After Saddam is gone, what's next for Iraq?
Major Gary Masapollo
Viewpoint: Iraq
Editor's note: The following is the first of part of a two-part piece considering the role the U.S. military will play in a postwar Iraq. The conclusion will appear on Monday.
As President Bush and his national security team assemble their final plans for a possible military operation against Iraq, all estimates call for a post-conflict administration of Iraq that will include a heavy American military presence in that country for an indefinite period. The post-conflict stakes within Iraq are very high.
If the U.S. forces do not take the lead role in leading a post-Hussein Iraq, the country could potentially fall apart or descend into chaos and violence. If American forces are perceived by the Iraqi people and/or the international community of being in there for any longer than an interim period, they run the risk of being accused of becoming a new imperial and occupying power.
While many of the specific elements of the post-conflict military plans are still classified, the final decision on what role the U.S. military will play in the region after Saddam Hussein is out of power will be initially predicated on how the transition to the post-Hussein period occurs. Under most of the possible scenarios, the major task for the U.S. military following the transition of power will be in "shaping and supporting the security environment."
Any plan utilizing U.S. military forces has to include provisions for countering factional instability, restoring basic Iraqi government services, transitioning power to the civil authorities, the possible apprehension of Iraqi war criminals, the seizing of state-owned oil fields and the disassembling of the clandestine Iraqi intelligence service; all while U.S. military forces continue their search for Iraqi chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction as its "endstate." This will all require a substantial commitment of the total U.S. military force — including the post-conflict capabilities of special operations forces, civil affairs and psychological operations teams and the substantial mobilization of the nation's National Guard and Reserve Component support personnel.
Given both the international reluctance to participate in any military coalition against Iraq and the magnitude of the post-conflict reconstruction tasks as envisioned by most military strategists, the U.S. military must be prepared to govern Iraq for an indefinite period in the future. This task is not that unfamiliar to the current U.S. military leadership. In recent times, U.S. military leaders have participated in various aspects of the civil governing environment, namely in Somalia (1992-93), Haiti (1994-96), Bosnia (1995-present) and within Kosovo (1999-present).
The past missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo were all in conjunction with the United Nations. The current post-conflict plan has not guaranteed such participation by the United Nations or other international agencies. In a country of over 24 million persons, any post-conflict plans appear on the surface to be the most ambitious American military effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. Without international participation, the U.S. military should plan for a long and protracted role in managing the reconstruction of the country. At a minimum, in order to be successful, the U.S. military must be able to effectively counter facilitate stability, transition power to the civil authorities and engage the international community.
The immediate aftermath will find American troops trying to stabilize a post-Hussein environment that could involve U.S. troops directly confronting those elements wishing to seek "anarchy, revenge and score-settling" in a post-Hussein Iraq.
One of the biggest problems facing U.S. military planners in the postwar period will be in the disarming of the over 150 Iraqi tribal groups. While factional tribes played a major part of the U.S. military success in Afghanistan, most of the Iraqi tribes have been directly supported by Hussein in the past and could remain loyal to him and form into insurgent forces.
Another problem facing U.S. military planners is the prospect that the various tribal groups will form into factional armies and began fighting each other, similar to what occurred between rival groups in postwar Afghanistan. Such an unstable and fragmented environment will create a particular security concern that the post-conflict Iraq is unsuitable for any reconstruction and international relief presence as it has in Afghanistan.
U.S. military commanders on the ground must be vigilant of rival ethnic parties wishing to partition or fragment Iraq in the post-hostilities period. Potential threats range from the Kurdish-dominated north to the Shiite Muslim-dominated south, as well as from a variety of Iraqi exile groups located outside of Iraq. Ironically, when Congress passed the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998, it officially recognized six different Iraqi exile groups as possible alternatives to Saddam Hussein's ruling Baath party. Now, any one of them could legitimately attempt to assert control in a post-conflict Iraq.
Possible military actions by our NATO ally, Turkey is of equal concern to U.S. military planners. Turkey may view the instability along its border by the Kurdish-controlled north as a way of guaranteeing a say in shaping post-war Iraq, namely in preventing any emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkish officials have long been concerned of any efforts that incite the Kurdish community to seek independence. Without any substantial U.S. military monitoring along the Turkish-Iraq borders, this condition could be left unchecked and erupt into a severe international crisis quickly. The United States has expressed its concern. Turkish officials and both groups have recently met and discussed these issues with the leading Kurdish officials.
Author's Note: On behalf of the Army, Air Force and Navy ROTC staffs, we would like to personally acknowledge the personal sacrifice and selfless dedication of those faculty, staff and students who have been called to active duty over the past few months. You truly reflect the meaning of the phrase, "God, Country, Notre Dame."
Major Gary Masapollo is a current member of the Notre Dame Military Science Department (ROTC) faculty and is a Civil Affairs officer with the U.S. Army. Prior to being assigned to Notre Dame in 2000, he participated in U.S. Army civil-military operations in post-war Kosovo.
The views expressed in this column are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Observer.
All Viewpoint Stories for Friday, February 14, 2003
