August 1977 through March 1990

A. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OR PERSONS WORKING FOR THEM

I. OVERVIEW: PERIODS AND SIGNIFICANT DATES

Such is not the case of the 1978-1990 period, in which there are distinct stages which vary widely one from another in terms of the number of fatal human rights violations and the methods used. That is true of those committed by government agents and those committed by politically motivated private citizens. Furthermore, major political and institutional changes took place during this period (cf. Part Two, Chapters One and Two).

It is nonetheless appropriate to regard the period from August 1977 to 1990 as a unit, at least from the standpoint of the most serious human rights violations. During these "post-DINA" years, actions of political repression or counterinsurgency in which people were killed, were primarily the work of the National Center for Information (CNI). Moreover, starting in 1979 and through the rest of this period, there was armed opposition activity, primarily by the MIR and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) which also produced serious human rights violations, inasmuch as people were killed in terrorist actions or other types of attacks.

An examination of such grave violations makes it possible to distinguish the following stages and significant dates during this period:

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The CNI, which was established by Decree Law No. 1878 (also August 13, 1977), succeeded the now disbanded DINA, and took over its staff and property. The CNI ceased to exist legally in February 1990. The CNI was very similar to the DINA in terms of how it was defined, and its characteristics, functions, and purposes. The most important differences were its line of authority—it now fell under the authority of the Interior Ministry, rather than the junta, as had been (formally) the case of the DINA, and the fact that it had a broad new mandate to "maintain the existing institutional framework." Article One of Decree Law No. 1578 defined the CNI as a "specialized military body of a technical and professional nature."

Like the DINA, the CNI was an intelligence agency of the government. Nevertheless, it cannot be said to have been an agency completely shielded from any oversight as was the DINA. Like the DINA, however, the CNI had a very broad intelligence mission that extended beyond activities of political repression. It was a national agency which also carried out operations in other countries, although not of the same nature and scope as the unlawful foreign operations that the DINA had carried out. Like the DINA, the CNI systematically committed unlawful actions in carrying out its assigned functions, although the differences with regard to their composition and the number of repressive actions should not be ignored. This is especially true of the first period (1978-1980). Contrary to the DINA, during the 1980s, the CNI was confronted with armed actions committed by far left groups and in the context of a genuine insurgency effort, no matter what might have been the real possibility for success of that insurgency. (Of course that situation does not justify actions of an unlawful nature committed while combating counterinsurgency, nor does it justify unlawful actions committed by far left groups).

During the 1983-1985 period, many people were killed in protests, as this account will show. Aside from those deaths, the number of fatal human rights violations attributable to government agents during the 1978-1985 period is about 160. In this report most of them are attributed to the CNI.

The CNI's most important duties as laid down in Article 1 of Decree Law No. 1878 were as follows:

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Prior to the promulgation of Laws 18314 and 18315 (May 17, 1984), the CNI could carry out arrests only with a judicial order, and it could carry out searches only when there was a presumption that weapons were being stored secretly or the crime of organizing private militias was being committed. Law No. 18314 (which defined terrorist behavior) authorized the CNI and other security forces to make arrests when they had a prior order from the interior minister, the regional intendants, the provincial governors, or garrison commanders, without any need for a judicial order.

Law No. 18315 (May 1984) modified Decree Law No. 1878, which had created the CNI, by empowering the agency to arrest people and hold them at its facilities, at the discretion of the interior minister, by virtue of the powers given him by Transitory Article 24 of the Constitution. However, Article 90 of the Constitution did not regard the CNI to be one of the agencies constituting the public force. Law No. 18663 (October 1987) withdrew the CNI's authority to hold people in detention on its own properties.

Like the DINA, the CNI had many collaborators in government agencies, as well as assistance from professional people—including some doctors who worked for the CNI and periodically examined prisoners. The Medical Association found it necessary to reprimand certain professionals in the investigation it prepared for the case of Alvarez Santibanez, which is described in this chapter.

Among the aspects more relevant to the purposes of this report is the fact that the CNI organized complete teams for following and suppressing political-military organizations like the FPMR and the MIR. Its metropolitan intelligence division had hundreds of staff members for that purpose. There was also a well staffed regional intelligence division. The CNI likewise had a structure for gathering intelligence in other countries, including infiltrating Chilean exiles, and continually exercising surveillance over organizations and persons who were supporting the opposition.

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security as such, as well as general political information, and covered political parties, religious bodies, labor unions, professional associations, culture, international relations, and so forth. This information was intended to feed into the government's political decision making, but it also served the operational side of the CNI. The CNI also gathered political data on the citizenry. That information could be passed on to government institutions to use in making hiring decisions. It was also provided to some private companies.

The CNI's other significant function, one that touches the purposes of this report more directly, was its specifically operational function, namely to engage in direct action against left organizations which had taken the route of armed struggle against the regime. In response it engaged in infiltration, surveillance, arrest, torture, and armed repression. As is noted further on, these means sometimes went to the point of killing people. There are grounds for presuming that organizations such as the September 11 Command, and the ACHA [Chilean Anti-Communist Association] which publicly took credit for some of the killings, were names that the CNI used to conceal its activities or those of people working for it. In engaging in these activities, the CNI was operating both within and beyond the legislation governing it. Some people were executed in compliance with orders from military prosecutors, but when people were arrested the evidence was often trumped up, for example, by putting weapons in their houses. Many of the gun battles reported never took place.

The CNI carried out yet another kind of direct action against mass anti-government demonstrations, especially during national protests and certain public demonstrations. Likewise, we should note that the CNI conducted threatening actions intended to constrain certain organizations and movements. It also infiltrated them and intercepted private communication to political, labor, or church leaders. The CNI played a role in attempting to create political or labor organizations that supported the government.

In all these activities it had utter assurance of its impunity. Its agents operated with false names, and did not give their identity even to the courts. Nor in practice were they compelled to comply with court orders issued against them. In practice they operated without being held accountable to the law; they enjoyed unrestricted powers of movement and resources.

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for its own ends. The national director administered this income and wealth, and he had broad powers for managing and utilizing property and money. The CNI handled sizeable amounts of money that were regarded as confidential and hence were outside the scope of normal oversight.

In addition, its important position in the government gave the CNI access to other non-material resources. For example, besides analyzing the media, the CNI had DINACOS [National Media Directorate] in order to give its own slant or version of events. In some cases it used media such as National Television to provide its own version of real or alleged gun battles.

Secret Decree No. 594 of the Interior Ministry dated June 14, 1984 designated those CNI properties that were to be regarded as detention sites in both the regions and in Santiago in accordance with Transitory Article 24 of the Constitution.

When the new CNI director took charge in November 1977, the agency was organized along lines different from those of the DINA, even though much of the staff was retained. Most of the staff members close to the director were changed, and the agency's functions were redesigned with greater emphasis on intelligence and less on repression as such. During this period the state of siege was ended in the country and the amnesty law was issued. The most serious human rights violations declined notably (cf. statistics at the end of this volume).

The beginnings of the MIR's "Operation Return" and the consequent rise in armed actions like bank robberies and bomb explosions enabled those who were calling for harsher treatment to regain some ground. The MIR's July 1980 action of selective terrorism in which army Lieutenant Colonel Roger Vergara lost his life probably prompted the change of command in the CNI. The agency gradually but clearly began moving toward emphasis on actions of repression and counterinsurgency. The MIR, whose most notable action was the attempt to set up a permanent base in Neltume in 1981, was not alone in prompting this shift. The Communist party's decision to change its strategy toward the dictatorship by
 
 

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embracing the armed struggle and by creating the FPMR (Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front) also played a role.

Over the next few years one can observe a continual increase in arrests and human rights violations for which the CNI was responsible, culminating in 1986 and 1987. The left called 1986 the "decisive year": that was the year a large quantity of weapons was smuggled into the country and that was when an action of selective terrorism against the president and army commander in chief cost the lives of five of his bodyguards. In 1987 five members of the FPMR underwent forced disappearance, and in "Operation Albania" twelve of its members were killed; in both instances the CNI was responsible.

This commando unit sought to investigate that case as well as other violent actions during this period, such as the robberies of branch banks on Calle Santa Elena. In a parallel action, on July 23 civilians who did not identify themselves arrested journalism students Eduardo Jara and Cecilia Alzamora. In the next few days a total of fourteen persons were secretly arrested. By August 5, all of them had been released. However, Eduardo Jara died on August 2—the very day of his release—due to the torture he had undergone while under arrest.

All these people were held prisoner by a group that had a wide range of resources at its disposal. It had numerous vehicles and sites in which to hold its prisoners, who were transferred several times while they were being held. These places were in the central and outlying areas of Santiago. They were very large, and gave the impression that many people were going about their normal working routine. This group was known as the Avengers of Martyrs Command (COVEMA), since that was how they identified themselves to their victims. The prisoners were questioned continually during this period about the killing of Roger Vergara and also in an effort to obtain data on left movements. The prisoners were constantly subjected to torture, mainly beatings and the application of electricity to various parts of their bodies.

The journalism student's death set off a great deal of public alarm, and the government declared its commitment to determine what had happened. In the ensuing court case, investigative police staff members were found guilty of torturing and unlawfully mistreating a female prisoner. She had recognized one of the places she was held as the investigative police Eighth station. The court determined that
 
 

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she was arrested by order of the Second Military Prosecutor's Office. However, the judicial investigation did not establish a connection between this prisoner and Eduardo Jara and his subsequent death, even though both were held together, and had been abducted by the same persons.

The group abusing all these prisoners was composed of agents from the investigative police. The trial revealed that besides that police station they had used the central headquarters on Avenida General Mackenna. In the legal process, the CNI and the police said that the investigative police, and specifically members of its homicide brigade, were responsible. As has already been noted, however, the CAS was made up of the homicide brigade, members of the police, and the CNI. CNI staff were indeed involved in COVEMA. In fact the CNI director at that time publicly said CNI staff members had established COVEMA as an independent entity.

This new unit was assigned not only members of what had been DICAR, but of other police units as well. According to various accounts, its staff numbered between 100 and 150 agents, which included police who had previously been assigned to the CNI. The agency also had civilians with expertise in intelligence activities. It should be noted that former members of the Joint Command, which had operated in 1975 and 1976, particularly in conducting repression against the Communist party, were part of DICOMCAR. As its headquarters the DICOMCAR used the building on Calle Dieciocho previously used by the Joint Command and called "the Company."

The DICOMCAR was engaged in intelligence activities. It is known that each week it prepared a report for the head of the police. Some of its functions also had to do with matters internal to the police. However, it also engaged in repressive activities. There is proof that in 1984 this agency made many arrests. There are signs of connections between the DICOMCAR and the CNI that year, although there were also conflicts between these two agencies. This agency was run by a director and an assistant director, both of whom were police colonels. Operational tasks of repression or counterinsurgency were located in a department of external affairs.

The Commission examined evidence linking DICOMCAR personnel to the killing of Carlos Godoy Echegoyen, who died of torture at the police station in Quintero. However, it was its links to the slitting of the throats of three members of the Communist party in March 1985 that made the DICOMCAR most notorious. The discovery of this link was what brought about the disbanding of DICOMCAR and other important changes in the police, including the retirement of its general director.

Although there is a great deal of evidence to presume that the DICOMCAR, which was made up of former members of the Joint Command, had reasons for being involved in this crime against the three Communists, and even though the CNI
 
 

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prepared a report to the judge investigating the case stating that the DICOMCAR was responsible, the involvement of other agencies cannot be ruled out.

Victims of fatal human rights violations committed by government agencies or groups (primarily the CNI) were chosen much more selectively during this period than they had been previously. Most of them were members of the MIR, the FPMR, and the CP. They had either returned to the country secretly, or they were involved in the MIR or FPMR military structure, or they were engaged in support tasks for that structure. Some persons killed in these parties or groups were involved in other functions, such as handling foreign communication.

The motivation or justification for these repressive actions was basically the same as the motivations of the DINA or the Joint Command which have already been discussed. There was one difference, however: DINA logic justified killing activists in order to destroy the potential danger they represented, while for CNI members, who were combatting efforts at armed insurgency, the adversary or enemy was more tangible. From that standpoint, killing a prisoner or someone who may have been captured alive was understood as the kind of tough measure required in irregular warfare and which the adversary was also committing.

That difference, which is both objective and a matter of perception, by no means justifies in the least the unlawful behavior of the CNI when it executed people who had been captured or who could be captured without great risk. It is important to stress this difference, however, for it makes it possible to become familiar with all aspects of the truth being studied, and all facets of the self-justifications offered even though they always remain unacceptable. Doing so also provides a basis for evaluating what must be done in the future so as to instill in the armed forces and police respect for certain basic norms. Such steps do not militate against the efficiency with which they are expected to carry out their functions, and there is no reason to think that they should do so.

In a number of cases studied during this period it can be observed that the motivation for executions or other grave transgressions was to carry out reprisal or to teach a lesson. The victims who were killed were chosen in order to exact revenge for an act of terrorism or some other attack. Moreover, during this period there are cases such as that of Tucapel Jimenez and that of the three Communists whose throats were slit in March 1985, in which more complex or obscure motivations seem to be at work.

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The main difference is that the CNI used two approaches to political repression or counterinsurgency. It formally arrested people and turned them over to the military prosecutors offices, but it also committed human rights violations and then used disinformation to conceal them—or indeed present them—as legitimate actions of self-defense in armed confrontations.

d.l) Detection

In any case it is clear that during this period the CNI was exercising surveillance over and following the members and liaisons of the groups it wanted to attack, sometimes over a long period. It was often in a perfect position to choose the exact manner, time, and place it wanted for the operation.

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d.6) Methods for concealing the facts and issuing disinformation

2. CASES

We will now describe how those who were officially described as killed in gun battles were actually killed. Some people who were killed in genuine armed
 
 

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actions will occasionally be mentioned when that is necessary in order to explain how events were connected.

On November II, 1977, Enrique LOPEZ OLMEDO, who was of Spanish nationality and an alternate member of the MIR political commission, was killed. He had been arrested in Valparaiso in late October 1977. The official account was that at 10:00 p.m. that day, he offered resistance when navy security personnel tried to arrest him at the intersection of Calles Pacifico and Coronel Silva Vergara in Valparaiso on suspicion of being involved in underground activities. The security agents then were forced to use their weapons. Lopez was wounded and died on the way to a hospital. Taking into account his political activity, the fact that he had been previously arrested, and the inexactitude of the official statement—along with the fact that even if he had offered resistance, killing him would not thereby have been justified—the Commission has come to the conviction that Enrique Lopez was executed by government agents in violation of his human rights.
On December 7, 1977, Augusto Heriberto Tadeo CARMONA ACEVEDO, a journalist and MIR activist, was killed in a gun battle with security agents at a building located at Calle Barcelona No. 2425 in San Miguel, according to newspaper accounts at that time. An eyewitness has testified to the Commission that what really happened was quite different. At about 8:30 p.m., approximately twenty cars came to the neighborhood and filled a whole block. A large group of heavily armed civilians got out. They raided the house at Calle Barcelona No. 2425 and the one immediately next to it. They went in shooting, but nobody was home. They then ordered all the neighbors who were observing these events to leave their houses. At about midnight, an individual arrived on foot, stopped in front of the doorway of that address, and got out his keys. At that moment they shot him two or three times from inside the house, and he fell to the ground. The agents hurried away. The Commission learned that CNI agents had located Augusto Carmona thanks to information provided by a female prisoner. Taking into account the evidence it holds, the Commission has come to the conviction that Augusto Carmona was executed by CNI agents in violation of his human rights.
 

On January 18, 1978, German de Jesus CORTES RODRIGUEZ, a MIR activist and former seminarian, was killed by CNI members. He had been arrested January 16, 1978, and taken to Villa Grimaldi. The press reported that after being arrested he was driven to his house to provide more information and turn over documents. At one point he tried to catch the security personnel off guard and shot at them with a weapon he had taken from underneath a bed. He missed them, but they killed him.

A person who was arrested with him describes being taken to German Cortes's house a couple days after his arrest. Cortes was also taken there by force in another automobile. When they arrived, this person observed that they took him out of the car, he was bent over from the torture he had received. A moment later this person heard the shots and the voice of one of the guards reporting over a radio that Cortes was dead. Taking into account this version in conjunction with the implausibility
 
 

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of the official report, the Commission has .come to the conviction that German de Jesus Cortes was executed by CNI agents, and regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On August 2, 1980, Santiago RUBILAR SALAZAR, a company manager, was killed. He had left his house in Santiago on July 26 en route to Valparaiso, and was due to return two days later. He did not return. The day he was due to return his wife found that her house had been searched. CNI members arrested her and her brother-in-law, and took them to their headquarters on Calle Borgono for interrogation about Rubilar's activities.

The official account was that Santiago Rubilar was killed August 2 in a gun battle with police as he was fleeing in a car. He was reported to have taken the car's owner and her son with him as hostages. In the course of events one policeman and the hostages were said to have been wounded. Rubilar was also said to be wanted for robbing the branch banks on Calle Santa Elena on July 28.

When an appeal for protection was initiated on Rubilar's behalf, the Ministry of Interior sent an exempt decree for his arrest. This decree proves that the official report is false. That decree was dated July 20,1980, that is, before the bank robberies; it also mentions, in addition to Rubilar, the two people he was said to be holding as hostages as he was running away on August 2, 1980. In view of this evidence, the Commission has come to the conviction that Santiago Rubilar was executed by government agents in violation of his human rights.

On November 7, 1980, the MIR activists Ruben Eduardo ORTA JOPIA, an electrician, and Juan Ramon olivares PEREZ, a worker, were killed in Santiago. According to the official account, at 1:20 a.m., CNI members are said to have halted a Citroneta that was driving along Avenida Domingo Santa Maria near the Vivaceta Bridge. The official account assumes that the two people in the car were trying to attack the CNI garrison which was nearby. They fired a burst of automatic weapons fire at the agents when they approached. The report also says that the car was carrying a variety of weapons.

However, the Commission received testimony indicating that CNI agents had arrested both of these people earlier that day. The story that they had tried to attack a CNI garrison while driving an old Citroneta, and that none of the agents were wounded by the burst of automatic weapons fire shot at them is implausible. The bodies, moreover, showed signs of torture. For all these reasons, the Commission has come to the conviction that Ruben Eduardo Orta and Juan Ramon Olivares were executed by CNI agents in violation of their human rights.

On January 18, 1981, Leandro Abraham ARRATIA REYES, 36, a photographer and CP activist, was killed. He had returned to Chile legally in October 1980. The official account stated that as CNI members were trying to arrest Leandro Arratia in the early morning, he resisted and climbed on top of a house at Calle Ricardo Santa Cruz No. 651 in the district of Santiago. The officers were forced to use their police weapons and shot him down. The Commission received statements by his relatives to the effect that early on the morning of January 14, 1981, security
 
 

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forces searched his house in the Conchali district. They demanded that he cooperate with them by identifying old friends and providing information on their activities. His relatives also say that on January 16, an individual came up to him while he was waiting for a bus. There was no further word on him until the official account.

In the judicial investigation, a CNI agent who was involved in the operation in which Arratia was killed said that he had been assigned to investigate his activities. Furthermore, the autopsy report says some of his bullet wounds came from being shot from behind, and hence it is at odds with the official version. Keeping in mind the previous accounts, Arratia's political activity, the search of his house, the surveillance over him, and other evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conclusion that he was executed by CNI members in violation of his human rights.

In July 1981, members of the security forces discovered the camp, which was still being built. They seized a large amount of equipment and documentation. The guerrillas fled up into the mountains with agents in pursuit. In August the MIR decided to send two of its members down to the cities below to look for food and renew contacts with their fellow party members. CNI agents detected and caught them, however, and took them to Santiago. These prisoners revealed the site where they were to meet with their comrades and the password they were to use.

On September 13, 1981, agents used this information to kill Raul Rodrigo OBREGON TORRES, a surveyor, when he came to the site to meet with his comrades. The Commission holds the conviction that he was executed, and that the agents utilized their knowledge of the meeting place and the password. Hence the official version which, like other similar reports, was spread through DINACOS reports claiming that people had been killed in gun battles, is false.

On September 17, security forces killed Pedro Juan YANEZ PALACIOS, an electrician's assistant who had become separated from the group because he was in poor physical condition due to the adverse weather they had to endure, and because one of his comrades had amputated his frozen and gangrenous foot. Hence the Commission came to the conviction that it is highly improbable that he would have offered resistance.

Around this time the group split, and three members went toward the area of Remeco Alto, to the house of a relative of one of them, in order to obtain food. The people in the house themselves alerted the soldiers to their presence. The soldiers caught them in their sleep and killed them. Patricio Alejandro CALFUQUIR HENRIQUEZ and Prospero del Carmen GUZMAN SOTO, both workers, were killed inside the house, which was completely destroyed by the shooting. Jose
 
 

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Eugenio MONSALVE SANDOVAL, also a worker, managed to flee a few yards from the house, but was caught and executed. The Commission has verified that none of these three people offered resistance before being killed. This all happened September 20, 1981.

On September 21,the two members of the groups who had been arrested at the outset, Rene Eduardo BRAVO AGUILERA and Julio Cesar RIFFO FIGUEROA, both of whom were workers, were executed. They had been brought to the site of the operation from Santiago. The official statement issued by DINACOS does not say how they died nor does it acknowledge the fact that they had been previously arrested. Other CNI reports state that they were arrested but were killed when they tried to escape. That story is hardly credible given the military deployment and the tight security to which they must have been subjected. The omissions in the official statement only confirm this point.

Finally on November 28, 1981, soldiers executed Juan Angel OJEDA AGUAYO, a medical assistant, in Quebrada Honda. The Commission finds credible the account of an eyewitness to the events who says that there was no armed confrontation in this case either.

