

HEGEMONIC DECLINE

Present and Past

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Terrorism and Hegemonic Decline

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Terrorism has not been a traditional concern of world-system studies. Compared to the more macro structures of the world-economy and international state system, or long-term trends like globalization, or structural constants like the core-periphery division of labor, terrorism seems sporadic, nonsystemic, and while of great interest and pain upon its occurrence, of little lasting effect in terms of the larger global dynamics of world historical development. All this may be true, but the events of 9/11 have made us think more about terrorism, and with that of the possible terrorism/world-system interface. In what follows we are concerned with two things: explaining terrorism and trying to understand what its presence tells us about the operation of the larger capitalist world-system in which it is not only embedded, but may be a constituent component.

Pieces of the Puzzle

Our present understanding of international terrorism appears as a giant jigsaw puzzle, where we are able to identify some pieces, but not others, such that the

whole thing fits together—with, of course, spaces left by missing pieces. As we do not have all parts to the puzzle, we begin with what pieces are discernable and, on the basis of how they fit together, offer a tentative account of how terrorism fits into the operation of the world-system.

Piece 1: Terrorism Comes in Waves

Our first piece of the puzzle is the observation that international terrorism bunches, clumps, or comes in waves (Rapoport 1999, 2001). It is not a constant, or if it is, it pulses and increases at certain points in time (Enders & Sandler 2001). The present outbreak of Arab-Islamic international terrorism began in the early 1970s with the attack against the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and continues through the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. How long this wave continues remains to be seen. For the working model being developed here we will consider this the third wave of international terrorism.⁴

Moving backward historically, the next generalized wave is that of anarchist-inspired terrorism that swept Europe from the 1870s to 1914, what we will call the second wave. Anarchist-inspired terrorism has been linked to Carlo Pisacane, a mid-nineteenth-century Italian republican extremist who died in a failed revolt against "Bourbon rule." He is best known for the theory of "propaganda by deed" where violence was necessary to help educate the masses for revolution.

Perhaps the first organization to put into practice Pisacane's dictum was the Narodnaya Volya, or People's Will (sometimes translated as People's Freedom), a small group of Russian constitutionalists that had been founded in 1878 to challenge tsarist rule. . . . To them, 'propaganda by deed' meant the selective targeting of specific individuals whom the group considered the embodiment of the autocratic, oppressive state. Hence their victims—the tsar, leading members of the royal family, senior government officials—were deliberately chosen for their 'symbolic' value as the dynastic heads and subservient agents of a corrupt and tyrannical regime (Hoffman 1998).

The Narodnaya Volya assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881, after eight previous plots had failed, and this brought down the power of the tsarist state, which arrested, tried, and hanged most of the plotters. Although this marked the end of the first generation of Narodnaya Volya, successor organizations emerged. During this same general period there was also terrorist activity in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. During the 1880s and 1890s this included Armenian terrorism against Ottoman rule and groups such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which operated in and

around Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia and were seeking an independent Macedonia. Prior to World War I, there were also terrorist organizations in Bosnia.

There, similar groups of disaffected nationalists—Bosnian Serb intellectuals, university students, and even schoolchildren, collectively known as Mlada Bosna, or Young Bosnians—rose against continued Habsburg suzerainty. . . . it was a member of Young Bosnia, Gavrilo Princip, who is widely credited with having set in motion the chain of events that began on 28 June 1914, when he assassinated the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, and culminated in the First World War (Hoffman 1998).

There were other Serbian nationalist groups.

The Narodna Obrana ('The People's Defense' or 'National Defense') had been established in 1908 originally to promote Serb cultural and national activities. It subsequently assumed a more subversive orientation as the movement became increasingly involved with anti-Austrian activities—including terrorism—mostly in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Narodna Obrana's exclusionist pan-Serbian aims clashed with the Young Bosnians' less parochial South Slav ideals, Narodna Obrana actively recruited, trained and armed young Bosnians and Herzegovinians from movements such as the Young Bosnians who were deployed in various seditious activities against the Hapsburgs (Hoffman 1998).

The period was full of high profile terrorist attacks (Joll 1979): In 1878 there was an attempted assassination of the German emperor and the Spanish King Alfonso XII; in 1893 a bomb was thrown into the French chamber of deputies; in 1894 French president Carnot was assassinated and a bomb was detonated in a Paris cafe wounding 20; in 1898 the Empress Elizabeth of Austria was assassinated; in 1901 the American President McKinley was assassinated; and in 1914 so was the Austrian archduke.

