is absurd that his assertions should be credible. Another mode consists in showing that the present cause has been decided before ; as Euripides does in the action against Hygiænontes, which is called *antidosis*, who accused him as an impious person. For when he objected to Euripides, that in that verse of his,

The tongue has sworn, but unsworn is the mind,

he persuaded men to perjure themselves, Euripides replied, " That his accuser acted unjustly, in bringing decisions into a court of justice, which had formerly been made in the contest pertaining to Bacchus ; for in that tribunal, he had defended the verse, and would again defend it, if he was willing to accuse him in that place." Another mode consists in reprobating false accusations, and in showing how great an evil calumny is, and that it is also attended with the evil of producing other judicial processes.

The place, however, which is derived from symbols, is common to both [i. e. to him who accuses, and to the crimination.] Thus Ulysses [in the tragedy called *Teucer*,] " accuses Teucer [as the friend of the Trojans,] because he was allied to Priam." For Hesione [the mother of Teucer,] was the sister of Priam. But

Teucer replied, "That his father Telamon was an enemy to Priam; and that he (Teucer) did not discover to the Trojans the spies which the Greeks sent to Troy." Another place pertains to the accuser, and consists in praising in a small degree, in order to blame afterwards more copiously; and if the opponent has performed any great deed, to mention it concisely; or having enumerated many of his good deeds, [which do not pertain to the cause,] to blame one of his actions, which does pertain to it. But accusers of this kind are most artificial and unjust; for they endeavour to injure by good deeds, mingling them with one evil deed. It is common, however, to the accuser, and to him who dissolves the crime, since it is possible that the same thing may have been done for the sake of many things,—it is common to the accuser indeed, to represent the affair in the worst, but to him who dissolves the crime, to represent it in the best point of view. Thus it may be said, "That Diomed preferred Ulysses [as his associate in the night adventure in Iliad 10,] because he thought Ulysses to be the best of the Greeks." Or it may be said, "That he did not prefer him for this reason, but because he alone was not his antagonist, as being a man of no consequence." And thus much concerning accusation.

CHAPTER XVI.

BUT narration in demonstrative orations, is not continued, but distinguished into parts. For it is necessary [in demonstrative orations] to enumerate those actions, from which the oration is composed. For an oration of this kind is composed, so as to be partly inartificial (since the orator is not the cause of any of the actions,) and partly artificial. This, however, consists in showing, either that the thing is, if it is incredible, or what the quality, or quantity of it is, or in exhibiting all these. On this account, sometimes it is not requisite to narrate every thing, because thus to demonstrate is adverse to facility of remembrance. [Thus, for instance, it may be said,] "That from these things it appears that he is a brave man; but from those, a wise, or just man." And the one oration is more simple, [i. e. the oration in which every thing is narrated in a continued series without any confirmation and amplification;] but the other [in which there is confirmation and amplification,] is various and not elaborate. It is necessary, however, to call to mind things and persons known and celebrated; on which account the greater part of celebrated persons and things do not require narration; as if, for instance, you should be willing to praise Achilles; for all men are acquainted with his actions; but it is requi-

site to make use of these actions. But if you were willing to praise Critias, narration is necessary; for he is not known by many persons.

At present, however, rhetoricians ridiculously say that narration should be rapid; though what a certain person said in reply to a baker, who asked, "whether he wished that he should make soft or hard bread," may be applied to these. For his answer was, "Is it not possible to make good bread, so that it may be neither hard nor soft, but of a moderate condition?" For it is requisite neither to make a long narration, as neither is it necessary to make a long exordium, nor to dwell on the credibility of what is narrated; since here also propriety consists neither in rapidity, nor conciseness, but in mediocrity. But this is effected by narrating such things as render the affair manifest; or such things as induce the audience to believe that the thing has been done, or that the person has been hurt, or the injury has been committed, or that the transactions were of that magnitude which the orator wishes the hearers to believe they were. Things, however, of a nature contrary to these are to be adduced by the opponent. The orator, likewise, should insert in his narration such things as pertain to his own virtue; such as, "But I always admonished him to act justly, and not to desert his children."¹ Or he should insert in his narration such things as pertain to the depravity of another person; [as in the above instance.] "But he answered me, that wherever he was he should have other children," which Herodotus [in

¹ This is supposed to be said by an orator against some one who had deserted his children.

Euterpe] says, was the answer of the Egyptians, when they revolted from their king. Or he should insert such things as are pleasing to the judges. To the defendant, however, narration is less necessary; but the subjects of controversies are, whether a thing has been done or not, whether it is detrimental or not, whether it is unjust or not, and whether it is a thing of so much consequence or not. Hence, the defendant must not dwell upon a thing that is acknowledged, unless something is said in opposition to his statement of the affair. For then he must show, that admitting the thing to have been done, yet it was not unjust. Farther still, it is necessary to narrate things which have not been done, as if they had been done, if they are calculated to produce commiseration or indignation. Examples of this are, the fabulous narration of Ulysses to Alcinous, and again to Penelope, which is effected in thirty verses. Another example is that of Phayllus, [who contracted a very long poem which was called] the circle, and also the prologue of Euripides in his *Æneus*. But it is necessary that the narration should be ethical; and this will be effected, if we know what produces manners. One thing, therefore, which produces them is, a manifestation of deliberate choice; and manners are good or bad from the quality which they possess. But deliberate choice is such as it is from the end. On this account mathematical discussions are not ethical, because they do not contain in themselves deliberate choice; for they have not that for the sake of which a thing is done [i. e. they do not consider the end;] but this is the business of Socratic discussions; for these consider things of this kind. The oration also expresses manners, which exhibits such things as are consequent to manners; such as, "That

at the same time he said these things, he went away ;” for this manifests audacity, and rusticity of manners. The oration likewise is rendered ethical by not speaking as if from a syllogistic process, like rhetoricians of the present day, but as if from deliberate intention ; as, “ I have wished,” and, “ For this was the object of my deliberate choice ; since, though I should desire no emolument from it, it is a better thing.” For the one [i. e. to speak as if from a syllogistic process] is the province of a prudent man ; but the other, [i. e. to speak from deliberate intention,] is the province of a good man. For it belongs to a prudent man to pursue what is beneficial, but to a good man to pursue what is beautiful in conduct. If, however, what you narrate is incredible, then the cause is to be explained ; an example of which is from the *Antigone* of Sophocles, “ That she was more anxiously concerned for her brother, than for her husband or children ; for she might repair the loss of her husband and children [by marrying again ;] but her mother and father having descended to Hades, she could never have another brother.” But if you cannot assign the cause, you may say, “ That you are not ignorant you relate what is incredible, but that you are naturally disposed not to admit any thing disgraceful.” For mankind do not believe that any action is performed willingly, except it is advantageous. Again, that the narration may be ethical, it is requisite that it should be pathetic ; and this is effected by relating such things as are consequent to the passions, which are known to the audience, and which particularly relate either to the orator, or his opponent ; as, “ But he departed looking after me ;” and as *Æschines* says of *Cratylus*, “ That he hissed, and clapped with his hands.” For these things are

adapted to persuade ; because these things which the audience know, are symbols of what they do not know. ¹ Many things also of this kind may be assumed from Homer ; as [in *Odyss.* 19.]

Then o'er her face the beldam spread her hands.

For those who begin to weep, cover their eyes with their hands. In the beginning of the oration, likewise, you should introduce yourself as a worthy, [and your opponent as an unworthy] man, that the audience may survey you and your opponent as such. But this should be done latently. And that this may be easily accomplished may be seen from those who announce any thing to us ; for concerning things of which we know nothing, we at the same time form a certain opinion [of their truth or falsehood.] In many places, however, it is necessary to narrate, and sometimes not in the beginning of the oration.

But in a popular oration, there is no need of narration, because no one makes a narration of future events. If, however, there should happen to be a narration in it, it will be of past events, in order that by recalling them into the memory, there may be a better consultation about such as are future, either employing on this occasion accusation or praise ; but then he who does this, will not perform the office of a counsellor. If, however, that which is narrated is incredible, then you ought to pro-

¹ For since the audience know that it is the province of an impudent man to hiss and clap with his hands, the orator by narrating these things persuades them that he who thus acted was an impudent man, of which perhaps they were ignorant.

mise the audience, that you will immediately assign the cause of it, and leave it to the audience to believe or not, as they please. Thus Iocasta in the *Œdipus*, of Carcinus, when she says something incredible in answer to him who asks her concerning his son, always promises [that she would prove the truth of what she had said.] And the *Æmon* of Sophocles [employs the same art.]



CHAPTER XVII.

IT is necessary, however, that credibility should be demonstrative. But it is requisite to demonstrate (since controversy is respecting four things) by adducing a demonstration of the controverted subject. Thus for instance, if it is controverted whether a thing has been done, it is especially necessary in a judicial process to give a demonstration of this; or if it is controverted whether this man has been injured, or whether he has been injured to the extent alleged, or whether justly or not. And in a similar manner of the existence of the thing controverted. Nor must we be ignorant that in this controversy alone, one of the persons must necessarily be deprived; for here ignorance is not the cause, as if certain persons were disputing about justice; so that this controversy but not others must be diligently discussed. But

in demonstrative orations the amplification will for the most part consist in showing that actions have been beautiful and beneficial ; for it is necessary to believe in facts. For demonstrations are seldom given of these things unless they are incredible, or another person is supposed to be the cause of them. In popular orations, however, it may be contended that a thing will not be ; or that what is advised will take place, but that it is not just ; or that it is not beneficial, or that it is not of such great consequence. It is likewise necessary to see whether the opponent has asserted any thing false, which does not pertain to the cause ; since from this, as from a sign, it may be inferred that he has also spoken falsely in other things.

Examples, however, are indeed most adapted to popular orations ; but enthymemes to judicial orations. For the former are conversant with the future ; so that examples must necessarily be derived from past events. But judicial orations are conversant with things which exist, or do not exist, in which there is in a greater degree demonstration and necessity. For that which has been done is attended with necessity. Enthymemes, however, must not be adduced in a continued series, but must be mingled [with other things more pleasant and easy ;] since if this is not done, they will be detrimental to each other ; for there is a boundary of quantity. [Hence, in Homer, in *Odys.* 4., Menelaus praises Pisistratus, the son of Nestor, for the mediocrity of his speech.] “ Dear youth, you have said just as much as a wise man would have said.” For he does not praise him that he said *such* things, *but so much and no more*. Nor must enthymemes be investigated in every subject ; for if this [precept] is not observed, you will do that which some of those who philosophise

do, who syllogistically collect things more known and credible, than the propositions from which they are deduced. When, likewise, you wish to excite the passions, do not introduce an enthymeme [i. e. abstain from argument ;] for the enthymeme will either expel the passion, or will be introduced in vain. For motions which exist at one and the same time expel each other, and either destroy themselves, or become imbecile. Nor when the oration is ethical is it proper at the same time to search for any enthymeme ; for demonstration has neither the power of expressing manners, nor deliberate choice. Sentences, however, must be used both in narration and confirmation ; for they are ethical ; as, “ And I indeed entrusted him with this, though I knew that it was not proper to believe in any man.” But if you wish to speak pathetically, you may say, “ And I do not repent though I have been injured ; for gain is with him, but justice with me.” It is not without reason, however, that popular orations are more difficult than such as are judicial ; because they are conversant with the future ; but the judicial are conversant with the past, which is scientifically known to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said. For he did not predict about future events, but about such past events as were immanifest. And the law is an hypothesis in judicial orations ; but he who possesses the principle, can more easily discover the demonstration. Popular orations, likewise, have not many digressions ; such for instance as, a digression to the opponent, either respecting himself, or which may produce the pathetic ; but such orations admit these, the least of all things, unless they depart from their proper employment. It is requisite, therefore, that he should digress, who is in want of arguments ; and this method is adopted by the

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Athenian rhetoricians, and also by Isocrates. For giving counsel he accuses the Lacedæmonians, in his Panegyric; but in his oration concerning Peace, he accuses Chares. In demonstrative orations, however, it is requisite to insert praise as an episode, as Isocrates does; for he always introduces something which he may praise. And Gorgias employed the same art, who said, "That he should never be in want of an oration." For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, afterwards Æacus, and afterwards the God [i. e. Jupiter, the great-grandfather of Achilles.] In a similar manner he praises the fortitude of Achilles. He, therefore, who has demonstrations, may speak both ethically and demonstratively. But if you have not enthymemes, you may speak ethically. And it is more adapted to a worthy man that he should appear to be a good man, than that he should deliver an accurate oration. Of enthymemes, however, those which are adapted to confutation are more approved, than those which are demonstrative; because such things as produce confutation are evidently more syllogistic; for contraries when placed by each other become more known.