In considering these events, what was said in Part One, Chapter Two of this report should be kept in mind. The actions or intentions for which those killed may have been responsible and even considerations on the danger they represented must be clearly separated from the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the officials' actions in combating them. Of course governments cannot be expected to fail to combat an insurgency or to do so with inadequate means in order to comply with some standard of behavior. However, it is proper to demand that certain norms governing the use of force be observed under all circumstances.

Bearing this in mind, the Commission believes that in all of the Neltume events but one, the officials who had already arrested two of these people were in a position to apprehend the rest instead of killing them. Its participants may have seen Neltume as the beginning of a guerrilla struggle. However, given the ineptitude and poor condition of the MIR activists who were involved in this operation, and the vast superiority of government forces, it was actually more a police matter than one that was truly military. Since the rational alternative of arresting these people was present in each of these situations, it was not lawful to choose to execute them, let alone to kill people whom they already had physically in their power.

The only real gun battle involved Miguel CABRERA FERNANDEZ, a worker whom police found in Choshuenco and killed in a shootout on October 16, 1981. The Commission believes he was killed in the gun battle, and that his human rights were not violated.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission believes all the other cases were executions in which the human rights of those killed were violated.

On November 10, 1981, Juan Ramon SOTO CERDA, a student, who was active in the Socialist party, Luis Pantaleon PINCHEIRA LLANOS, an accountant who was active in the MIR, and Jaime Alfonso CUEVAS CUEVAS, a worker who was active in the Socialist party, were killed in Santiago. According to the official report, in the early morning hours security forces and four subversives had
 
 

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a gun battle. In the course of the shootout the car they were driving caught fire and three of them were completely burned up. An examination of the map of the events prepared by the investigative police which is found in the case's judicial file established that the security forces did not shoot from the location from which they claimed they had shot, and that the victims could not have fired the shots that hit the CNI vehicle. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Juan Soto, Luis Pincheira, Jaime Cuevas, and a fourth person who remains unidentified were executed by CNI agents in violation of their human rights.

On December 11,1981, Sergio Gabriel FLORES DURAN, 29. a MIR "Central Force" leader who was living underground in Chile, and Maria Veronica CIENFUEGOS CLAVIERS, 28, a MIR activist, were killed. The official account of the events issued by DYNAMOS states that on December 11 during operations following the killing of three members of the investigative police, there was an armed clash with MIR activists at Called Rivadavia No. 6674 in the San Joaquin district, and that these two people were killed. However, statements by witnesses and other information gathered by the Commission indicate that security agents were following Sergio Flores and Maria Cienfuegos for some time, and were keeping the building in which they lived under permanent surveillance. Hence they could have arrested them; they did not have to kill them. Indeed, the shape of the operation planned against them, with large numbers of personnel from the CNI, the police and the investigative police, backed up by two helicopters, and the fact that the whole thing was filmed, indicates that the objective was not to arrest Gabriel Flores and Maria Cienfuegos, but to kill them. In view of the foregoing, the Commission has come to the conviction that they were executed in violation of their human rights.

On December 17, 1981. Ivan Alfredo QUINTEROS MARTINEZ, 31. a MIR activist and merchant, was shot down in a gun battle with security agents in front of Callejon Lo Ovalle No. 437, two blocks from bus stop 17 on the Gran Avenida, according to the newspaper. Witnesses have testified that he was riding a bicycle along Callejon Lo Ovalle when he was hit by a Suzuki van driven by CNI members. They threatened him and told him to get up but he could not and fell down again. They then shot him and left him in grave condition; he died shortly afterwards. The autopsy report says that he had been hit by five bullets. Taking into account the evidence gathered, as well as his political activism, the inaccuracy of the official statement, and the fact that he was followed because he was connected to Maria Cienfuegos and Sergio Flores who had been killed some days before, the Commission has come to the conviction that Ivan Quinteros was executed by CNI members, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On April 28, 1983, Daniel MEDEL RIVAS, 30, who was active in the Socialist party, was taken off a long distance bus at the kilometer seven and a half bus stop on the road between Quillota and La Calera by CNI agents who shot and killed him. Taking all this evidence into account, the Commission has come to the conviction
 
 

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that Daniel Medel was executed by CNI members, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

What happened was actually quite different. Security agents were aware that underground MIR members were living in the building. The attack on them was planned after the general was killed. A large contingent of security agents from CNI and other services was assembled. After a number of actions that day, including making arrests, they went to this building. There they set up a 50 mm. machine gun and immediately began to shoot. Only after doing so for a few minutes did they ask those inside to surrender. In response Sergio PENA DIAS, a veterinarian, and MIR activist who had entered the country clandestinely, came out with his hands behind his neck. As he was approaching the fence in the front yard, two agents shot and killed him at short range with automatic weapons. These events, which the Commission learned through the account of an eyewitness, have enabled it to come to the conviction that Sergio Pena was executed by CNI members, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

After the killing of Sergio Pena, Lucia Orfilia VERGARA VALENZUELA, a MIR activist who had entered the country clandestinely and was inside the house, began firing out. The agents immediately went back on the attack. They also shot a flare, which set the house on fire. The other person in the house, Arturo Jorge VILAVELLA ARAUJO, an engineer by profession and a MIR activist who had also entered the country clandestinely, was burned to death. In view of the obvious true purpose of the operation, the Commission believes that these last two persons can also be regarded as executed.
 
 

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Janaqueo

With the evidence it has in hand, the Commission has proven that this story is false, since CNI agents shot and killed Salgado point blank as he was approaching his house. He did not offer any resistance. The agents immediately began to shoot with the 50 millimeter machine mounted on a jeep that they had used against the building on Fuenteovejuna. Hugo Ratier was inside the building. They killed him even though he had not attacked them. The agents had previously gathered the neighbors, approximately eighty people, in a local church. The Commission came to the conviction that both of these people were executed by government agents in violation of their human rights.

On November 3, 1983, armed civilians arrested Victor Hugo HUERTA BEIZA, 52, who was active in the Communist party, on a public thoroughfare in Concepcion. Hours later he was killed in a gun battle with CNI agents, according to the official account. At 5:30 p.m. that same day his house was searched; hence he was presumably already in the CNI's hands. The autopsy report states that he was hit by more than ten bullets and that the immediate cause of death was "a cranial and cerebral wound fired from a nine calibre bullet, which from the shape of the wound may have been inflicted with a mounted weapon. The path of the bullet was from back to front." In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Victor Huerta was executed by CNI agents and that the report that he was killed in a gun battle was not true; hence it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On December 29, 1983, Juan Elms ESPINOZA PARRA, 35, a MIR activist, was killed as he was walking east on Calle Andes and was arriving at Calle General Barbosa. He died of more than 22 bullet wounds, apparently fired by CNI agents. Some of the shots came from behind, according to the autopsy report. Juan Espinoza, who had entered the country clandestinely, was said to be one of those in charge of keeping records and organizing documentation at a MIR forgery shop. In view of the evidence it has received and statements by witnesses, the Commission has come to the conviction that security agents detected and followed Juan Espinoza, and that even though they could have arrested him, they executed him on a public thoroughfare; it therefore regards his death as a human rights violation committed by government agents.
 
 

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On July 2, 1984, Hector Patricio SOBARZO NUNEZ, a teacher and MIR activist, and Enzo MUNOZ AREVALO, an active Communist, were killed in Santiago. The official report reads: "On July 2 at 11:50 p.m., CNI agents detected suspects riding in a car along Avenida Jose Pedro Alessandri very close to the Departamental Traffic Circle. The suspects shot at the security agents from inside their car. The agents shot back and the ensuing gun battle ended with the death of Enzo Munoz and Hector Sobarzo."

The evidence gathered reveals that the official version is not truthful. Witnesses have testified that at 11:30 p.m. Enzo Munoz and Hector Sobarzo parked the car at the Departamental Traffic. Circle in front of the Don Camilo apartment complex. Sobarzo got out to make a phone call. At that moment armed men in plainclothes drove up in a large number of vehicles. They shot at Enzo Munoz and arrested Hector Sobarzo, put him in a vehicle, and shot him further on. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that these people were executed by CNI agents, and it regards their deaths as human rights violations for which government agents were responsible.

On July 3, 1984, Ana Alicia DELGADO TAPIA, an agronomist who was active in the Communist party, and Juan Manuel VARAS SILVA, a mechanic and MIR activist, were killed in Callejon Lo Ovalle in a gun battle that followed the one described above. This official account notes that some hours after the other gun battle and as part of the effort to investigate recent attacks in Callejon Lo Ovalle, when the agents came to the 800 block and were carrying out a search, they had a gun battle with three men and a woman, in which Juan Varas and Ana Delgado were killed. The evidence gathered by the Commission, and particularly the fact that the official account of the deaths of Enzo Munoz and Hector Sobarzo was false, has enabled the Commission to come to the conviction that these two people were executed by government agents who thus violated their human rights.

In Valparaiso on August 12, 1984, Luis Enrique TAMAYO LAZCANO, 27, who was not politically active, was killed. According to the official account, at noon CNI agents came to Tamayo's house at Calle Tegucigalpa No. 200 in the Progreso shantytown in Cerro Los Placeres. When he saw the security agents he ran away and shot at them. They were forced to respond to his attack, and thus they killed him. However, the evidence gathered by this Commission indicates that the CNI agents violently broke into Enrique Tamayo's house and that he ran out unarmed. A security agent who saw what was happening, shot and killed him on the spot. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Luis Tamayo was not killed in a shootout, but was executed by CNI agents who thus violated his human rights.

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country illegally and were working underground. Security agents had been following all of them, and hence they were quite clear on the activities in which they were engaged. The official reports issued on these cases all spoke of gun battles in which people were killed. With the various items of evidence it gathered, however, the Commission has come to the conviction that these people were executed.

The first event took place on the morning of August 23, 1984 in Hualpencillo, an area near Concepcion. Luciano Humberto AEDO ARIAS, a worker, was executed near his house. Witnesses say that they shot him without ordering him to surrender, and that he offered no resistance.

Hours later the small bus in which Mario Octavio LAGOS RODRIGUEZ, a worker, and Nelson HERRERA RIVEROS, a merchant, were travelling was stopped in the Lorenzo Arenas section of Concepcion. The bus had been followed from Talcahuano, and was halted in front of the fruit and vegetable market where there are always many people. Witnesses -whom the Commission questioned said that Lagos and Herrera did not offer any resistance, and that they got off the bus unarmed, without hostages, and with their hands in the air. At that moment Mario Lagos was shot in the armpit, thus proving that his hands were up. The autopsy report on Nelson Herrera indicates that he was killed subsequently, with a shot to the head at short range, and while handcuffed as indicated by the marks on his wrists. A camera crew was filming all of these events with National Television equipment. The fact that the TV crew was already set up in that area before the events likewise indicates that this was not a chance gun battle but had been planned beforehand.

At 6 p.m. that same day, August 23, Mario Ernesto MUJICA BARRIOS, a bookkeeper, was shot and killed in the doorway of his house. Testimony examined by the Commission indicates that he did not offer any resistance when he was arrested.

At around the same time Raul Jaime BARRIENTOS MATAMALA, an office worker, and Rogelio Humberto TAPIA DE LA PUENTE, a forestry engineer, were killed on the road between Valdivia and Niebla. An official report also spoke of a gun battle in this case and mentioned a third person who fled from the scene. The layout of the land makes that highly unlikely. The Commission has information indicating that these two men were arrested in Valdivia and driven to this area to be executed by CNI agents.

The last of these events took place on August 24, and cost the life of Juan Jose BONCOMPTE ANDREU, an economist. He was caught at home by a large number of agents. He tried to escape through the back of his house but he was surrounded, shot repeatedly, and died on the spot. A number of witnesses have said that he did not offer any resistance, and that the agents killed him when he was completely at their mercy.

In view of statements from many witnesses whom it interviewed, as well as other evidence that has been gathered, and the implausibility of official accounts of how these events took place, this Commission is convinced that these seven people were executed by government agents in violation of their human rights.

On December 15, 1984, Fernando Gabriel VERGARA VARGAS, a MIR activist who had entered the country clandestinely, was killed. According to the official account, CNI members who were patrolling the area of Santa Elvira near
 
 

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Santa Elena, that day intercepted an individual who seemed to be engaged in suspicious activity. When he saw the security agents he shot twice, and they shot back and killed him. The Commission has evidence that CNI agents had been following Fernando Vergara, thus making it doubtful that he was caught by chance. Expert examination has likewise shown that the weapon he supposedly used to fire two shots was not working well, since it had a broken trigger, and presumably it was not used. In view of the foregoing, the Commission has come to the conviction that CNI agents followed, arrested, and executed Fernando Vergara, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

Witnesses, however, say that on that day a large contingent of security forces came to this site, and they were backed up by a jeep which had a mounted machine gun. CNI agents surrounded the house, which was built of light material, warned Alan Rodriguez to surrender, and then immediately began shooting. He offered no resistance. The official claim that he had a mortar is implausible since he would have caused a great deal of damage and would have injured many agents, but that did not happen. Likewise, since the house completely burned down, it is unlikely that such a weapon would have survived unscathed like the one later exhibited. Hence the Commission believes that Alan Rodriguez was executed by CNI agents who intended not to arrest but to kill him, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

^ On January 19, 1985, two brothers, David MINO LOGAN, 31, and Marcelo MINO LOGAN, 29, both of whom were active in the MIR, were killed. The newspapers reported that at 2:30 p.m. that day, as security agents were preparing to search the house that the Mino brothers were renting at Avenida Valparaiso and Calle Yungay in Quillota, they were fired upon. The two subversives were killed in the ensuing gun battle. However, a witness said that a large group surrounded the Mino brothers' house and began shooting at it. One of them was killed, and the other was executed when he tried to surrender. The Commission possesses evidence indicating that they did not offer resistance. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that the Mino brothers were executed by CNI agents in violation of their human rights.

On March 29, 1985,Paulina Alejandra AGUIRRE TOBAR, 20, a MIR activist, was killed. According to the official account, on March 27, 1985, weapons were found at a house on Calle Pastor Fenandez No. 16100 in Las Condes, where Paulina Aguirre lived. CNI agents removed the weapons and set up surveillance to arrest the occupant. She did not return until Friday, March 29 at 11:15 p.m., and
 
 

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she arrived on foot. CNI agents intercepted her, and warned her to halt and present identification. The account goes on to say that she did stop but then opened her purse, took out a gun and fired three times. They therefore shot back and killed her. The autopsy report says that Paulina Aguirre was hit by two bullets to the head, one in the neck, three in her right hand and two in her left forearm. In view of the large amount of evidence gathered and after examining the site itself, the Commission has come to the conviction that Paulina Aguirre could have been arrested, but instead CNI agents shot and killed her as she was coming home, even though she offered no resistance. Hence it regards her death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On March 29, 1985, two brothers, Eduardo Antonio and Rafael Maurico VERGARA TOLEDO, both of whom were MIR activists, were killed. The newspaper reported that, "On March 29, 1985; at 7:45 p.m. in the area of Las Rejas near Cinco de Abril, three armed criminals attempting to rob a store were caught by police who were patrolling in a van. Having been frustrated, the thieves fought back, and there followed a brief exchange of fire in which police Corporal Marcel Munoz Cifuentes was wounded, as were Eduardo and Rafael Vergara Toledo. The latter two died on the spot. The third criminal managed to escape."

The evidence gathered by the Commission, including the autopsy reports, enables it to state that both brothers died of multiple trauma from bullet wounds, and that the body of Rafael Vergara had a bullet wound to the back of the neck fired at short range, which was the ultimate cause of his death. The Commission has come to the conviction that Rafael Vergara was executed by government agents when he was already wounded and in the power of his killers, and thus in violation of his human rights. The Commission was unable to determine exactly how the shooting took place, nor how Eduardo Vergara was involved, and thus has determined that he died as a result of the situation of political violence.On July 1, 1985, Gilberto de las Mercedes VICTORIANO VELOSO, who had graduated with a degree in social work and was active in the CP, was killed. The official account stated: "On July 1, 1985, two individuals who were being pursued by a CNI operational group engaged in a gun battle with security forces which broke out at 10:05 a.m. at the intersection of Avenidas Los Morros and Alejandro Guzman, near bus stop no. 31 on Gran Avenida. One of them was seriously wounded and died on the way to the Barros Luco Hospital. He was identified as Gilberto Victoriano Veloso. The other, Pablo Yuri Gonzalez, was only moderately wounded."
 

This account is contradicted by what an eyewitness told the Commission. This person said that at about 9:45 a.m. a large number of armed civilians came to the area. At that moment the witness saw Victoriano Veloso running and being chased by several armed, men^ When he realized that there was no escape he shot twice, and was answered with bursts of automatic weapons fire.The CNI agents told Him to give up; when he threw his gun on the ground, they shot him down. In view of the foregoing as well as other evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the
 
 

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conviction that he was executed by CNI agents, and that his death was a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On April 18, 1986, Jose Daniel MURGA MEDINA, 28, a MIR leader who was privately employed, and Juan Antonio DIAZ CLIFF, 41, who was also a MIR leader and was living underground, were killed in Santiago. The official account said they were subversive criminals who were killed after a battle with security forces. Witnesses have provided information indicating that what really happened was different. Juan Antonio Diaz was walking along Calle Gabriel Palma, when CNI agents shot him point blank. Others say that Jose Murga got off the bus at the comer of San Alfonso and Tucapel and was heading toward his house. When he crossed Calle General Jarpa witnesses say that they saw him stop in front of armed men in civilian clothing and raise his hands, and that he was then shot down. The autopsy reports indicate that Juan Antonio Diaz died of a bullet wound to the right lung which caused acute blood loss, and that Jose Daniel Murga died of widespread skeletal and visceral trauma from bullets. Taking into account the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that CNI agents followed and executed Juan Antonio Diaz and Jose Daniel Murga, and it believes that killing them was a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On December 8, 1986, Marcelino Carol MARCHANDON VALENZUELA, 28, an active CP member, was killed. According to the account provided by DINACOS, at 10:50 p.m. that day Marcelino Marchandon, a subversive, was killed when the CNI barracks on Avenida Santa Maria in Santiago repelled an attack. Witnesses have testified, however, that he had been arrested December 6 on the street by armed civilians and taken to a secret facility. The autopsy report says that the cause of death was facial, cranial, and encephalic trauma from bullets. Ten bullet wounds were found, along with a number of buckshot wounds. In view of the evidence received, Marchandon's political activity, and the fact of his previous arrest, the Commission has come to the conviction that Marcelino Marchandon was executed by CNI agents, and that his death was a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

Events began to unfold early in the morning on June 15, 1987, when Recaredo Ignacio VALENZUELA POHORECKY, an economist, was stopped on Calle Alhue in Santiago a few yards from his mother's house. Without ordering him to surrender, the CNI agents who were lying in wait shot and killed him. Because this account has been affirmed in accounts by witnesses to which this Commission had
 
 

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access, it came to the conviction that he was executed by CNI agents and it regards his killing as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

At approximately 6:30 p,m. that same day Patricio Ricardo ACOSTA CASTRO was killed on Calle Varas Mena where he lived by a bullet that caused cranial, encephalic and spinomedular trauma. Given the overall context and the manner in which he was killed with a single shot to the brain, the Commission came to the conviction that he was executed by government agents in violation of his human rights.

Shortly after midnight a few blocks away at Calle Varas Mena No. 417, a further action took place, and two people lost their lives. An FPMR guerrilla school was located at this address. At that moment three members were inside, and an undetermined number of students were toward the back of the building. For some time the building had been surrounded, and agents were in position in neighboring houses. At that moment a large number of agents knocked on the door and ordered those inside to come out. The agents almost immediately drove a vehicle into the door to knock it down and began to shoot from different directions. The people in the back of the house fled, and some were apprehended in the neighborhood. Those who were inside the house shot back at the agents for a time and then also tried to escape.

The first one, Juan Waldemar HENRIQUEZ ARAYA, an engineer, was killed when he tried to escape through the attic of the house next door (No. 415). The Commission cannot regard his killing as a human rights violation, but rather it believes he died as a result of the situation of political violence, since he could not be expected to do anything but defend himself against his aggressors who obviously intended to kill him.

Wilson Daniel HENRIQUEZ GALLEGOS, a worker, who was wounded, sought refuge in the back yard of the house next door (No. 419), which the agents had left by this time. The woman who owned the house saw him and motioned to him to give up, but he refused to do so. Accounts by witnesses indicate that after some time another group of agents came in and made the family go into the bedroom. They seized Wilson Henriquez and began to taunt him: they beat him and dragged him out to the street; they said they were going to take him back inside so he would not catch cold. They then killed him. According to the autopsy report, his body bore twenty-one bullet holes. The Commission has come to the conviction that Wilson Henriquez was executed by CNI agents and regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

Meanwhile in the Villa Olimpica area of the capital yet another person was killed by CNI agents. Julio Arturo GUERRA OLIVARES, an electrician, was in his apartment when security agents surrounded it. His captors started a gun battle, which was observed by witnesses. When it was over, he was executed by being shot at short range. In view of the foregoing, and taking into account the fact that he was at the mercy of his captors, this Commission regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

The last episode took place early in the morning that same day on Calle Pedro Donoso in the Conchali district and cost the lives of the greatest number of people: Esther Angelica CABRERA HINOJOSA, unemployed, Elizabeth Edelmira
 
 

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ESCOBAR MONDACA, a domestic servant, Patricia Angelica QUIROZ NILO, a student, Ricardo Hernan RIVERA SILVA, a driver, Ricardo Cristian SILVA SOTO, a student, Manuel Eduardo VALENCIA CALDERON, an electrical mechanic, and Jose Joaquin VALENZUELA LEVI, a student.

