In 1980, Menachem Begin reportedly made the statement that if Ariel Sharon was made the Minister of Defense he would surround the Knesset with tanks and execute a military coup. Following his reelection in 1981, however, Begin’s attitude had apparently changed and Sharon was appointed Minister of Defense in the newly formed Israeli cabinet. The PLO in Southern Lebanon had become troublesome and Begin had decided it was time to get them out. The course of action he desired was a limited one, perhaps slightly larger than Operation Litani and much more successful than Litani had been. To accomplish his goal, Begin appointed a war cabinet of which Sharon was part. Within a little over a year, Sharon succeeded in leading a naïve Israeli Cabinet and Prime Minister into a full-scale war in Lebanon it did not approve of by exploiting their ignorance and utilizing intentional deception. The integrity of Israel’s democracy was threatened by the war as decisions were made outside of and without the approval of the government. By manipulating the Cabinet to serve his own ends, Sharon executed a variation of the coup Begin had earlier said would be accomplished by force. This paper will not argue whether or not Sharon should bear responsibility for the war and the problems resulting from it. What it will focus on is the Israeli national security decision-making process and how its structure, or lack of, made possible Sharon’s virtual coup. Namely, what is the history of Israel’s national security establishment? What are the flaws of the decision-making process? How were these flaws the crucial factor in Israel’s extensive involvement in Lebanon? And finally, what steps may be taken to remedy the problem?
One of the most difficult missions facing the first prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, was the establishment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as the only lawful army of the new state. To accomplish this he had to eliminate the many existing military organizations such as the Palmach or incorporate them into the IDF according to Section 18 of the Law and Administration Ordinance. In doing so, Ben-Gurion ensured the safety of the new government from the influence of political groups backed by military might. The law established the IDF as the sole army of the state, but did not state who had control over state security matters. At this point in time, control over security matters fell to the government by virtue of Section 29 of the Basic Law: The Government (1968). Section 29 provided that "subject to any law, the government has the authority to act on behalf of the State, whenever the power to act is not conferred by law on any other body" – authority residually granted. (Previous to 1968, the general authority to manage state security matters was placed with the government through general executive powers recognized by the Supreme Court). The residual powers according to the Basic Law: The Government were broadly stated though, and failed to delineate how power should be divided between the government and the defense minister and between those two and the chief of staff of the army. This absence of definition was gravely viewed, especially following the Yom Kippur War. A commission appointed to investigate the war concluded that the lack of a definition of the powers existing in the present situation in the area of security, which is an area of vital importance, makes effective action difficult, blurs the focus of legal responsibility, and even creates lack of clarity and confusion amongst the general public.
In response to this dilemma, Basic Law: The IDF was passed in 1976. It determined the relationship between the three authorities mentioned above. The Basic Law: The IDF officially established the principle of civilian control of the military and the subordination of the chief of staff to the government and the defense minister. The status Ben-Gurion had pursued from the start was now laid down in the law. What it did not establish was the division of authority between the government and the defense minister in regards to army matters. The power to make national security decisions rests vaguely in the executive branch (prime minister and cabinet). In the final analysis, the concept that the military has been subordinated to political civilian control is firmly established. But the key question of who decides what, when and how remains unaddressed and is "only resolved on the basis of chance, custom, historical precedent, and, above all, an intricate configuration of personal relations." This leaves us in Israel’s present state, where there is no defined method at the executive level for reaching national security decisions and no independent advisory body to the executive branch on national security issues.