Arguments, however, which are employed against the opponent are not specifically different [from those which we employ in our own defence;] but it pertains to credibility, to dissolve some things by objection, and others by syllogism. It is also necessary both in consultation and in a judicial process, that he who first pleads his cause, should in the first place confirm his cause, but afterwards should dissolve or extenuate the arguments contrary to his own. But if the opposing arguments are many, these must be first confuted, as Callistratus did in

the Messeniæc assembly; for he first refuted what his adversaries could say, and then said what conduced to his own cause. He, however, who speaks in the second place, ought first to encounter the reasoning of his adversary, dissolving it, and syllogizing in opposition to it, and especially if the arguments of his opponent have been approved. For as the soul is not favourably disposed towards those who have been already accused of crimes, after the same manner neither does it willingly attend to an oration, if the opponent appears to have spoken well. In order to prepare the mind of the auditor, therefore, to hear an oration, it is necessary first to show that what the opponent has said is false. Hence, the orator must fight against either all the arguments of his opponent, or the greatest of them, or those which are most approved, or those which may be easily confuted, and thus render his own arguments credible. [Thus Hecuba in Euripides,]

But first the goddesses I will assist;
For Juno, &c.

For here Hecuba first confutes what was most infirm.
And thus much concerning confirmation.

But with respect to manners, since for a man to say certain things about himself, is either invidious, or is attended with circumlocution or contradiction; and to speak of another person is attended either with slander or rusticity;—hence, it is necessary to introduce another person speaking, as Isocrates does in his oration against Philip, and in his Antidosis; and as Archilochus blames. For he makes the father [Lycambes] say concerning his daughter, in an Iambic verse, “There is no-

thing which may not be expected to be done, and nothing which will not be sworn to, through money." And in another Iambic, the beginning of which is, "I care not for the riches of Gyges," he introduces Charon the artist speaking. Thus, also, Æmon [the son of Creon, and the husband of Antigone,] in Sophocles, while he supplicates his father Creon for the life of Antigone, commemorates the praises of Antigone not from his own proper, but from another person. It is necessary also to change enthymemes, and sometimes to change them into sentences; as, "It is requisite that those who are intelligent should form compacts with enemies, when they are in prosperity; for thus they will be attended with the greatest advantage." But this is done enthymematically as follows: "For if it is then requisite to form compacts, when they are most useful, and replete with the most advantageous conditions, it is also necessary that they should be made in prosperity."

CHAPTER XVIII.

WITH respect to interrogation, it is then especially seasonable to employ it, when something is said by the opponent of such a nature, that by the addition of one interrogation, an absurdity will ensue. Thus Pericles

asked Lampo concerning the mysteries of Ceres, who was called the saviour goddess ; but Lampo replied, " That it was unlawful for one who was uninitiated to hear them related." Pericles, however, again asked him, " If he knew these mysteries?" And Lampo replying that he did, " And how is this possible, said Pericles, since you are uninitiated?" In the second place, it is seasonable to employ interrogation, when one of the premises [from which something follows favourable to our cause] is perspicuous, but the other will be evidently granted by the opponent ; for then it is requisite to interrogate concerning such premise, and immediately conclude, without interrogating concerning the other premise, which is perspicuous. Thus Socrates when Melitus accused him of not believing there were Gods, asked him whether he thought there was any such thing as a dæmoniacal nature ; and when Melitus acknowledged that he did, Socrates also asked him, whether dæmons were not either the sons of the Gods, or something divine. But Melitus granting that they were, Is it possible, therefore, said Socrates, that any one can believe that there are sons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? Farther still, interrogation may likewise be seasonably employed, when we wish to show that the opponent contradicts himself, or asserts something paradoxical. In the fourth place, it may be opportunely employed, when the opponent can only answer to what is said sophistically, by asserting that a certain thing is and is not, or partly is, and partly is not, or in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not ; for the auditors are disturbed by such answers, and are dubious as to their meaning. When, however, none of the above-mentioned opportunities occur, interrogation must not be employed ; for if it

should happen that the opponent answers properly, and eludes the interrogation, he who interrogates will appear to be vanquished. For many questions must not be asked on account of the imbecility of [the mind of] the auditor. Hence, it is especially necessary that enthymemes should be contracted.

It is likewise requisite to reply to ambiguous questions, by logically dividing, and not speaking concisely. But to things apparently true, a solution must immediately be given with the answer, before the opponent can add a second interrogation, or syllogize. For it is not difficult to foresee what he wishes to infer. This, however, and the solutions, [i. e. the mode of avoiding and solving captious interrogations,] will be manifest to us from the Topics. If the question, also, of the opponent produces a conclusion [against us,] it will be opportune in the answer to assign the cause why it does so. Thus, Sophocles being asked by Pisander, whether he was of the opinion of the other senators that a dominion of forty persons should be established? he replied that he was. And when he was again asked, "Does not this appear to you to be a base thing?" he said, "It does." "Have you therefore, Pisander replied, given your assent to this base deed?" "I have, said Sophocles, for no better measure could be adopted." Thus, too, that Lacon [who had been an Ephorus, or senator,] when he was desired to give an account of his conduct while he was in administration, was asked by some one, "Whether his colleagues appeared to him to have been justly condemned?" he replied they did." But the other then said, "Did not you also decree the same things together with them?" He acknowledged that he did. "Is it not

therefore just, the other replied, that you also should be put to death?" "By no means, said Lacon. For they did these things, having received money for doing them; but I did not; since my conduct was the result of my own judgment." Hence, neither is it proper to interrogate after the conclusion, nor to interrogate concerning the conclusion itself, unless much truth is contained in it.

With respect to ridicule, however, since it appears to possess a certain use in contests, and it is necessary, as Gorgias rightly said, that the serious arguments of the opponent should be dissolved by laughter, and his laughter by serious arguments, we have shown in the Poetic, how many species of ridicule there are. But of these species, one indeed is adapted to a liberal man, and another is not. The orator, therefore, must assume that species of ridicule, which is adapted to the occasion. Irony, however, is more liberal than scurrility. For he who employs irony, produces the ridiculous for his own sake; but he who employs scurrility, for the sake of another person.

CHAPTER XIX.

EPILOGUE, however, or peroration is composed from four things; from that which may cause the auditor to

think well of the orator, and ill of his opponent ; from amplification, and extenuation ; from that which may excite the passions of the auditor ; and from recalling to the memory [what has been said.] For it is natural, after demonstration, for the orator to show, that *what* he has asserted is true, and that what his opponent has said is false ; and thus to praise, and blame, and conciliate the good opinion of the audience. But of two things, it is requisite that the orator should direct his attention to one of them, viz. either to show that he is good to the audience, or that he is simply a worthy man ; and that his opponent is bad to the audience, or that he is simply a bad man. We have shown, however, what the places are from which things of this kind are to be derived, viz. whence it may be inferred that men are worthy or depraved. In the next place, it is requisite to amplify or extenuate, according to nature, what has now been demonstrated. For it is necessary that it should be acknowledged a thing has been done, if the orator intends to speak of its magnitude ; for the increase of bodies, is from pre-existent substances. But we have already shown whence the places of amplification and extenuation are to be derived. After these things, however, since it is evident what their quality and quantity are, the orator should excite the passions of the auditor : but these are, pity and indignation ; anger and hatred ; envy, emulation and contention. And we have before shown the places of these. Hence it remains that in the peroration the orator should recal into the memory of the audience what has been before said. But this is to be done in such a way, as others improperly teach us to do in proems ; for that a thing may be easily understood, they order us to repeat it frequently.

In proems, indeed, it is necessary to speak of the thing [which is the subject of discussion,] lest the audience should be ignorant what that is which is to be decided ; but here [in peroration,] the arguments which have been employed, must be summarily repeated. The beginning, however, of the peroration should be, " That the orator has accomplished what he promised ;" so that he must then explain what those things are of which he has spoken, and on what account they were discussed by him. But the repetition should be made from a comparison of what has been said by the opponent. And it is requisite to compare either such things as have been said on the same subject, both by the orator and his opponent ; or such things as have not been said by both of them on the same subject ; as, " And he indeed said *this* on the subject, but I *that*, and for these reasons." Or the repetition should be made from irony ; as, " For he said *this*, but I *that* ;" and, " What would he have done, if he had shown that *those* things were transacted, and not *these*?" Or from interrogation ; as, " What has not been shown?" Or thus, " What has the opponent shown?" Either, therefore, the repetition must be thus made, or it must be made from comparison, or the orator must repeat in a natural order what he has said. And again, if he is so inclined, he may repeat what his opponent has said. That mode of diction, however, is adapted to the conclusion of the oration, which is called disjunctive, in order that it may be an epilogue, and not an oration ; such as, " I have said, you have heard, you are masters of the subject, judge for yourselves."

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P O E T I C.

CHAPTER I.

LET us speak concerning poetry itself, and the species of it ; what power each of the species possesses, and how fables must be composed, so as to render poetry such as it ought to be : farther still, let us show of how many and what kind of parts poetry consists ; and in a similar manner with respect to such other things as pertain to this method, beginning for this purpose, conformably to nature, first from such things as are first.

The epopee, therefore, and tragic poetry, and besides these comedy, and dithyrambic poetry, and the greatest part of the art pertaining to the flute and the lyre, all these are entirely imitations. They differ, however, from each other in three things ; for they differ either by imitating through instruments generically different, or by imitating different things, or by imitating in a different, and not after the same manner. For as certain persons assimilating, imitate many things by colours and figures, some indeed through art, but others through

custom, and others through voice ; thus also in the above-mentioned arts, all of them indeed produce imitation in rhythm,¹ words and harmony ; and in these, either separately assumed, or mingled together. Thus, for instance, the arts pertaining to the flute and the lyre, alone employ harmony and rhythm ; and this will also be the case with whatever other arts there may be which possess a power of this kind ; such as the art of playing on pipes formed from reeds. But the arts pertaining to dancing imitate by rhythm, without harmony ; for dancers, through figured rhythms, imitate manners, and passions, and actions. The epopee, however, alone imitates by mere words, viz. metres, and by these either mingling them with each other, or employing one certain genus of metres, which method has been adopted [from ancient to the present times.] For [without this imitation,] we should have no common name, by which we could denominate the Mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, and the dialogues of Socrates ; or those whose imitation consists in trimetres, or elegies, or certain other things of this kind ; except that men conjoining with measure the verb *to make*, call some of these elegiac *poets*, but others epic *poets*, not as poets according to imitation, but denominating them in common according to measure. For they are accustomed thus to denominate them, if they write any thing medical or musical in measure, [i. e. in verse.] There is, however, nothing common to Homer and Empedocles except the measure ; on which account, it is just indeed to call the former a poet ; but the latter, a physiologist rather than a poet. In a similar manner though

¹ *Rhythm* is defined by Plato in his *Laws* to be, *orderly motion either of the body, or the voice.*

some one mingling all the measures, should produce imitation, as Chæremon does, who wrote the Centaur, which is a rhapsody mingled from all the measures, yet he must not on this account be called a poet. And thus much concerning these particulars. There are, however, some kinds of poetry which employ all the before-mentioned [instruments of imitation;] viz. rythm, melody, and measure, such as dithyrambic poetry and the Nomi, and also tragedy and comedy. But these differ, because some of them use all these at once, but others partially. I speak, therefore, of these differences of the arts in which imitation is produced.

CHAPTER II.

SINCE, however, imitators imitate those who do something, and it is necessary that these should either be worthy or depraved persons; (for manners are nearly always consequent to these alone, since all men differ in their manners by vice and virtue)—this being the case, it is necessary, in the same manner as painters, either to imitate those who are better than men of the present age, or those who are worse, or such as exist at present. For among painters, Polygnotus, indeed, painted men more beautiful than they are [at present,] but Pauson painted them less beautiful, and Dionysius painted them so as to

resemble men of our times. It is evident, however, that each of the before-mentioned imitations has these differences; and imitation is different, by imitating different things after this manner. For there may be dissimilarities of this kind in dancing, in playing on the flute, and in playing on the lyre; and also in orations and mere measure. Thus Homer imitates better men than such as exist at present, but Cleophon men similar to those that now exist; and Hegemon the Thasian who first made parodies, and Nicocharis who wrote the *Deliad*, imitate men worse than those of the present age. In a similar manner in dithyrambics and the *Nomi*,¹ [there may be an imitation of better and worse men,] as Timotheus and Philoxenus, have imitated the Persians and the Cyclops. By this very same difference also, tragedy is separated from comedy. For the intention of comedy indeed is to imitate worse, but of tragedy, better men than such as exist at present.