Once more the official account claimed that these people were killed in a gun battle. It also said that one person escaped and that some of the agents were wounded. The Commission has rejected that account by reason of the following considerations: there were no signs of shots having been fired from inside the building; bullet marks on the floor indicated that some of the victims had been shot from above, presumably while they were in a squatting position; it is unlikely that someone would have fled from the house, as claimed in the official account, since the house is completely enclosed; it was not possible to verify that any agents had been wounded as had been stated publicly; and finally, the lack of CNI cooperation in the legal process that sought to clarify this situation should be taken into account. Not only did the agents involved not testify; their real names were not provided, nor were the weapons alleged to have been captured in the house brought forward. In view of the foregoing, the Commission has come to the conviction that these seven people were executed by government agents in violation of their human rights.

A further general observation should be made. It is not very likely that there would be so many gun battles leaving so many people dead in a few hours. Hence, these events were presumably planned in advance.

On December 20, 1988, Guillermo Eugenio RODRIGUEZ SOUS, a street vendor, was killed. The CNI issued a statement that he was killed at 11:30 p.m. that day in a gun battle with CNI agents in front of the building located on Avenida Manuel Rodriguez No. 369. However, witnesses have said that there was no such gun battle, but rather that he was stopped, beaten, and shot by armed civilians. Moreover, the autopsy report says that there were no powder bums on his fingers, thus indicating that he had not fired any weapon. In view of the evidence gathered and statements by witnesses, the Commission has come to the conviction that Guillermo Rodriguez was executed by CNI agents and that his death was a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

The police report states that the body was found on the northern bank of the Mapocho River opposite Calle Barnechea. The "autopsy report says the cause of death was asphyxiation due to being under water and encephalic cranial and spinomedular trauma. Further on it states that "the injuries could have been caused as the body was being pulled through the current or it could have another cause, especially the fracture of the spinal column." That report is contradicted by the
 
 

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report and map prepared for the judicial investigation, which make it clear that the body was found on Calle Barnechea, some meters away from the Mapocho River.

A number of other anomalies in that legal process suggest that government agents were involved in these events. Among them are the following:

On August 23, 1978, Alfonso Luis AROS PARDO, a taxi driver who was active in the Christian Left, was killed when he was held up, according to newspaper reports. His party work, the persecution that his relatives say he suffered, and the fact that when they received his body none of his valuable items such as a watch, a chain, and so forth had been taken, enable this Commission to reject the claim that it was a robbery and to state that Alfonso Aros was executed by government agents who were acting for political reasons in violation of his human rights.

On April 28, 1979, the body of Jose Aristeo AVILES MIRANDA, 72, a contractor who was not known to be politically active, was found in the Lampa district in front of the El Montijo estate in Renca. The previous day he had left his house in the Pudahuel district to do some errands. One of his sons had been held prisoner on Dawson Island after the military coup and had later gone into exile. The cause of the death of Jose Aviles according to the death certificate is cranial encephalic trauma. The press said it was an execution by the MIR and that the finding of the body had enabled the security services to trace a series of executions committed by that group.

The Commission has come to the conviction that Jose Aristeo Aviles was executed for. political reasons in violation of his human rights but it does not have the evidence that would make it possible to identify who was responsible.
 
 

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The Commission came to a similar conviction in the case of Arturo Ricardo NUNEZ MUNOZ, a MIR activist, who was arrested on May 17, 1979, and whose body bearing two bullet wounds to the head appeared the next day in the area of Quilicura. As in the previous case the newspapers reported that "the MIR claimed that it assassinated one of its activists."

On June 23, 1979, Alberto Eugenio SALAZAR BRICENO, a former sailor, and Iris Yolanda VEGA BIZAMA, a merchant, both of whom were active in the MIR, were killed in Concepcion by a bomb explosion. The official account said that they were trying to place a bomb at the Radio National station when it exploded on them. The public was told that ten persons whom the CNI accused of being part of the group that planned the operation were arrested. The results of the judicial process to which these events gave rise refutes this account. On June 11, 1980, all concerned were absolved since they could not be proven to have committed any crime. Meanwhile, the investigation into the deaths of these two men established that there were signs that they had been murdered, but there was no proof that would make it possible to accuse particular persons. In view of these conclusions, the Commission has come to the conviction that Alberto Salazar and Iris Vega were executed in violation of their human rights; and taking into account their political activity and the falsity of the official statement, it attributes their killing to government agents.

On August 13, 1979, Mario Daniel ACUNA SEPULVEDA, a public employee who was active in the Socialist party, was killed in La Serena. According to the official account issued in a statement by the office of the regional intendant, there was an explosion on a piece of property that belonged to Acuna. The police alerted the CNI which went to search the property. When they identified themselves, someone inside the building threw a bomb and ran. They chased him through the yard but before they entered the house, a second explosion occurred inside and broke all the windows. They found Acuna dead in the bathroom and arrested another person.

This Commission has in its possession evidence enabling it to state that the above account is false. In the judicial process it was established that, contrary to the official account, it was a CNI agent who went to the police station in Tierras Blancas to report the supposed explosion and asked them to allow him to contact the CNI headquarters. Thus it was not the police who called the CNI. Furthermore, it is not likely that the only person to hear the explosion that precipitated matters should have been a CNI agent. Nor is it plausible that the operation should immediately move to Acuna's house, when it is clear that they had no proof that the explosion had occurred there.

The autopsy report notes the possibility that his death may have been the result of foul play. When an effort was made to consider this possibility by reexamining the body to check the condition of his hands and see whether it was he who had handled the explosive device, his hands mysteriously disappeared after the body was exhumed, and they could not be subjected to expert examination. The judge assigned
 
 

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to the judicial investigation declared himself incompetent when he determined that persons with military immunity were involved in these events.

The foregoing, combined with the fact that at that time members of the Socialist party did not advocate the use of violence, led the Commission to the conviction that Mario Acuna was executed by CNI agents.

On October 31, 1980, Jose Rienzi ZUMAETA DATTOLI, 38, who was active in the Socialist party, was murdered by a bullet to the forehead as he was about to enter his house. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that politically motivated persons violated Jose Zumaeta's human rights, but it was unable to come to a conviction on who they were.

On July 8, 1981,Hugo RIVEROS GOMEZ, a painter who was part of the MIR's urban support structure and worked primarily in communication, was found dead. He had been arrested by the CNI in November 1980 and put into preliminary detention by the military prosecutor's office. He was released on bail in March 1981. While he was being held at the Borgono barracks, he managed to look out of the comer of his blindfold and see the main features of the garrison and some of his captors. Once outside, he was able to depict what he saw in his drawings. Hugo Riveros's drawings, including the faces of more than a dozen CNI agents were sent outside the country, but the CNI intercepted one of the packages.

On July 8, 1981, at 2:30 p.m., four armed young men took Hugo Riveros from his house blindfolded and forced him into a dark blue car. The next night his body was found stabbed to death on a road near the hydroelectric station at los Maitenes in Cajon del Maipo. A group calling itself the Gamma Commando Unit claimed to have killed Hugo Riveros and Oscar Polanco (whose case follows), and indicated that they had acted in retaliation for the killing of a CNI agent a few days earlier in San Miguel.

Taking into account the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Hugo Riveros was abducted and then executed, presumably by CNI or other government agents, and that his killing was a human rights violation.

That same night, Oscar POLANCO VALENZUELA, an active Socialist, finished work at the San Juan machine shop in the Pudahuel district and was on his way to meet three friends. He left the office and walked toward Mapocho. He had come a short distance to the comer of Calles Molina Levin and Mapocho when he ran into a friend and had a short conversation. A blue car with three men inside slowly pulled toward them. Two men and a woman were in another car close behind. One of them called him over. Polanco went up to the car, and one of the passengers fired a burst of shots from a rapid fire pistol. Polanco fell to the ground fatally wounded as the vehicles vanished. A group calling itself the Gamma Commando Unit took credit for his killing, like that of Hugo Riveros (mentioned above), and said they were acting in retaliation for the killing of a CNI agent a few days previously in San Miguel.

Taking into account the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Oscar Polanco was executed on a public thoroughfare by unidentified
 
 

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killers, presumably CNI or other government agents or civilians who were at the service of the government.

On March 19, 1982, at about 8:10 a.m., Rene BASOA ALARCON, 35, who had formerly been active in the Communist party, left his house, which was located at Calle Alonso de Trona No. 197 in San Bernardo. A few minutes later he was approached by three men who chased him about twenty yards. One of them took out a 32 calibre pistol and shot three times. One shot hit him in the occipital region, and he died instantly. This information is all registered in reports sent by the police and the investigative police to the court. Bearing in mind the fact that he had previously collaborated with the Joint Command in repression against members of the Communist party, the Commission has come to the conviction that Rene Basoa was killed by government agents or by private citizens acting for political reasons, and it regards his killing as a human rights violation.

In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission believes that the official version is untrue, since at least two of the three people who had allegedly committed suicide had two bullet wounds and the weapons in their possession showed no signs of use. Hence it has come to the conviction that the two sisters, Margarita Eliana and Maria Paz Martin, did not commit suicide, but rather were executed by police officers, and it regards their deaths as human rights violations for which government agents were responsible.
 
 

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People killed under the state of siege

At 5:00 a.m. three armed civilians came to the home of Jose Humberto CARRASCO TAPIA, a journalist and union leader who was a MIR activist, in the Bellavista neighborhood, and they took him away by force.

The bullet ridden bodies of these three abducted men were found some hours later.

The next day, that is, September 9 at 3:00 a.m., twelve armed men came to the property of Abraham MUSKATBLIT EIDELSTEIN, who worked in advertising and was active in the CP, in the area of Casas Viejas, and abducted him. His bullet-ridden body showed up a few hours later in an irrigation canal along the road to Lonquen. That same night armed civilians tried to abduct Luis Toro, who worked as a lawyer for the Vicariate of Solidarity.

A self-styled September 11 Commando Unit claimed the credit for these events. The minister secretary general of government told the public that the possibility that these crimes reflected an internal purge of the Communist party was not being ruled out.

In view of the political activism and work of the victims, and considering that the abductors identified themselves as police, that these events took place in the predawn hours in defiance of the strict military and police control then in effect, and that the perpetrators had considerable means at their disposal, the Commission has come to the conviction that these were politically motivated executions for which the government was morally responsible, either because its agents were directly involved in the events, or because they were in complicity with or tolerated these events; these violent killings were therefore human rights violations.

On January 19, 1988, the body of Juan Carlos HERNANDEZ ALARCON, who was active in the FPMR was found in a canal on the Nogal de Maipu property. He was carrying one of the organization's scarves. The cause of death was trauma to the chest and abdomen from perforating bullet wounds. In view of the foregoing, the Commission has come to the conviction that Juan Hernandez was executed for political reasons, but the perpetrators are unknown.

On October 21, 1988 an FPMR group led by the top leaders, Cecilia MAGNI CAMINO and Raul PELLEGRIN FRIEDMANN, attacked the small settlement of Los Queries, leaving a police corporal dead, and then fled back into the mountains. On October 28, 1988, Cecilia Magni's body was found in the Tinguiririca River; that of Raul Pellegrin was found on October 31, 1988. According to the autopsy reports, both bodies had injuries from blunt instruments and showed signs that
 
 

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electric current had been applied. The report on Raul Pellegrin said that the cause of death was asphyxiation by being under water, and that the bruises on his back, judging from the distribution, depth and the lack of external wounds, must have been caused by blunt instruments.

Taking into account all the information received, the Commission has come to the conviction that Cecilia Magni and Raul Pellegrin were caught while they were fleeing, and were tortured and executed by government agents, and hence it regards their deaths as human rights violations for which those agents were responsible.

On the night of September 4, 1989, the leader of the political faction of the MIR [see explanation in "current situation of groups practicing violence" on p. 685 of Volume Two], Jecar Antonio NEHGME CRISTI, was murdered by men in civilian clothing as he was crossing Calle Bulnes heading toward the Alameda. The September 11 Commando Unit, which had also been involved in the killings that took place the night after General Pinochet's motorcade was attacked, took credit for this killing. The Commission has proof that he was being continually followed in the days before he was killed, and witnesses have said that they observed it the very day he was killed. The Commission has come to the conviction that Jecar Nehgme was killed by private citizens for political reasons in violation of his human rights, and that there are indications that government agents were involved.

The Commission has come to the conviction that a crime was committed for political reasons, and that Tucapel Jimenez's human rights were violated. Although it cannot categorically state that government agents committed this crime, in weighing all the evidence, it honestly believes that the government is involved in his death, since even if the perpetrators were not government agents, they at least enjoyed government protection.

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abducted in the street in the wealthy area of the city. Early the next morning Jose Manuel PARADA MALUENDA, who headed the department of analysis at the Vicariate of Solidarity, was abducted as he was talcing his daughter to the Colegio Latinoamericano de Integracion. At the same time Manuel Leonidas GUERRERO CEBALLO, who taught at the school and was a leader in the Association of Chilean Teachers (Agech), was abducted. He had been Jose Manuel Parada's friend for many years.

The kidnappers had an array of means at their disposal in these two operations. In the case of Santiago Nattino they said they were police and that they were arresting him because of economic problems. Witnesses say that a helicopter was involved in the other kidnapping and that traffic in the area was diverted. The cruelty of the action was made clear when a teacher who tried to stop it was shot point blank.

Connected to these two attacks was the abduction of Ramon Arriagada in February of that year. He had a degree in architecture. He was interrogated on the activities of Manuel Guerrero and Jose Parada. Both were involved in making an analysis of the structure and functioning of the Joint Command, on the basis of information obtained some time before from confessions of a former member.

The abduction was also connected to an operation against the Agech office at Londres No. 75 in the capital carried out on the night of March 28. Santiago Nattino received correspondence and had a telephone line at that location. Manuel Guerrero went there often because he was a leader of the organization. A number of teachers were taken out of the location and held in jail. The place where they were held was later discovered to be the DICOMCAR headquarters on Calle Dieciocho. This was the same site that the Joint Command had previously used under the name of "the Company."

Despite a great deal of effort expended, there was no word about any of those who had been abducted until March 30, 2985, when their bodies were found with their throats slit along the road between Quilicura and the Pudahuel airport. This crime had a major impact in Chile and elsewhere, and led to an extensive judicial investigation. Government officials initially explained the crime as the result of an internal purge within the Communist party. However, on the basis of the facts recounted and those gathered in the judicial investigation, the Commission has come to the conviction that Manuel Guerrero, Jose Parada, and Santiago Nattino were executed by government agents because of their political involvement and hence in violation of their human rights.

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he was in very poor physical condition. He was then taken to the prison infirmary, but the CNI refused to take him to a hospital. The next day he died at the Central Emergency Clinic where he had been rushed. When he was brought in, he was diagnosed has having multiple contusions, hemoptysis, and lung failure. The official explanation of his death was that when he was arrested, a police officer had been forced to hit him on the head in order to subdue him. However, on the basis of the evidence gathered, and particularly the inquiry that the Medical Association made into the behavior of the medical people involved which noted that the cause of death was not any blow to the head he might have received, the Commission has come to the conviction that Alvarez died of the torture he had endured while being held prisoner at a CNI garrison, and it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On April 21, 1980, Bernardo Enrique SOLORZA GONZALEZ, died. Investigative police arrested him in Taica for committing common crimes. The official report stated that he had committed suicide by hanging himself. That was the cause of death listed on his death certificate. However, evidence and testimony gathered by the Commission indicate that he died as a result of the mistreatment and torture inflicted on him during his imprisonment. The Commission came to the conviction that Bernardo Solorza died of torture inflicted by government agents who thus violated his human rights.

On August 2, J980, Eduardo JARA ARAVENA, a journalism student and MIR activist, was killed. He and Cecilia Alzamora had been abducted together on July 23 at the comer of Calles Eliodoro Yanez and Los Leones. He was held prisoner along with other persons whom his captors, who identified themselves as members of the Avengers of Martyrs Commando Unit (COVEMA) connected to the killing of Colonel Roger Vergara. While he was held prisoner he was subjected to tortures, such as being beaten all over his body, and receiving electrical current and other torture, all of which produced obvious serious effects, such as deep gashes on his wrists, bums on his ankles and lips, and bruises on his forehead and nose. While in prison he was continually groaning from pain, but that only prompted those holding him to beat him further. The prisoners were frequently transferred and they were later able to identify some of the detention sites as investigative police buildings.

Their captors released Jara and Cecilia Alzamora on August 2 in the La Reina district. He was then taken to Emergency Clinic No. 4, and died there that same day. The Commission has come to the conviction that Eduardo Jara died of the torture he endured while under arrest and that at least members of the investigative police were involved in it, and thus it regards his death as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On October 18, 1984. Mario FERNANDEZ LOPEZ, 49, a truck owner who was active in the Christian Democrat party, died. CNI agents arrested him at his home in the city of Ovalle early on the morning of October 17. He was taken to CNI buildings in La Serena and tortured by agents. The next day he had to be taken to the emergency ward of the regional hospital in La Serena, but he was already
 
 

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dying. He died at 10:30 p.m. as a result of violent blows to the abdominal wall which caused a hypobolemic shock due to tissue damage, according to the autopsy report.

In response, the CNI made a public statement that, "On October 18, the prisoner suffered a nervous breakdown and lost control over himself because his terrorist and subversive activities had been discovered, and he beat himself against the prison furniture. No one else was involved. He injured himself in unspecified ways, thus making it advisable to transfer him to the regional hospital in La Serena because his heartbeat and breathing had stopped." In the court case, two CNI employees were accused of unnecessary violent actions leading to death. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Mario Hernandez died of the torture inflicted by CNI agents, and hence it does not regard the official report as truthful, and it regards these events as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On October 22, 1984, the body of Juan Antonio AGUIRRE BALLESTEROS, 23, a baker who was not politically active,<was found. At about 5:45 a.m. on September 4, 1984, a day on which people were being called out to participate in a national protest against the military government, police arrested Aguirre and some friends of his as they were on their way to work at the comer of Calle Brangranza and Avenida Salvador Gutierrez in Pudahuel. He was blindfolded and taken to a place where he was physically abused, according to testimony by people who were being held along with him. His body was found 51 days later at the Codegua marshlands in the area of La Leona in San Rafael de Melipilla. Officials have never acknowledged his arrest. Taking into account the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Juan Aguirre died of the torture to which he was subjected by government agents, and that his body was thrown onto unused land to conceal what had happened; it regards his killing as a human rights violation for which government agents were responsible.

On February 22, 1985, Carlos GODOY ECHEGOYEN, a student who was active in the Socialist party, died. He was in Quintero together with other young Socialist party activists when police from the local police station arrested them and accused them of being involved in a guerrilla training school. The young people were interrogated and tortured at the Quintero police station and then transferred to Vina del Mar. Later they were taken back to Quintero, and members of DICOMCAR who had made a special trip from Santiago took charge of the operation. The young people were beaten and electrical current was applied to them. Godoy died as a result of this mistreatment on February 22, 1985. In their official report, the police said that the cause of death was a heart condition. Information in the hands of the Commission, including his prior medical records and the autopsy reports, leaves no room to doubt that Carlos Godoy's death was the result of torture that government agents had inflicted on him in violation of his human rights.

On June 24, 1989, police arrested Marcos QUEZADA YANEZ, 17, a student who was active in the Pro-Democracy party (PPD), on the street in Curacautin, and took him to the checkpoint. A few hours later he died as a result of "shock,
 
 

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probably from an electric current," according to the autopsy report. Taking into account the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Marcos Quezada did not commit suicide—and hence it rejects the official report— but that he died as a result of torture applied by government agents in violation of his human rights.

On August 30, 1977, Luis Gerardo OTAROLA VALDES, an active member of the Communist party, was arrested at his home on Calle Teniente Montt, Lot 53, in Valparaiso. The house was searched, and he was taken away under arrest by six heavily armed plainclothes agents. His wife and daughter observed what happened. On August 31, 1977. Sergio Jorge HIDALGO ORREGO, was arrested at midnight at his house in the presence of his wife. A neighbor also observed the arrest and was able to identify three of the vehicles involved in the operation. The arrest of Sergio Hidalgo, who was active in the Socialist party, was part of an operation by the SIM from Valparaiso. On August 31, 1977, Raul Ivan CARCAMO ARAVENA, who was active in MAPLJ, was arrested on Calle Traslavina in Vina del Mar. At least eight agents were involved in the arrest which took place on a public thoroughfare and was observed by witnesses. Finally on October 9, 1977, Hernan Leopoldo QUEZADA MONCADA disappeared after going out with a security agent with whom he previously had ties.

The Commission came to the conviction that all these people disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated their human rights.

On October 17, 1977, Jenny del Carmen BARRA ROSALES, a student and MIR activist, was arrested at about 9:30 p.m. after leaving a friend's house. On October 19, 1977, a group of plainclothes agents arrested Hernan Santos PEREZ ALVAREZ, as he was leaving preschool G-27 in the Teniente Merino shantytown where he worked. This young man, who was active in the Socialist party and a friend of Jenny Barra, was hit with brass knuckles and forcibly put into a vehicle. Many witnesses observed the abduction and they saw the license number of one of the vehicles. Inside they could see Jenny Barra already under arrest and surrounded by three people.

The judicial investigation brought to light that the license plate of that vehicle had been issued free of charge by the municipality of Renca to the agency called DINAR, which gave an address in the Diego Portales building. These facts in combination with other evidence have enabled this Commission to come to the
 
 

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conviction that the arrest and disappearance of Jenny Barra and Hernan Perez was the work of DINA agents who thus violated their human rights.

On December 15, 1977, police came looking for Pedro Gonzalo MILLAS MARQUEZ, who was frightened and tried to run away but was caught and arrested. Before his disappearance he had previously been harassed repeatedly by police from the police station in Lautaro because of his previous support for the Popular Unity government. There has been no further word on him since that day. The Commission came to the conviction that Pedro Millas disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.