Piece 2: Hegemonic Decline

The second piece in the puzzle is the fact that terrorism (as seen in the first and second waves) appears during periods of hegemonic decline. The second wave was during the British decline at the end of the nineteenth/turn of the twentieth centuries, and the third wave was during the American decline at the end of the twentieth/beginning of the twenty-first centuries. This is the key to the proposed world-system explanation of terrorism, for it is the most macro of global factors and as such lies at the heart of any understanding of not only the timing, but the inner reasons for the wave-like appearance of terrorism. We

have long known that economic expansion/contraction (Schumpeter 1939; Kondratieff [1926] 1979), hegemonic peace/rivalry-war (Modelski & Thompson 1995), free trade/protectionism (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, & Brewer 2000), and colonialism/decolonization (Bergesen & Schoenberg 1980) appear in a cyclic format; and we would like to suggest here that international terrorism works similarly and, further, that the correlation between hegemonic decline and outbreaks of terrorist activity is not spurious.

This second piece of the puzzle now leads us further back in the history of the modern world-system, for there were other periods of hegemonic decline besides those of Britain and the United States (Wallerstein 1983; Arrighi 1990; Chase-Dunn 1998). Moving backward we will skip the controversial Dutch hegemony of the seventeenth century because it is hard to believe in the concept of a hegemonic peace (*Pax Britannica*, *Pax Americana*) within a European world-system that was dominated by the generalized conflict of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). Therefore, going back further in time, we come to the more agreed upon Spanish/Habsburg hegemony of the sixteenth century (Boswell & Sweat 1991) and the Thirty Years War, which can reasonably be seen as part of the conflictual succession dynamics generated by Spanish decline.

A Missing Piece?

But the identification of a wave of terrorism within this first cycle of hegemonic decline is less clear. Modern political terrorism is usually thought to arise with the French Revolution of 1789, and so the types of acts associated with contemporary terrorism are not identified for this earlier period, which makes this one of the missing pieces in our jigsaw puzzle. It may be that some hegemonic declines do not manifest terrorist components, or, because the years in and around the Thirty Years War were ones of a noticeable use of terror and atrocities, terrorism and war might have been fused, or mixed together in earlier centuries.⁵ It is possible that terrorism and war are both parts of the conflict involved in the process of hegemonic succession, which is itself a subpart of the overall reproductive dynamics of the world-economy as a whole (Bergesen 1985; Chase-Dunn 1998; Chase-Dunn & Hall 1997). That is, with the growth in technology, globalization, and the overall deepening of the integration of the world-system, there has been an increase in the division of violent labor over the centuries.

During the first cycle of hegemonic-succession struggles (centered on the Thirty Years War), terrorism took the form of marauding, unemployed soldiers and acts of religious violence between Catholics and Protestants (not, in some sense, unlike the Catholic/Protestant terrorism in Northern Ireland) and, as such, was often undifferentiated from the state terrorism and war of princes, or empires at war. What is civilianist versus statist violence and terror overlapped in time, space, and issues. In the earlier period. But over time civilianist and statist violence began to differentiate, such that by the time of

the second cycle of hegemonic-succession struggles, there was now a clear, earlier period (1870–1914) of civilian violence in the form of anarchist terrorism, which was then followed by a period of more purely state violence in the form of World War I, which began in 1914. This major power conflict was triggered by a terrorist incident (the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by the Bosnian radical anarchist Gavrilo Princip) that provided a violence bridge between the earlier phase of terrorism and the later phase of war. If this pattern repeats itself, the present wave of international terrorism (1979 to the present) may represent the first phase of the violence of hegemonic decline that will be followed by a second wave of more official state violence in the form of World War III. If this is so, then terrorism may be an integral component of the unraveling of the hegemonic order (Arrighi & Silver 1999) and, therefore, should be included along with core war (Bergesen, 1985; Modelski & Thompson 1995) as part of the dynamics of systemic reproduction. Until now we have mostly seen great power war as the political violence linked to hegemonic transitions, but the succession dynamic may cast a wider net than previously theorized, for it may also include an earlier phase of terrorism that starts in semiperipheral zones and continues as great power war when it moves to the core. Hegemonic-succession violence has, therefore, two parts: an earlier phase of terrorism and a succeeding phase of state-to-state conflict. In earlier centuries, these components were undifferentiated; but in the same way as the division of economic labor has grown during expansionary periods of full hegemony, so too does the division of violent labor expand under conditions of hegemonic decline.