CHAPTER III.

THERE is also a third difference of these, and this consists in the manner in which each of them may be imitated.

¹ Lyric poems, such as those of Pindar, and in short, hymns in praise of Bacchus, are called *dithyrambics*. The *Nomi* were poems originally composed in honour of Apollo, and derived their name from being sung by shepherds among the *pastures*.

For by the same [instruments,] the same things may be imitated, the poet sometimes speaking in his own person, and sometimes in that of another, as Homer does; or speaking as the same person without any mutation; or imitating every thing as acting and energizing. But imitation consists in these three differences, as we said in the beginning; viz. it differs either because it imitates by different instruments, or because it imitates different things, or imitates in a different manner. Hence, Sophocles will partly be the same imitator as Homer, for both of them imitate celebrated characters; and partly the same as Aristophanes; for both of them imitate persons engaged in acting and performing; whence also it is said that certain persons call them *dramatists*, because they imitate those who are engaged in *doing* something. On this account the Dorians vindicate to themselves the invention of tragedy and comedy; of comedy indeed the Megarensians, as well those who are natives of Greece, as being invented by them at the time when their government was a democracy, as those who migrated to Sicily. For the poet Epicharmus derived his origin from thence, who was much prior to Chonoides and Magnes. But some of those Dorians who inhabit Peloponnesus claim the invention of tragedy, making names an indication of this. For it is said that they call their villages *komai*, but the Athenians *demoi*; as if comedians were not so denominated from *komazein*, or *the celebration of festivals*, but from wandering through villages, in consequence of being ignominiously expelled from cities. The verb *poiein* also, or *to make*, is by the Dorians denominated $\delta\rho\alpha\nu$, *dran*, but by the Athenians *pratein*. And thus much concerning the differences of imitation, as to their number and quality.

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CHAPTER IV.

Two causes, however, and these physical, appear in short to have produced poetry. For imitation is congenial to men from childhood. And in this they differ from other animals, that they are most imitative, and acquire the first disciplines through imitation; and that all men delight in imitations. But an indication of this is that which happens in the works [of artists.] For we are delighted on surveying very accurate images, the realities of which are painful to the view; such as the forms of very savage animals, and dead bodies. The cause, however, of this is that learning is not only most delightful to philosophers, but in a similar manner to other persons, though they partake of it but in a small degree. For on this account, men are delighted on surveying images, because it happens that by this survey they learn and are able to infer what each particular is; as, that *this* is an image of *that*; since, unless we happen to have seen the realities, we are not pleased with the imitation of them, but the delight we experience arises either from the elaboration of the artist, or the colour of the resemblance, or some other cause of the like kind. But imitation, harmony and rhythm being natural to us, (for it is evident that measures or metres are parts of rhythms)

those who are especially adapted to these things, making a gradual progress from the beginning, produced poetry from extemporaneous efforts. Poetry, however, was divided according to appropriate manners. For men of a more venerable character imitated beautiful actions, and the fortunes of those by whom they were performed ; but more ignoble men imitated the actions of depraved characters, first composing vituperative verses, in the same manner as the other composed hymns and encomiums. Prior, therefore, to Homer, we cannot mention any poem of this kind ; though it is probable that there were many such. But if we begin from Homer, we may adduce examples of each kind of poems ; such for instance as his *Margites*,¹ and some others, in which as adapted to reprehension the measure is Iambic. Hence, also, vituperative verse is now called Iambic, because in this metre, [those ancient poets after Homer] defamed each other. Of ancient poets likewise, some composed heroic poems, and others Iambic verses. But as Homer was the greatest of poets on serious subjects ; and this not only because he imitated well, but also because he made dramatic imitations ; thus too he first demonstrated the figures of comedy, not dramatically exhibiting reprehension, but the ridiculous. For as is the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to tragedy, so is the *Margites* to comedy. Of those poets, however, who were appropriately impelled to each kind of poetry, some, instead of writing Iambics, became comic poets, but others, instead of writing epic poems, became the authors of tragedies, because these forms are greater and more honourable than those. To

¹ This was a satirical poem, the name of which is derived from *μαργης* or *μαργος*, *foolish, ignorant*.

consider, therefore, whether tragedy is now perfect in its species or not, as well with reference to itself, as to theatres, is the business of another treatise. Both tragedy and comedy, therefore, were at first exhibited in extemporaneous verse. And tragedy, indeed, originated from those who sung dithyrambic verses; but comedy, from those who sung Phallic verses,¹ which even now in many cities are legally established. Thus comedy became gradually increased, till it arrived at its present condition. And tragedy, having experienced many mutations, rested from any further change, in consequence of having arrived at the perfection of its nature. *Æschylus*, also, first brought the number of players from one to two. He likewise diminished the parts of the chorus, and made one of the players act the first part of the tragedy. But *Sophocles* introduced three players into the scene, and added scenic decoration. Farther still, tragedy having acquired magnitude from small fables, and ridiculous diction, in consequence of having received a change from satiric composition, it was late before it acquired a venerable character. The metre also of tragedy, from tetrameter, became Iambic. For at first tetrameter was used in tragedy, because poetry was then satirical, and more adapted to the dance. But dialogue being adopted, nature herself discovered an appropriate metre; for the Iambic measure is of all others most adapted to conversation. And as an indication of this, we most frequently speak in Iambics in familiar discourse with each other; but we seldom speak in hexameters, and then only when we exceed the limits of that harmony which is adapted

¹ These were verses in honour of the rural deities.

to conversation. Again, tragedy is said to have been [at length] adorned, with a multitude of episodes, and other particulars. Let, therefore, thus much suffice concerning these things ; for it would perhaps be a greater labour to discuss every particular.

CHAPTER V.

COMEDY however is, as we have said, an imitation indeed of more depraved characters, yet it does not imitate them according to every vice, [but according to those defects alone which excite laughter ;] since the ridiculous is a portion of turpitude. For *the ridiculous is a certain error, and turpitude unattended with pain, and not of a destructive nature.* Thus, for instance, a ridiculous face is something deformed, and distorted without pain. The transitions, therefore, of tragedy, and the causes through which they are produced, are not unknown ; but we are ignorant of the changes that comedy has experienced, because it was not at first an object of serious attention. For it was late before the magistrate [who presided over the games,] gave the chorus to comedians ; but prior to that period, the choruses were voluntary. Comedy, however, at length having obtained a certain form, those who are said to be the

authors of it are commemorated. But it is unknown who it was that introduced masks, or prologues, or a multitude of players, and such like particulars. Epicharmus, however, and Phormis, began to compose fables ; which, therefore, [as both of them were Sicilians] originated from Sicily. But among the Athenians Crates, rejecting the Iambic form of comedy, first began universally to compose speeches and fables. The epopee, therefore, is an attendant on tragedy, as far as pertains to measured diction alone, since through this it is an imitation of worthy persons and actions. But it differs from tragedy in this, that it has a simple metre, and is a narration. It also differs from it in length. For tragedy is especially bounded by one period of the sun, [i. e. by one natural day,] or admits but a small variation from this period ; but the epopee is not defined within a certain time, and in this it differs from tragedy ; though at first tragedy, no less than epic poetry, was not confined to any portion of time. With respect to the parts, however, of the epopee and tragedy, some are the same in both, but others are peculiar to tragedy. Hence he who knows what is a good or bad tragedy, knows also what kind of epic poetry is good or bad. For those things which the epopee possesses are also present with tragedy ; but the epopee has not every thing which tragedy contains.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING hexameter imitative poetry, therefore, and comedy, we shall speak hereafter. Let us now, however, speak concerning tragedy, assuming the definition of its essence as deduced from what has been already said. *Tragedy, therefore, is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious, and perfect action, possessing magnitude, delivered in pleasing language, using separately the several species of imitation in its parts, and not through narration but through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.*¹ But I say it is

¹ When Aristotle says that *tragedy through pity and fear effects a purification from such like passions*, his meaning is, that it purifies from those perturbations, which happen in the fable, and which for the most part are the cause of the peripetia, and of the unhappy event of the fable. Thus for instance, Sophocles, through pity and terror excited by the character of Ajax, intends a purification from anger and impiety towards the gods, because through this anger and impiety those misfortunes happened to Ajax; and thus in other instances. For it must by no means be said that the meaning of Aristotle is, that tragedy through terror and pity purifies the spectators from terror and pity; since he says in the 2d book of his Ethics, "that he who is accustomed to timid things becomes timid, and to anger becomes angry, because habit is produced from energies." Hence, we are so far from being able, through the medium of terror and pity in tragedy, to remove

an imitation delivered in pleasing language, viz. in language possessing rhythm, harmony, and melody. And, it uses separately the several species of imitation, because

terror and pity from the spectators, that by accustoming them to objects of commiseration and terror, we shall in a greater degree subject them to these passions. Indeed, if tragedy intended through pity to purify from pity, and through fear to purify from fear, it would follow that the same passion of the soul would be contrary to itself; for contraries are cured by contraries. Hence, fear would be contrary to itself, and pity would be contrary to pity. Hence, also, energies would be contrary to their proper habits, or rather the same energies and habits would be contrary to each other, which is repugnant to reason and experience. For we see that energies and habits are increased and established from similar energies.

By no means, therefore, does Aristotle oppose Plato, in ascribing this purifying effect to tragedy. For when Plato expels tragic poets from his Republic, it is because they are not serviceable to youth who are to be educated philosophically. For a purification from all the passions is effected by philosophic discipline; but tragedy only purifies from some of the passions, by the assistance of others, viz. by terror and pity; since it is so far from purifying the spectators from terror and pity, that it increases them. To which we may add, that philosophic discipline is not attended with the mythological imitation of ancient tragedy, which though it harmonizes with divine natures, and leads those who possess a naturally good disposition to the contemplation of them, yet it is not useful to legislators for the purposes of virtue and education, nor for the proper tuition of youth. For the good which such fables contain is not disciplinative, but mystic; nor does it regard a juvenile, but an aged habit of soul. For Socrates in the Republic justly observes, "The young person is not able to judge what is allegory, and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age, are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immovable."

None of the English translators and commentators On the Poetic of Aristotle, that I have seen, appear to have had the least glimpse of this meaning of the passage, though I trust it is sufficiently obvious that it is the genuine meaning of Aristotle.

some parts of the tragedy are alone perfected through metres, and again others through melody. Because, however, tragedians produce imitation by acting, in the first place the ornament of the sight [i. e. the scenic apparatus,] will be a certain part of tragedy, and in the next place the melopoëia [which comprehends rhythm, harmony, and melody,] and the diction. For in these imitation is produced. But I call diction, indeed, the composition of the metres; and melopoëia that, the whole power of which is apparent. Since, however, tragedy is an imitation of action, and action is effected by certain agents, who must necessarily be persons of a certain description both as to their manners and their mind, (for through these we say that actions derive their quality) hence there are naturally two causes of actions, *dianoia*¹ and manners, and through these actions all men obtain or are frustrated of the object of their wishes. But a fable, indeed, is an imitation of action; for I mean by a *fable* here, the composition of things. By *manners* I mean those things according to which we say that agents are persons of a certain description; and by *dianoia* that through which those who speak demonstrate any thing, or unfold their meaning. It is necessary, therefore, that the parts of every tragedy should be six, from which the tragedy derives its quality. But these are, fable and manners, diction and *dianoia*, sight and melopoëia. Of these parts, however, two pertain to the instruments by

¹ *Dianoia* *διάνοια* in a general way, may be defined to be *διεξέλιξις του λογου ενεργεια* i. e. *the discursive energy of reason*. But accurately speaking, it is *that power of soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect*. This latter definition, however, pertains to it, so far as it is not influenced in its reasonings by imagination and false opinions.