On January 23, 1978, at 3:45 p.m. the army subofficer Guulermo JORQUERA GUTIERREZ was arrested by police from the Fourteenth station in Santiago on Calle Bustos No. 2021, which is near the Venezuelan embassy in Chile. According to the police report, this subofficer was trying to seek asylum and in the process he abused a police officer but did not cause serious injury. A few hours later police officials handed Guillermo Jorquera over to the army intelligence directorate as a prisoner. He was a well-known intelligence specialist who had worked for the DINA outside the country and in the Foreign Ministry. He had worked on intelligence and security matters in the Foreign Ministry while Carlos Guillermo Osorio Mardones was minister. Osorio Mardones's tragic death which occurred shortly before these events is regarded as relevant to the asylum attempt, arrest, and disappearance of Guillermo Jorquera.

High level army officials told the courts that he had been released the day he was arrested, and no charges were made, and the matter was not brought to either the court system or the military prosecutor's office. That claim is not credible when seen in the light of the accusations made against him the moment he was arrested and the fact that there has been no further word about him. In view of the foregoing, the Commission concluded that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that he disappeared at the hands of government agents in violation of his human rights.

In the early morning of February 8, 1978, members of the investigative police arrested Luis Rene CESPEDES CARO, at his home in the Angel Bugueno shantytown in the La Cisterna district in Santiago. They also arrested his brother and two other persons. They were all taken to investigative police headquarters on Calle General Mackenna in Santiago. The others were released in the predawn hours, but Cespedes was not released and has been disappeared since then. The Commission came to the conviction that Luis Cespedes disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.

In early March 1978, police from the checkpoint of the Zanartu neighborhood in Chillian arrested Celindo del Carmen CATALAN ACUNA in the Santa Elvira sector of the city. The youth's relatives observed him being arrested. Since then there has been no word on him. The Commission came to the conviction that Celindo Catalan disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.
 
 

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On February 20, 1980, police in Curico arrested Farming del Carmen MARTINEZ ROJAS and took him to the checkpoint at Barrio Notre in the city. Police officials told his relatives that he had been released that same day in order to get the money he needed for bail. This claim does not fit the usual way the police function in arrests, and does not explain why nothing further has been heard of Martinez. The Commission came to the conviction that Fermin Martinez disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.

On November 15, 1981, at about 8:30 p.m. a group of ten young people were standing around on Avenida Departamental in Santiago when an investigative police van pulled up. Four civilians with automatic weapons got out and threatened to arrest them and take them away unless they left the area. One of the youths jokingly told the men that they would not all fit in the truck. The remark annoyed the police, and they responded by violently beating the young man and then arresting and taking away Hipolito ZUNIGA ADASME and Pablo RODRIGUEZ LEAL. Both have been disappeared since then. The Commission came to the conviction that both of these people disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated their human rights.

On December 12, 1981, Oscar Elicer ROJAS CUELLAR, a MIR activist, was arrested in Santiago, very probably, by CNI agents. He has been disappeared since then. After a war tribunal found him guilty in 1973, Oscar Rojas had been able to have his sentence reduced to exile. He served part of this punishment in exile in England. In 1980 he had returned to Chile clandestinely, since he was prohibited from entering the country. All the members of his MIR cell were killed in gun battles with the CNI, except for one survivor who is still in prison. CNI officials subjected this prisoner to exhaustive interrogation, including asking about Rojas' activities. That fact, taken in conjunction with other evidence on him, led this Commission to the conviction that he disappeared at the hands of government agents in violation of his human rights.

On December 20, 1984, Sergio Fernando RUIZ LAZO, a MIR leader who had secretly returned to Chile at the beginning of the month, was arrested in Santiago by CNI agents. Sergio Ruiz had been arrested by DINA agents in 1975 and was held prisoner at Villa Grimaldi, Cuatro Alamos, and Tres Alamos. He then lived with his family in exile in France. Officials had issued an exempt decree barring him from entering the country. Even though officials denied that he had been arrested, this Commission received information from witnesses and other evidence indicating that he was held prisoner at the CNI facility on Calle Borgono before he disappeared. The Commission came to the conviction that Sergio Ruiz disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.

The adolescent Ruben Simon SOTO CABRERA disappeared on January 18, 2983 in Valparaiso. In light of the evidence it was able to examine, this Commission believes that agents of the security services can reasonably be assumed to have been responsible. In 1973 his father, Gustavo Soto Peredo, who was active in the
 
 

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Communist party, and his brother Gustavo Soto Cabrera, a MIR activist, were arrested and then disappeared. The Commission came to the conviction that Ruben Soto disappeared at the hands of government agents who thus violated his human rights.

They were Jose Julian PENA MALTES, an engineer who was arrested September 9, 1987; Julio Orlando MUNOZ OTAROLA, a technician arrested on the street on September 9, 1987; Manuel Jesus SEPULVEDA SANCHEZ, who was arrested September 10, 1987 after leaving his house in Santiago at 7:00 p.m.; Alejandro Alberto PINOCHET ARENAS, an automobile mechanic, who was arrested in the street before witnesses in the course of a large operation on September 10, 1987; and Gonzalo Ivan FUENZALIDA NAVARRETE, a furniture maker, who was arrested September 9-10, 1987 (CNI agents had searched the house of his fiancee on September 3 and had first asked what his nickname was).

Even though officials and the head of the CNI denied that these people had been arrested, this Commission can only regard it as a certain and true fact, in view of their political activity, the circumstances of their arrest, what witnesses say about how the arrest was made in the one instance in which there are eyewitness accounts, and the overall context of the moment. The Commission came to the conviction that all these people disappeared at the hands of government agents or of people working for government agents who thus violated their human rights.

On the night of November 14, 1989, Hector Segundo PACHECO AVEN-DANO was arrested in the Lo Herminda de la Victoria shantytown, in Cerro Navia. He was involved in a human rights working group in the chapel of Our Lady of Hope in the shantytown where he lived. On two previous occasions he had protested that he was being pursued by unidentified persons and that they were keeping the local parish under surveillance. The Commission came to the conviction that Hector Pacheco suffered a grave human rights violation, namely being arrested and then disappearing. It was not able to determine who was responsible for these actions, however.

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political violence in the country. This section presents those cases in which the victim of political violence was not involved in an armed confrontation.

October arid. November 1983 saw a resurgence of violent actions in Concepcion. In some instances men in plainclothes who did not identify themselves and did not show any warrants were carrying out arrests. In addition people have testified that they were subjected to torture by government agents.

This was the context in which Galo and Maria Candelaria Acevedo Saez, the children of Sebastian ACEVEDO BECERRA, were arrested on November 9, 1983, by unidentified armed civilians. Their father desperately went looking for them at different sites and asked for help from many quarters, suspecting that they were being held by the CNI. On November 11, 1983, when he had not received any information on them, as a form of protest and in order to pressure officials, Acevedo put kerosene and gasoline on his clothes in the city square; when a policeman tried to arrest him, he lit a match, and died a few hours later of the bums he sustained.

The Commission has determined that while Sebastian Acevedo certainly died as a result of his own actions, and that strictly speaking his death cannot be classified as a human rights violation, he was a victim of political violence, since he made the decision that cost him his life as an extreme measure to save his children from consequences that were not clear but which certainly could have been extremely serious, or as a desperate way to protest what was tormenting him as a father.

On April 30, 1984, Sergio Antonio QUINTANA MICHELSON, 32, an office worker who was not politically active, was killed. The official report states that on April 30, at about 1:10 a.m. soldiers on guard duty at Garrison No. 2 of the War Arsenals were pursuing a suspect and shot approximately twenty bullets in the air without halting him. One of those bullets hit the shack located at Isabel Riquelme No. 1626 which was occupied by Sergio Antonio Quintana and hit him in the neck. He died on the spot. On the basis of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Sergio Quintana died of political violence.

On May 4, 1984, at about 8:00 p.m. a group of shantytown dwellers tried to break into the Baratisimo supermarket at the comer of Calles Teniente Cruz and Jose Joaquin Perez in the Pudahuel district, but they were immediately blocked by police from the western precinct. Later under circumstances that have not been clarified, Maximo Astolfo BERMUDEZ BALLON, and his father, Juan Rafael BERMUDEZ GAETE, who were unarmed, were shot to death. Taking into account the evidence it has received and especially testimony from witnesses, the Commission has come to the conviction that Maximo and Juan Rafael Bermudez were victims of political violence.

On August 23, 1984, a group of subversives robbed the Italiana and Real gun-shops at Nos. 164 and 169 Calle Arturo Prat in Santiago. As they were making their escape they ran into CNI agents in the area where the North-South highway passes Parque O'Higgins. Guido Hector SEPULVEDA FERREIRA, who by chance was walking by, was fatally wounded. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Guido Sepulveda died a victim of political violence.
 
 

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On May 23, 1989, at the shopping center in Santa Rosa a group of youths broke into a store intending to rob it. At that moment two policemen assigned to Station No. 13 of La Granja who were patrolling the area tried to stop the robbery but were repelled by gunfire and were wounded. Macarena Denisse TORRES TELLO, a six-year-old girl, was hit in the shootout and died on the way to the hospital. In view of the evidence accumulated, the Commission has come to the conviction that Macarena Torres died a victim of political violence.

On Saturday November 26, 1989, at 9:00 p.m., Pablo Marcelo ROBLES OR-TEGA, 16, who was not politically active, and a cousin stopped at a stand in the La Obra area and bought a bottle of liquor to take to a party. At that moment the power went off, apparently because of an explosion. A friend advised them not to go near the area of the monument, but they had to go that way to return to the cousin's house. As they were passing by they were both hit by bullets, and Robles died a few minutes later. In view of the evidence it has examined, the Commission has come to the conviction that Pablo Robles died a victim of political violence.

At this point we report on a number of cases of people who were victims of political violence during this period inasmuch as they were killed under such circumstances.

On August 4, 1979, Antonio Apolonio LAGOS RODRIGUEZ, a mining technician and MIR activist, was killed when CNI agents attacked his house in Arrayan. The shooting caused a fire in the house and set off an explosion. Lagos was burned to death. The Commission has come to the conviction that Antonio Lagos died a victim of political violence.
 
 

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On November 27, 1979, Ricardo Delfin RUZ ZANARTU, a teacher and a MIR activist, was killed when the police were stopping and checking cars at the comer of Calle Pedro de Valdivia and Las Encinas in Santiago. When he realized what was happening he tried to escape in the taxi in which he was riding. He was killed in the ensuing clash with the police. The Commission has come to the conviction that Ricardo Ruz died a victim of political violence.

On January 16, 1978, Gabriel Octavio RIVEROS RAVELO, an engineer and MIR activist, was killed on Calle Pablo Goyeneche Iver No. 010 in Santiago. He was caught by surprise that day when CNI agents violently burst into his house shooting. They also fired tear gas bombs further into his house so he would surrender. He died of a bullet to the head which the autopsy report stated was the kind of wound typical of suicide. The Commission has come to the conviction that Gabriel Riveros died a victim of political violence.

In the morning of April 28, 1980, Oscar SALAZAR JAHNSEN, a teacher, left his house and did not return at noon as he had said he would. He had been followed, and hence had preventively introduced an appeal for protection on his own behalf. That was the day on which the policeman guarding the flame of freedom on Cerro Santa Lucia was killed. At 8:00 p.m. CNI agents searched his house. The next day his family read in the newspapers that he had been killed in a gun battle with security services. The Commission has come to the conviction that Oscar Salazar died a victim of political violence.

On April 23, ]981.Juan TRUJILLO LUCERO, 24. a MIR activist, was killed in a gun battle with police. The newspaper said he had committed suicide when he realized that they had him trapped. Other accounts say he was killed during the gun battle. The Commission has come to the conviction that Juan Trujillo died a victim of political violence.

On August 16, 1981, Arcadia Patricia FLORES PEREZ, 27, a MIR activist who was part of its military structure, was killed. According to statements by witnesses, after her husband was arrested, investigative police tried to enter her house at Calle Petronila No. 644, but Arcadia Flores fought back shooting from inside. She was killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. The Commission has come to the conviction that Arcadia Flores died a victim of the political violence of that moment.

On August 17, 1981, at 7:40 p.m. Lisandro Salvador SANDOVAL TORRES, 26, a MIR activist, was killed in a gun battle with CNI agents when they tried to arrest him at the comer of Calles Rosas and Van Guard in the Risopatron shantytown in the Santiago district. The Commission has come to the conviction that Lisandro Sandoval died a victim of political violence.

On January 6, 2982, Enrique Hernan REYES MANRIQUEZ. 36, a former first corporal of the Chilean Air Force who was head of the MIR central force, was
 
 

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killed at the central market in a shootout with CNI agents who had been following his tracks, according to evidence gathered by the Commission. The Commission has come to the conviction that Enrique Reyes died a victim of political violence.

On January 16, 1982, according to evidence gathered by the Commission, Ernesto ZUNIGA VERGARA, 29, a MIR activist, was at the comer of Calles Teniente Cruz and Jose Joaquin Perez in Pudahuel, when he realized that CNI agents were nearby. He went running and in the subsequent gun battle with the agents he was fatally wounded. The Commission has come to the conviction that Ernesto Zuniga died a victim of political violence.

On November 28, 1982, Dagoberto CORTES GUAJARDO, 33, a MIR leader, was killed in a gun battle with police who tried to arrest him near Calle Aldunate No. 5009 in Santiago. The Commission has come to the conviction that Dagoberto Cortes died a victim of political violence.

On February 7, 1983, as he was leaving his house, Fernando Eugenio IRI-BARREN GONZALEZ, 26, a MIR activist, saw that CNI agents were following him; witnesses say he then ran toward the Plaza Manuel Rodriguez where he was surrounded, resisted, and was shot down by security forces. The Commission has come to the conviction that Fernando Iribarren died a victim of political violence.

On April 19, 1983, at about 7:00 a.m., two MIR activists who had secretly entered the country,Manuel Genaro FLORES DURAN, 28, and German OSO-RIO PEREZ, 30, were intercepted by security agents while they were crossing the street at Calle Villaseca No. 185 in the Nunoa district in Santiago. They were killed in the ensuing gun battle, according to evidence held by the Commission. The Commission has come to the conviction that Manuel Flores and German Osorio were victims of political violence.

On June 10, 1984, according to evidence held by the Commission, at the comer of Balmaceda and Almirante Barroso, investigative police thought Arnoldo FLORES ECHEVERRIA and Oscar TAPIA LEYTON looked suspicious. They were active in the Communist party. When they realized that they were being followed they ran away, and were then fatally wounded by the agents. The Commission has come to the conviction that Manuel Flores and German Osorio were victims of political violence.

On September 5, 1986, according to evidence held by the Commission, a group of shantytown dwellers tried to enter a bakery in the Villa Francia shantytown. Police moved in with helicopter support. Miguel Angel LEAL DIAZ, 18, was killed, although how he was killed remains unclear. The Commission has come to the conviction that Miguel Leal died a victim of political violence.

On September 16, 1988, according to evidence gathered by this Commission, at 1:05 p.m. at the comer of Calles Carrera and Lincoyan in the city of Concepcion, Hector Leonardo RAMIREZ PINO, 38, a member of the FPMR, was wounded in a
 
 

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gun battle between the CNI and civilians, and subsequently died. The Commission has come to the conviction that Hector Ramirez died a victim of political violence.

On April 18, 1989, Ivan PALACIOS GUARDA, 19, was killed, and Erick RODRIGUEZ HINOJOSA, 20, was wounded in a gun battle with security agents. According to the official account, at 9:10 p.m., in the 4000 block of Avenida San Pablo, electrical power went out. In a gun battle between CNI agents and civilians, Ivan Palacios was killed on the spot and Erick Rodriguez was wounded and died later. However according to testimony by witnesses that the Commission has received, since early 1988 someone calling himself "Miguel" had been working his way into the shantytowns and into the youth group in which these two were involved. They say they that have proof that Miguel was a security agent, and that he was pretending to be the MIR organizer for the area, and thus recruiting young people ages 18 to 24 to join the Resistance Command. In view of the evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Ivan Palacios and Erick Rodriguez were shot by CNI agents in a gun battle and died as victims of political violence.

On August 31, 1989, Marcelo Esteban BARRIOS ANDRADE, a history and geography student who was active in the FPMR, was killed. He was killed in a gun battle with members of the navy when they tried to arrest him at Cerro Yungay in Valparaiso. In view of the testimony it has taken and other evidence gathered, the Commission has come to the conviction that Marcelo Barrios was killed in a gun battle with government agents, and that he died a victim of political violence.

On September 11, 1977, Cherif Omar AINIE ROJAS, who had lived in Argentina since childhood and was studying chemistry at the University of Buenos

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Aires, was arrested in the Quilmes neighborhood. The next day troops from the joint armed forces raided his house and took his identification card. The Commission concluded that Cherif Ainie was arrested and disappeared in Argentina in violation of his human rights in the context mentioned above. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Chilean government agents were responsible.

In 1978, the Chilean citizens Raul TAPIA HERNANDEZ, Jaime Nury RIQUELME GANGAS, and Luis ESPINOZA GONZALEZ, were arrested in Buenos Aires. They were exiles and were working legally in Argentina. They disappeared in the context noted above in violation of their human rights. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Chilean government agents were responsible.

In April 1978, Carlos Patricio ROJAS CAMPOS, an active Communist, disappeared. He had been persecuted in Calama and Tocopilla until 1977, when he took refuge in Buenos Aires. He regularly corresponded with his family in Chile by mail. Since that date there has been no word about him. In view of the insecurity in which Chilean political refugees were living in Argentina, his political activity and persecution in Chile before he fled, and the fact that human rights organizations in Argentina include him on their lists of victims, the Commission believes that it is quite probable that he disappeared in Argentina and that his human rights were violated, but it cannot say so categorically nor can it affirm that Chilean security agencies were involved in this matter.

On July 26, 1978, Cristina CARRENO ARAYA, an active Communist, disappeared in Argentina. She had arrived from Hungary at the beginning of the month. On the 24th, she said she was being followed and asked for refugee status at the office of CEAS, the Catholic church agency that was working in coordination with the UNHCR. Although there is no doubt that Cristina Carreno's human rights were violated, since many witnesses have testified that she was held at the Argentinean police facilities of El Banco and Olympo in Buenos Aires, the Commission cannot say that agencies of the Chilean government were responsible.

On January 27, 1979, Oscar Orlando OYARZUN MANZO, an active member of the Chilean Communist party who had been a refugee in Argentina since 1974, was abducted by plainclothes agents and killed on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. The investigation into the case established that the abduction and subsequent killing of Oscar Oyarzun, who had just obtained his visa to go to Germany as a refugee, was a politically motivated execution in violation of his human rights. It took place in the overall context of Argentina described above, but it cannot be said that Chilean agents were involved.

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He had taken refuge in Argentina after the DINA had come looking for him at his home and his workplace in Rancagua. From 1975 to 1977 he lived in the provinces of Mendoza and Tucuman. Witnesses have said that a person in Argentina with DINA ties informed the Argentinean police about Jose Luis de la Maza's political past. The Commission believes that there are good grounds to believe that Jose de la Maza disappeared in Argentina in violation of his human rights and that agents of the Chilean government were involved in bringing it about.

On January 10, 1978, Argentinean police arrested Guido Arturo SAAVEDRA INOSTROZA, a student at the University of Buenos Aires and an office worker at the Textil Gloria factory. He has been disappeared since that date. This university student had left Chile in the post-September 11, 1973 period after he had been arrested at the Universidad Federico Santa Maria in Valparaiso. Evidence made available to the Commission has enabled it to come to the conviction that Guido Saavedra suffered a human rights violation committed outside the country by agents of the Chilean government or with their participation. To arrive at that conviction it considered the high level of communication between Argentinean and Chilean security agencies at that time, which taken in conjunction with the evidence specific to this case, provides grounds for assuming that such was the case.

On February 19, 1981, Jose Alejandro CAMPOS CIFUENTES, a nursing student, and Luis QUINCHAVIL SUAREZ, a former Mapuche leader, both of whom were MIR activists, were arrested along the Chilean-Argentinean border in the area of Paimun. They had both attempted a clandestine entry into Chile in the so-called "Operation Return." War tribunals had previously sentenced them to prison terms, which were reduced to exile in 1975, and hence they were prohibited from entering the country.

The evidence gathered taken in conjunction with the CNI operations that ended in the dismantling of guerrilla activity in the area of Neltume in 1981 led this Commission to the conviction that Jose Campos and Luis Quinchavil were arrested on the border by Argentinean police who turned them over to Chilean security agents in whose hands they disappeared in violation of their human rights.
 

B. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY PRIVATE CITIZENS FOR POLITICAL REASONS DURING THE AUGUST 1977-MARCH 1990 PERIOD

1. OVERVIEW

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examined and explained in the next few pages, which will also deal with the groups that were carrying out such actions.

Fifteen of these victims were civilians, some of whom were children. They were killed by bombs set off in public places, armed political propaganda actions, and one instance of a selective assassination. These people happened to be present when terrorist attacks took place, but they were not themselves involved.

All the others killed were members of the armed forces, the police, and the security forces. They were killed in different kinds of terrorist attacks, particularly selective assassination attempts, robberies to get money for other kinds of actions, bombings, and attacks on units of the police or armed forces. Prominent in this latter group were attacks on the lives of police who were doing their duty, for example, standing guard, when they were ambushed and had no chance to respond to the aggression. In a number of instances, after they had been killed their weapons or headgear were taken.