If we take the European world-system since the sixteenth century, as conventionally theorized, the first hegemony was that exercised by the Spanish Hapsburgs under Charles V, reaching its zenith in the early sixteenth century and then commencing a long period of decline. This is followed by the British hegemony of the late eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries, which then also began a period of decline to be followed by the American hegemony of the mid-twentieth century, which, by most accounts (Chase-Dunn 1998, ch. 9), is now in economic decline. Present economic trends suggest that East Asia will be the next hegemonic center (Bergesen & Sonnett 2000), although some scholars feel that a permanent division of labor between military power in the United States and economic strength in Asia will yield a heretofore never-seen "bifurcation" of economic and military power (Arrighi & Silver 1999) or something like a new "empire" of global capital/capitalists free from the constraints of being situated in hegemonic states (Robinson 2001).

But this strikes us as a mistaken idea that arises only when looking at data in the short term. So, for instance, if one examines the global distribution of the world's 500 largest firms (Bergesen & Sonnett 2000), they are divided about one third between Europe, the United States, and East Asia. This seems like a tripartite division of power—not the sign of a new hegemony—and, as such, support for

the transgeographic capitalist class/empire thesis. But this pattern reflects only the present moment, so that if one examines these statistics back through the 1970s or earlier, what they show is that the number of firms in Europe has been relatively stable, in Asia it has been rising, and in the United States it has been declining; evidence, therefore, for hegemonic decline (United States) and hints about the next hegemonic zone (Asia). These three lines meet only at this moment, and so—if the trend holds—in a few years from now, the U.S. line will continue to decline, Asia's will rise, and Europe's will stay the same. Therefore, the process of hegemonic succession by a new zone or state shows no sign of not operating as it has in the past. Therefore, both the Left and the Right mask this hegemonic decline/succession struggle process when they speak of "empire" to characterize the contemporary period.

When commentators on the Left (*Monthly Review* 2002) and the Right (*New Statesman* 2002) use the designation "empire" for the early twenty-first century, in reality the situation is more likely late hegemony, where the hegemon's economic position has begun to decline but the political/military global stretch is still there. Hence it seems like military for the sake of military and therefore like earlier "empires." It is not that the U.S. is like past Spanish and British empires, although these too were periods of late Spanish and British hegemony. It is the present condition of military predominance in the absence of a clear economic predominance that creates the idea of empire. Hegemonic decline then generates the empire-like behavior of the hegemon that, because of the earlier economic hegemony, has the global military reach, but that now with complete dominance a thing of the past, and a balkanizing world, is left with only the military reach, which appears to many as "empire."

In other words, it is as if the hegemon has been divested of the Gramscian support (Arrighi 1994) of its global order, and what remains is the naked apparatus of coercion and domination (Althusser 1994) without any of the pretensions toward acting for the sake of the "general interest." The difference between a hegemonic state and an empire is that the former acts for the benefit of all while the latter cares only about its internal security and the protection of its power base. The recent emergence of the terms *unilaterality* and *multilaterality* within popular political discourse, the first to designate what the United States is currently doing (acting first and asking questions later) and the second to refer to what it *should* be doing (including the international community's input into its decision-making process), can be seen as evidence of the breakdown of the hegemonic postwar global political order.

We realize this seems ironic: Economic decline leads to military assertion. But it is military assertion by default. No one believes that the United States will be the next economic hegemon during the next sustained upswing of the world-economy, but like Britain at the end of the nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, so today at the end of the twentieth/early twenty-first, it is the extant hegemon that intervenes around the world while the hegemon-in-waiting

(East Asia) concentrates on economic expansion, not military overhead. Britain was certainly all over the globe at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries, but that "empire" did not guarantee that they would be the next economic hegemon. That, as history shows, was the United States. So now, at the turn of the twentieth/twenty-first centuries, who is militarily all over the globe: the United States. And will that facilitate the United States' moving back to economic hegemony? It did not for the British and it seems doubtful that it will for the United States. In sum, empire talk is a manifestation of decline, ironically not realized by the Left or the Right who now speak in these terms.