which tragedy imitates ; one, to the manner in which it imitates ; and three to the things which it imitates. And besides these, there are no other. Not a few tragic poets, therefore, as I may say, use all these species [i. e. parts] in composing tragedies. For every tragedy has a scenic apparatus, manners, and a fable, and melody, and in a similar manner dianoia. But the greatest of these is the combination of the incidents. For tragedy is an imitation not of men, but of actions, of life, and of felicity and infelicity. For felicity consists in action, and the end [of tragedy,] is a certain action, and not a quality. Men, however, are persons of a certain character or quality, according to their manners ; but according to their actions, they are happy, or the contrary. The end of tragedy, therefore, does not consist in imitating manners, but actions, and hence it embraces manners on account of actions ; so that things and fable are the end of tragedy. The end, however, is the greatest of all things ; for without action, tragedy cannot exist ; but it may exist without manners. For most modern tragedies are without manners ; and in short, many poets are such as among painters Zeuxis is when compared with Polygnotus. For Polygnotus, indeed, painted the manners of good men ; but the pictures of Zeuxis are without manners. Farther still, if any one places in a continued series ethical assertions, and dictions and conceptions well framed, he will not produce that which is the work of tragedy ; but that will be in a much greater degree a tragedy, which uses these as things subordinate, and which contains a fable and combination of incidents. To which may be added, that the greatest parts of the fable by which the soul is allured are the peripetizæ, [or changes of fortune] and recognitions. Again, it is like-

wise an indication of this, that those who attempt to write tragedies, acquire the power of expressing a thing in tragic diction, and representing manners accurately, before they possess the ability of composing the fable, as was nearly the case with all the first poets. The fable, therefore, is the principle, and as it were the soul of tragedy; but manners rank in the second place. For tragedy resembles the art of painting; since the most beautiful pigments laid on the canvas [promiscuously] would be less pleasing to the view, than an image painted with a white colour alone, [i. e. than a picture in which there is nothing but light and shade.] Tragedy also is an imitation of action, and on this account is especially an imitation of agents. But *dianoia* ranks in the third place. And this is *the ability of unfolding what is inherent in the subject, and is adapted to it*, which ability is the peculiar power of politics and rhetoric. For ancient poets represent those whom they introduce as speaking politically; but poets of the present day represent them as speaking rhetorically. Manners, however, are a thing of such a kind as to render manifest what the deliberate choice is, in those things in which it is not apparent whether the speaker is influenced by choice or aversion. Hence some speeches are without manners. But *dianoia*¹ is that through which it is shown that a certain thing is, or is not, or which universally enunciates something. And the fourth part of tragedy is diction. But I say, as was before

¹ *Dianoia*, therefore, cannot be, as I have seen it translated, *sentiment*. For can any thing be more obvious than that the power through which it is shown that a thing is or is not, and which universally enunciates something, must be *discursive*, agreeably to the definition we have before given of *dianoia*? But how is this to be effected by sentiment?

observed, that *diction is an interpretation through the denomination of a thing, and which also has the same power in verse and prose.* The melopoeia, however, ranks in the fifth place, which is the greatest of condiments. But the sight [i. e. the scenic apparatus,] possesses indeed an alluring power ; yet it is most inartificial, and is in the smallest degree appropriate to poetry. For the power of tragedy remains, even when unaccompanied with scenic apparatus and players. And farther still, the art of constructing the scenic apparatus possesses greater authority than the art of the poet.

CHAPTER VII.

THESE things being defined, let us in the next place show what the combination of the incidents ought to be, since this is the first and greatest part of tragedy. But let it be granted to us, that tragedy is the imitation of a perfect and whole action, and which possesses a certain magnitude ; for there may be a whole which has no [appropriate] magnitude. A whole, however, is that which has a beginning, middle, and end. And the beginning is that which necessarily is not itself posterior to another thing ; but another thing is naturally adapted to be posterior to it. On the contrary the end is that, which is itself naturally adapted to be posterior to another thing, either from necessity, or for the most part ; but after this

there is nothing else. But the middle is that which is itself posterior to another thing, and posterior to which there is something else. Hence, it is necessary that those who compose fables properly, should neither begin them casually, nor end them casually, but should employ the above-mentioned ideas [of beginning, middle, and end.] Farther still, that which is beautiful, whether it be an animal, or any thing else which is a composite from certain parts, ought not only to have this arrangement of beginning, middle, and end, but a magnitude also which is not casual. For the beautiful consists in magnitude and order. Hence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the survey of it is confused, since it is effected in nearly an insensible time. Nor can a very large animal be beautiful; for it cannot be surveyed at once, but its subsistence as one and a whole eludes the view of the spectators; such as if, for instance, it should be an animal of ten thousand stadia in length. Hence, as in bodies and in animals it is necessary there should be magnitude, but such as can easily be seen; thus also in fables, it is necessary indeed there should be length, but this such as can easily be remembered. The definition, however, of the length [of the fable] with reference to contests and the senses, [i. e. with reference to external circumstances,] cannot fall under the precepts of art. For if it were requisite to perform a hundred tragedies [in one day,] as is said to have been the case more than once, the performance ought to be regulated by a clepsydra [or hour-glass.] But the definition of the length of the fable according to the nature of the thing, is this, that the fable is always more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous. Simply defining the thing, however, we may say, that every fable

has an appropriate magnitude, when the time of its duration is such as to render it probable that the transition from prosperous to adverse, or from adverse to prosperous fortune which it relates, has taken place, the necessary or probable order of things being preserved, through which one thing follows from, and after another.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE fable, however, is one, not as some fancy, if one person is the subject of it; for many things and which are generically infinite happen [to one and the same man;] from a certain number of which no one thing results. Thus, also, there are many actions of one man, from which no one action is produced; on which account all those poets appear to have erred who have written the Heracleid, and Theseid, and such like poems. For they fancied that because Hercules was one person, it was fit that the fable should be one. Homer, however, as he excelled in other things, appears likewise to have seen this acutely, whether from art, or from nature. For in composing the Odyssey, he has not related every thing which happened to Ulysses; such as the being wounded in Parnassus, and pretending to be insane, when the Greeks were collected into one army against the Trojans; one of which taking place, it was not necessary or

probable that the other should happen ; but he composed that poem from what relates to one action, such as we say the *Odyssey* is ; and he has composed the *Iliad* in a similar manner. It is requisite, therefore, as in other imitative arts one imitation is the imitation of one thing, thus, also, [in tragedy,] the fable should be the imitation of one action, since it is an imitation of action, and of the whole of this, and that the parts of the transactions should be so arranged, that any one of them being transposed, or taken away, the whole would become different and changed. For that which when present or not present produces nothing perspicuous, is not a part of the fable.



CHAPTER IX.

IT is however evident from what has been said, that it is not the province of a poet to relate things which have been transacted, but to describe them such as they would have been had they been transacted, and to narrate things which are possible according to probability, or which would necessarily have happened. For an historian and a poet do not differ from each other, because the former writes in prose and the latter in verse ; for the history of Herodotus might be written in verse, and yet it would

be no less a history with metre, than without. But they differ in this, that the one speaks of things which have been transacted, and the other of such as might have happened. Hence, poetry is more philosophic, and more deserving of serious attention than history. For poetry speaks more of universals, but history of particulars. *Universal*, however, consists indeed in relating or performing certain things which happen to a man of a certain description, either probably or necessarily, and to which the attention of poetry is directed in giving names to men; but *particular* consists in narrating what Alcibiades did, or what he suffered. In comedy, therefore, this is now become manifest. For comic poets having composed a fable through things of a probable nature, they thus give names to the persons they introduce in the fable, and do not, like Iambic poets, write poems about particular persons. But in tragedy the ancient names are retained. The cause, however, of this is that the possible is credible. Things, therefore, which have not yet been done, we do not yet believe to be possible; but it is evident that things which have been done are possible; for they would not have been done, if it was impossible that they should. Not, indeed, but that in some tragedies there is one or two of known names, and the rest are feigned; but in others there is no known name; as for instance, in the tragedy of Agatho called *the Flower*. For in this tragedy, the things and the names are alike feigned, and yet it no less delights [than if they were not feigned.] Hence, ancient fables which are the subjects of tragedy, must not be entirely adhered to. For it is ridiculous to make this the object of investigation, because such fables are known but to a few, though at the same time they delight all men. From

these things, therefore, it is evident that a poet ought rather to be the author of fables than of metres, because he is principally a poet from imitation. But he imitates actions. Hence, though it should happen that he relates [as probable] things which have taken place, he is no less a poet. For nothing hinders but that some actions which might have been performed, are such as it is both probable and possible have happened, and by the narration of such he is a poet.

Of simple fables, however, and actions, the episodic are the worst. But I call the fable episodic, in which it is neither probable, nor necessary that the episodes follow each other. Such fables, however, are composed by bad poets, indeed, on their own account; but by good poets, on account of the players. For, introducing contests [among the players,] and extending the fable beyond what it will admit, they are frequently compelled to distort the connected order of things. Tragedy, however, is not only an imitation of a perfect action, but also of actions which are terrible, and the objects of commiseration. But actions principally become such, and in a greater degree, when they happen contrary to opinion, on account of each other. For thus, they will be more admirable, than if they happened from chance and fortune; since, also, of things which are from fortune, those appear to be most admirable, which seem to be as it were adapted to take place. Thus the statue of Mityus [in Argos,] by falling, slew him who was the cause of the death of Mityus, as he was surveying it. For such events as these seem not to take place casually. Hence, it is necessary that fables of this kind should be more beautiful.

CHAPTER X.

OF fables, however, some are simple, and others complex ; for the actions of which fables are the imitations, are immediately things of this kind. But I call the action simple, from which taking place, as it has been defined, with continuity and unity, there is a transition without peripetia, or recognition. And I call the action complex, from which there is a transition, together with recognition, or peripetia, or both. It is necessary, however, that these should be effected from the composition itself of the fable, so that from prior transactions it may happen that the same things take place either necessarily, or probably. For it makes a great difference whether these things are effected on account of these, or after these.

CHAPTER XI.

BUT peripetia, indeed, is a mutation, as we have before observed, of actions into a contrary condition; and this, as we say, according to the probable, or the necessary. Thus in the *Œdipus* [Tyrannus of Sophocles,] the mes-

senger who comes with an intention of delighting Œdipus, and liberating him from his fear respecting his mother, when he makes himself known, produces a contrary effect. Thus too, in the tragedy called Lynceus, he indeed is introduced as one who is to die, and Danaüs follows with an intention of killing him; but it happens from the transactions of the tragedy, that Lynceus is saved, and Danaüs is slain. And recognition is, as the name signifies, a mutation from ignorance to knowledge, or into the friendship or hatred of those who are in prosperous or adverse fortune. The recognition, however, is most beautiful, when at the same time there are peripetia, as in the Œdipus [Tyrannus of Sophocles.] There are, therefore, also other recognitions. For sometimes it happens, as we have before observed, that there are recognitions of things inanimate, and casual. And if some one has performed, or has not performed, a thing, there is a recognition of it; but the recognition which especially pertains to the fable and the action, is that which we have mentioned. For a recognition and peripetia of this kind, excite either pity or fear; and tragedy is supposed by us to be an imitation of actions which produce fear and commiseration. Again, it will happen that infelicity and felicity will be in such-like recognitions; since recognition is a recognition of certain persons. Farther still, of recognitions, some are of one person only with reference to another, when it is evident who the other person is, but sometimes it is necessary to recognize both persons. Thus Iphigenia was recognized by Orestes through the sending an epistle; but another recognition was requisite to his being known by Iphigenia.

CHAPTER XII.

Two parts of the fable, therefore, viz. peripetia and recognition, are conversant with these things; but the third part is pathos [or corporeal suffering.] And of these we have already discussed peripetia and recognition. Pathos, however, is an action destructive, or lamentable; such as death when it is obvious, grievous pains, wounds, and such-like particulars. But we have before spoken of the parts of tragedy which it is requisite to use as species. The parts of tragedy, however, according to quantity, and into which it is separately divided, are as follow: prologue, episode, exode, and chorus. And of the parts pertaining to the chorus, one is the parodos, but the other is the stasimon. These [five] parts, therefore, are common to all tragedies; but the peculiar parts are those which are derived from the scene and the commi. And the prologue, indeed, is the whole part of the tragedy, prior to the entrance of the chorus. The episode is the whole part of the tragedy, which is between all the melody of the chorus. The exode is the whole part of the tragedy, after which there is no further melody of the chorus. And of the chorus itself, the parodos, indeed, is the first singing of the whole chorus; but the stasimon is the melody of the chorus, without trochee and anapæst: and the commus is the

common lamentation of the chorus and the scene. We have, therefore, before shown what the parts of tragedy are which must necessarily be used ; but the parts of it according to quantity, and into which it is separately divided, are these.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN the next place we must show, as consequent to what has been said, to what the attention ought to be directed of those who compose fables, and whence the work of tragedy is derived. Since, therefore, it is necessary that the composition of the most beautiful tragedy should not be simple, but complex, and that it should be imitative of things of a dreadful and commiserable nature (for this is the peculiarity of such an imitation)—in the first place it is evident, that it is not proper worthy men should be represented as changed from prosperity to adversity ; for this is neither a subject of terror nor commiseration, but is impious. Nor must depraved characters be represented as changed from adverse to prosperous fortune ; for this is the most foreign from tragedy of all things, since it possesses nothing which is proper ; for it is neither philanthropic,