Those responsible used various criteria in choosing their victims. Sometimes it was simply a matter of chance. In other cases, they were chosen very much because of the person's highly visible role in the government or the security agencies. However, it can be said that in most cases the object was not so much to do harm to the specific person being attacked as to cause an overall impact within society. The individual thereby became a mere instrument. Such a practice is incompatible with the value of human life as embodied in the modem conception of human rights.

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nor indeed are all their members. Hence it is difficult to determine with precision how they are organized and how they make their decisions.

One feature can be noted immediately, the manner in which power is centralized. The members are organized around the idea of compartmentalized functions and absolute compliance with agreements once they are made. That gives them a character of strict discipline, which of course makes them somewhat attractive to young people.

The information available indicates that the MIR is organized into cells. The top authority is the central committee, presided over by a national secretariat, as its executive body. The general secretary is the visible head, and depending on circumstances he may act as a political leader. This solid structure is nevertheless affected by events, thereby occasioning internal problems and divisions that will be mentioned below. Within the MIR special action groups may be formed, for example, the Miguel Enriquez Rebel Youth, which sought to recruit young people for revolutionary action.

At the beginning of this period, many MIR activists were outside the country in exile. They had survived the period of greatest repression, organized by the DINA. By 1975 their activity had almost been brought to a standstill. Most of those outside the country remained united around their leaders and under their command. During this period the MIR's contacts in Argentina had weakened as a result of changing circumstances there, and France became the new place for assembling. It was there that the organization decided to give its members military training, and many of them travelled to Cuba for that purpose. There is proof that groups assigned to carry out particularly complex missions received training in other countries.

In 1980 the MIR leadership made the decision to have its members return in large numbers. That process had to be clandestine, since the MIR was prohibited from entering Chile. A number of methods were used, and many members managed to evade government vigilance and make it back into Chile in order to take up their subversive activity once more. The most outstanding event during this period was the Neltume episode, which is described in a previous section. This was the MIR's most serious effort to establish a permanent guerrilla foco, which was to begin in the mountains in the Tenth Region. The plan was that the top leaders would establish a base there. This experience ended in failure, and many of the organization's activists were killed. That failure prompted major internal changes and the painful process of deciding who would assume particular responsibilities, which in turn later led to a split in the organization.

That these violent approaches failed is not to be explained solely on the grounds that the organization may have been infiltrated. It was also due to the difficulties the members had in getting settled and in being integrated into the community, thus making it easier for security agents to locate them. Moreover, mistakes were made in training members, and in planning and carrying out actions. The CNI detected a substantial proportion of the MIR activists who entered the country underground.

As a result of these failures, MIR activity gradually became less significant over the years, and the group had to make way for the violent actions of a new group, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which resulted from a change of strategy within
 
 

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the Communist party. This group operates with similar structures, but it is more militarized. Its specifically military structure stands above the rest of the organization. Its leaders have military titles. The top authority is a "command" made up of twelve members. Five of them are further singled out as "supreme commanders."

The leaders of these organizations have often made public statements. When they do so, they speak with conviction and assurance. The assumption is that their organizations are solidly united and are utterly unwavering in support of their leaders. Yet they have certainly not been free from problems arising from splits into factions or around particular leaders. The experience of the members of these organizations has been shaped by the fact that many of them took part in the armed actions that led the Sandinistas to power in Nicaragua, and in armed activity in Angola, in addition to receiving training in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The FPMR's political vision differs from that of the MIR, which still holds onto the vision of society it had in the 1960s. The FPMR's starting point is an analysis that sees a society on the brink of a massive general uprising against a government it regards as dictatorial. Its action is stamped with the idea of a popular uprising and the acceptance of all forms of struggle that the Communist party, profoundly altering its strategy, adopted after the regime moved toward becoming more institutionalized in 1980. That is why all the FPMR's violent actions are urban, and it has not had a conception of guerrilla warfare, such as the one that is obvious in the MIR's efforts in Neltume.

Finally, it was the idea of a "grand revolution" in the minds of the FPMR ideologues that led them to plan to stockpile a large supply of weapons at Carrizal Bajo and to attack General Pinochet and his motorcade. The security forces, however, discovered the location in the north where these weapons were being smuggled into the country. The government made accusations against the subversives and connected the events to foreign countries. The public was initially inclined to be skeptical, but evidence showed that there really was such an effort. The far left parties could not deny it, and this ultimately became a setback for them. The effort nevertheless showed that their international connections and their ability to operate inside Chile should not be underestimated. Most of the citizenry disapproved of that action. The legal procedure that then ensued, criticisms of the way it has been conducted notwithstanding, has brought many details to light.

The attack on the president's motorcade along the Cajon del Maipo road as he was returning to Santiago took the lives of several bodyguards, but it failed to achieve its main objective. Once more it drew attention to the proven ability of FPMR organizers and to their option for armed struggle. Again, the bulk of the citizenry did not approve of the action. Most of those involved are still in prison pending the outcome of a court case that is still in process. The salient point about these two actions is, as we said, the idea that had they been successful they would have precipitated a vast popular uprising. That is not in tune with how the citizenry felt at that time however, as was clearly evidenced later. These landmark events took place in 1986 which the FPMR called the "decisive" year, and yet which marked the beginning of their own downfall as an organization when these two actions failed.

Although it was still able to engage in elaborate actions that had a great deal of impact, such as the kidnapping of Colonel Carreno and the murders of
 
 

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the neighborhood leader Simon Yevenes and of the former member of the Joint Command, Roberto Fuentes Morrison, in the next few years the FPMR saw its cadres decimated with internal squabbles and a merciless persecution by government authorities operating both through military prosecutor's offices and in actions of repression, such as Operation Albania, already described.

Finally, the MAPU Lautaro, which is newer and less well-known, reflects its ties to the MAPU political party from which it sprang. Its organization is more oriented toward political forms. It includes what are called the MAPU Lautaro party, the Lautaro Youth Movement, and the Lautaro Rebel and Popular Forces. It is this last structure that advocates activities of a military nature and which have recently taken the form of terrorist actions. The political rationale for this group's actions is even fuzzier and less comprehensible than that of the previous organizations. Its actions are plainly more cruel. The explanation may lie in the diversity of its members, their very limited training, and the lack of clarity over their aims. It should certainly be acknowledged, however, that little is known about its inner workings.

In 1984 the top leader of the MIR said, "We understand this popular war as the combined development of all forms of mass struggle, from the use of active nonviolence passing through direct and disruptive mobilizing all the way to the development of violent armed struggle." That is the central argument. What he calls "direct and disruptive mobilizing" can be taken to mean the protest demonstrations that the opposition organized in 1983 and 1986. The use of the term "armed struggle" expresses the position that rebellion is regarded as valid in a particular given situation. Another quotation is even more illustrative: "We have shown that we can sabotage many railroad lines. We have derailed dozens of trains. We have attacked the electrical power system and knocked over numerous high power lines. We have also carried out actions to punish agents of repression. We have set ambushes. We have also conducted actions to harass police stations." "Punishment" and "ambush" fall within the category of terrorist actions.
 
 

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The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front can be said to have superseded the MIR in carrying out violent actions. The FPMR has been making its presence felt since 1984, but it has been clearly the major force since 1986. The army's accusations of acts of violence are made almost exclusively at this front. The July 1988 issue (No. 32) of its newsletter El Rodriguista has an interview with the national leadership of the FPMR in which it is stated:

Both organizations' statements are in keeping with what has happened. The account provided in this report confirms what they have said. Over a substantial period of time—from the killings of the high ranking officers Vergara and Urzua to the attack on the presidential motorcade—the MIR and the FPMR have engaged in violent activity. Even today they still hold those same underlying doctrinal and •practical ideas.

The common procedure in selective killings was to surround the victim's car near his house. Strategically placed snipers would fire automatic weapons. This procedure limited the ability to respond and made it easier to escape. These groups would also shoot police from behind and run away.

Subversive movements tended to use explosives a great deal. They especially targeted high voltage power lines, radio stations, and generally tended toward actions that would become widely known. The result was that innocent people were killed
 
 

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as well as persons inexperienced in handling explosives. They also engaged in bank robberies, some of them bloody. Their purpose was not simply to get money for future actions but also to get themselves publicity and to show that government security mechanisms could be penetrated.

The smuggling of large supplies of weapons has already been noted. The fact that it required complex operations indicates the capacity for prior planning that such groups sometimes evidenced, whatever the end result of those actions may have been.

one part continued to advocate armed struggle and in turn split into the "Historic MIR" and the "Miliary Commission MIR"; the other group, called "MIR Renewal," entered political life. It joined the United Left in 1987 and ran candidates in the parliamentary election [December 14, 1989].

After having justified all kinds of actions that had been undertaken and providing a twofold theoretical basis for them (overthrowing the military government and preparing to change the social system), the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front was also divided. The "Autonomous Front" emerged as the stronger faction. The FPMR generally rejected the means used by the opposition because they seemed doomed to failure. When the new government came in, it took more concrete actions, and tried to attack people who had been part of the previous regime. The assassination attempt against General Leigh is attributed to the FPMR.

We should note that there has been a good deal of discussion on connections between the FPMR and the Communist party. Actually neither organization has acknowledged that there is any tie or that one has authority over the other—nor have they expressly disavowed it. Recent events indicate that the two are distinct, since the Communist party accepted the opposition's decisions on the plebiscite and the presidential and parliamentary election. It is the "autonomous" faction that refuses to accept this point; the other faction agrees with the party, and there are some reports that activists from this sector of the FPMR have joined or rejoined the party.

The spirit of revolutionary violence is not extinguished, however. In 1990 the MAPU, which also advocates revolution, took on a new vitality. It works with young people and has made violent attacks on banks, Mormon church properties, members of the armed forces, stores, and so forth. The recent killing of two police is attributed to MAPU-Lautaro.
 
 

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What currently constitutes the problem of "political prisoners," as they are conventionally called, is the fact that they are accused of the crimes described in this section. These are serious actions, some even leading to death, resulting from the use of weapons, bombs, and the like. The political factor was at work in all of them, although the law does not use that category to define these actions as crimes.

The situation is very complex since those who are on trial or who have been sentenced for such crimes make three arguments on their own behalf: the right to rebel, which they claim is the reason that they have launched their strategy of armed struggle; the fact that elementary norms of due process were not observed in their own trials; and the claim that they have been punished unjustly, either because they are innocent or because the punishment is excessive. Hence, when the question of how to solve the problem is discussed, political positions are continually clashing. While some regard the military regime's human rights violations as justified because it was necessary to invoke the right to rebellion in order to overcome the previous crisis, likewise those who allegedly broke the laws of that regime believe they are innocent, because they are being oppressed by a dictatorial society.

The matter should be handled by the proper agencies within the Chilean democratic system. This Commission can only say that beyond those humanitarian considerations that would urge rapid solutions while not impairing the essence of the law, in principle such thinking should not focus one-sidedly on how the rights of the individual relate to the rights of society. All those who believed they could take another persons's life in the difficult situations that we Chileans have experienced during these years must understand that they were mistaken. If, instead of holding onto criteria that violate the rights of each human being, they were to grasp the depth of the individual and collective suffering of so many people, we could perhaps hope that the truth might lead to justice and to a way of life proper to a truly human society.

The Commission has judged that the fatal incidents narrated in the next section constituted grave human rights violations during this period.

2. CASES

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killed by a terrorist action that violated his human rights which was committed by private citizens for political reasons.

On June 21, 1979, Nicomedes INOSTROZA MOLINA, 42, a police first sergeant who was assigned to the Eleventh station in Santiago, was killed. At about 8:00 a.m. near the Lo Valledor slaughterhouse in Santiago, Sergeant Inostroza, who was in charge of police van Z-757, and his assistant tried to halt a pickup truck driven by MIR members that looked suspicious to them. The car sped away, and they began to chase it. The suspects abandoned their pickup, and the police officers followed them on foot. The police and those they were pursuing fired their weapons. Sergeant Inostroza was killed by a "perforating bullet to the chest, lungs and aorta," fired by MIR members. The facts gathered indicate that he was fulfilling his normal duties, and that in the course of doing so he began to follow suspects, and in that pursuit MIR members shot him to death. This Commission has come to the conviction that First Sergeant Nicomedes Inostroza was killed as the result of a human rights violation committed by MIR members.

On November 24, 1979, Bruno Orlando BURDILES VARGAS, 33, a police first corporal, was killed. That day he was guarding a truck whose crew was carrying valuables from the Banco de Concepcion. When they arrived at the Agas supermarket at the comer of Calle Manquehue and Isabel La Catolica in Santiago, an armed group attacked them. First Corporal Burdiles was in the back of the truck and was hit by two bullets and died. A second police corporal was also wounded.

The evidence gathered makes it possible to conclude that:

On March 24, 1980, Orlando Jose SAEZ PEREZ, 10, a fifth grade student at School E-148 in Quinta Buin, was killed. He was returning from school together with his sister and an aunt. When they came near the La Pincoya checkpoint, he found a package in a string bag hanging from a tree and was especially intrigued by the clock inside. When young Saez opened the package the bomb went off. He died a few hours later at the Neurosurgery Institute of the damage caused to his limbs by the bomb's impact, as the autopsy report indicated. The evidence makes
 
 

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it possible to conclude that he was killed as the result of the explosion of a bomb placed intentionally so that any passer-by would set it off by picking it up. The Commission has come-to the conviction that Orlando Jose Saez died a victim of a grave human rights violation, when a bomb placed on a public thoroughfare by politically motivated terrorists exploded on him.

In Valparaiso on April 19, 1980, Domingo Antonio ROCHA ROCHA, 59, and Rodolfo Hernan PINTO, 49, both of whom were working in the Minimum Employment Plan, were killed. They were killed by the explosion of a bomb that terrorists had placed at the provincial capital building in Valparaiso where there were always many people coming and going. Having verified these facts, this Commission has come to the conviction that Domingo Antonio Rocha and Rodolfo Hernan Pinto suffered a violation of their basic human rights committed by unknown people who were politically motivated.

On April 29, 1980, Heriberto Hernan NOVOA ESCOBAR, 21, a policeman, was killed. That morning officer Novoa was on duty at Cerro Santa Lucia guarding the "flame of freedom." A group, presumably composed of MIR members, shot and killed him. They then stole his weapon. Since he was on duty and the attack on him was clearly politically motivated, this Commission holds the conviction that policeman Heriberto Novoa was killed by a terrorist act committed by politically motivated private citizens who violated his right to life.

On July 15, 1980, army Lieutenant Colonel Roger Juan de Dios VERGARA CAMPOS, 43, the head of the army intelligence school, was killed in an ambush set by MIR activists. At the comer of Calles Puyehue and Manuel Montt in the Providencia district in Santiago, a taxi cut in front of his car, forcing his driver to slow down. At that moment a pickup truck pulled up to Vergara's car and two individuals in the back began shooting at him and his driver. Lieutenant Colonel Vergara was taken toward the military hospital but died on the way. His driver was seriously wounded. The evidence gathered makes it possible to conclude that the action was planned and carried out in such a way as to kill him and assure that the perpetrators could escape. The Commission has come to the conviction that Lieutenant Colonel Roger Vergara was killed by MIR members in an action that constituted a human rights violation.

On December 16, 1980, Manuel ESPINOZA BRAVO, 52, was killed. He was killed when MIR members robbed a branch of the Banco de Chile on Avenida Pedro Aguirre Cerda in Santiago. When Espinoza, who was guarding cars, became aware of the robbery he tried to run and tell the police, and was shot by one of the robbers. This Commission has come to the conviction that Manuel Espinoza Bravo was killed by MIR members in an action that gravely violated human rights.

On December 30, 1980, at about 2:30 p.m. three banks were robbed on Avenida Irarrazaval in Santiago (the banks of Concepcion, Chile, and Taica). Two police officers from the Eighteenth station in Nunoa were killed:
 
 

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Washington GODOY PALMA, 31, a police first corporal, and
Daniel Alberto LEIVA GONZALEZ, 27, a police second corporal.

This operation involved many people, and entailed elaborate tactics, even the use of police uniforms. The robberies took place simultaneously. These two police officers were among those who came to provide protection. The bank robbers shot and killed them.

Since these two police officers were killed as they were carrying out their duty to protect public order, and since the bank robbery was an action carried out by a politically motivated armed group, this Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of First Corporal Washington Godoy and Second Corporal Daniel Alberto Leiva were violated by a politically motivated armed group that killed them.

On November 18, 1981, three members of the investigative police who were assigned to the Eleventh station of the investigative police in Las Condes, were killed:

Hector Hugo HENRIQUEZ ALISTE, 28, an inspector;
Ricardo REYES URRA, 21, a detective;
Sergio Leonel OSBEN CUEVAS, 25, a driver.

These three officers were in a police car patrolling Calle Eliodoro Yanez in the Providencia district and were passing by the house of the head of the presidential general staff when an armed group attacked them. Since they were carrying out their normal duties and were killed in an ambush which was obviously intended to have a political impact, this Commission has come to the conviction that Inspector Hector Henriquez, Detective Ricardo Reyes, and driver Sergio Osben were killed by an armed group operating for political reasons and that this action gravely violated their human rights.

On July 6, 1981, Carlos Enrique TAPIA BARRAZA, 60, a subofficer major (ret.) in the army who worked for the CNI, was killed when he was shot by unknown people as he was leaving his house on Calle Anoca, Villa La Union, San Miguel. Since he belonged to the CNI, and since similar things were happening during this period, it can be concluded that this attack was politically motivated. This Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of Carlos Enrique Tapia were violated by private citizens who killed him for political reasons.

On September 19, 1981, Victor Manuel NAHUELPAN SILVA, 19, a conscript, was killed when he was accidentally hit by a burst of machine gun fire in the course of an anti-guerrilla operation in Neltume in the Tenth Region. The evidence it has obtained enables this Commission to come to the conviction that Victor Manuel Nahuelpan, a conscript, died as a result of the situation of political violence prevailing in that time and place.

On August 30, 2983, at the intersection of Calle Cordillera and Avenida Apoquindo in Santiago at about 9:00 a.m. the intendant of the Metropolitan Region,
 
 

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Major General Carol Urzua Ibanez (ret.), was attacked. The general and two of his bodyguards were killed. Their names were:

Carol Miguel Angel URZUA IBANEZ, 57, army major general (ret.), who was intendant of the Metropolitan Region;
Carlos Manuel RIVEROS BEQUIARELLI, 30, an army first corporal who belonged to the armored cavalry and had been assigned to the CNI; and
Jose Domingo AGUAYO FRANCO, 34, an army second corporal who belonged to the transportation service and was assigned to the CNI.

As Major General Urzua (ret.) and his bodyguards left his house on Calle La Cordillera that day and came to the comer of Avenida Apoquindo they were attacked by a group of individuals who were pretending to be fixing a stalled car and others who had taken positions in the area. General Urzua's car was caught in a crossfire and was hit by 62 bullets. Major General Urzua (ret.) was hit five times and died on the spot. The two bodyguards were also hit by a number of bullets and also died on the spot. The testimony from witnesses that this Commission has received along with other evidence examined has enabled it to declare that a group of MIR activists was responsible for this action. On the basis of the evidence it can be concluded that this was a surprise terrorist attack in which the victims had no chance to defend themselves. The Commission holds the conviction that Major General Carol Urzua, First Corporal Carlos Manuel Riveros, and Second Corporal Jose Domingo Aguayo died victims of human rights violations committed by MIR activists.

On September 11, 1983, Pedro Efrain SALAS LINEROS, 33, a police second sergeant who was assigned to the Fifth station in Conchali, was killed. While Second Sergeant Salas was standing guard at the house of an appeals court judge, two armed individuals shot at him with intention to kill, leaving him gravely wounded; they then took his gun and ran away. He managed to radio to the police station for help. He was taken to the Jose Joaquin Aguirre Hospital and died there of his wounds. The autopsy report concluded that he was hit by four bullets, and that the cause of death was abdominal and spinomedular trauma aggravated by a peritonitis which was ultimately the cause of death. This information indicates that the perpetrators took him by surprise and shot him at close range, and therefore he had no chance to defend himself. The Commission came to the conviction that police Second Sergeant Pedro Efrain Salas was killed by politically motivated private citizens and that their actions were a violation of his fundamental rights.

On October 13, 1983, Juan Angel CACERES OPAZA, 31, a police second corporal who was assigned to the Third station in Santiago, was killed. At dawn that day he was standing guard at the police apartment building on Calle Herrera between Rosas and Santo Domingo. Individuals who were passing by suddenly opened fire on Caceres. They took away his weapon and his radio equipment, and ran away. Caceres was already near death as he was being taken toward Emergency Clinic No. 3 of the public health system, and he died along the way. Eyewitnesses observed that on
 
 

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their way to a waiting car the three individuals threw miguelitos [homemade wire devices for puncturing tires] on the road to prevent them from being pursued. The autopsy report concluded that the cause of death was cranioencephalic, cervical, thoracic, and spinomedular trauma from bullets. Since it has been established that this subofficer was on duty and that the perpetrators attacked him by surprise, the Commission was able to come to the conviction that police Second Corporal Juan Angel Caceres was killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated his human rights.

On November 5, 1983, Hector Arturo FUENTEALBA ASCENCIO, 28, a police first corporal who was assigned to police general headquarters where he worked as a radio operator, was killed. That day while Corporal Fuentealba was at the intersection of Pasajes Argentina and Bizancio in the Maipu district on his way to work, an unidentified civilian who was in the company of another shot at him. They then took his gun and ran away. Gravely wounded, he was taken by ambulance to the main medical center and died that same day. The autopsy report says that the cause of death was damage from perforating bullet wounds to the chest and abdomen and to the left arm, and that he was hit four times. Witnesses say that he was shot point blank and had no chance to defend himself. The Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of First Corporal Hector Arturo Fuentealba were violated by the politically motivated private citizens who killed him.