Piece 3: Semiperipheral Origins

This brings us to the third piece in the puzzle: that terrorism appears to originate in semiperipheral zones. If we consider England, Spain, and say, France, as the core states of the first period, then the Holy Roman Empire of central Germany could be considered something of a more semiperipheral zone. Not as a colony, or a Wallersteinian outlying area, but as an empire, these German lands were not politically structured in what was becoming the dominant political form of the emerging European capitalist world-system: the modern nation state (Modelski 1978). Geographically, it lay just to the east of the dominant "modern" states that constituted the heart, or core, of the European world-system/economy.

The semiperipheral zone for the second wave of terrorism was farther to the east: the Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires (Rapoport 1999).⁶ In the third cycle of hegemonic decline, terrorism again arises in a semiperipheral zone, this time even farther east, in the Arab-Islamic Middle East and parts of Central Asia (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). A semiperipheral zonal location is common to all three waves of terrorism.

Piece 4: The Semiperiphery's Fate

The fourth piece of the terrorism/world-system jigsaw puzzle is the fact that the political forms of these semiperipheral areas in which terrorist activity is largely centered do not survive the hegemonic transition struggles of their respective period. The Holy Roman Empire did not survive the Thirty Years War; the Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires did not survive World War I; and it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the autocratic Arab-Islamic regimes presently in place will not survive the conflicts over accession to American hegemony in the years to come. What replaces these fragile autocratic regimes are strengthened "modern" state forms: after the Holy Roman Empire came polities that would become Prussia and the Netherlands; and after the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires came Turkey, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary states of Eastern Europe. The political

shape of the future of the Middle East, of course, remains open, but it seems a reasonable assumption that some form of contemporary state with democracy, civil rights protected in law, open borders/markets, and legal protections for women and minorities will, in one form or another, come to replace these autocratic Arab-Islamic regimes. This suggests that certain kinds of semi-peripheral states—those that are empire-like, or “pre-modern,” or insufficiently similar to the predominant state to effectively function—will pass away with the tensions, crises, and instabilities in the fight for hegemonic succession.

Piece 5: Religious/Ethnic Nationalism

The international terrorist organizations we have been discussing (including Protestant and Catholic groups during the seventeenth century) all have a mix of religious-ethnic nationalism at, or near, the heart of their rhetoric of grievances. The nationalism part is vis-à-vis a foreign power, colonizing power, or hegemonic influence. The German princes (Protestant) of the seventeenth century were opposed to the political power of the Holy Roman Empire (Catholic). It was nationalism cloaked in religious difference, as such a fusion of religion and ethnicity that often lies at the heart of nationalism, where a people seek a state to represent their national existence (Anderson 1983). Depending upon the period, one or the other seems to be emphasized. If the first wave of terrorism sided toward the religious identities, the second seemed more on the ethnic end. This was Pan-Slavism and national aspirations for the various ethnic peoples contained in Eastern Europe at the intersection of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires. By the third wave, the two poles appear as one: Arab-Islamic terrorism. So: religiously Protestant versus Catholic the first time; ethnically Balkan nationalisms versus Austro-Hungarian/Ottoman empires the second; and now the ethnic/religious combination in the third cycle: Arab-Islamic religious ethnicity against U.S. global dominance. One advantage of this perspective is that it puts in historical context the “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington 1997) or “Jihad versus McWorld” (Barber 1995) and other characterizations (Lewis 1993, 2002) of this most recent wave of terrorism.

Piece 6: Terrorism Spreads Globologically

The hypothesized connection between waves of terrorism and waves of great-power hegemonic-succession wars can be seen in the spread of terrorism from the edges of the semiperipheral zone of origin to the core states at the center of the system. In waves one and two, terrorist incidents provided the trigger for the war phase (Bergesen & Lizardo 2002). The outcome of the third cycle is yet to be decided, but the second cycle saw the terrorist assassination of the Austrian archduke as the trigger to the first of the world wars over British

succession. The trigger for the first wave could also be considered something of a terrorist act, the Second Prague Defenestration, when the two ambassadors of the Emperor Matthias were thrown out the window of the Royal Palace in Prague in 1618. It was the precipitating incident for the start of the Thirty Years War, the true war for Spanish (hegemonic) succession.