nor commiserable, nor dreadful. Nor again must a very depraved man be represented as having fallen from prosperity into adversity. For such a composition will indeed possess the philanthropic, but will neither excite pity or fear. For the one is conversant with a character which does not deserve to be unfortunate; but the other, with a character similar [to most of the spectators.] And pity, indeed, is excited for one who does not deserve to be unfortunate; but fear, for one who resembles [the multitude;] so that the event will neither appear to be commiserable, nor terrible. It remains, therefore, that the man who exists between these must be represented. But a character of this kind is one, who neither excels in virtue and justice, nor is changed through vice and depravity, into misfortune, from being a man of great renown and prosperity, but has experienced this mutation through a certain [human] erroneous conduct; such as *Œdipus* and *Thyestes*, and other illustrious men of this kind. Hence, it is necessary that a fable which is well composed, should be rather simple than twofold, (though some say it should be the latter,) and that the persons which are the subjects of it should not be changed into prosperity from adversity, but on the contrary into adversity from prosperity, not through depravity, but through some great error, and that they should be such persons as we have mentioned, or better rather than worse than these. But the truth of this is indicated by that which has taken place. For ancient poets adopted any casual fables; but now the most beautiful tragedies are composed about a few families; as for instance, about *Alcmaon*, *Œdipus*, *Orestes*, *Meleager*, *Thyestes* and *Telephus*, and such other persons as happen either to have suffered or perpetrated things

of a dreadful nature. The tragedy, therefore, which is most beautiful according to art, has this composition. Hence, Euripides is erroneously blamed by those, who accuse him of having done this in his tragedies, and for making many of them terminate in misfortune. For this method, as we have said, is right ; of which this is the greatest indication, that in the scenes, and contests of the players, simple fables which terminate unhappily, appear to be most tragical, if they are properly acted. And Euripides, though he does not manage other things well, yet appears to be the most tragic of poets. The fable, however, ranks in the second place, though by some it is said to be the first composition, which is of a twofold nature, such as the *Odyssey*, and which terminates in a contrary fortune, both in the better and worse characters [which it exhibits.] It appears, however, to rank in the first place, through the imbecility of the spectators. For the poets [by whom it is composed] accommodate themselves to the spectators, and compose fables conformable to their wishes. This pleasure, however, is not [properly] derived from tragedy, but is rather adapted to comedy. For these, though the persons in the fable are most hostile to each other, as *Orestes* and *Ægisthus*, yet in the end they depart friends, and one of them does not die through the other.

CHAPTER XIV.

~~TERROR and pity~~, therefore, may be produced from the sight. But they may also be excited from the condition itself of the things, [i. e. from the combination of the incidents,] which is a more excellent way, and the province of a better poet. For it is necessary that the fable should be so composed without any scenic representation, that he who hears the things which are transacted, may be seized with horror, and feel pity, from the events; and in this manner he who hears the fable of *Œdipus* is affected. But to effect this through scenic representation is more inartificial, and requires great experience. Those, however, who produce not the terrible, but the monstrous alone, through scenic representation, have nothing in common with tragedy. For it is not proper to seek for every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but for that which is appropriate. Since, however, it is necessary that the poet should procure pleasure from pity and fear through imitation, it is evident that this must be effected [in the representation of things of a terrible and miserable nature.] We must explain, therefore, what kind of events appear to be dreadful or lamentable. But it is necessary that actions of this kind should either be those of friends towards each other, or of enemies, or of neither. If, therefore, an enemy kills an enemy, he does not exhibit any thing which is an

object of pity, neither while he kills him, nor when he is about to kill him, except the evil which he who is slain suffers. And this will be the case, when one of those who are neither friends nor enemies kills the other. But when these things happen in friendships, as when a brother kills a brother, or a son his father, or a mother her son, or a son his mother, or intends to do it, or does any thing else of the like kind, it is not only a lamentable circumstance on account of the evil which is suffered, but also because it is inflicted by one by whom it ought not to be inflicted. Fables, therefore, which have been received [from the ancients] are not to be dissolved [i. e. destroyed.] I mean, for instance, such as the fable of Clytemnestra slain by Orestes, and of Eriphile slain by Alcmæon. But it is necessary that the poet should invent the fable, and use in a becoming manner those fables which are delivered [to him by tradition.] What, however, we mean by using fables in a becoming manner, we will explain more clearly; for the action may take place in such a way as the ancients have represented it, viz. accompanied with knowledge; as Euripides represents Medea killing her children. An action may also be done, by those who are ignorant of its dreadful nature, and who afterwards recognize the friendship [which they have violated,] as in the *Œdipus* of Sophocles. This, therefore, is external to the drama. But it may also be introduced into the tragedy itself; as in the *Alcmæon* of Astydamas, or *Telegonus* [the son of Ulysses by Circe,] in the *Ulysses Wounded*. Farther still, besides these there is a third mode, when some one is about to perpetrate through ignorance an atrocious deed, but recognizes that it is so before he does it. And besides these, there is no other mode. For it is necessary

to act, or not; and knowingly, or not knowingly. But of these, to intend to perpetrate the deed knowingly, and not to perpetrate it, is the worst; for it is wicked and not tragical; because it is void of pathos. Hence, no poet introduces a character of this kind except rarely; as in the Antigone [of Sophocles,] in which Hæmon [endeavours to kill his father] Creon, [but does not effect his purpose.] For the action here ranks in the second place. But it is better to perpetrate the deed ignorantly, and having perpetrated to recognize [the enormity of it;] for then it is not attended with wickedness, and the recognition excites horror. The last mode, however, is the best; I mean, as in the Cresphontes [of Euripides,] in which Merope is about to kill her son, but does not in consequence of recognizing that he was her son. Thus too, in the Iphigenia in Tauris [of Euripides,] in which the sister is going to kill the brother, [but recognizes him;] and in the tragedy called Helle, the son is about to slay his mother, but is prevented by recognizing her. Hence, as we have formerly observed, tragedies are not conversant with many families; for poets were enabled to discover a thing of this kind in fables, not from art, but from fortune. They were compelled, therefore, to direct their attention to those families, in which calamities of this kind happened.

And thus we have spoken sufficiently concerning the composition of things, [i. e. the combination of the incidents] and have shown what kind of fables ought to be employed.

CHAPTER XV.

WITH respect to manners, however, there are four things to which the attention ought to be directed; one, indeed, and the first, that the manners may be such as are worthy. But the tragedy will indeed possess manners, if, as we have said, the words or the action render any deliberate intention apparent; containing depraved manners, if the deliberate intention is depraved; but worthy manners, if the deliberate intention is good. But manners are to be found in each genus; for both a woman and a man servant may be good; though perhaps of these, the one [i. e. the woman] is more imperfectly good [than the man,] and the other is [generally speaking] wholly bad. In the second place, the manners must be adapted to the persons. For there are manners which are characterized by fortitude, but it is not adapted to a woman to be either brave or terrible. In the third place, the manners must be similar. For this, as we have before observed, differs from making the manners to be worthy and adapted. In the fourth place, they must be uniform; for if he is anomalous, who exhibits the imitation, and expresses such-like manners, at the same time it is necessary that he should be uniformly unequal. The example, however, of depraved manners is indeed not necessary; such for instance as that of

Menelaus in the *Orestes* [of Euripides ;] but an example of unbecoming and unappropriate manners is, the lamentation of Ulysses in the tragedy of *Scylla*, and the speech of Menalippe [in Euripides ;] and the example of anomalous manners, in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* [of Euripides]. For *Iphigenia* supplicating does not at all resemble the *Iphigenia* in the latter part of the tragedy. It is requisite, however, in the manners, as well as in the combination of the incidents, always to investigate, either the necessary, or the probable ; so that such a person should say or do such things, either necessarily, or probably ; and that it be necessary or probable, that this thing should be done after that. It is evident, therefore, that the solutions of fables ought to happen from the fable itself, and not as in the *Medea* of Euripides from the machinery, and in the tragedy called the *Iliad*, from the particulars respecting the return of the Greeks to their country. But machinery must be employed in things which are external to the drama, which either happened before, and which it is not possible for men to know, or which happened afterwards, and require to be previously proclaimed and announced. For we ascribe to the gods the power of seeing all things, but we do not admit the introduction of any thing absurd in the fable ; since, if it is introduced, care must be taken that it is external to the tragedy ; as in the *Cædipus* of Sophocles. Since, however, tragedy is an imitation of better things, it is necessary that we should imitate good painters. For these, in giving an appropriate form to the image, preserve the similitude and increase the beauty. Thus, also, it is requisite that the poet in imitating the wrathful and the indolent, and those who are similarly affected in their manners, should form an example of

equity, or asperity; such as Agatho and Homer have represented Achilles. These things, indeed, it is necessary to observe; and besides these, we should pay attention to such particulars as are consequent from necessity to the scenic representation. For in these, errors are frequently committed. But concerning these things, we have elsewhere sufficiently spoken.

CHAPTER XVI.

WHAT recognition, however, is, we have before shown. But with respect to the species of recognition, the first indeed is the most inartificial, is that which most poets use through ignorance, and is effected through indications. But of these, some are congenial, such as the lance with which the earth-born race [at Thebes] were marked, or the stars on the bodies of the sons of Thyestes in the tragedy of Carcinus. Other indications, however, are adventitious. And of these, some are in the body, as scars; but others are external, such as necklaces; and such as the indication through a small boat, in the tragedy of Tyro. These signs also may be used in a better or worse manner. Thus Ulysses, through his scar, is in one way known by his nurse, and in another by the swineherds. For the recognitions which are for

the sake of credibility, are more inartificial, and all of them are of this kind; but those which are from *peripetia*, such as were made [by Euryclea] in washing the feet of Ulysses, are better. And those recognitions rank in the second place, which are made by the poet, on which account they are not inartificial. Thus Orestes in the *Iphigenia* [in Tauris of Euripides,] recognizes his sister, and is recognized by her. For she indeed recognizes her brother through a letter, but he recognizes her through indications. Orestes, therefore, says what the poet pleases, but not what the fable requires; on which account it is near to the above-mentioned error; since other things might have been equally well said. Thus too in the *Tereus* of Sophocles, the voice of the shuttle produced a recognition.¹ But the third mode of recognition is through memory, from the sensible perception of something, as in the *Cyprii* of Dicæogenes; for on seeing the picture a certain person weeps. And in the narration at the court of Alcinous; for Ulysses on hearing the lyrist [singing the fortunes of the Greeks at Troy,] and recollecting [the story,] weeps; whence also he is recognized [by Alcinous.] The fourth mode of recognition is derived from syllogism, as in the *Coephorii* [of Æschylus]—a similar person is arrived—there is no similar person but Orestes,—Orestes, therefore, is arrived. Thus too in the *Iphigenia* of Polyides the sophist. For it was probable that Orestes would syllogistically conclude, that because his sister had been immolated, it would likewise happen to him to be sacrificed. Thus also in the *Tydeus* of Theodectes, [a certain per-

¹ i. e. Perhaps, the sound made by the shuttle as Philomela was weaving occasioned her to be recognized.

son coming for the purpose of finding his son, says] "I came to discover my son, and I shall be put to death." Another example also is in the *Phinidæ*. For the women, on seeing the place, syllogistically inferred what their fate would be, viz. that they should perish in this place; for they were exposed in it from their infancy. There is also a certain recognition, which is produced from the paralogism of the theatre; [i. e. of the spectator] as in the *Ulysses Pseudangelus*. For the one person says, he should know the bow, which he had not seen; but the other, as if he must be known through this, on this account paralogizes.¹ The best recognition, however, of all, is that which arises from the things themselves, astonishment being excited through probable circumstances; as in the *Œdipus* of Sophocles and the tragedy of *Iphigenia*; (for it is probable that she would be willing to send letters) since such things alone are without fictitious signs and necklaces. But the recognitions which rank in the second place, are those which are derived from syllogism.

¹ Perhaps the fable of this tragedy was composed as follows: Penelope, conceiving that Ulysses still lived, was unwilling to marry any one of the suitors; but a false messenger respecting the death of Ulysses is introduced to Anticlea the mother of Ulysses by the suitors. This false messenger pretends that he had formerly attended Ulysses at the Trojan war, and affirms that Ulysses is dead. To prove, likewise, that what he says is true, he adds, that he could distinguish the bow of Ulysses from ten thousand other bows. A great quantity of bows are then placed before him, among which is the bow of Ulysses, which he knows through a sign perhaps which had been taught him by the suitors. In consequence of this, Anticlea thus paralogizes: This man knew the bow; he could not have known it unless he had been with Ulysses; this person, therefore, has attended Ulysses, and is a true messenger of his

CHAPTER XVII.

