Notre Dame needs conscience clause
By TODD DAVID WHITMORE
In an earlier column, I mentioned the need for a conscience clause for athletes and coaches at Notre Dame with regard to contracted apparel. Such a clause, placed in every contract with an apparel manufacturer, would read something like the following: "If a coach or athlete after careful examination and discernment cannot in good conscience wear the officially contracted apparel, he or she may wear a reasonable, situationally appropriate alternative." My concern that there be such a clause has arisen from reflection on the problem of the working conditions of those who manufacture the apparel and the recognition that these conditions may provide problems of conscience for a coach or athlete. I say this without making specific judgments about Adidas or Champion companies at the present time and without anticipating making a negative judgment in the future.
The case for such a conscience clause rests on three points. The first concerns the primacy of conscience in the moral life. A traditional way of articulating this primacy is through the case of the ignorant conscience: It is better that a person of erring conscience follow the dictates of that conscience than for that person to do the objectively right thing when he or she thinks it is wrong. It is best that the person do what he or she thinks is good or right. Thomas Aquinas discusses the point by saying that the will "at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil."
More recently, the Second Vatican Council speaks of conscience as our "most secret core and sanctuary," where we are alone with God," who summons us to "do good and avoid evil." To obey one's conscience, "is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged." This does not mean that what our conscience tells us is always right, only that it should be obeyed. While conscience "frequently errs from invincible ignorance without losing its dignity," if we ignore our own considered judgments of what is good and evil, we cut at the core of the moral life.
Some thinkers add the qualifier that it is better that the person be coerced to do what is judged (by others) to be right in cases where following the erring conscience would lead to "scandal," that is, would bring shame upon the person and the Church. I will return to this.
The second point is the secondary or instrumental nature of our licensee's relationship to sport. This is not to say that contracting with the apparel companies does not have significant benefit for our sports teams — for instance, allowing us to hire a high-powered coach with the incentive that he or she can draw non-salary income from such contracts. It is simply to point up the fact that such money is not intrinsic to the performance of the sport. At best, the income from such contracts is what is called an "extrinsic good." Moreover, not wearing the apparel of a particular company can hardly be considered a scandal.
In cases where there is conflict between what is intrinsically good and what is instrumental, the former ought to be allowed to take precedence. Moreover, I am told that Notre Dame allowed Pat Garrity to wear Nike shoes (with the swoosh covered) for reasons of comfort. If we can allow alternatives for comfort, it seems that we can allow alternatives for conscience.
The third point is that a legally explicit conscience clause will help avoid scandal. Earlier in the semester, James Keady spoke at Notre Dame. He argues that St. John's University forced him to resign as assistant soccer coach when he refused to wear Nike apparel. St. John's counters that it did not. The parties went beyond disagreement to calling each other untruthful. Without judging who has the story right, it can be viewed as a scandal whenever members of the Body of Christ call each other liars. A conscience clause would have avoided this situation.
Analogy with the question of conscience regarding war can further clarify what is at stake. As late as 1956, Pope Pius XII said that lay Catholics could not be conscientious objectors; war is too grave a matter to leave up to individual conscience. The Second Vatican Council changed this to allow for conscientious objection — that is, the legal recognition of the objection to all wars. Since then, the Church has been pressing for legal recognition of "selective conscientious objection": the objection on "just war theory" grounds that some wars may be just, but the one in question is not. Without such legal recognition, selective conscientious objectors are treated as criminals.
An athlete or coach could be an economic selective conscientious objector: While affirming the market economy in general, he or she may still object to the specific practices of a particular company. Without the legal recognition of this view, such a person is left to the whims of his or her coach or athletic director.
Perhaps even more significantly, no such conscience clause would communicate to the world that our university regards relations with the apparel companies to be a matter more grave than war.
Todd David Whitmore is the director of the program in Catholic social tradition and an associate professor in theology. His column appears every other Friday.
The views expressed in this column are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Observer.
All Viewpoint Stories for Friday, November 19, 1999