If a terrorist act is a trigger, alliance structures provide the connecting tissue between terrorism and war. In the first instance there had been struggles between autonomy-minded Protestant Princes and the Catholic empire since the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which was largely ignored by the Protestants. They continued their conversions—a course of action that angered the Catholics—and in turn many Protestants were reconverted by the Jesuits, which angered the Protestants. In the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire, Catholicism was being reimposed and Protestants campaigned to convert, and this unrest was linked to the broader world through the formation of the Protestant League (1608) by the Protestant Princes in alignment with England and the Netherlands and the Catholic League (1609), which was formed in reaction to an alliance with Spain. These constituted the precursors of the Triple Alliance/Triple Entente system of coalitions that existed prior to 1914. If war erupted most states would be involved, which, given the assassination of the archduke and the Austrian desire for punishment, is exactly what happened. But earlier, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the same scenario was played out, when Emperor Matthias tried to make his Catholic cousin Ferdinand I the king of Protestant Bohemia, which rebelled in 1618, throwing his ambassadors out the window of the palace in Prague. The empire wanted to quash the revolt, and utilizing the alliance system (as was done in 1914), the Bohemians turned to the Protestant League for assistance; in turn, Ferdinand turned to the Catholic League. The Bohemian revolt was suppressed, but soon afterward the other major powers entered the war: first the Danes, then the Swedes, and finally the French, who, while Catholic, sided with the German Protestant states in a classic balance-of-power maneuver. In 1914 the triggering event brought the Austrians, Germans, Russians, French, British, and Americans into World War I, as once again, a terrorist event on the edge of a semiperipheral zone came to envelop the core states in conflict.

The terrorist events emanating from the semiperipheral zone of the Middle East may be an equivalent triggering, or bridging event that sets off the wider conflict of a global war, which in retrospect we would call the first war in the struggle for American (hegemonic) succession. Are there signs of the Protestant League/Catholic League or a Triple Entente/Triple Alliance today? We can only speculate, of course, but the growing distance of Europe from the United States and the growing closeness of Russia to NATO, which when combined in such a way that NATO minus the United States becomes a new alliance of Europe/Russia to be balanced by a Washington/Tokyo/Beijing axis, yield a tentative model for a future alliance system.

The three waves of world-system terrorism are reflective of system expansion. The semiperipheral zone at the edge of the core states at first was only central Germany; but by the second cycle it had moved east to the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires; and now, in the third cycle, it moves east again to Central Asia and the Middle East. Similarly, the hegemonic zone has moved west: Spain to Britain to the United States, and if present predictions hold true, on to East Asia. But there is more than just the geographical expansion of the system, interesting as that is, for the terrorism/war matrix is also a means of political incorporation/transformation. The first semiperipheral zone of terrorism, seventeenth-century central Germany, would give rise to a major core state—Germany—that would participate in the next round of core conflicts over succession to the next hegemon. The new semiperipheral zone of terrorism would move east to the Ottoman/Russian/Austro-Hungarian empires, and after the conflict there we would see dominant states, such as the Soviet Union, emerge. Under the conditions of the Cold War, it was assumed that the oppositional structure was between the United States and the Soviet Union, but that has all changed.⁷ Russia's one-time enemy NATO may very well provide the incorporating structure that binds Europe and Russia while at the same time excluding the United States.

In the most recent period at least, and maybe for the earlier waves as well, there is an interesting relationship between the repressive regimes of semiperipheral states where terrorism arises and terrorism that is becoming distinctly international. It is not that there is no international terrorism without local oppressive state policies, but the latter may significantly contribute to the process. Hegemonic decline involves the twin unraveling of relations between the core states and between core and semiperipheral areas. There is a legitimacy crisis, as autocratic semiperipheral states are often dependent upon support from the hegemon to maintain their repressive regimes, and hegemonic decline undermines that legitimacy. Second, the growing competition between core states, generated by hegemonic decline, manifests itself as rivalry and colonial/neocolonial interventionism in the affairs of peripheral and semiperipheral states, which also destabilizes them (Kowaleski 1991). The mixture then of delegitimation in culture and geopolitical competition destabilizes semiperipheral states at moments of hegemonic decline.

As an example of this, present-day Middle Eastern regimes have come under attack from within with the emergence of terrorist organizations. The semiperipheral autocrats, in turn, repress them, and the terrorists often flee abroad, which then gives rise to a more distinctly "international" character of terrorist activity. Terrorist groups begin to cross the often-porous national borders of peripheral states away from the repressive regimes within which they arose and toward more receptive areas of the periphery, usually rivals of their home state, who are willing to provide a safe haven in exchange for being able to use terrorist groups for their own local geopolitical ambitions. However, this