It is necessary, however, that the poet should compose fables, and elaborate his diction, so as that he may especially place the thing before the eyes of the spectator. For thus the poet perceiving most acutely, as if present with the transactions themselves, will discover what is becoming, and whatever is repugnant will in the smallest degree be concealed from his view. An indication of this is the fault with which Carcinus is reproached. For Amphiarus departs from the temple, which is concealed from the spectator, who does not perceive it. But this is wanting in the representation, and the spectators are on this account indignant. For the poet as much as possible should co-operate with the scenery; since those are naturally most adapted to persuade who are themselves under the influence of passion. Hence, also, he agitates others who is himself agitated, and he excites others to anger who is himself most truly enraged. Hence, poetry is the province either of one who is naturally ingenious, or of one who is insane. For of these characters, the one is easily fashioned, but the other is prone to ecstasy. It is likewise necessary that the poet

death. Then, becoming desperate through grief, she destroys herself.

should universally exhibit the fables composed by others, and those which he composes himself, and afterwards introduce and insert episodes. But I say that he should in this manner direct his attention to what is universal. Thus for instance in the *Iphigenia* [in *Tauris* of Euripides,] a certain virgin being led to the altar that she might be sacrificed, and vanishing from the view of those who were to sacrifice her, and being brought to another country in which it was a law to sacrifice strangers to a certain goddess, she is made the priestess of these rites. Some time after, it happened that the brother of the priestess came to this place; but on what account? Because some god had ordered him, for a certain reason which does not pertain to the universal [composition of the tragedy,] to come thither, but why he did so is foreign to the fable. The brother, therefore, coming, and being made captive, is recognized by his sister, when he is going to be sacrificed; whether as Euripides says [by an epistle,] or as Polyides feigns, speaking according to probability, because he said, it was not only requisite that the sister, but that he also should be sacrificed:—and hence safety arises. After these things the poet having given names to the persons should insert the episodes; and he must be careful that the episodes are appropriate. Thus the insanity through which Orestes was taken captive, and his being saved through expiation, are appropriate. In dramas, therefore, the episodes are short, but by these the epopee is lengthened. For the fable of the *Odyssey* is short, viz. the fable of a certain person wandering for many years by himself, and with Neptune for his foe. And besides this, his domestic affairs being so circumstanced, that his wealth is consumed by suitors, and stratagems are formed against the

life of his son. But at length, driven by a tempest, he lands on his own coast, and recognizing certain persons, he attacks the suitors, and is himself saved, but destroys his enemies. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of the fable, but the rest is episode.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IN every tragedy, however, there is a bond [or plot] and a solution of it. And external circumstances indeed, and some of those that are internal, frequently form the bond; but the rest form the solution. I call, however, the bond, the whole of that which extends from the beginning to the part which is last, from which there is a transition to good fortune; but I denominate the solution that part which extends from the beginning of the mutation to the end. Thus in the Lynceus of Theodectes, the past transactions, and the capture of the son, are the bond; but the part which extends from the charge of murder to the end, is the solution. But of tragedy, there are four species; for so many parts of it have also been enumerated. And one species indeed is complex, of which the whole is peripetia and recognition. But another species is pathetic; such as the tragedies of Ajax and Ixion. A third species is ethical; such as the Phthiotides and the Peleus. But the fourth

species is such as the Phoroides [of Æschylus] and the Prometheus, and the tragedies which represent what passes in Hades. It is especially necessary, therefore, that the poet should endeavour to have all these species; or at least that he should have the greatest and most of them, especially since men of the present age calumniate the poets. For as there have been good poets in each part of tragedy, men of the present times require one poet to excel in all the parts. But it is just to call tragedy different and the same, though not perhaps with any reference to the fable. Those tragedies, however, ought rather to be called the same, of which there is the same plot and solution. But many poets connect the fable well, and solve it badly. It is necessary, however, always to labour to effect both these, and not to make tragedy an epic system. But I call that tragedy an epic system, which consists of many fables; as if some one should compose a tragedy from the whole fable of the Iliad. For in the Iliad, on account of its length, the parts receive an appropriate magnitude. But in dramas, the effect produced would be entirely contrary to expectation. The truth of this is indicated by such as have represented [in one tragedy] the whole destruction of Troy, and not some part of it, as the Niobe or Medea of Euripides, and who have not acted like Æschylus; for these have either failed of their purpose, or have contended badly; since Agatho also failed in this alone. But in peripetia, and in simple actions, such poets have admirably effected their purpose. For this is tragical and philanthropic. This, however, takes place, when a wise but a depraved man, such as Sisyphus, is deceived; and a brave but an unjust man is vanquished. But this is probable, as Agatho says. For it is probable that

many things may take place contrary to probability. It is necessary likewise to conceive the chorus to be one of the players and a part of the whole, and that it cooperates with the players, not as in Euripides, but as in Sophocles. But with other tragedians, the part assigned to the chorus does not more belong to that fable, than to any other tragedy; on which account the chorus sing embolima [or songs inserted in the fable,] of which Agatho was the inventor. What difference, however, does it make, to sing embolima, or to adapt the diction of one drama to another, or the whole episode?

CHAPTER XIX.

WE have, therefore, now discussed the other parts of tragedy. And it remains that we should speak concerning diction and dianoa [i. e. the discursive energy of reason.] The particulars, therefore, respecting dianoa are unfolded in the treatise On Rhetoric. For the discussion of it is more the province of that treatise. But those things pertain to dianoa, which it is requisite to procure by a reasoning process. And the parts of these are, to demonstrate, to solve, and to excite the passions; such as pity, or fear, or anger, and the like; and besides these, to amplify and extenuate. It is evident, however,

that in things, also, it is requisite to derive what is useful from the same forms, when it is necessary to procure objects of pity, or things of a dreadful, or great, or probable nature. Except that there is this difference, that things in tragedy ought to be rendered apparent without teaching, but in an oration they are to be procured by the orator, and produced through the oration. For what employment would there be for the orator, if the things should appear of themselves pleasing, and not through the oration? But of things pertaining to diction, there is one species of theory respecting the forms of it, which it is the province of the player to know, and of him who is a master artist in a thing of this kind. Thus, for instance, it is requisite he should know, what a mandate is, what a prayer, narration, threats, interrogation and answer are, and whatever else there may be of this kind. For from the knowledge or ignorance of these, the poetic art incurs no blame of any moment. For who would think that Homer errs in what he is reprov'd for by Protagoras? viz. That while he fancies he prays, he commands, when he says,

The wrath of Peleus' son, O goddess, *sing.*

For, says he, to order a thing to be done, or not to be done, is a mandate. Hence, this must be omitted as a theorem pertaining to another art, and not to poetry.

CHAPTER XX.

OF all diction, however, the following are the parts; viz. element, [or letter] syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, case, and sentence. Element, therefore, indeed, is an indivisible vocal sound; yet not every such sound, but that from which an intelligible vocal sound is adapted to be produced. For there are indivisible vocal sounds of brutes, no one of which I call an element of diction. But the parts of this indivisible sound are, vowel, semivowel, and mute. And a vowel, indeed, is that which has an audible sound, without the concurrence of another sound; such as *a* and *o*. But a semivowel is that which has an audible sound, with the concurrence of another sound; as *s* and *r*. And a mute is that which, even with the concurrence of the tongue, has of itself, indeed, no sound, but becomes audible in conjunction with things which have a certain sound; as *g* and *d*. But these differ by the forms of the mouth, by places, by density and tenuity of aspiration, by length and shortness; and farther still, they differ by acuteness and gravity, and by a medium between both these; the theory respecting each of which pertains to the metrical

¹ i. e. The different organs of speech, from which letters are denominated nasal, dental, labial, &c.

art. But a syllable is a sound void of signification, composed from a mute, and an element which has sound, [i. e. from a vowel, or semivowel.] For *g r* without *a* is a syllable, ¹ and also with *a*, as *g r a*. The speculation, however, of the differences of these, pertains also to the metrical art. But a conjunction is a sound void of signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound adapted to be composed from many sounds, and which may be placed either at the beginning or the end of the period, unless something requires that it should be placed by itself at the beginning; such as *μεν*, *ητοι*, *δη*. Or it is a sound non-significant, composed from more sounds than one, but naturally adapted to produce one significant sound. An article is a sound void of signification, which shows the beginning or end, or distinction of a word; ² as *το φημι*, and *το περι*, and others of the like kind. Or it is a sound void of signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound naturally adapted to be composed from many sounds, both in the extremes and in the middle. But a noun is a composite sound, significant without time, of which no part is of itself significant. For in double [or composite] nouns, we do not use the parts as of themselves significant. Thus in the word *θεοδωρος*, *Theodorus*, [though *theos* signifies God and *doron* a

¹ *G r* is an instance of a syllable composed of a mute and a semivowel; and *g r a* of a syllable composed of a mute, a vowel, and a semivowel.

² This description is most obscure; but the sense seems to be, that an article is a sound which of itself does not signify any thing definite, but merely serves to indicate a significant sound, before or after which it is placed, or which it distinguishes from other words.

gift,] yet *doron* signifies nothing. A verb is a composite sound, significant with time, of which no part is of itself significant, in the same manner also as in nouns. For *man* or *white* does not signify in conjunction with time; but *he walks*, or *he did walk*, signify, the former indeed the present, and the latter the past time. But case pertains to noun or verb. And one case, indeed, [in nouns] signifies that something is said *of* this thing, or is attributed *to* this thing, and the like; but another is that which pertains to one thing or many things; as *men*, or *man*. And another case pertains to action, such as what relates to interrogation or demand. For *did he walk?* Or *walk* is a case of a verb according to these species. And a sentence is a composite significant sound, of which certain parts of themselves signify something; for not every sentence is composed from nouns and verbs; (since the definition of man [a rational mortal animal,] is a sentence without a verb) but there may be a sentence without verbs. A sentence, however, will always have some part significant; as in the sentence *Cleon walks*, the word *Cleon* is significant. But a sentence is one in a twofold respect; for it is either that which signifies one thing, or that which becomes one from many conjunctions. Thus the *Iliad*, indeed, is one by conjunction; but the definition of man is one, because it signifies one thing.

CHAPTER XXI.

WITH respect to the species of a noun, one is simple ; and I call the simple noun that which is not composed from things significant ; but another is twofold. And this either consists of that which is significant, and that which is without signification, or of words which are significant. A noun also may be triple and quadruple, as is the case with many of the nouns of the Megalioῦῶ ; such as *Hermocaicoxanthus*.¹ But every noun is either proper or foreign, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or invented for the purpose, or protracted, or contracted, or changed. But I call that a proper name, which is used by every one ; and that a foreign name which is used by other nations. Hence, it is evident that the same noun may be both foreign and proper, though not to the same people. For the word *Σίγγυον*,² is proper to the Cyprians, but foreign to us. But a metaphor is the transposition of a noun to a signification different from its original import, either from the genus to the species, or from the species to the genus ; or from species to species, or ac-

¹ This is a noun composed from the names of the three rivers Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus.

² A dart made entirely of steel.

ording to the analogous. I call, however, a transposition from genus to species, such as,

There station'd is my ship.¹

For to be moored is something pertaining to the being stationed. But a transposition from species to genus is such as,

———— Ten thousand valiant deeds
Ulysses has achiev'd.²

For ten thousand is a great number, and is now used instead of many. And a transposition from species to species is such as,

The brazen falchion drew away his life,

And,

Cut by the ruthless sword.

For here *to draw away*, is used instead of *to cut*; and *to cut* is used instead of *to draw away*; since both imply the taking something away. But I call a transposition according to the analogous, when the relation of the second term to the first, is similar to that of the fourth to the third; for then the fourth is used instead of the second, or the second instead of the fourth. And sometimes that to which a thing is related is added instead of the thing itself. I say, for instance, a cup has a similar relation to Bacchus, that a shield has to Mars. Hence, a shield may be called the cup of Mars, and a cup the shield of Bacchus. Again, evening has a similar relation to day, that old age has to life. It may therefore be said

¹ Odyss., lib. 1.

² Iliad., lib. 2.

that evening is the old age of day, and that old age is the evening of life; or as Empedocles calls it, "The setting of life." In some instances, also, where there is no analogous name, this method may be no less similarly employed. Thus, to scatter grain is to sow; but there is no name for the scattering of light from the sun, and yet this has a similar relation to the sun that sowing has to grain. Hence, it is said,

——— Sowing his god-created flame.