National security by its nature is an essential part of a nation’s well-being. For Israel, whose existence has been threatened since inception, this is even more the case. One would think that Israel would have an advanced decision-making process, utilizing the most effective tools available today to decision-makers. Accordingly, Israel’s military establishment, the IDF, is one of the most advanced in the world; Israel’s intelligence assets, the Mossad and Shin Bet, are world-famous; and the military’s R&D program is developed to a higher level than many countries much larger in size. It is surprising, therefore, to discover that "Israel not only lacks basic tools of policy planning and analysis at the highest level of decision-making, not only falters at the level of elementary interdepartmental coordination, but that at the summit it has, in effect, no organized and systematic decision-making process at all." What’s also missing is an independent advisory body to the executive branch. There is no institutional provision that provides the prime minister with an independent advisor who could keep him aware of all decision-making options and ramifications. A comprehensive summary of what is lacking in regards to national security decision-making in Israel is contained in a study carried out by Israel’s National Defense College. It asked the question of "whether the prime minister and other top decision makers have at their disposal the necessary tools in order to ensure an optimal and effective decision-making process." The following deficiencies are listed:
Lack of a clear definition of the goals and aims of national security policy.
Lack of periodic reexamination of basic assumptions. Many decisions are taken on the basis of assumptions and doctrine which were accepted in the past, but have never been reassessed in the light of new data.
Lack of systematic staff work at the highest level. Questions are brought before the decision-making forum with no certainty as to the accuracy and/or objectivity of the data and information presented.
Limited approach to problems. Each problem is dealt with individually, with an eye to specific and immediate goals. An overall view is lacking, as is an examination of each issue in a wider context.
Lack of overall national planning. The future is not taken into consideration and not given enough weight in the decision on the "here and now." There is no attempt at long-range planning, i.e., decision-making with a view to progress in time toward desired goals.
Responsive and unplanned actions. As a result of the lack of policy planning, decisions are made in reaction – sometimes hastily, even spontaneously – to immediate events, without thinking ahead and without proper examination of future consequences.
Postponement of non-essential decisions. Decision-making bodies tend to deal with the pressing issues – those which are immediately relevant – and neglect issues of a hypothetical nature. Thus when an issue suddenly becomes urgent, it is decided without time for in-depth study.
Lack of equilibrium among the diverse systems and establishments: the IDF wields a disproportionate and totally dominating influence on the decision-making process. The IDF has at its disposal the most sophisticated and efficient staff system, far outweighing the staffs of the prime minister, the Foreign Ministry, and the defense minister all put together, and as a result it exercises virtually exclusive power over strategic and tactical questions.
In some instances throughout Israel’s history, the decision through hindsight may appear to be the right one and the end result might have been favorable. Yet this does not minimize the failings of the decision-making process. In the long run, the negative consequences are greater as will be seen in the case study of the Lebanon War. One example of a decision that turned out to be favorable is the waiting period before the Six Day War. Today it is widely known that Israel gained huge political rewards for withholding their attack on Egypt for several weeks until all other political options had been exhausted, but at the time these political rewards were unknown. The waiting period was not a result of policy analysis, of examination of options, or of weighing military versus political considerations. It was the by-product of the hesitation and lack of self-confidence of many Cabinet members, and of the government’s inability to reach a decision; it represented a desperate attempt to avert war by political means. At no time in the three week waiting period did the Israeli government see their stalling as preparing the international political climate for a preemptive strike. In fact, the IDF was applying massive pressure for immediate action and it was only confusion and fear which prevented it from getting its way.
This brings us to our next point. A key problem in Israel’s national security decision-making process is the total absence of staff facilities of any sort for the decision-maker. The result is a lack of policy planning, evaluation and position papers reflecting an overall view, as well as a general absence of proper staff preparation for negotiations or for any political or political-military action. What fills this void is the IDF (point 8 in the National Defense College Study). Only the military possess the staff needed for strategy development. The IDF has at its disposal the most sophisticated, complex, and efficient staff system in Israel. The intelligence, planning and operational branches of the IDF mold Israel’s security doctrines. What results is a very negative effect on the efficiency of the decision-making process. An integrative approach to national security issues, stressing political, economic, and domestic factors is lacking. This is not to say that the IDF is narrow-minded. The IDF represents a certain view and is an interested party – it simply cannot represent an overall point of view objectively which is of primary importance at the prime ministerial and cabinet levels. The same can be said of a staff unit at the defense minister’s level, which will become evident when we look at Defense Minister Sharon’s unit for national security in the next section. To illustrate this point we have Henry Kissinger’s case of the bogus options, which he used in his own arguments for a strong national security council staff. For the purposes of this paper, the scenario Kissinger sets up will be applied to the Israeli situation.