can be a costly bargain, as the importation of terrorist groups to other states in the periphery may create further instability within those borders. This can lead to new terrorist organizations arising within the protector nation, which in their turn become the victims of violent state response and exportation, thus widening the spiral. So, international terrorism has a world-system origin but not one that is usually thought of; for it is not so much a direct link between semiperipheral terrorists and dislike of the hegemon but a displacement from a repressive semiperipheral regime that leads to new non-semiperipheral targets—like the hegemon and its outposts: the Marine barracks in Lebanon; or the USS *Cole*; or U.S. embassies; or the hegemon itself, as in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and, most dramatically, September 11. Interestingly, the stronger the hegemon, the more secure the semiperipheral autocrat and so less resistance and less domestic terrorism in the semiperiphery. That is why terrorism appears during hegemonic decline and not at its height.

That is the globological irony: It is when hegemonic power weakens that legitimacy slides for those repressive semiperipheral states that are influenced, controlled, or somehow supported by the hegemon, and so resistance has political opportunity (McAdam 1982) and begins to appear domestically in the form of terrorism.

Conclusion

In sum, terrorism/war as involved in hegemonic-succession struggles expands and reproduces the structures of the world-system. Terrorism is not exogenous to the functioning of the global system. It is generated by the system's reproductive logic. It has been going on since the first Hapsburg hegemony and shows no signs of changing in a fundamental way. That is enough to make all worry and think about possible ways to halt these cycles of terrorism and great power war.

Endnotes

1. There are numerous types of terrorism occurring in the world, and various attempts at topology and definition of the phenomenon have already been attempted (e.g., Black 2002; Cooper 2001; Ganor 2001; Gibbs 1989). Therefore, we will not add to the cacophony here. As a working definition, we lean on Perer Chalk's conceptualization of terrorism as "the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing according to the group concerned" (Chalk 1999, p. 151, italics added). We endorse this definition because it differentiates terrorism by sub-state actors from state terrorism, which we acknowledge as a phenomenon of great importance in its own right. However, our focus here is upon Arab-Islamic terrorism and phenomena analogous to it, which are a type of terrorism fitting the above characterization. For data on recent terrorism more broadly writ, see Johnson (2001) and Enders and Sandler (1999).

2. Our periodization of terrorist waves differs from Rapoport's in two major respects. First, for Rapoport, there have been four major waves of terrorism since 1879: nineteenth-century anarchism (1879-1914), anticolonial revolts (1920-1960), Marxist radicalism/ethnic separatism (1960-1979), and the current Islamic-religious fourth wave (1979 to the present). We view his first and fourth waves as terrorist waves proper, for reasons to be explained below (having to do with their connection to larger world-system dynamics); and second, we extend our analysis further back in history, identifying a truly "first wave" of terrorism, during the religious wars of sixteenth-century Europe.

3. The emergence of the Narodnaya Volya stands as a watershed event in the history of modern terrorism. No other organization did more to define and lay down a template of how to conduct and organize terrorist activities (Rapoport 2001). Even after its demise, the model that it laid out would go on to be followed by countless terrorist organizations in the future. Born out of the disaffection of the masses in the corrupt regime of tsarist Russia, terrorism represented a new challenge to established governments, beyond the usual varieties of popular unrest that they had become adept at managing. As Rapoport writes: "Dynamite, a recent invention, was the weapon of choice, and the bomb the terrorist threw distinguished him [sic] from the ordinary criminal because it usually killed the terrorist too, an event more effectively dramatized in the period that saw the rise of the mass daily newspaper" (Rapoport 2001).

4. Boswell and Sweat (1991) provide evidence that indicates that the Hapsburgs, by all empirical accounts, functioned as a Hegemon in terms of preserving political order and relative peace (as measured by the lower incidence and intensity of conflict during their period of dominance).

5. For a historical account that details the coevolution of terrorism and military strategy, see Carr (1996). For Carr, the only factors that distinguish terrorism from warfare in the modern period are "the scope of operations and the fact that terrorists' most often do not represent established national governments" (p. 3).

6. The core is also in the process of expanding to include the upwardly mobile United States, which by 1914 would be in contention for succession to Britain.

7. Enders and Sandler (2000), in their study of recent terrorist trends, find the year 1991 as one of the major turning points of the trajectory of modern terrorism, with terrorist attacks increasing in their brutality since then. They speculate that the demise of the old Soviet Union spelled the end of progressive terrorist organizations based on Left-leaning Marxist principles while clearing the way for the new Islamic fundamentalist brand of terrorism, a far more deadly brew.

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