 On November 15, 1983, Jose Miguel JORQUERA GALVEZ, 26. a policeman assigned to the Petorca police station, was killed. That morning he was travelling as a guard with two social security employees from Quillota who were carrying a shipment of money. When they came to the La Grupa Tunnel, MIR members in a car cut in front of their vehicle and stopped it. After taking four million pesos, they shot this policeman. He died that night in the Cabildo Hospital. His killers took his weapon and the government vehicle. The death certificate says that the cause of death was a bullet wound that destroyed his brain. The Commission has come to the conviction that police officer Jose Miguel Jorquera was killed by MIR activists in an action that violated his right to life.

On December 28, 1983, Francisco Javier PEREZ BRITO, 27, a policeman who was working as a courier for the central district's Twenty-first station, was killed. That day he was going to leave correspondence at the western prefecture in Santiago. As he got off the bus at the comer of Calles Teniente Cruz and General Bonilla, two individuals ambushed him. They shot him in the back and left him dying. They took his weapon and ran away. He died at the police hospital.

Fifteen hours later Manuel Jesus VALENZUELA LOYOLA, 45, a police second sergeant who was assigned to the Third station in Santiago, was also killed. While Sergeant Valenzuela and another policeman were guarding the police neighborhood on Calle Herrera between Rosas and Santo Domingo, unidentified individuals attacked him. Although they managed to repel the attack, this subofficer was left mortally wounded, and he died early the next morning at the police hospital. His colleague was also wounded. Another policeman had been killed at this same
 
 

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spot two months before. The autopsy report on policeman Perez Brito concluded that the cause of death was abdominal and thoracic trauma from bullets. The autopsy report on Valenzuela Loyola came to the same conclusion. Since these two policemen were on duty and in both cases the perpetrators made sneak attacks, this Commission has come to the conviction that police officer Francisco Javier Perez and police Second Sergeant Manuel Jesus Valenzuela were killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated their human rights.

On March 30, 1984, Pedro Lorenzo NUNEZ ENRIQUEZ, 27, a police second corporal, was killed. That night at the comer of Calle Carmen and Avenida Bernardo O'Higgins in Santiago a bomb exploded under a special forces prefecture bus which was taking police back to their headquarters. The bomb was activated by remote control and destroyed the vehicle. Several of the passengers were wounded, including Second Corporal Pedro Nunez, who died a few hours later at the intensive care unit of the Central Emergency Clinic. The autopsy report says that he died of extensive trauma from an explosive device. Evidence examined makes it possible to state that this was an intentional attack on the Chilean Police, and that the circumstances were such that those attacked had no chance to defend themselves. This Commission has come to the conviction that Second Corporal Pedro Nunez was killed by politically .motivated private citizens who violated his human rights.

On April 16, 1984, Carlos Enrique MEZA TORRES, 32, an army first sergeant who was assigned to the maintenance and general logistics battalion in the Cerro Navia district, was killed in an attack. Very early that morning, he was guarding the towers holding up the high voltage lines at the Endesa substation in the Cerro Navia district. Seeing suspicious individuals, he approached them and ordered them to stop. They ran away shooting back, and one of the bullets hit Sergeant Meza. He died as he was receiving care at the Central Emergency Clinic in Santiago. The autopsy report concluded that the cause of death was "abdominal and thoracic trauma from perforating bullet wounds." In view of the evidence presented and since the patrol was attacked while it was carrying out its duties, the Commission has come to the conviction that army First Sergeant Carlos Meza was killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated his human rights.

On May 6, 1984, Jose Isaias ALVAREZ MONDACA, 24, a policeman who was on duty at the western precinct of Santiago, lost his life. At sundown on May 4, when a group of individuals broke into the Baratisimo supermarket in the Pudahuel district intending to take merchandise, an operational group from the western precinct including Alvarez went to the supermarket. As they arrived on the scene they were met with gunfire, and he was gravely wounded. He died two days later at the police hospital of the grave head wounds he had sustained. The death certificate states that -the exact cause of death was, "cranial encephalic trauma from bullets." Since it has been established that he was carrying out his duties, this Commission has come to the conviction that police officer Jose Alvarez died a victim of political violence.

693
 

On June 21, 1984, Juan Francisco AVILA GARAY, 32, conductor's assistant at the state railroad company, was killed. A group of about fifteen or twenty members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front halted the express train to Linares for purposes of political propaganda. When Avila Garay tried to seize the weapon from one of the attackers, another fatally wounded him. During this action they hung banners, passed out flyers, and read a statement about their organization's anniversary. The same organization carried out a similar action in the city of Valparaiso. The autopsy report concluded that Avila died of thoracic, abdominal, and spinomedular trauma from perforating bullets and acute loss of blood. The evidence presented makes it unquestionably clear that this sneak attack was politically motivated and that Avila was unable to defend himself. The Commission has come to the conviction that Juan Francisco Avila Garay was killed by members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front who violated his human rights.

On July 27, 1984, Julio Alberto ALLENDE OVALLE, 24, a Chilean police sublieutenant, was killed. That night Allende, who was in charge of an operational section made up of personnel from the Twenty-sixth station in Pudahuel, went to clear obstacles left by demonstrators at the intersection of Calles Mapocho and Huelen. As he arrived, individuals who had taken positions on a wall shot at him. He was hit by a bullet to the head and died shortly thereafter at the police hospital. The autopsy report said that the cause of death was cranial encephalic trauma from a perforating bullet wound. He was killed after a day of protest or a general strike in Pudahuel. The Commission has come to the conviction that police Sublieutenant Julio Allende was killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated his human rights.

On September 5, 1984, Julio Enrique BRIONES RAYO, 27, an army lieutenant and head of the CNI in the Third Region, was killed. Early in the afternoon as a demonstration was taking place inside the University of Atacama in the city of Copiapo, the rector asked for help from government forces. Police arrived first, followed by soldiers and members of the CNI. Uniformed troops fired many shots. Briones was at the back of the campus, as the CNI itself acknowledged. While there he was hit in the chest region and suffered a mortal wound. He was immediately taken to the emergency ward of the regional hospital and died on the operating table. A university student was also killed. The autopsy report stated that the most probable cause of his death was a "perforating wound to the right arm and acute post-hemorrhage blood loss." The Commission came to the conviction that army Lieutenant Julio Briones was killed in political violence; the shots that killed him may have been from government agents.

On November 2, 1984, a police bus was attacked on Route 68 while it was taking police to cover the Vuelta Ciclistica a Chile [national bicycle race]. Four police officers were killed:

Uldaricio ARAVENA SANHUEZA, 43, a police subofficer;
Hugo Armando TOLEDO TREJO, 37, a police first corporal;
 
 

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Angel Manuel SAZO CASTILLO, 22, a police second corporal; and
Patricio DELGADO VERGARA, 24, a police second corporal.

All belonged to the operational section of the Seventh station of special forces in Valparaiso. While they were on their way to the race, at kilometer 115 on Route 68 at a place called La Planchada, the bus carrying them was attacked with a Vietnamese-type bomb. They were killed instantaneously in the explosion. Since this was a planned sneak attack and these people were utterly defenseless, this Commission has come to the conviction that Subofficer Uldaricio Aravena, First Corporal Hugo Toledo, Second Corporal Angel Manuel Sazo and Second Corporal Patricio Vergara were killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated their human rights.

On November 4, 1984, the Tenth station in La Cisterna was attacked, and two policemen were killed: Elvis Manuel ARAVENA CACERES, 21, and Jose Gustavo ERICES PICA, 26. That night while they were on guard, the police station suddenly came under attack by unknown people who were using automatic weapons and grenades. A grenade explosion wounded Erices and Aravena. They died of their wounds while they were being treated at the Ramon Barros Luco Hospital. The autopsy report on Aravena Caceres concludes that the cause of death was "thoraco-abdominal trauma from a perforating bullet wound," and that of Erices Pica was "thoraco-pulmonary trauma from a penetrating bullet wound and acute loss of blood." The evidence put forward reveals that the intention was to attack the Chilean Police. The Commission has come to the conviction that Elvis Aravena and Jose Erices suffered a human rights violation since they were killed in an attack on their lives by politically motivated private citizens.

On November 22, 1984, Hugo Alberto FAUNDEZ HULIN, 29, a first corporal in the Chilean Navy, was killed. That day at about midnight, unknown people shot at him while he was guarding high voltage power lines in the area of Puente Perales in the city of Talcahuano. He died of those wounds shortly thereafter while being treated at the naval hospital. An PAL rifle was found at the site. Presumably it had been used by the attacker who dropped it as he was running away wounded when other troops on guard duty responded to the attack. The cause of death according to the autopsy report was a "contused heart wound caused by the fracture of the sternum inflicted by two gunshot wounds." Since it is established that the attack took place while the subofficer was carrying out his responsibilities, and since it can reasonably be assumed that the perpetrators were politically motivated, the Commission has come to the conviction that the killing of navy First Corporal Hugo Faundez was a human rights violation.

On December 6, 1984, Jose Guillermo HERRERA SERRANO, 26. a police first corporal who was assigned to the Santa Adriana police station, was killed. Corporal Hen-era was spending the night at the barracks when heavily armed individuals attacked the building. Those on duty repelled the attack. This subofficer was hit by bullets, and he died of those wounds when he was taken to the Barros Luco
 
 

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Hospital. Other police officers were also wounded. The autopsy report concludes that the cause of death was "thoracic, dorsal, spinomedular, abdominal, and right arm traumas from bullets." The evidence examined makes it possible to state that the attack was directed at the Chilean Police. The pattern of similar events leads to the presumption that this attack was part of a planned series of attacks. The Commission came to the conviction that police First Corporal Jose Herrera died a victim of a human rights violation, since he was killed in an attack carried out by politically motivated private citizens.

On March 26, 1985, Rene Osvaldo LARA ARRIAGADA, 32, a navy second sergeant, and Alejandro del Carmen AVENDANO SANCHEZ, 41, an army sub-officer, were killed by a bomb explosion in Concepcion. Programming on National Television was interrupted that evening with political statements broadcast by the underground Radio Liberacion. The broadcast was found to be coming from a hotel in the city, and the radio equipment was found there. As police and security agents were examining it, a bomb went off and instantly killed Avendano and gravely wounded Lara, who died a few hours later at the regional hospital in Concepcion. Two other subofficers and a police officer were also wounded. The autopsies on both of them concluded that the precise cause of death was the extensive damage done by the bomb. Since it has been established that they were carrying out their duties, and that the action was clearly politically motivated, the Commission has come to the conviction that the killing of navy Second Sergeant Rene Lara and army Subofficer Alejandro Avendano were human rights violations, inasmuch as they were killed by an explosion set off by politically motivated private citizens.

On April 19, 2985, Alberto Arturo NEUMAN ADRIAZOLA. 43, a police first corporal who was assigned to the Second station in Temuco, was killed. Early that morning as he was heading toward the prison cells, a prisoner who belonged to the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front shot him by surprise inflicting fatal wounds. He died moments later. The perpetrator was killed by a guard who repelled the attack. The death certificate says that the cause of death was a "bullet wound from the back of the neck through the face that perforated the rachidian canal." The evidence presented makes it possible to declare that he was carrying out his duties at a police installation, that he was shot by surprise and had no chance to defend himself, and that the perpetrator was active in the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Hence the Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of police First Corporal Alberto Neuman were violated since he was killed in an attack on his life by a politically motivated private citizen.

On May 25, 1985, Jessica Alejandra TOBAR MARTINEZ, 21, who did housework, died. On May 12 a bomb went off while she was in the Conchali municipal building to arrange a time for getting married. Word of the bomb had been received in a telephone call, but it went off as the building was being evacuated. Tobar was gravely wounded and died at the Jose Joaquin Aguirre Hospital several days later. Since she died of the injuries she sustained in a bomb explosion, and since the bomb was placed in a crowded public place, this Commission has come to
 
 

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the conviction that Jessica Alejandra Tobar's right to life was violated by a terrorist act carried out by politically motivated private citizens.

On July 16, 1985, Raul Antonio ORELLANA GUTIERREZ, 35, a police second corporal, was killed. That afternoon while Corporal Orellana was guarding the Ministry of Education, an air force officer ordered him to stop two individuals who were suspected of having put a smoke bomb in the chassis of a stolen van and left it at the comer of Calles Amunategui and Bernardo O'Higgins. The corporal pursued them as they were escaping toward Plaza Bulnes. He was shot three times and fatally wounded. Witnesses observed these events. The autopsy report states that the cause of death was cranio-encephalic and thoraco-abodominal traumas from perforating bullet wounds. Since he was carrying out his duties, and it is reasonable to presume that the action was politically motivated, this Commission came to the conviction that Second Corporal Raul Orellana's human rights were violated by politically motivated private citizens.

On July 19, 1985, Mario Sergio PEREZ CORREA, 48, a masseuse, was killed by a bomb explosion. Perez Correa who worked at the thoracic hospital was driving home along Calle Merced. A car bomb was set off outside the United States consulate as he was driving by a few yards away. The bomb was inside a Volkswagen parked in front of the consulate. Perez was killed instantly, due to "cranial, encephalic, and thoracic traumas from an explosion and partial burning of flesh." That same day there were two other similar attacks nearby. A member of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed credit for them by telephone. Bearing in mind these facts, the Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of Mario Perez were violated insofar as he died as the result of an act of terrorism carried out by members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front.

On August 13, 1985, Cesar Omar CHESTA MOUSSET, 26, a navy second lieutenant, was killed. A group of specialists including this officer went to deactivate a bomb along the Penablanca railroad line about 20 kilometers from Vina del Mar. As they were doing so, the bomb went off. Lieutenant Chesta was wounded and died on the way to the hospital in Quilpue. Other navy personnel were also injured. The autopsy report concluded that the cause of death was "multiple trauma including fracture at the base of the skull and cerebral contusion, damage to the chest with pulmonary contusion, and both hands amputated caused by an explosion at close range of some kind of explosive device." There was a series of bomb explosions that same day in Penablanca and at the Valencia station in Quilpue. The evidence provided makes it possible to state that this officer was carrying out his assigned duties, and likewise it is reasonable to assume that these explosions were politically motivated. The Commission came to the conviction that Second Lieutenant Cesar Chesta was a victim of a human rights violation, since he died while carrying out his duty in deactivating a bomb placed by politically motivated private citizens.

On October 26, 1985,Hugo Luis LAGOS EYZAGUIRRE, 32, a detective in the Chilean Investigative Police who was assigned to the Fifteenth Judicial station
 
 

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of the investigative police, was killed. That day at 7:45 p.m. he was patrolling along Avenida Jose Joaquin Prieto in Santiago when he asked an individual for his identification. Pretending to reach for his documents, the man took out a gun and shot Lagos point blank, killing him on the spot. Since he was carrying out his duties, and since other evidence examined makes it possible to state that the perpetrator was a member of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, this Commission came to the conviction that the detective Hugo Lagos was killed by a member of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front who violated his human rights.

On November 11, 1985, Santiago Armando TRINCADO ROJAS, 32, a police second corporal, was killed. That day at approximately 10:00 p.m., as he was on Calle Roberto del Rio in the Providencia district standing guard at the houses of high ranking police officers, two individuals attacked him and shot him at close range. He died on the spot. The perpetrators removed his police weapon and fled in a waiting pickup truck. A fellow guard was also wounded. Since it was a surprise attack leaving him no chance to defend himself, and since the perpetrators took his police weapon, the Commission came to the conviction that Second Corporal Santiago Trincado's right to life was violated by politically motivated private citizens.

On November 13, 1985, Manuel Nibaldo GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, 34, a police first corporal and an explosives expert who was assigned to the CNI in Valparaiso, was killed. That day he was patrolling the Renaca Alto area in Vina del Mar. Around midnight a group of unidentified individuals threw a bomb at his car. He died while receiving medical attention at the naval hospital in Valparaiso. That same day there was a series of other explosions in the city that alarmed the population. Since he was carrying out his proper responsibilities of guarding public order in that area and since a series of explosions was set off that same day, this Commission has come to the conviction that the fundamental rights of First Corporal Manuel Gonzalez were violated by politically motivated private citizens.

On December 6, 1985, Patricio Hilario RODRIGUEZ NUNEZ, 26, a policeman who was assigned to the special forces prefecture, was killed. At about 11:00 p.m. that day he was walking along Calle Sotero del Rio in the La Florida district of Santiago going toward the Thirty-sixth police station to deliver some official documents. At that moment, a group of unknown armed persons attacked him, and he was hit by six bullets and died on the spot. The attackers painted slogans on the wall and stole his gun. The autopsy report stated that he died of six bullet wounds. Since the manner in which he was killed made it impossible for this policeman to defend himself, and since the perpetrators took his weapon and painted slogans on the walls, this Commission has come to the conviction that the killing of Patricio Rodriguez was a human rights violation committed by politically motivated private citizens.

On February 11, 1986, Luis Hernan RIVAL VALDES, 41, a police second sergeant who was assigned to the special forces prefecture, was killed. At about 8:00 a.m. February 5, at the intersection of Calles Eyzaguirre and Santa Rosa in the
 
 

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district of Santiago a bomb explosion hit the police bus in which he was riding. He suffered damage to his head and neck from which he died. Sixteen other police officers were also injured. The evidence examined makes it possible to conclude that:

On February 26, 1986, Alfonso Mauricio RIVERA LOPEZ, 30, a police lieutenant who was assigned to the Tenth station in La Cistema, was killed. At about 9:30 p.m., the operational group of the Tenth station under his command was trying to break up a demonstration at the comer of Avenida Central and Las Industrias in the San Miguel district. The police were attacked as they were withdrawing. The lieutenant received a bullet wound in the clavicle and died while being taken to the police hospital. The evidence gathered leads to the conclusion that:

On April 2, 1986, Simon YEVENES YEVENES, 42, who worked as a merchant and was a neighborhood leader of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in San Joaquin, was killed. At about 8:00 p.m. he was in his store on Villa Brasil in Santiago when an individual came in and shot him at close range with an automatic weapon. He was wounded in the head and neck and was killed on the spot. Another armed individual stood outside to guard the location. This information has come from statements by witnesses and from newspaper reports. In the judicial process it was established that the perpetrators belonged to the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, because the weapons used were the same as those subsequently used in an attack on the Lautaro bakery. People have been brought to justice for these
 
 

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actions. The Commission came to the conviction that Simon Yevenes was killed in a violation of his human rights committed by members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front who were politically motivated.

On April 28, 1986, Miguel Antonio VASQUEZ TOBAR, 21, a policeman, was killed. He was assigned to the Lo Lillo substation. At about 8:00 a.m. that day in the La Cistema district in Santiago members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) attacked the Lautaro bakery. The police were alerted and came to the scene. Officer Vasquez Tobar was hit by a bullet as he was getting out of the car and was killed instantly. Two of his fellow police were also injured, and one of the attackers from the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front was killed. The evidence examined makes it clear that

On July 16, 1986, Jorge Sergio CAMPOS FARDILLA, 50, the sales manager at the Carozzi company, was killed. At about 7:00 a.m. that day, as he was riding the metro to work a bomb left in one of the cars by unknown persons went off. Campos Fardilla died of the injuries he sustained. It has not been possible to identify who was responsible for the explosion nor to determine whether they belonged to some movement of this nature. Six other people were injured in the same incident. Since the deed can be regarded as a terrorist act inasmuch as it was intended to bring about human loss and create public disturbance, the Commission has judged that Jorge Campos was killed in a violation of his fundamental rights committed by politically motivated private citizens whom it has not been possible to identify.

On August 29, 1986, Francisco Ramiro GUZMAN MUNOZ, 45, a bus driver on the Santiago-Puente Alto route, was killed. At about 10:00 p.m. that day in the city of Puente Alto, a group of people attacked the bus he was driving, and threw gasoline on it to set it on fire. He tried to stop them, and so they shot and killed him on the spot. Two passengers were also wounded. The attackers fled without achieving their objective. Since movements whose political objective was to create disturbance and public alarm were frequently committing actions like this and since Guzman tried to prevent them from burning the bus which was his only source of work, the Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of Francisco Guzman were violated and that he was killed in a terrorist action committed by politically motivated private citizens.
 
 

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On September 7, 1986, the following were killed at Cajon del Maipo:

Roberto Segundo ROSALES MARTINEZ, 25, an army second corporal who belonged to the infantry;
Miguel Angel GUERRERO GUZMAN, 29, an army first corporal who belonged to the infantry;
Cardenio HERNANDEZ CUBILLOS, 32, an army first corporal who worked as a driver in the transportation service;
Gerardo REBOLLEDO CISTERNAS, 31, an army first corporal who belonged to the infantry; and
Pablo Arturo SILVA PIZARRO, 31, a police second corporal who was part of the president's bodyguard.

That day General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the president of the republic and commander-in-chief of the army, was in a motorcade returning to Santiago from his mansion in El Melocoton, Cajon del Maipo. An armed group attacked the motorcade in the area of the Las Achuapallas upgrade. Evidence presented to this Commission and the proofs registered in the criminal case, indicate that the perpetrators of this terrorist attack were members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. In their ambush they used cars to cut off the presidential motorcade in both directions and opened fire with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and LOW rockets. The result was that the five troops listed above were fatally wounded in various ways. The evidence examined by the Commission makes it possible to conclude that:

On October 13, 1986, Fernando Ivan PARRA ROLDAN, 27, a commission salesman in a private company, was killed. At about 9:00 that day as he was inside the Cosmocentro Apumanque in Santiago a bomb went off, and he was killed of thoracic and abdominal traumas. Three other persons were also killed. Witnesses have testified that he was in the building carrying out work obligations. It has not been possible to identify the perpetrators or to what group they might have
 
 

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belonged. This Commission regards Parra as having been killed by a bomb explosion in a shopping center frequented by many people, and hence this can be presumed to have been a terrorist action carried out by some movement that regarded the use of violence for political objectives as legitimate. Hence this Commission has been able to come to the conviction that the death of Fernando Parra was a human rights violation by means of an act of terrorism carried out by politically motivated private citizens.