Following a hostile action committed by an Arab country, the Israeli Cabinet will convene to decide on Israel’s response. The IDF will decide in advance what action it wants to take and present its proposal to the Cabinet. In effect, the Cabinet has no other real option before it. To conceal this fact, though, the IDF will present the Cabinet with three options. The first option is to do nothing, a choice that is totally unacceptable to the government for domestic reasons if for no other. The second option is the preferred course of action. The third option is a major military action which, under the circumstances, is totally implausible. Many times, these options are presented with pro/con position papers, with an emphasis on the negative for options one and three and positives for the second. Thus, the ministers may see themselves as choosing from alternatives when, in reality, they had only one viable option before them. In most real-life situations there are options which involve a non-military response, yet there is no one to present them to the Cabinet. As will be seen in the case of the Lebanon War, Sharon often employed the "bogus option" to get what he wanted from the Cabinet.
Where does the role of the defense minister fall in the midst of all this? Are defense ministers a superior chief of staff? There is substantial evidence for concluding that most of the defense ministers acted as if they were superior chiefs of staff, and saw themselves as authorized to get involved in the administration of the army, and even to give orders in the conduct of operations. It is important to look at whether defense ministers have adhered to the constitutional provisions requiring military operations, their aims, and there scope to come within the sole authority of the government.
During Ben-Gurion’s reign (1948-1953; 1955-1963) the strengths of one man made up for the weaknesses of the system. His authority was seldom questioned, his knowledge of every sphere of national security was daunting, and he had an amazing ability to place his tactical decisions in the scope of the nation’s long-term objectives. Ben-Gurion occupied both the positions of prime minister and defense minister while in office. He alone determined the priorities of the IDF in 1948 and without prior government support launched the 1956 War. While Ben-Gurion did not adhere to the constitutional provisions, his situation was singularly unique. His knowledge and foresight and the fact that he was the founding ruler of the state almost exempts him. Unfortunately, under Ben-Gurion the weaknesses of the decision-making system were hidden and only appeared once he left office:
So long as Ben-Gurion held both positions [prime minister and defense minister], his personal stature was a guarantee that military officers would not exceed their role. But when the two positions were divided, and when former military professionals became ministers of defense, the lines of authority became murky and an avenue for military influence on policy-making was opened up. This peaked in the Lebanese War in 1982, when Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon conducted his own policy rather than that of the cabinet . . .
What made Sharon’s manipulation of the Cabinet possible was the lack of any independent advisory committee to the executive branch, particularly to the Prime Minister. If one had existed, cabinet ministers and Prime Minister Begin might not have been led down the disastrous path that Sharon took them on.
"The most striking point about Israel’s march toward war from August 1981 until June 1982 was that while it forged ahead implacably, month after month, there were repeated signs that Ariel Sharon’s clockwork fantasy of reconstituting the Middle East along new political lines was riddled with flaws. Each of these indications . . . was consistently ignored by the defense minister . . . It cannot be said that they were disregarded by the Cabinet because they were never brought to the Cabinet’s attention."
The War in Lebanon is a textbook case on how not to make decisions, and highlights to the utmost the flaws inherent in the Israeli national security decision-making process or lack thereof. The first part of this case study will show how through the lack of an independent oversight and advisory committee both the Cabinet and Prime Minister Begin were deceived and tricked by Sharon. The second part will demonstrate that the lack of an adequate advising staff to Defense Minister Sharon led him to make false assumptions which would prove lethal to his own plan.
