Over the two weeks, our university has sponsored a forum entitled, "Peace and War 2003: Debating the Issues," for the purpose of an academic and moral discussion of a seemingly imminent U.S.-led war against Iraq, or more specifically, against Saddam Hussein. These faculty members presented the pros and cons about the war and tried to convince the audience of their viewpoints and stances.

Despite their eloquent argument and persuasive evidence, one important question is absent in their address, that is, why the U.S. chooses such timing to disarm the Saddam regime rather than in the wake of Iraq's initial defiance of the relevant U.N. resolutions. Put another way, what has spurred the U.S. to pursue such a hard-line course of action on Iraq instead of the previously endorsed U.N.-led inspection, containment or deterrence?

In a special issue of Time magazine, Romesh Ratnesar referred to Paul Wolfowitz's role in initiating and pressing the case against Iraq in the aftermath of Sept. 11. He wrote, "An Afghan war in his [Wolfowitz's] view had the makings of a quagmire. The larger threat to American security was sitting not in a cave in Afghanistan but in a Baghdad bunker." The unconventional attacks of Sept. 11 alarmed the Bush administration of potential dangers from better equipped and organized "rogue states."

The so-called rogue states cannot pose a conventional threat to the U.S. homeland and overseas military bases, but they can resort to some unconventional means of this kind to inflict considerable damage on U.S. material wealth and morality. The coinage of "evil axis" reflects the shift in focus of U.S. anti-terror war from terrorist networks to state actor with the likelihood to become enemies of the U.S. The Sept. 11 event provides the U.S. with optimal opportunity and excuses to reassess its strategic configuration and maximize its security interests.

There is a strong possibility that disarming Iraq is merely the first step on Bush's agenda of safeguarding the United States' global primacy. Fundamentally, the legitimacy of U.S. predominance runs parallel to U.S. superior power in almost all areas.

Such unconventional attacks may erode the U.S. power and shake the building block of U.S. primacy. As a result, the U.S. will do what it can to tame and even eradicate the sources of trouble. In Iraq's case, the resort to war will serve as the most efficient and decisive method because of Saddam's notorious records and the United States' uncontroversial hegemonic status in the Middle East. By contrast, the United States' prudent North Korean policy is indicative of the entangled great power interests in Northeast Asia.

Those who think that oil or justice is the ulterior motive behind the United States' warlike behavior have to answer why the U.S. failed to wage war to disarm Saddam after his defiance of the U.N. resolutions.

Shan Huang

graduate student

Fischer Graduate Residence

Feb. 4

• Celebrating Catholic faith in Uganda
  
• Boston College has provided an example to follow
  
• Title IX solution is to exempt football
  
• Timing matters in Iraq