On November 18, 1986, Angel CONTRERAS GARAY, 36, who worked selling coffee on a street comer, was killed. The Commission holds evidence enabling it to conclude that on that day unknown people threw a bomb at the San Ramon branch of the Banco del Estado in Santiago. It did not go off immediately but was only emitting smoke. Contreras accordingly stepped in front of the group of people in order to protect them, and he absorbed the impact himself. As a result he suffered cervical and abdominal traumas which caused his death, according to the death certificate. The owner of a public bus company was also injured. It has not been possible to identify the perpetrators or to what group they might have belonged. The Commission came to the conviction that Miguel Angel Contreras died a victim of a violation of his right to life as the result of an act of terrorism committed by politically motivated private citizens.

On November 28, 1986, Jaime Luis SAEZ NEIRA, 31, a police lieutenant who was in command of the Santa Rosa police headquarters in Chena, was killed. The Commission holds evidence enabling it to conclude that at about 9:30 a.m. that day, on the rural road to Santa Cruz in Padre Hurtado as he was directing a group that was checking passing cars, he stopped a taxi carrying a group of individuals who had just robbed a branch bank in Penaflor. The passengers immediately opened fire at the police, and Jaime Saez was hit twice and died as he was being taken for treatment. Evidence furnished to the Commission made it possible to determine that the perpetrators were MIR activists. Two of the attackers were killed in this clash. Another police officer was gravely injured. With the evidence it has in hand the Commission concluded that it could come to the conviction that the human rights of police Lieutenant Jaime Saez were violated by MIR members who were politically motivated.

On December 29, 1986, Rosa RIVERA FIERRO, 37, a domestic servant, died. On November 5, at 9:40 p.m., she was travelling on a bus in Vina del Mar when a group of hooded subversives attacked and threw firebombs into it. Rosa Rivera suffered bums on thirty percent of her body. The bums led to her death on December 29. She was pregnant when the bus was attacked. Two other people were also injured less seriously. The Commission came to the conviction that Rosa Rivera Fierro's human rights were violated in an act of terrorism committed by politically motivated private citizens.

On March 6, 2987,Eduardo Harold TAMAYO MEDINA, 21, a police sublieutenant who was assigned to the First police station in Concepcion, was killed.
 
 

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At about 9:00 a.m. the police received a telephone call advising that a MIR banner had been put up in the Laguna Redonda area in Concepcion. Tamayo went there and removed the flag and other things that had been left near it. A bomb placed in the area went off. The explosion gravely injured him, and he died while being treated at the regional hospital clinic. The police officer with him was also wounded, but only moderately. The evidence examined makes it possible to conclude that:

On April 13, 1987, Jose Eduardo CORTES VASQUEZ, 34, a guard in the investigative police who was in the process of retiring, was killed. When these events took place he was selling lamps. That night members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) occupied a number of radio stations and an international news agency in various parts of the country. Three members of that subversive organization tried to transmit a manifesto over Radio Tropicana located on Pasaje Lima in the Huamachuco No. 2 shantytown in the district of Renca. The owners resisted, the FPMR members withdrew without completing their mission. As they were doing so they ran into Cortes, who heard the woman who owned the station shouting for help and tried to stop them. They reacted by shooting him in the chest, as indicated on the autopsy.

The Commission took the following facts into consideration:

On August 3, 1987, Jesus RODRIGUEZ MUNOZ, 26, a detective who was assigned to the Fourteenth station of the investigative police in La Cisterna was killed. That day Detective Rodriguez Munoz was engaged in a preventive patrol
 
 

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near the comer of Avenida Las Industrias and Departamental, in the La Cisterna district. He had been called there to investigate a gas station robbery. When he and two other detectives arrived in the patrol car they tried to question three suspects, who shot at them with automatic weapons and left Rodriguez gravely wounded. He died shortly afterwards at the Barros Luco Hospital, as indicated on the death certificate. On the basis of the evidence examined, the Commission concluded that:

On September 11, 1987, an explosion damaged a police truck, and two police were killed. Their names are:

Ramon Ignacio BAHAMONDES ELGUETA, 28, a second corporal who was driving the truck and who was also assigned to the second shift of radio patrol cars in the area of the Twelfth station in San Miguel;

and Mario MARTINEZ VARGAS, 48, a first sergeant who was leading the patrol and was assigned to the third shift of radio patrol cars in the area of the Twelfth station in San Miguel.

704

On January 20, 1988, Berta Rosa PARDO MUNOZ, 65, who was living off a navy pension, was killed when an explosive device went off in Valparaiso. The Commission holds evidence indicating that on that afternoon she was waiting for treatment in the waiting room of the medical center for members of the armed forces and their dependents. At that moment a bomb placed under a chair by unknown subversives blew up and killed her instantly. The cause of death was damage to the abdomen and lower extremities, as indicated on the death certificate. The Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of Berta Pardo were violated in an act of terrorism by politically motivated private citizens.

On January 26, 1988, in the La Cisterna district, Julio Eladio BENIMELLI RUZ, 42, a police major who was head of the police special operations group, was killed by an explosive device. Major Julio Benimelli and other police officers went to a house in the area of La Cisterna to respond to a complaint by the owners that there were explosives inside. While he and the other officers and the owners were inside, a combination of approximately seven explosive devices went off in the house. Major Benimelli died as a result of multiple injuries sustained in the explosions as the autopsy report indicates. The evidence gathered reveals that:

On April 12, 1988, Samuel Esteban LOPEZ CONTRERAS, 23, who was assigned to the Seventh police station in Renca, was deliberately killed in that district. That morning Samuel Lopez was standing guard with another policeman at a piece of land that had been occupied at the corner of General Velasquez and Arturo Prat in the Renca district. A short woman came along and drew near to the police. Two men approached from another corner of the property. The woman suddenly drew a pistol from her purse and ordered the other two to fire. They did so and caught the police by surprise. Witnesses say the police had been talking with two children and when the shooting began they sought to take cover and shoot back. Officer Lopez tried to protect the children, but he was hit by a bullet and fell to the ground, as one of the children later told the newspaper. The other officer managed to find cover, and fire back, but he was also wounded. The armed group finally fled in a stolen taxi. Lopez died at the J.J. Aguirre Hospital of the five bullet wounds he received, according to the autopsy report. Hence, this Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of police officer Samuel Lopez were violated in an act of terrorism carried out by politically motivated subversives.
 
 

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On April 29, i988, Juan de Dios HORMAZABAL NUNEZ, 40, a police second sergeant who was assigned to the Thirtieth station (radio patrols), was attacked and killed in the Renca district. That morning he was in command of a patrol that was examining the documents of people suspected of having been involved in setting a bus on fire and causing other damage to public transportation, according to the newspapers. As he was searching two men, one drew a pistol from a bag he was carrying and shot him in the chest. Other members of the patrol shot back, but the two men managed to escape. Sergeant Hormazabal died on the spot of bullet damage to the chest, as the autopsy report indicates. The evidence gathered indicates that his death was connected to events that same morning, namely the burning of the bus which was probably politically motivated. Hence those who shot this police officer were presumably involved in that action and were operating for the same reasons. Therefore, the Commission has come to the conviction that the human rights of Second Sergeant Juan Hormazabal were violated by politically motivated private citizens.

On May 5, i988, Armando CRUZ OLIVARES. 40, a navy first sergeant who was assigned to the CNI, was killed in the city of Vina del Mar. That afternoon he joined a CNI operational group. He and two colleagues had the mission of following a suspect. As he was doing so, the suspect turned around and fired a sawed-off shotgun and killed him. Sergeant Cruz died of his wounds as he was being operated upon at the Renaca Clinic, in Vina del Mar, according to a navy report. This Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of navy First Sergeant Armando Cruz were violated by a politically motivated private citizen.

On May 20, I988, Carlos Arturo GONZALEZ VALENZUELA, 31, police second sergeant, and a musician in the national police chorus, was killed in an attack in the area around the central railroad station. Second Sergeant Gonzalez was waiting for a bus at the bus stop on Avenida Pedro Aguirre Cerda at the Calle General Velasquez underpass when two men approached. One of them came up from behind and shot him in the head. The other finished him off, as eyewitnesses told the media. They then took his cap and his weapon and ran away on foot. In the attack he was shot six times, twice in the head, twice in the lower torso, and twice in 'the back, as the autopsy report indicates. He died on the spot. Evidence examined by the Commission indicates that:

This Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of Second Sergeant Carlos Gonzalez were violated by politically motivated private citizens, but it cannot specify the group to which they belonged.

Also on May 20, Jaime Orlando SANDOVAL MENDOZA, 27, a police second corporal who was assigned to the Twenty-sixth station in Lo Prado, was killed at night at bus stop No. 36 on Avenida Vicuna Mackenna. At around 10:00 p.m., Second Corporal Sandoval Mendoza was off duty but in uniform and travelling in the back of a bus on the Santiago-Puente Alto route. When the bus arrived at the Plaza de Armas in Puente Alto, two young men, who according to the newspapers were carrying backpacks and were also on the bus, shot him six times. They immediately took his gun and ran away. As he was being taken to the Sotero del Rio Hospital on the same bus, Sandoval died of his bullet wounds, as was established in the autopsy report. The kind of attack, the cold manner of execution characteristic of the operations of politically motivated armed subversive groups, and the fact that it coincided with another such attack that morning makes it possible to assume that the action was politically motivated; likewise Gonzalez had no reasonable chance to defend himself, since his attackers took him by surprise and at little risk to themselves. Hence this Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of police Second Corporal Jaime Sandoval were violated by politically motivated private citizens.

On June 7, 1988, Miguel Eduardo ROJAS LOBOS, 43, an army lieutenant colonel who was in the process of retiring and was working as finance manager at the Plansa factory, was attacked and killed in the San Joaquin district. He was in his car driving away from the factory, which is located at Avenida Carlos Valdovinos No. 473, when a man approached and shot him with a sawed-off shotgun and then fled in a stolen taxi, as several eyewitnesses told the press. He died of damage to the chest and acute loss of blood from bullet wounds as he was being taken to the police hospital, as the autopsy report indicates. The Commission took into account that:

On October 21, 1988, Juvenal VARGAS SEPULVEDA, 34, a police second corporal who was part of the crew at the Los Queries checkpoint in the province of Curio, was killed when his unit was attacked. That night members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) attacked the Los Queries checkpoint, in the Romeral district of Curico. A woman who observed the events said that Vargas was at home when he heard the shooting. He went outside and was killed immediately
 
 

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in the exchange of fire as he was trying to repel the attack. After they set the police building on fire, the armed group conducted propaganda actions, as witnesses later told the press. Vargas died of his wounds shortly thereafter. The cause of death was acute loss of blood caused by an abdominal wound with complications, as stated in the death certificate. The evidence examined indicates that:

On February 8, 1989, two police officers were killed in an attack which took place in the Quilicura district. Their names are:

Jose Luis PIZZOLEO CANALES, 27, a lieutenant who was in command at the Quilicura station;
Leonardo Antonio MARILLANCA GARATE, 29, a second corporal at that same station.

That morning Lieutenant Pizzoleo and Corporal Marillanca were patrolling in a police jeep on Calle Carampangue in the Quilicura district. When they went to check three people whom they thought looked suspicious they suddenly came under
 
 

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fire from a fourth person who was hidden. The other three also opened fire. They took away the officer's weapon and Corporal Marillanca's Uzi machine gun. Lieutenant Pizzoleo died of cranial, encephalic, thoracic, abdominal, and pelvic trauma from bullets, as stated on his death certificate. Corporal Marillanca died of facial, thoracic, and lumbar trauma, as his death certificate states. Evidence examined reveals that:

On April 12, 1989, Juan Carlos AMAR ITURRIETA, 24, a sublieutenant who was the head of the Talca prefecture civilian commission, was attacked and killed in the city of Talca. That morning Sublieutenant Amar and two other police officers entered a video game parlor to check it. When they questioned two men— who according to evidence gathered by the Commission turned out to be members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front—one of them drew out a weapon and fired at the three police. Two of them were gravely wounded, and Sublieutenant Amar died of a thoracic and abdominal bullet wound, as his death certificate indicates. The Commission took into consideration that:

On May J8, 1989, Julio Edmundo PAVEZ ORTIZ, 34, a police second corporal who was assigned to the Thirteenth station, was attacked and killed in the La Granja district in Santiago. That day Second Corporal Perez was walking along Calle Central toward the La Astrina police station. At that point three youths and a woman who belonged to the Lautaro Popular Rebel Forces came out from behind a street stall and opened fire on the police. Taken by surprise they were unable to fire back, and they fell dead. Their attackers took their weapons and ran away, as eyewitnesses later told the press. In the attack Corporal Pavez was hit by two bullets to the chest, as noted in the autopsy, and he died at the police hospital shortly thereafter. The evidence examined reveals that:
 
 

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On June 9, 2989, Roberto FUENTES MORRISON, 50, retired squadron commander of the Chilean Air Force and a former member of the Joint Command, was attacked and killed outside his home in the Nunoa district. At about 9 a.m. that day, he left his house in Villa Frei in Nunoa. He was ambushed by two members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. One of them was hidden among some bushes and the other was on the second floor of the building in which he lived. Both opened fire with automatic weapons and shot him down immediately. The killers fled the scene along with other members of their armed group who had been providing cover. Fuentes was hit by fourteen bullets and died instantly. Examining the evidence, the Commission concluded that:

On July 6,1989, Carlos Jesus LAMOZA ARCE, 36, a police first corporal who was assigned to the department of drug control and criminal surveillance (OS-7), was attacked and killed in the district of Santiago. That afternoon he was off duty and in ordinary clothes at a store on Calle San Diego. Suddenly a group—presumably members of the Lautaro group—came rushing in intending to rob it. When Lamoza tried to stop them, a member of the group shot him. He was hit by five bullets, according to the autopsy report, and died on the spot. The Commission took into consideration that:

On those grounds, the Commission came to the. conviction that the fundamental rights of police First Corporal Carlos Jesus Lamoza Arce were violated by politically motivated private citizens, presumably members of the Lautaro group.

On July 10, 1989, Patrick) Ruben CANIHUANTE ASTUDILLO, 26, a police second corporal who was assigned to the radio and traffic substation of the First station in Vina del Mar, was attacked and killed in that city. He was on duty outside a building in Vina del Mar where officers and subofficers of the prefecture lived. As he was heading into the building, two armed people attacked him and shot him in the head, as indicated on his death certificate, and he died shortly thereafter. In view of the evidence, the Commission concluded that:

On July 21, 1989, two police from the Sixth station in Santiago were killed. Their names are:

Jaime Dionesimo PARRA AGUAYO, 26, a second corporal; and
Ramon Adolfo SALAS SANHUEZA, 22, a policeman.

That morning Second Corporal Parra and officer Salas were standing guard between two banks. While they were doing so, an armed commando unit got out of a car and began firing at the police with automatic weapons. The police fell wounded. A commando member came up to them and finished them off on the ground, and then took away their weapons, their walkie-talkies, and their hats. Second Corporal Parra was hit by seven bullets, according to his autopsy report, and officer Salas was hit six times. Both died as they were being taken to a hospital. The police have said that the perpetrators belonged to the Lautaro Popular and Rebel forces. The press said that the Lautaro Youth Movement was responsible. The Commission took into consideration that:

On these grounds the Commission came to the conviction that the human rights of police Second Corporal Jaime Parra and officer Ramon Salas were violated by an armed group, presumably the Lautaro Youth Movement.

On August 20,1989, Julio Roberto ZEGERS REED, 26, an army lieutenant who was assigned to the army aviation command, was killed in an attack on the airfield at Tobalaba in Santiago. At around midnight on August 20, Lieutenant Zegers and another soldier were patrolling the installations of the army aviation command. While they were doing so, they caught a group from the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) trying to break into military property. One of them. shot the officer. The enlisted man with him fired back and killed the person who had shot Zegers. Lieutenant Zegers was hit by six bullets and died on the spot, according to the autopsy report. The evidence gathered indicates that:

On September 29, 1989, Hector PINCHEIRA ARMIJO, 30, a police second corporal who was assigned to the Forty-second police station (radio patrol cars), was killed in an attack that took place in the San Miguel district. On the night of September 29, he and other police officers were travelling in a police vehicle on their way to investigate a crime report. As they were driving along Calle Angamos a pickup truck pulled in front, and several individuals began to shoot back at the police van. In the shooting, Pincheira was hit twice, according to the autopsy report. He died at the Barros Luco Hospital, as indicated on his death certificate. Another police officer and two passers-by were also wounded. The evidence examined indicates that:

On December 14, 1989, Patricio Adolfo CASTILLO LARA, 23, a police officer who was assigned to the La Castrina station, was attacked and killed in the
 
 

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La Granja district in Santiago. Presidential and parliamentary elections were being held that day. Castillo was standing guard outside school D-495 in the Joao Goulart shantytown. As he was doing so, a young man came up and shot him. Castillo fell to the ground, and the attacker seized his weapon and ran away. Many witnesses saw what happened and described it to the press. Castillo was hit by four bullets and died on the spot, as indicated in his autopsy report. Evidence gathered makes it possible to conclude that:

On February 9, 1990. Jaime Arturo GONZALEZ CALQUIN, 28, a policeman assigned to the Thirteenth station in La Granja, was killed in a gun battle in this district. That night a politically motivated commando unit attacked an investigative police unit. Members of this group later attacked the San Ramon police substation .and ran away. Gonzalez was at this latter unit and set out to chase the attackers. A few blocks from the police unit the attackers and the police engaged in a gun battle. Gonzalez and another policeman were wounded. A bullet hit officer Gonzalez in the head, and he died at the police hospital while he was undergoing treatment. Since the attack on two police units can only be understood in the context of violent political struggle, the Commission came to the conviction that police officer Jaime Arturo Gonzalez Calquing was killed in a gun battle with politically motivated private citizens.

C. PEOPLE KILLED IN MASS PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

1. OVERVIEW

The Commission examined 141 cases in which people were killed in connection with the major political demonstrations that began in 1983. Most of these cases took place between 1983 and 1985 during the National Protests. In the course of the investigation it was clear that these people lost their lives in highly complex circumstances. Because they have common features these deaths can be distinguished from other cases presented to the Commission and can be examined as a group. First, these deaths occurred in the context of political demonstrations in which different
 
 

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sectors of the population were involved in a variety of ways, as were the various forces that were protecting public order. The role played by government officials and the organizers of the demonstrations must also be taken into account. Second, the overall political character of these events was not necessarily manifested in particular incidents: often those killed were not involved in a demonstration, or were government agents who were maintaining public order as part of their normal duties.

This section of the report offers an overall description of the political demonstrations and the manner in which the victims were killed. As a rule, they are presented in chronological order.

The first National Protest was held May 11, 1983. The Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC) issued a call in the following words: "Our problem is that we need not one law more or one law less, or one sort of change or another in what now exists. It is deeper and goes to the heart of things: our problem is an economic, social, cultural, and political system that has us all bound tight and is squeezing us, one that is at odds with our peculiar character as Chileans and workers, one that has tried to strangle us with weapons like fear and repression, so as to squeeze us tighter and tighter. We have no feeling for this system; it is not in accord with our way of life, because it was imposed on us by force and deceit." The statement invited people to protest "against an economic, social, and political system that has plunged our country into the deepest crisis in its history." The document insisted that the protest had to be nonviolent, and urged the following actions: keeping children home from school, buying nothing whatsoever, banging pots inside houses at 8 p.m., and turning off lights and all electrical devices in houses and buildings for five minutes beginning at 9:30 p.m.

National Protests and other demonstrations were held from then onward. There were nationwide organizing efforts and also numerous actions whose scope was more restricted or involved particular sectors or locations. The mass demonstrations revolved around the fourteen National Protests (1983 to 1985). Broadly-based organizing and demonstrations, strikes, protest days, and stoppages continued with some frequency until the National General Strike on July 2 and 3, 1986. In the following years demonstrations were less intense and less well organized.
 
 

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The first calls were issued by union organizations. Later various political movements took on that role. Those issuing the call continually shifted and regrouped throughout this period. The instructions given emphasized that discontent was to be expressed peacefully. Economic and social demands were added to the primary demand which was political: ending the present government and returning immediately to democracy. Thus, for example, in 1983 opposition political leaders urged that there be a great national consensus around demands such as the following:

voluntary resignation by the current rulers, establishing a provisional government, holding elections for a constituent assembly, an emergency economic plan, immediate restoration of social and political rights, and so forth. Observing that protests were expanding and becoming more massive that same year, and "legitimately invoking the right of petition" they asked "that the president of the republic give up his rule over the nation."

Discontent was expressed in relatively uniform ways and people adhered to the proposals made in the calls to the first National Protests. Subsequently, even in 1983, demands gradually came to vary from sector to sector. Among the forms of peaceful protest most commonly employed to one degree or another were strikes, sit-ins, assemblies, marches, work slowdowns, delays, honking horns, banging pots and pans, staying away from school, cutting back on bus service, and closing stores. It is not the Commission's role or within its ability to clarify to what extent some of these actions were voluntary or whether in fact the overall context of the demonstrations made them compulsory.

The strategy and political activity of far left groups was often out of line with the peaceful nature of the convocations, inasmuch as they advocated the armed route toward overthrowing the government. The organizers of the National Protests refused to deal with these sectors. The left groups, however, participated in those protests, and they brought in forms of expression that entailed disturbing public order. They also attacked the police and private citizens who did not join the demonstrations. Gradually the instructions and tactics used by these groups prompted people into violent actions, especially in shantytowns. Their programmatic statements, backed up by amply attested actions, proved that the use of violence was often planned ahead.