The defense minister is the intermediary between the government and the military. The chief of staff is directly subordinate to the defense minister, and the defense minister reports to the prime minister and the cabinet. Sharon utilized his position as the single link between these two bodies to isolate one from the other and lead them down two different paths. A Cabinet meeting on June 5 and a General Staff meeting on the previous day illustrates the discrepancies. The Cabinet meeting ended with the conclusion that any war in Lebanon would be limited and that confrontation with the Syrians would be avoided at all costs. It would be call Operation Peace for Galilee. The meeting with the Generals outlined the implementation of "Operation Big Pines" to link up with Lebanese Christian forces outside Beirut; they also spoke of cutting off the Beirut-Damascus highway which would force the Syrians to engage the IDF in battle. Thus can be seen two completely different definitions of what the war would encompass. Over the course of the war, Sharon would reduce the Cabinet to a "genteel debating society" that received regular but carefully censored reports and was never advised as to what would likely result from the IDF’s anticipated moves.
In order to understand Sharon’s reasons for deception, we must back up six months to January 1982. One of the first tasks on Sharon’s agenda after being appointed Minister of Defense was to deal with the PLO and Syrian presence in Lebanon. He instructed the General Staff of the IDF to work out a plan for what was to be called "Operation Big Pines" with the following objectives:
to remove Israeli settlements in the North from the range of terrorist shelling;
to crush the terrorists in Beirut, militarily and politically;
to set up a legitimate government in Lebanon which would sign a peace treaty with Israel; and
to insure the evacuation of Syrian troops from the Beirut area.
Operational plans were drawn up based on an existing plan. They were part of a larger plan of attack that had been drawn up a year earlier at the request of Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan. Prime Minister Begin was in full support of this plan at the beginning. Sharon, Eitan and Begin presented the plan to the Cabinet on December 20, 1981. The reaction from the Cabinet was not welcoming. A large number of the Cabinet members were in opposition to the plan. They expressed concerns that the plan would draw Syria into a large-scale conflict. Another worry was that it might jeopardize the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Realizing the extent of the opposition in the Cabinet, Begin decided to take the proposal off the agenda.
The Cabinet’s decision on "Operation Big Pines" and Begin’s subsequent withdrawal of support convinced Sharon and Eitan that approval for a large-scale IDF operation would only happen if the PLO first shelled Northern Israel. If Cabinet approval could be obtained for limited air raids against PLO positions, the PLO might respond with shelling. Over the next six months, Sharon attempted to push through air raids during perceived windows of opportunity. Once a limited IDF operation was given approval, Sharon knew he could then expand the operation in its scope.
The first window opened on January 28, when PLO terrorists infiltrated a northern settlement. Three terrorists were killed and three escaped. Sharon met with Begin and both decided to propose an air strike to the Cabinet. Led by Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich, the Cabinet opposed and Begin acquiesced. After this, Sharon knew that Begin was no longer entirely in his corner. A second opportunity arose on March 25, when a terrorist attack on the Gaza Strip and Israeli soldier was killed and three wounded. Sharon proposed to the Cabinet that PLO bases be bombed, but once again the opposition prevailed. The third opportunity proved fruitful for Sharon. On April 3, a second secretary at the Israel Embassy in Paris was assassinated. The Cabinet approved Sharon’s proposal for an air raid but it was postponed until April 21. Unfortunately for Sharon the PLO did not react as he wanted, responding with limited shelling but not enough to warrant an invasion of Lebanon.
Following this last failure, Sharon decided to propose a more modest plan than "Operation Big Pines." In May 1982, he brought the new plan before the Cabinet and was again rejected, but this time by a closer margin. On June 3 1982, Israel’s ambassador to England, Shlomo Argov, was almost assassinated. Once again Sharon was able to gain approval for an air strike. This time the PLO retaliated with heavy shelling as Sharon had hoped. At this point, Sharon was able to accrue enough support from the Cabinet for a limited assault into Lebanon called Operation Peace for Galilee that would begin on June 5. The Cabinet was given to understand that the entire operation would take no longer than 48 hours and that its purpose was to establish a forty-kilometer buffer zone north of Israel’s border and to destroy as much of the PLO as possible in the process. The general assumption was that the IDF would then be replaced by a multinational force.
