I spy ... Russia
Martha Merritt is an assistant professor of political science.
The views expressed in this column are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Observer.
My favorite object at the recently opened International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C., is a small lipstick-shaped pistol. No wonder the Cold War spawned suspicion and paranoia. The attractive woman next to you could reach for her cosmetic case, twirl the tube and bam! Death in KGB Red.
We live in an age when spying is glorified and wars are hot, none more so than the pending conflict with Iraq. Given that Russia has shifted from a Cold War foe to one of the strongest allies of the United States in the war on terrorism, her continued opposition to the war on Iraq is worth pondering.
I would like to consider here some reasons for Russian resistance before returning to the notion of spying and its relevance for our country's foreign policy. Russia offers perspective on the price of using allies as reluctant supporters when we have escalated into war, rather than as participants in decision-making.
Russian opposition to the war on Iraq falls into several categories. The first concerns Russia's traditional ties to the region and investment in Iraq's infrastructure. Put simplistically, Iraq owes Russia billions, and some U.S. government officials assume that this debt is Russia's chief concern. I am sure that the flurry of communication among countries in the last weeks included assurances to Russia that Iraq's debts would be honored in the event of an invasion. Yet this has not been persuasion enough.
The Russian media have almost universally denounced the U.S. claim that a war against Iraq would be a "preemptive strike." Newspapers in Russia occupy a wide ideological spectrum, while television an even narrower range. Though under President Vladimir Putin the ability of especially the television media to criticize has been curtailed in significant ways, coverage of foreign policy is not generally one of them. Editorial comment has nevertheless been universal in arguing that preemption — averting a pending attack — fails to characterize Iraqi mobilization.
With a global war on terrorism absorbing many resources, Russian critics wonder about the need to expand the front and express concern about North Korean responses. The more paranoid, possibly lipstick-toting among them believe that the U.S. campaign against Iraq is just one more step in a post-Cold War effort to assert American global domination.
Finally, President Putin has built a pro-western foreign policy around the desire for better trade relations and more foreign investment for the Russian economy. Putin has an especially strong European focus. He sees Germany as one of Russia's most important partners. Russia is in the painful position of having to choose between alliance with the dominant powers of Europe on the war or alliance with the lone superpower. So far, Putin has chosen the former.
The current mania for spying in the U.S. (in the museum's interactive exhibits, films, even Barbie dolls) neglects the risk of looking through a pre-determined filter of analysis: We are watching this factory because we think weapons are manufactured here, we are watching this person because we think (s)he is suspicious.
The danger has always been that setting our gaze with intent shapes perception and interpretation. What the president considers irrefutable evidence of Saddam Hussein's support for al-Qaeda, for example, has not stood up in the court of international opinion. The CIA recently offered an assessment to Congress that Iraq does not present a compelling security risk at present. Could this independence be sustained during wartime?
Wars privilege the intelligence community, but they also shackle the range of acceptable interpretation. This is one reason why long wars are bad for government and state-society relations. Russia's civil wars with Chechnya (1994-96 and 1999-present) offer a textbook case of the expansion of state secrecy and the sacrifice of individual lives — be they soldiers, victims of soldiers or audience members in a theater in Moscow — for something defined, with less accountability, as the public good.
We move closer to war with the support of staunch but doubting allies, such as Great Britain and Australia, and staunchly grateful allies, such as the countries of eastern Europe. Any military effort by the United States is a chance for friendly countries to demonstrate their loyalty and to reap the rewards of doing so, in addition to gaining significance as international players.
Given what appears to be a long-standing personal determination on the part of President Bush to wage war on Iraq, most countries are now deliberating whether they should stand in front of an accelerating train or jump on. Russia quietly presses for a continuation of diplomatic efforts.
If Russia does end up supporting the war on Iraq, it will happen because the United States was unstoppable, not because the U.S. has a monopoly on wisdom. And therein lies one difference between foregone conclusion and the ongoing struggle to see clearly.
All Viewpoint Stories for Tuesday, February 11, 2003