This mode of metaphor may likewise be used differently, when, calling a thing by a foreign name, something belonging to it is denied of it; as if a shield should be called the cup, not of Mars, but without wine. But a noun invented for the purpose, is that in short which not being adopted by certain persons, is introduced by the poet himself. For it appears that there are certain nouns of this kind; as substituting *ερνυται*¹ instead of *κερατα* for *horns*, and calling a *priest* *αρητηρ*, instead of *ιερευς*. And a noun is protracted or contracted, partly by using a vowel longer than the proper one, or by inserting a syllable; and partly by taking something away, either from the word itself, or the inserted syllable. A protracted noun, indeed, is such as *ποληος* for *πολεος*, and *πηληιαδεω* for *πηλειδου*; and such as *κρι*, and *δω*,² are contracted nouns; and,

· ——— *μια γινεται αμφοτεροι οψ.*³
 ——— The sight of both is one.

¹ *ερνυται* is derived from *ερη*, which, according to Hesychius, signifies *buds* or *scions*.

² For *κριθη*, *δωμα*.

³ For *οψις*.

And a noun is changed when part of it is left, and part is invented by the poet; as,

Δεξιτερῶν κατὰ μᾶζον.

In the right breast.¹

Instead of δεξιῶν. Farther still, of nouns some are masculine, others feminine, and others between, [or neuter]. And the masculine, indeed, are such as end in *n* and *r*, and such as are composed from mutes; but these are two, ψ and ξ . The feminine nouns are such as are composed from vowels, and always end in long vowels; as, for instance, in *η* and *ω*, or in long *α*. Hence, it happens that the number of terminations for masculine and feminine are equal; for the terminations of ψ and ξ are the same. No noun, however, ends in a mute, or in a short vowel; and only three nouns end in *i*, viz. *μελι*, *κορμι*, and *πεπερι*. But five end in *υ*; viz. *παυ*, *ναυ*, *γону*, *δορυ*, and *αστυ*. And the neuter nouns end in these, and in *ν* and *ς*.²

¹ Iliad, lib. 5.

² The whole of this doctrine pertains rather to grammar than to philosophy or poetry, and is very mutilated and imperfect. Hence, the critics suspect that the text is greatly corrupted.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE virtue of diction, however, consists in being perspicuous, and not abject. The diction, therefore, is most perspicuous, which is composed from proper nouns, but then it will be abject. But an example of this is the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. It will, however, be venerable, and remote from the vulgar idiom by the use of unusual words. But I call unusual words, such words as are foreign, the metaphorical, the lengthened, and every word except the proper [name of a thing.] If, however, language wholly consisted of such words as these, it would be either an enigma, or a barbarism. If, therefore, it were composed from metaphors, it would be an enigma; but if from foreign words, a barbarism. For the idea [i. e. the definition] of an enigma is this, the conjoining things impossible with the inherent properties of a thing. From the composition, therefore, of [proper] names, it is not possible to effect this, but it may be effected by a metaphor; as "I saw a man conglutinating brass to a man with fire;" and others of the like kind. But from the composition of foreign words a barbarism is produced. Hence language should be moderately mingled with these. Foreign, therefore, metaphorical, and ornamented words, and the other species that have been mentioned, cause the diction neither to be vulgar nor abject; but proper words cause it

to be perspicuous. The protracting, however, contracting, and changing of names, contribute in no small degree to the perspicuity of the diction. For the use of words in a way different from their proper and usual signification, causes the diction to be not vulgar; but the adoption of words in their accustomed meaning, renders it perspicuous. Hence those do not blame rightly, who reprobate this mode of speech, and like the ancient Euclid ridicule the poet, for the facility with which verse might be composed, if the quantity of syllables might be lengthened at pleasure, making iambics even in common discourse; as

Ητι Χαριι ειδοι Μαραθωντα βαδίζοντα.

And,

Ουκ αν γιταμιτος τον εκειτοι εξ ελλιβερον.

It is evident, therefore, that the use of this mode of diction is ridiculous. But measure is common to all the parts of diction. For the same effect would be produced by the improper and ridiculous use of metaphors, foreign words, and other forms of diction. But we may see what splendour the appropriate use of them gives to epic poetry, by putting the words in metre. And he who transfers proper names into foreign words, into metaphors, and the other forms, will see that what we have said is true. Thus, for instance, Æschylus and Euripides made the same iambic verse; but by only changing one word, from its proper and usual to a foreign signification, the one verse appears beautiful, and the other mean. For Æschylus indeed, in his *Philoctetes*, writes,

A cancerous ulcer feeds upon my foot.

But Euripides, instead of εσθιεῖ, *feeds*, uses the word θοιναται. And, [in the verse of Homer, *Odys.* 9.]

Νυν δι μ' ἔων ὀλιγος τι καὶ οὐτιδανος καὶ ἀεικος,

by inserting proper [and common] words, it will be,

Νυν δι μ' ἔων μικρος τι καὶ ἀσθινικος καὶ αἰδης.¹

And,

Διφραὶ αἰκελιον καταθεις, ὀλιγην τι τραπίζαν.
Διφραὶ μοχθηρον καταθεις, μικραὶ τι τραπίζαν.²

And,

Ἡϊους βοωσιν. [*Iliad*, 17.]
Ἡϊους κραζουσιν.

i. e. If instead of saying the shores *rebellow*, we should say the shores *resounded*. Again, Aripkrades ridicules the tragic poets for employing modes of diction, which no one would use in common conversation; such as δωματων απο, and not απο δωματων, i. e. *home from*, and not *from home*; σεθεν [for σου;] νιν [for αυτον;] and Αχιλλεως περι, and not περι Αχιλλεως, i. e. *Achilles about*, and not *about Achilles*; and other expressions of the like kind. For all such forms of language, because

¹ In this verse Polyphemus complains that he was deprived of sight by Ulysses, a *little, weak, vile* man. But Homer, instead of using the word μικρος, *little*, uses ὀλιγος, which signifies *few*. Instead of ἀσθινικος, *puny*, he uses οὐτιδανος, which signifies *a man of no account*; and ἀεικος, *powerless*, instead of αἰδης, *obscure*.

² In this verse, which is from the 21st book of the *Odyssey*, Homer, for the purpose of signifying an *ignoble seat*, calls it by a foreign word, αἰκελιον, and not by the usual word, μοχθηρον; and he calls the *table*, not μικραν, *small*, but ὀλιγην, *few*.

they are not in common use, remove vulgarity from the diction. But of this he was ignorant. It is, however, a great thing to use each of the above-mentioned modes in a becoming manner; and also compound and foreign words. But the greatest thing is to employ metaphors properly. For this alone cannot be acquired from another, but is an indication of an excellent genius; since to employ metaphors well, is to survey similitude. But of words, the double indeed [or compound,] are especially adapted to dithyrambic verse; the foreign to heroic, and metaphors to iambic verse. And in heroic verse, indeed, all the above-mentioned words are useful; but for iambs, because they especially imitate common discourse, those words are adapted which may be used in conversation. And words of this description are, the proper, the metaphorical, and the ornamental. And thus much may suffice concerning tragedy, and the imitation in acting.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CONCERNING the poetry, however, which is narrative and imitative in metre, it is evident that it ought to have dramatic fables, in the same manner as tragedy, and should be conversant with one whole and perfect action, which has a beginning, middle, and end, in order that

like one whole animal it may produce its appropriate pleasure ; and that it may not be like the custom of history, in which it is not necessary that a manifestation should be made of one action, but of one time, viz. of such things as have happened in that time, respecting one, or more persons, the relation of each of which to each other is just as it may happen. For as the sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, though they happened at the same time, contributed nothing to the same end ; thus also in successive times, one thing may sometimes be connected with another, from which no one end is produced. Nearly, however, most poets do this. Hence, as we have before observed, in this respect also Homer will appear to be divine, when compared with other poets, because he did not attempt to sing of the whole of the Trojan war, though it had a beginning and an end. For if he had, it would have been very great, and not sufficiently conspicuous ; or if it had been of a moderate size, it would have been intricate through the variety of incidents. But now having selected one part of the war, he has made use of many episodes from the other parts ; such as the catalogue of the ships, and other episodes, with which he has adorned his poem. Other poets, however, have composed a fable about one man, and one time, and one action, consisting of many parts ; as the authors of the *Cypriacs*, and the lesser *Iliad*. With respect to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, therefore, one or two tragedies only could be made from each. But many might be made from the *Cypriacs* ; and from the lesser *Iliad* more than eight ; such as the *Judgment of the Arms*, *Philoctetes*, *Neoptolemus*, *Eurypylos*, the *Ptochia*, [or *Ulysses* in the character of a beggar,] the *Lacænaë*,

Arist.

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the Destruction of Troy, the Return of the Greeks, Sinon, and the Troades.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AGAIN, it is requisite that the epopee should have the same species as tragedy. For it is necessary that it should be either simple, or complex, or ethical, or pathetic. The parts also are the same, except the music and the scenery. For it requires peripetia, recognition, and passion; and besides these, the reasoning and the diction should be well formed; all which were first used by Homer, and are used by him sufficiently. For in each of his poems he has introduced all these; the Iliad indeed containing the simple and pathetic; but the Odyssey the complex; for through the whole of it there is recognition and the ethical. And besides these things, he excelled all poets in diction and reasoning. The epopee, however, differs from tragedy in the length of the composition, and in the metre. But the proper boundary of its length we have before described; for it should be such that the beginning and the end may be seen at one view. This, however, will be effected if the compositions are shorter than those of the ancient poets, and

brought to the same length with the multitude of tragedies that are performed at one time. But it is the peculiarity of the epopee to possess abundantly the power of increasing in magnitude; for tragedy is not capable of imitating many actions that are performed at the same time, but that part only which is represented in the scene, and acted by the players. In the epopee, however, in consequence of being a narration, many events may be introduced which have happened at the same time, which are so connected as to contribute to the same end, and from which the bulk of the poem is increased. Hence, this contributes to its magnificence, transports the hearer to different places, and adorns the poem with dissimilar episodes. For similitude of events rapidly produces satiety, and causes the failure of tragedies. But heroic metre [i. e. hexameter verse,] is found by experience to be adapted to the epopee. For if any one should attempt narrative imitation in any other metre, or in many metres mingled together, the unfitness of it would be apparent. For heroic metre is of all others the most stable and ample. Hence it especially receives foreign words and metaphors. For narrative imitation excels all others. But iambics and tetrameters are of a motive nature; the one being adapted to dancing, but the other to acting. It would, however, be still more absurd, to mingle them together, as Chæremon did. Hence, no one has composed a long poem in any other measure than the heroic; but, as we have said, nature herself teaches us that hexameter verse is adapted to the epopee. Homer, indeed, deserves to be praised for many other things, and also because he is the only poet who was not ignorant what he ought to do himself. For it is requisite that the poet should speak in his own

person as little as possible ; for so far as he speaks in his own person he is not an imitator. Other poets, therefore, take an active part through the whole poem, and they only imitate a few things, and seldom. But Homer, after a short preface, immediately introduces a man or a woman, or something else that has manners ; for there is nothing in his poem unattended with manners. It is necessary, therefore, in tragedies to produce the wonderful ; but that which is contrary to reason is better fitted to be received in the epopee. Hence, the wonderful is excited in the highest degree from the agent not being seen. In the next place, the particulars respecting the pursuit of Hector, would appear ridiculous [when placed before the eyes] in the scene ; the Greeks indeed standing still, and not pursuing, and Achilles making signs to them not to engage. But in the epopee this is concealed. The wonderful, however, is pleasing ; of which this is an indication, that all men when they wish to gratify their hearers, add something to what they relate. Homer also in the highest degree taught others how to speak falsely [i. e. to make false narrations] in a proper manner. But this is a paralogism. For men fancy that when the consequent follows from the antecedent, the consequent may be converted, and that the antecedent will follow from the consequent. This, however, is false. For the antecedent may be false ; but this being otherwise, the consequent will necessarily follow. For through knowing the consequent to be true, our soul paralogizes, and concludes that the antecedent also is true.'

' The moderns, from being ignorant of this very important truth, have committed the greatest errors in the mathematical sciences ; for they have not been aware how possible it is to deduce *true conclusions* from *false principles*. See my *Elements of the True Arithmetic of Infinites*.

Again, things which are impossible but probable, are to be preferred to such as are possible but improbable. Fables also should not be composed from irrational parts, but as much as possible, indeed, they should have nothing irrational in them : if, however, this is impossible, care should be taken that the irrational circumstance does not pertain to the fable, as in the case of *Œdipus* not knowing how *Laius* died. For it must not be brought into the drama, like the narration of the *Pythian games* in the *Electra*, or him who, in the tragedy of the *Mysians*, comes from *Tegea* to *Mysia* without speaking. It is ridiculous, therefore, to say, that otherwise the fable would be destroyed ; for such fables should not at first be composed. But if they are composed, and it appears more reasonable that they should be, the absurdity also must be admitted ; since the irrational circumstances in the *Odyssey*, such as *Ulysses* being left on the shore of *Ithaca* by the *Phœacians*, would evidently have been intolerable, if they had been fabricated by a bad poet. But now the poet conceals the absurdity, and renders it pleasing by the addition of other delightful circumstances. The diction, likewise, should be laboured in the sluggish parts of the poem, and which are neither ethical nor ratiocinative. For a very splendid diction conceals the manners and the reasoning.