Having at first assured the Cabinet that a confrontation with Syria would be avoided, Sharon waited until the following night of June 6 before presenting to the Cabinet the dilemma of what should be done about PLO forces hiding behind Syrian lines. Sharon told the Cabinet that there was two alternatives: to attack the Syrians or to force them to withdraw by presenting a threat to their rear. Not wanting to have a confrontation with Syria, the Cabinet chose the latter. Sharon succeeded in deceiving them in two different ways at this point. First, those were not the only two options available. Sharon had utilized Kissinger’s "bogus options." There were other non-confrontational measures that could have been pursued such as negotiation with Syria or confining the attacks against the PLO to South Lebanon. Second, the advice Sharon provided the Cabinet with was false. The record showed, and Sharon knew, that a flanking maneuver would not cause the Syrians to withdraw, but would instead lead into direct confrontation with them. The flanking maneuver served Sharon in two ways: 1) The Syrians would be drawn into a fight and 2) The IDF would be in better position to take the Damascus road. Sharon’s mode of dealing with Prime Minister Begin and the Cabinet became typical. In the early days of the conflict he would usually approach both with a proposal in the eleventh hour that was meant to save men in the field who were in mortal danger. After initiating conflict with the Syrians, Sharon knew he had to take out their air defenses. On June 9, he presented the situation to Begin and the Cabinet such that an action against the SAMs needed to be taken in order to protect the Israeli soldiers. In reality, the SAMs needed to be taken out to preserve the Israeli ground initiative. Sharon continued to get approval from the Cabinet for incremental moves towards Beirut. This was done ad hoc by proposing small movements and avoiding discussion of strategic implementation. Without adequate advising, the Cabinet could not put the pieces of what Sharon was doing together. According to Ezer Weizman, Sharon always knew how to present his positions in a way that would render them acceptable . . . his fingers roamed freely over maps which were utterly incomprehensible for most of his colleagues. On occasion I had a feeling that the marks on the maps were not accurate. But nobody around would admit that he does not understand much about such matters
The entire Cabinet was thus exceedingly dependent on the information and assessment provided by Sharon, who was determined to expand the war from the outset. At the end of the first week of fighting, it was becoming clear to most Cabinet members that the IDF was implementing a variation of Big Pines. Most of the Cabinet began to suspect that they had become victim to a carefully contrived deceit. Faced with this fomenting opposition, Sharon had to resort to extra-legal means. He would simply not ask for approval until after the action had been taken – a fait accompli. A cease-fire was implemented on June 11. Over the next two days, however, Israeli forces continued to move toward Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. At the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday, June 13, Sharon was asked to explain the continued fighting after the cease-fire had become effective. Sharon replied that it was merely response to terrorist fire – a blatant lie. The Cabinet also asked him why Beirut was being bombed and Sharon replied that it was only to remove terrorist threats – another lie. In reality, IDF forces were in a final push to join up with Lebanese Christian forces in Beirut. "Again, the Cabinet had been presented with a fait accompli: contrary to the impression left on them by Sharon who had said more than once that it was part of IDF tradition never to enter an Arab capital , army units were then being directed into the city." This maneuver would prove to be critical. It shed light on just how far Begin and the Cabinet had been deceived. It also transformed Operation Peace for Galilee from a limited military action to protect the settlements of Northern Israel into a war to conquer an Arab capital.
Not only did Sharon manage to deceive Begin and the Cabinet, but was also misinformed himself – a situation which might not have occurred had he been better advised. Sharon had two fundamental assumptions going into the war. One was that the Phalange forces (the Lebanese Christian forces) would assist the attack once Israel’s invasion was underway. Sharon believed that Israel would eliminate most of the PLO force and remove Syria from the war. As he understood it, the Phalange forces would then sweep through and clean the PLO out of Beirut and install Israel-friendly regime. Unfortunately, he was way off the mark. If he had been properly advised, he would have known what the IDF knew: namely that The Phalange forces were not properly equipped to go on the offensive. Their military capabilities were limited to the defensive.