CHAPTER XXV.

WITH respect to the objections of critics, and the solutions of those objections, the number and quality of their species will become apparent from surveying them as follows. Since the poet is an imitator, in the same manner as a painter, or any other person who makes likenesses, it is necessary that he should always imitate one of three things. For he must either imitate things such as they were or are, or such as they are said and appear to be, or such as they ought to be. But these must be enunciated either by [common] diction, or by foreign words and metaphors. For there are many properties of diction ; and we concede these to the poets. Besides this, there is not the same rectitude of politics and poetry, nor of any other art and poetry. But of poetry itself, the error is twofold ; the one indeed essential, the other accidental. For the error is essential, when it attempts to imitate that which is beyond its power ; but accidental, when it attempts to imitate improperly ; as if, for instance, a horse should be described as moving both its right legs together. Or an error in each of the arts is accidentally committed in poetry, as in medicine, or any other art, when it fabricates things that are impossible. These, therefore, whatever they may be, are not the essential errors of poetry. Hence, the objections of critics must be dissolved from surveying these particulars. For in the first place, indeed, the poet errs, if what he fabricates is impossible according to

the art itself ; but it will be right if the end of poetry is obtained by it. For we have before shown what the end is. Thus, for instance, the end of poetry will be attained, if the poet thus renders what he fabricates, or any other part of the poem, more capable of producing astonishment. An example of this is the pursuit of Hector. If, however, this end can be obtained in a greater, or even a less degree, and that according to the art pertaining to these things, then the fault will not be entitled to excuse. For it is requisite if possible to be entirely without error. Farther still, it should be considered whether the error ranks among things pertaining to the poetic art, or to some other art. For it is a less fault not to know that a hind has no horns, than to make a bad imitation of a hind. Besides this, also, if the poet is blamed for not imitating things as they truly are, the solution is, that he imitates them as they ought to be. Thus Sophocles said, that he described men such as they ought to be, but Euripides such as they were. Hence, such must be the solution to this objection. If, however, it should be objected, that the poet neither represents things such as they are, nor such as they ought to be, he may say that he represents them conformably to the general opinion, as, for instance, in things pertaining to the gods. For perhaps it is neither better thus to speak, nor true, but it is just as it may happen ; as Xenophanes observes, "In these things there is nothing certain." Perhaps, however, it may be said, that it is not better, indeed, thus to speak, but that the thing did at that time thus subsist ; as in this instance concerning the arms [of the soldiers of Diomed :]

A wood of spears stood by, that, fix'd upright,
Shot from their flashing points a quivering light. IL. 10.

For such was the order in which they were then placed, as it is now with the Illyrians. With respect, however, to the inquiry whether a thing is said or done by any one well or ill, we must not only direct our attention to the thing itself which is done or said, and see whether it is good or bad, but we must also consider the person by whom it is done or said, viz. concerning whom, or when, or to whom, or on what account, he speaks or acts; as whether it is for the sake of a greater good, or in order to avoid a greater evil. But it is requisite to dissolve some objections by directing the attention to diction; as, for instance, to foreign words [in Homer:]

On mules the infection first began.

IL. 1.

For perhaps *ουρηας* does not signify *mules*, but *guards*.
And in what he says of Dolon,

—— his form was bad.

IL. 10.

It may be said that *ειδος κακος*, does not signify a body without symmetry, but a deformed face. For the Cre-
tans call a man with a good face *ευειδης*. And,

Mix purer wine.

IL. 9.

For *ζωροτερον* may not mean wine undiluted with water, such as those who are addicted to intoxication delight in, but wine poured out rapidly. But a thing is said meta-
phorically, as,

The other gods and men ——

Slept all the night.

IL. 2.

For *all* is metaphorically used for *many*; since all is a certain great multitude. And,

Alone unbath'd—

IL. 18.

is said of Orion metaphorically. For that which is most known, is called *alone* or *sole*.¹ Objections also may be solved from accent, as Hippias the Thasian solved the following passages :

διδωμι δὲ οἱ [εὐχος ἀριστοῖς]²

And,

— το μὲν οὖ καταπυθίται ἄμβρο.³

— Of some stately oak the last remains,
Or hardy fir, unperish'd by the rains. POPE, IL. 23.

Objections likewise may be solved by the division of the sentence, [or interpunction ;] as in the following instance from Empedocles,

¹ Viz. It is called so comparatively with reference to what is less known. And it is most known of this constellation, that it does not appear to set in the ocean.

² This line is not extant, and what is supplied is from the conjecture of some learned men. It alludes to the order given by Jupiter to the dream in Il. 2. to deceive Agamemnon. Here, if *διδωμι* is read with an accent in the antepenult, it will signify *damus*, and will imply that Jupiter promises Agamemnon glory from the battle ; but if it is read with an accent in the penult, so as to be the infinitive Ionic, it will signify *dare*. It will therefore imply that Jupiter orders the dream to *give the hope* of victory to Agamemnon.

³ If this is read with the circumflex on the *οὖ*, it will signify that the oak became putrid by the rain, which is absurd ; but if it is read with an acute accent and spiritus lenis, it will signify *not*, and will imply, that the oak was not rotted by the rain.

Αἴψα δὲ θνητ' ἔφθοντο, τὰ πρὶν μᾶλλον ἀθάνατ' ἦναι,
 Ζῶσα τὸ πρὶν κείριτο. ¹—

Or by ambiguous expressions, as [in Iliad, 10.]

— παραχρησὶν δὲ πλείων ἰούξ,
 [τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, τρίτῳ δ' ἔτι μοίρα λειπύται.] ²

Night of two parts the greater share had wan'd,
 But of her empire still a third remain'd.

For the word greater is ambiguous. Or objections may be solved from the custom of diction; as when it is said that wine is *κεκραμμενον*, *mixed*; whence the poet,

———— Greaves of new-wrought tin. IL. 21.

And those that work on iron are called braziers.
 Whence Ganymede is said

———— To pour out wine for Jove; IL. 20.

though the gods do not drink wine. But this may be considered as metaphorically said. It is necessary, however, when a word appears to signify something of a

¹ The sense here depends on the punctuation. For if the comma is put after ζῶσα in the second line, instead of πρὶν, the sense will be, "Immediately those things were made mortal which before had learnt to be immortal, and pure which before were mixed."² But if the comma is put after πρὶν instead of ζῶσα, the sense will be, "that those things which before were pure, were mixed."

² In the original this line in the brackets is wanting; but there can be no doubt of it having been inserted by Aristotle, because without it there is no ambiguity. But the ambiguity is occasioned by the word πλείων, which may either signify *more than*, or *the greater part of*.

contrary nature, to consider how many significations it may have in the passage before us ; as,

Five plates of various metal, various mould,
 Compos'd the shield, of brass each outward fold,
 Of tin each inward, and the middle gold ;—
 There stuck the lance :———— POPE, IL. 20.

For here the word *stuck* implies that the lance was impeded by the golden plate. Many objections, however, may be solved by paying attention to the many contrary opinions which the poet might follow. For the opinion of the multitude is frequently contrary to that of the poet.¹ Or, as Glauco says, “some men presuppose irrationally, and reason from their own decision : and in consequence of being led by appearances, reprobate whatever is contrary to their opinion.” This was the case with respect to Icarus [the father of Penelope]. For the multitude fancy that he was a Laconian. On this supposition, therefore, it is absurd that Telemachus should not meet him, on his arrival at Lacedæmon. Perhaps, however, the truth is as the Cephælians say, viz. that Ulysses married among them, and that Icarus, and not Icarus [was his father-in-law]. It is probable, therefore, that this objection is erroneous. In short, it is necessary to refer the impossible either to the poetry, or to that which is better, or to opinion. For so far as pertains to poetry, probable impossibility is more eligible, than the improbable and possible. For the poet may imitate things not as they are, but as it is better for them to be, just as Zeuxis painted [Helen more beautiful than

¹ From the obscurity of the original, I have been obliged to paraphrase this passage.

she was]. For it is necessary that the pattern in imitation should be transcendent. The objection, also, that something is irrational may be solved by saying, that sometimes it is not irrational; for it is probable that what is improbable may have happened. But with respect to the solution of subcontraries, these are to be considered in the same manner as *elenchi*¹ in arguments, if the same thing [is affirmed or denied,] and with respect to the same thing, and after the same manner, and whether it is the same person [who affirms and denies]. It must, likewise, be considered whether he speaks from his own opinion, or adopts the opinion of some wise man. The reprehension [of poets] will however be right, through which it is shown that they have without any necessity devised something irrational or depraved. Thus irrationality is devised [without any necessity] by Euripides in his *Ægeus*, and impiety, in the character of Menelaus, in his *Orestes*. These reprehensions, therefore, may be derived from five species. For they are either made because impossibilities are introduced, or absurdities, or what is hurtful, or subcontraries, or as errors committed against the rectitude of art. But the solutions may be surveyed from the above-mentioned number; for they are twelve.

¹ Elenchi are defined by Aristotle in his treatise on *Sophistical Elenchi*, to be *sylogisms of contradiction*.

CHAPTER XXVI.

IT may however be asked, whether epic or tragic imitation is the more excellent. For if that imitation is the better which is less troublesome to the spectator, and such an imitation pertains to better spectators, that which imitates every thing is evidently attended with molestation. For such imitation supposes that the spectators will not perceive what is acted without the addition of much movement; just as bad players on the flute turn themselves round, when it is requisite to imitate a discus [in its circumvolution;] or when they sing of Scylla [drawing ships,] draw to themselves the coryphæus, or leader of the band, [in order to imitate this drawing]. Tragedy, therefore, resembles this imitation. For players of the first eminence express a few things by gesture and motion; but players of the second rank express nearly every thing by these. Hence, Myniscus called Callipides an ape, in consequence of carrying his imitation to a great excess. And there was also an opinion of this kind concerning Pindar [the player]. But as players of the first are to players of the second eminence, so is the whole art of tragedy to the epopee. They say, therefore, that the epopee is calculated for equitable and worthy persons, on which account it does not require scenery; but that tragedy is calculated for

the vulgar. Hence, tragic imitation, which is troublesome to the spectator, will evidently be inferior to epic imitation.

In the first place, however, this accusation does not pertain to the poet, but the actor; since it is possible in reciting epic poetry to pay too much attention to action, as Sosistratus did, and likewise in singing, as Mnastheus of Opus did. In the next place, neither is all motion to be despised, since neither is every kind of dancing, but only that which is bad; and hence Callipedes was blamed, as others now are for not imitating free women. Farther still, tragedy, in the same manner as the epopee, may attain its end without motion [and gesture;] for by reading, it is manifest what kind of a thing it is. If, therefore, it is in other respects better, it is not necessary that it should be accompanied with motion and gesture. In the next place, tragedy has every thing which the epopee possesses. For it may use metre, and it has also music and scenery, as no small parts, through which the pleasure it produces is most apparent. To which may be added, that it possesses perspicuity, both when it is read, and when it is acted. The end too of its imitation is confined in less extended limits. For being crowded into a narrower compass, it becomes more pleasing than if it were extended through a long period of time. Thus, for instance, if the *Œdipus* of Sophocles were put into as many verses as the *Iliad*, [it would be less pleasing]. Again, the imitation of the epopee, of whatever kind it may be, has less unity [than tragic imitation;] of which this is an indication, that from any kind of epic imitation many tragedies may be produced. Hence, if he who writes an epic poem

should choose a fable perfectly one, the poem would necessarily either appear short, as if curtailed, or if it should be accompanied with length of metre, it would seem to be languid. But if he should compose one fable from many fables, I mean, if the poem should consist of many actions, it would not possess unity. Thus, the Iliad and Odyssey contain many such parts, which of themselves possess magnitude, though these poems are composed, as much as possible, in the most excellent manner, and are most eminently the imitation of one action. If, therefore, tragedy excels in all these particulars, and besides this, in the work of art, (for neither tragic nor epic imitation ought to produce a casual pleasure, but that which we have mentioned) it is evident that it will be more excellent than the epopee, in consequence of attaining its end in a greater degree. And thus much concerning tragedy, and the epopee, as to themselves, their species, and their parts, their number and their difference, what the causes are of their being good or bad, and also concerning the objections which may be made to them, and the solutions of the objections.