A second part of this first assumption was that Sharon believed he would be able to successfully install Bashir Gemayel, the Phalange leader, as the new President of Lebanon. He also believed the new Phalange government would be pro-Israeli. Events unfolded contrary to these expectations. Bashir was assassinated shortly after taking power. His brother, an incapable leader, was then installed which proved worthless. In regards to the new relations to be formed between the two countries, the Phalange proved less than friendly. While wanting to attain power, the Phalange also wanted to maintain ties with the Arab world.
The second assumption Sharon made going into the conflict was that the IDF would achieve there objectives quickly with few casualties. After all, this was a battle-proven elite fighting force taking on a paramilitary group and a third-rate Syrian army. Sharon had the support of the IDF and particularly Chief of Staff Eitan. The IDF, and particularly Eitan, had been in favor of implementing a plan similar to Big Pines for over a year. In most of Sharon’s dealings with the Cabinet he was backed up by the support of Eitan. Sharon had forgotten his military background though. The destination of final objectives is of the utmost importance in a military venture, for to no small degree to the ends determine the means. If the Destination of Northern Command’s forces was indeed Beirut, then the best course would be to land forces in the enemies rear along the Beirut-Damascus highway. The problem was that such a move would expose the great disparity between what Sharon was briefing the General Staff on and what he was telling the Cabinet. The IDF thus had to pursue a more conventional and predictable route – a straight forward thrust into Lebanon. As a result, the IDF did not advance as quickly as Sharon had planned on and sustained much heavier casualties than he had ever anticipated Sharon’s need to deceive the Cabinet, the public and the superpowers with regard to his real intentions entailed a heavy cost. It meant that the advance between June 12 and June 24 could only be conducted at a low profile. As a result, IDF infantry and paratroop forces were ordered to advance without air and artillery support. Heavy Syrian resistance could not be overcome by firepower. Unable to extricate themselves from difficult situations, Israeli units suffered heavy casualties.
Even if Sharon had been correct in his strategic assumptions going into the conflict and the war had been a success, it would make no difference as far as the decision-making process was concerned. The integrity of Israel’s democratic government had been threatened by Sharon’s actions. He had deliberately deceived the rest of the executive branch and during the later parts of the war had even taken the decision-making out of the legitimate government structure. For the first time in the state of Israel, a severe cleavage in the body politic manifested itself while the war was going on. Multiple demonstrations took place in Tel Aviv in protest to the war, each protest larger than the one before. Unrest in the IDF began simultaneously to occur both on the battlefield and in the reserve ranks at home. Called reservists failed to show in numbers never seen before. Israel’s international image was severely tarnished and its relations with the United States strained. In light of all this it becomes clear that Israel needed to better define its decision-making processes and create independent advisory staffs for the Prime Minister’s office. The next section highlights prospects for change.
Through the aftermath of the Lebanon War it becomes evident the need for the implementation of an effective decision-making process at the national level. Under the current state of affairs, the information a prime minister and his/her cabinet receives can come from a single, unchallenged source – the minister of defense or from the IDF. Both of these sources, and especially the latter, are biased in that they represent a special interest. Problems can arise not only from intentional deception, as is the case with Sharon, but also from a narrow interpretation of events. Therefore, a decision-making advisory and oversight committee would necessarily need to be independent, or at least interpret events from the civilian-political side of things in order to counter the military view.
Next, the form of this committee must be constructed. Yehuda Ben-Meir offers three models for change: the prime ministerial model, a cabinet secretariat model, and an MNSC ( Ministerial National Security Committee) model. The prime minister model can be compared to the U.S.’s National Security Council (NSC). This calls for the establishment of a personal staff appointed by the prime minister and responsible to him/her. The advantage to this system is that it would enjoy the full confidence of the prime minister. Locating the staff within the prime minister’s bureau should make him/her more comfortable and also ensure greater confidentiality. The disadvantage is that this model is totally dependent on the prime minister and leaves the rest of the cabinet at his/her mercy. Israel’s government is parliamentary and therefore does not have a separate Executive Branch as the U.S. does. Therefore, we must look for something better suited to the Israeli form of government.
The second model, the cabinet secretariat model, is formulated for a parliamentary system. In fact it is the system that Great Britain employs. This model strengthens the position of the Cabinet Secretariat. Both domestic and foreign governmental staff functions would be united under one roof. The cabinet secretary would thus be the prime minister’s as well as the government’s chief of staff and would act also as the senior civil servant of the state. The central importance of Israel’s security makes this model unworkable. What is needed is a high level staff facility that handles only national security matters.
This brings us to our third model, the MNSC model. The MNSC would absorb all current functions of national security. It would be headed by the prime minister and also include the foreign, defense, and finance ministers. The committee would have a permanent staff, headed by a chief of staff. The chief of staff and other staff members would be appointed by and responsible to the prime minister. The staff would have responsibility for both planning and operations at the cabinet level – it would deal with policy analysis and evaluation, present papers on policy positions, and oversee the administration of MNSC decisions. The staff and its head would advise the prime minister on all questions of national security and would also present the full range of options on any issue to the cabinet. Through this model, Ben-Meir brings together the positive aspects of the first and second models.
The last remaining task to be accomplished is the implementation of a new system such as the MNSC. Such implementation will not be easy to achieve since it will require the creation of a new Basic Law or the amending of an old one, namely Basic Law: The Government. There are other obstacles to overcome. Each player that currently has a stake in national security decision-making will be reluctant to give up any part of that authority. It is manifestly clear, however, that Israel’s current mode of national security decision-making is in need of a major overhaul. In light of the fact that Israel did not implement any changes to its security decision-making process after the debacle of the Lebanon War, it remains to be seen what level of mishap is required to initiate action in this regard. Conclusion
Three different models were proposed above. None of them are currently receiving any amount of attention by the Israeli government. Fifteen years have passed since the Lebanon War and Israel has not implemented a national security decision-making process. Why is this the case? Why does Israel, so advanced in most areas of national security, maintain such a primitive decision-making process? In 1986, before proposing his models for a decision-making-process, Ben-Meir outlined several reasons why Israel has no process. The reasons held true then and hold true today with some additions:
1) Fear of leaks: The concern for secrecy in Israeli society and the fear of leaks are a major impediment to a decision-making process. Israeli leadership has decided that it is impossible in a more formal decision-making system to prevent leaks. The safest method to prevent the leak of a document is for there not to be a document at all. 2) The lack of a civil service tradition: Israel lacks the tradition of a strong, professional civil service which has the confidence of the country’s leadership and can influence policy. Israel is also a country where improvisation is a national trait and leaders are self-made. 3) Exaggerated self-confidence and past success: A prerequisite for leaders is a high level of self-confidence. In Israel it is magnified by past successes, manifested in Israel’s triumph over many obstacles and threats. In light of Israel’s overall success, reasons for changing specific problems, such as the lack of an adequate decision-making process, become disregarded. 4) Recent History: Israel has not been attacked by another nation since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. While Lebanon proved to be a failure, Israel was not threatened by that failure with immediate physical harm. Israel is currently at peace with two of its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, and the country’s biggest concern at the moment is the Palestinian peace process. Given the first three factors listed coupled with its recent history, it is easy to see that Israel has no obvious impetus to undergo change in regards to its national security decision-making process.
What this paper has tried to provide is that impetus for change. In the Lebanon War, Ariel Sharon was able to manipulate and deceive the Israeli Cabinet into pursuing ends that Sharon desired. While Prime Minister Menachem Begin may have sided with Sharon at the start, when the opposition in the Cabinet asserted itself, Begin backed off. Without a national security decision-making body at the Cabinet level, Sharon was able to selectively present information in a beneficial way to his plans without any counter-information being given. The only other body that would have had the ability to do so was the IDF, and Chief of Staff Eitan sided with Sharon. When one man is able to command such power it becomes a threat to the integrity of Israel’s democracy and a threat to Israel itself. Without proper advising to the Cabinet, a man or woman like Sharon could mislead Israel into another disaster with far more serious ramifications than the ones the Lebanon War presented.
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