Starting in 1982, the Communist party adopted a "policy of popular rebellion" which was based on "developing and preparing mass armed struggle, starting with tiny destabilizing actions and extending all the way to armed conflict if that is necessary." The Communist party sought to overthrow the military regime by creating a climate of ungovernability. Other groups besides the party were also striving to create such a climate. Starting in December 1983 the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front maintained that "the people's violence is legitimate" and that "all modes of struggle must be used, including those that take the path of violence." One of the aims of their strategy was "to raise the spirits of the people by calling them to action," especially through blackouts, barricades, and street battles during days of protest or demonstrations. The MAPU Lautaro urged an insurrectionary mobilization of the masses in order to "gradually take over the country, to seize Chile; starting in the people's territories. .. until gradually reaching a culmination in the seizure of power." This movement advocated "the
 
 

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idea of a people in arms," an "unconventional guerrilla force," with an "effective firepower in what is basically an urban operation, which provides mass combat with the ability to strike hard." Its basis is to be "the multiplication of homemade weaponry."

The MIR also did mass work, especially in shantytowns, aimed at developing an insurrectionary strategy. "We understand this popular war as the combined development of all forms of mass struggle, from the use of active nonviolence passing through direct and disruptive mobilizing, all the way to the development of violent armed struggle." In 1985 a MIR leader stated, "We have shown that we can sabotage many railroad lines. We have derailed dozens of trains. We have attacked the electrical power system and knocked over numerous high voltage lines. We have also carried out actions to punish agents of repression. We have set ambushes. We have also conducted actions to harass police stations."

Among the expressions that to some extent entailed disturbing public order and sometimes led to acts of political violence, whose impact varied in intensity, the following should be mentioned:

Such actions took place primarily at night and in outlying areas, as has been noted. During the day in most of the capital and the country the situation was relatively calm. Actions by the most extreme groups never came to the point of paralyzing the country.

The government used various measures for dealing with the protests. The following may be mentioned:

collective public actions in streets, plazas, and other public places and those who promote or incite to demonstrations of any other nature or who permit or encourage the disturbance of public tranquility commit a crime against public order" (Law No. 12927, on State Security, Article 6, letter i). That provision was added by means of Law No. 18256, dated October 27, 1983.

— A number of restrictions on the exercise of freedom of information were decreed, ranging from prohibiting some stations from broadcasting news to prior censorship over some written media.

— Social and political leaders who had not been directly involved in such acts of violence were arrested. Sometimes they were sent into internal exile in various places in the country, and some were expelled from the country. These were administrative measures whose adoption was justified by invoking the various states of exception that were in force.

— Massive search operations were carried out in shantytowns, starting with the first one which took place May 14, 1983. Military forces, and those of the police, the investigative police, and civilians conducted sweeps in large sectors of the southern part of Santiago through shantytowns in the districts of San Miguel, La Cisterna, and La Granja. The operation began after midnight on the 13th when the area was cordoned off. At 5:00 a.m. simultaneously throughout the area, a call went out over loudspeakers warning all the males over 14 to get up, and telling them they would be picked up at their front doors. Women and children were to remain inside. Government forces violently forced their way into many houses and took objects that they regarded as subversive. The men were led on foot or in vehicles to nearby soccer fields in each shantytown where their documents were examined. Some were beaten, and the overall treatment was abusive and violent. The operation lasted all day. As their documents were checked, they were either released or taken to police facilities. Later on such sweeps reoccurred either before or after National Protests.

— CNI agents raided and searched offices of political and labor movements.

— Usually police and military were involved in controlling public order. Army personnel usually guarded areas of special importance such as traffic circles, bridges, underpasses, and roads leading into the capital. On some occasions the government stepped in to take total control over the city, particularly during the fourth National Protest on August 11-12, 1983, and the National Strike held July 2-3, 1986. Army forces were especially harsh since they fired their weapons and did not have police experience in maintaining public order. Referring to those who were killed during the fourth Protest, when officials claimed that eighteen thousand soldiers were controlling the capital, one government official said, "People were killed during the protest demonstrations solely because army troops had to react when they were attacked." The

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Some private citizens deliberately shot at people for political reasons. These were generally civilians shooting from a moving unlicensed vehicle or from a vehicle used for public transportation. In such cases the nature of the political motivation of the perpetrators usually cannot be determined. While it is not out of the question that these might be actions committed by subversive groups aimed at making the demonstrations more violent, in some cases the Commission has had indications that these were individuals who supported the government in power. Indeed, the forces responsible for maintaining order were apparently sometimes aware of them or in complicity with them. The fact that the perpetrators often drove around at night during curfew in areas where the police were on patrol supports the conclusion that they had ties to government agents.

However, on some occasions private citizens killed someone in self-defense or to defend their property. What they did is not regarded as violating human rights when it has all the features of proportionality and the like to make it legitimate. However, such persons may be regarded as victims of political violence in a more general sense as long as they are not proven to be among the perpetrators of the unjust attack that prompted legitimate self-defense.

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other occasions both government agents and private citizens committed abuses or assaulted fundamental human rights in their actions against mass demonstrations.

Certainly for the most part the protest demonstrations were peaceful. Nevertheless, there were expressions of violence, especially in outlying shantytowns during the evening and at night. The efforts of social and political leaders to preserve the peaceful character of the demonstrations began to be overwhelmed starting in 1984, and hence the level of violence and disorderly conduct gradually increased. Likewise the measures the government took and the manner in which the government forces acted in order to prevent the disturbance of public order were often excessive. The climate of social confrontation intensified, and the most vulnerable sectors of society suffered the consequences. As the demonstrations increasingly lost their peaceful character and it became clearer that they were not being effective in bringing about their political objective, their impact diminished, especially after July 1986.

It was difficult for the Commission to come to a precise conviction about what had happened in all cases, due to the diversity of the kinds of death, the overall context of a disturbance of public order, and the confusion surrounding many situations. Hence here as in other chapters, the Commission made a distinction between victims of human rights violations and people who were killed as a result of the situation of political violence (that is, who suffered the fatal consequences of the clash between the two contending political forces). The former category includes deaths by execution or by the use of undue force by government agents, and deaths caused by politically motivated private citizens. When, however, the use "of what could be regarded as justified or proportionate force by government agents caused the unforeseeable death of innocent people, the Commission regarded those killed as victims of the situation of political violence at that time. Such was sometimes the case when people were killed by tear gas canisters; when it could not be reasonably presumed that excessive force had been used; when a private citizen who was not politically motivated caused a death in which there was some relationship to the surrounding violence, as in cases of legitimate self-defense in which it is not clear that the person killed was at fault; when it could not be determined that government agents had committed the action or even when the cause of death could not be
 
 

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determined but it seemed to be connected to the surrounding violence. Sometimes because of the difficulty in proving exactly which of these situations was the case, the Commission did not come to a consensus on whether a person's human rights had been violated or whether he or she was simply a victim of the situation of political violence.

In weighing items in order to come to a conclusion, a distinction was made between deaths inflicted by government agents and those inflicted by private citizens. The main problem connected with the involvement of government agents was that matters became very complex during the demonstrations. Some actions did indeed disturb public order; the rights of other citizens were affected; and in extreme cases, violent clashes took place. In such circumstances, government forces were not simply acting politically, but were carrying out their institutional duties. This Commission cannot overlook the fact that the law charges these institutions with maintaining public order and that their operations and use of force to attain those ends are inherently justified.

Therefore, when government agents were involved, it was necessary to make an evaluation to establish whether the use of force had been proportional to the aim of carrying out the institution's purpose of maintaining public order. To that end the Commission took into account evidence on how government agents acted during the protests in addition to testimony on how they acted in each individual case. Knowledge of the normal procedure—such as whether guns were used more or less frequently and indiscriminately—entered into the consideration of most cases in determining whether the action of government agents had been disproportionate.

Where private citizens were responsible for death, it has been necessary to establish a presumption that they were politically motivated. Usually the Commission came to the conviction that a politically motivated human rights violation had taken place, unless there was evidence suggesting other motives or that the use of force had been justified. Such was rarely the case when private citizens were involved. In such cases overall testimony on actions by private citizens have been taken into account, with regard to both attacks on demonstrators and terrorist actions that could harm people indiscriminately (such as setting off bombs or knocking down power lines).

Elsewhere we have referred to ties between the actions of private citizens and government agents, or we have said that these private citizens supported the government in power. The Commission believes that it was very difficult either to affirm or rule out such ties in each and every case. When there are indications of such ties, however, they are noted.

Finally, it should be noted that in establishing whether a person's human rights had been violated, the Commission felt it did not need to establish the degree of individual responsibility on the part of the perpetrators. On that point it takes no position whatsoever.

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surrounding mass demonstrations. Those killed included people whom the perpetrators had not picked beforehand; people who were not being pursued either for who they were, for their political activity, or for particular personal relationships. Children and old people, youth and adults, men and women, participants in protests and people uninvolved, were all among those who lost their lives. The only thing they had in common was that they were caught up in a situation of intense political confrontation. It was the poorer people in the cities who bore the brunt, especially those living in the shantytowns in outlying areas of the capital. Most of those killed were young males.

They were killed in a variety of ways. Most were killed by wounds from bullets, pellets, or buckshot. Some died of knife wounds; suffocation; inhaling tear gas; being hit by a tear gas canister; bums; heatings; electrocution caused by attacks on power lines; rocks thrown; and explosive devices placed in a public thoroughfare.

We now offer systematic information on each individual victim in a schematic account, arranged according to the chronological order of the various demonstrations.

2. CASES

On September 11, 1983, in the Pudahuel district, Pedro MARIN NOVOA, 24, was killed. That day those participating in the Minimum Employment Program and the Employment Program for Heads of Families in the district were summoned to the Santa Corina complex near the municipal building so that they could be driven downtown for the celebration of September 11, 1973 anniversary. At around 9:30 a.m., it was announced over loudspeakers on a truck that attendance was voluntary. That those who desired could return home, and they would still have three days off as already provided. Clashes then broke out between those who wanted to go and those who did not. Rocks were thrown at the vehicles in which they were to be taken. At that moment a jeep from the municipality arrived and employees from the security department fired at the mass of workers. One of these shots killed Pedro Marin Novoa. These events, the numerous statements by witnesses that this Commission examined, and the guilty verdict handed down by the court, enable it to come to the conviction that Pedro Marin was killed by persons at the service of the government who thereby violated his human rights.

That same day, Sergio Segundo ALEGRIA ARRIAGADA, 24, a street vendor, was killed. On the night of September 11, 1983, anti-government demonstrations were taking place in the Neptuno shantytown (Santiago) as they were elsewhere in the city. Sergio Segundo Alegria was at the intersection of Los Aromos and Loyola when he was hit by a bullet; he died the next day. Credible witnesses have said that the bullet came from a car that passed by shooting at the demonstrators. In view of the evidence offered, this Commission has come to the conviction that Sergio Segundo Alegria died a victim of a human rights violation committed by politically motivated private citizens.
Four persons died during the sixth National Protest, held October 11-13, 1983:

On December 14, 1983, Eduardo Antonio DIAZ SOTO, 19, who worked with his mother at a fruit and vegetable stand, was killed in a protest demonstration. Around midnight, although no national protest was being observed, a group of young people set a pile of tires on fire at the comer of Los Tres Antonios and Camino Agricola (Santiago). Witnesses say that shortly thereafter a car pulled up, and a man stepped out and shot at the demonstrators. A bullet hit Diaz in the chest and went through his heart and lung, and he died a few minutes later. The nature of the demonstration the young people were having and the plausibility of the testimony concerning how Eduardo Diaz met his death, have led this Commission to come to the conviction that he was killed by politically motivated private citizens who violated his right to life. The Commission had indications that government agents might be responsible.

On March 27, 1984, eleven people were killed in incidents connected to the eighth National Protest:

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weapons. One of the bullets hit him in the lungs, and he died shortly thereafter. On the basis of various items of evidence and credible testimony by witnesses, this Commission holds the conviction that police fired the shots, and the confused nature of the situation notwithstanding, the Commission presumes that government agents committed a human rights violation when they used excessive force.

On May 11, 1984, during the ninth National Protest, Miguel Angel GONZALEZ BRAVO, 18, a high school graduate, was killed in the course of anti-government demonstrations at the comer of Calle Rojas Magallanes and Americo Vespucio (Santiago). A car passed by and unidentified people fired their weapons, leaving him wounded in the street. He died of cranial encephalic trauma caused by a bullet. In view of the facts presented and their context, this Commission holds the conviction that Miguel Angel Gonzalez died a victim of a human rights violation committed by politically motivated private citizens.

On August 9, 1984, a Day for Life organized by a number of religious, social and political organizations was being celebrated. Hugo Patricio BRAVO FUENTES, 19, was killed in that context. During the night he was one of about eighty people who were participating in a barricade-bonfire at the comer of Exequiel Fenandez and Camino Agricola (Santiago). Police came to break up the demonstration. They fired their weapons. A bullet hit him in the head and killed him. On the basis of testimony by witnesses on this case, and bearing in mind the, way government forces proceeded on other occasions, the Commission presumes that despite the need to control public order their use of weapons was disproportionate and thus the human rights of Hugo Patricio Bravo were violated.

On August 14, 2984, at a nighttime demonstration with barricades in the area of Lo Hermida (Santiago), Marcelo Augusto RIQUELME LEMUS, 17, a night school student, was killed. It happened when a demonstrator threw a rock at a private car that was pulling away after it had been allowed to pass. The driver stopped further on, and fired back at the demonstrators. Marcel Augusto Riqueime was hit by a shot and died of bullet damage to the chest. With the evidence it has examined, the Commission believes that Marcelo Augusto Riquelme was killed as a result of political violence.

On September 4-5, J984, eight persons were killed in the context of demonstrations organized for the tenth National Protest:

On October 29 and 30, 1984, a National General Strike was held. Nine people were killed on that occasion:

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that Oscar Fuentes's right to life was violated by a government agent who used excessive force in trying to arrest him.
On August 9, 1985, three people were killed in the course of the Day for Life:

On December 4, 1985, ten people were killed in demonstrations connected to the fourteenth National Protest.

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the demonstration was peaceful, enable this Commission to come to the conviction that Ronald Wood was killed by government agents who used excessive force and thus violated his right to life.

On June 13, 1986, in the context of a student demonstration along the Panamerican Highway heading north (Santiago) to protest the passing of education over to municipal governments, Guadalupe del Carmen CHAMORRO LEIVA, 18, a domestic servant, died of "cranial encephalic trauma." The accounts examined by the Commission suggest various possibilities on the source of the shooting. The Commission nonetheless holds the conviction that Guadalupe del Carmen Chamorro died a victim of the political violence that characterized that period.

On July 2 and 3, 1986, eight persons were killed in connection with the National General Strike:

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On March 6, 1987, Miguel Angel ANTILAF EPULEF, 22, who collected old newspapers for recycling, was standing on the comer of Lo Encalada and Carlos Dittborn (Santiago) at night during an International Women's Day demonstration when he sustained a fatal bullet wound. According to a number of accounts that this Commission finds credible, protesters had set up barricades and were chanting at that location. An automobile pulled up and the people in it shot at the demonstrators. Given the well-known circumstances, this Commission holds the conviction that Miguel Angel Antilaf was killed by private citizens who violated his human rights for political reasons.

On April 2, 1987, Erick Patricio JUICA CORTES, 26, a news vendor, was killed at a land occupation site in the Conchali district. That afternoon troops arrived in trucks and expelled the people from the land, firing their weapons to do so. On the basis of various accounts by witnesses and items of evidence, this Commission presumes that even though it is legitimate to expel people who have illegally occupied land, force was used disproportionately and Juica's human rights were gravely violated.

On October 7, 1987, a National Strike was held. Four people were killed in the demonstrations and clashes that took place on that occasion:

On April 28, 1988, Alexis Eduardo MUNOZ RIVEROS, 17. a technical school student who was active in the National party, was killed. That night after a student demonstration in support of a protest by the teachers, he was killed by a bullet fired by a private citizen in the area of Avenida Departamental (Santiago) under circumstances that the Commission was unable to clarify. The evidence gathered by the Commission enables it to come to the conviction that the killing of Alexis Eduardo Munoz was the result of the political violence of that period..

On August 30 and 31, 1988, street demonstrations were held to protest the nomination of President Augusta" Pinochet as a candidate for the plebiscite that year. Four people were killed:

On the night of December 29, 1989, Jaime Antonio QUILAN CABEZAS, 26, a worker, was taking part in a local anti-government demonstration in the Cerro Navia district (Santiago). According to credible accounts, when the demonstration was over, someone who had arrived shortly before followed Jaime Quilan in a car and fatally shot him in the back. According to evidence examined by the Commission, Jaime Quilan was actively involved in activities of opposition to the government. Hence the perpetrator can be presumed to have been politically motivated. This Commission therefore holds the conviction that Jaime Quilan died as the result of a human rights violation by a politically motivated private citizen.
 
 

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D. USE OF UNDUE FORCE AND ABUSES OF POWER TOLERATED BY THOSE IN AUTHORITY

1. INTRODUCTION

This section deals with cases of use of undue force and abuse of power that constituted human rights violations which the Commission has been able to verify in the course of its investigations, even though they have no political overtones. The Commission believes that the most significant characteristic of the killings of that nature that took place in 1973 was that they were part of a general framework of political violence during that time. Hence it has opted to include them along with the other cases of fatal human rights violations committed during the months following the change of government, and therefore they will not be included in this section. However, all cases of that nature that took place during the period from 1978 to 1990 are included, as are those from the previous period covering the years 1974 to 1977.

The Commission examined 242 cases fitting those categories. It concluded that sixty-eight of them constituted human rights violations. It did not come to such a conviction with regard to the remaining 174 cases.
 

2. CASES IN WHICH THE COMMISSION CAME TO A CONVICTION THAT PERSONS HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF UNDUE FORCE OR THE ABUSE OF POWER WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF OFFICIALS

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on an equal footing with all the other cases on which the Commission came to a conviction.

The following are the names of persons killed as a result of the use of excessive force by government forces:

ACEVEDO CISTERNAS, Eduardo Bernabe
ACUNA BALLESTEROS, Reinaldo Enrique
ANTIMAN NAHUELQUIN, Ruben Armando
BAEZA ZENTENO, Linfor del Carmen
BARRAZA HENRIQUEZ, Eduardo Octavio
BARRIENTOS ANAZCO, Hugo Orlando
BECKER ALFARO, Victor Hugo
 
 

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CABEDO AGUILERA, Jorge
CARO BENITEZ, Ricardo Alejandro
CASTILLO ARCAYA, Roberto
CASTILLO OYARCE, Ricardo Sergio
CAUTIVO AHUMADA, Salvador Fidel
CONTRERAS GONZALEZ, Jorge Edilio
CONTRERAS GONZALEZ, Juan Orlando
CONTRERAS MENARES, Manuel Andres
CONTRERAS, PLOTSQUI, Exequiel Zigomar
CORREA ORTIZ, Hernan
CORTES NAVARRO, Andres Nicanor
DELPERO PANIZZA, Bruno
ESCOBAR FERRADA, Angel
ESCOBAR LAGOS, Lorena del Pilar
ESPINOLA MUNOZ, Juan Carlos
FARIAS NARANJO, Jose Carlos
FRES GALLARDO, Gonzalo Elis
GAETE AVILA, Miguel Segundo
GARRIDO QUEULLO, Christian Leandro
GONZALEZ FREDES, Fernando Dionisio
GUTIERREZ GUTIERREZ, Maria Cristina
JARA CORTES, Carlos Eduardo
MAIGRET BECERRA, Mauricio
MENDEZ VASQUEZ, Laura Rosa
MORALES CHAVEZ, Enrique Segundo
MORALES SANTOS, Jose Eduardo
NAVARRO SUBIABRE, Nibaldo
OBANDO GALETOVIC, Ivan
OPAZO LARA, Luis Humberto
ORTIZ CID, Giovanna de las Mercedes
PEREIRA LUNA, Sergio Omar
PEREZ ESPINOZA, Victor Omar
PEREZ VALDEBENITO, Roberto Andres
RANDOLPH SEGOVIA, Jose Rodolfo Rigoberto
REYES ARZOLA, Marco Aurelio
REYES CASTILLO, Javier Esteban
RIQUELME CASTILLO, Luis Fernando
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, Armando
ROJAS PEARCE, Rodrigo Hugo
SANTANDER ZUNIGA, Omar Hernan
TAPIA AGUILERA, Rene Hernan
ULLOA SAEZ, Jose Ivan
VARGAS, LIZAMA, Pedro Jaime
VASQUEZ PENA, Hugo Hernan
WINLO BARRIOS, Victor Hugo
ZAVALA BARRA, Ruben Eurico
 
 

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DUARTE REYES, Ramon Leopoldo
MANZANO GONZALEZ, Patricio Enrique
PLAZA DIAZ, Sara Beatriz

NAVARRO MELLADO, Sergio
PALACIOS TORO, Esteban Alejandro
PINO CORTES, Claudio Patricio
RIVERA BARRAZA, Pedro Benito
SOLORZA GONZALEZ, Bernardo Enrique

b.2) Abuses of power that constituted human rights violations

ORMENO MOSCOSO, Jorge Hernan
VARGAS SALAZAR, Angel Patricio
MELO FARIAS, Joel

Gilberto Antonio MORA ORELLANA.
 
 

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E. REACTIONS OF MAJOR SECTORS OF SOCIETY TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN 1978 AND 1990

1. FIRST SUBPHASE—REACTION OF MAJOR SECTORS OF SOCIETY TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BETWEEN 1978 AND THE FIRST PROTESTS IN MID-1983

From this point onward, opposition to the military regime was to be channeled along two distinct and opposed lines: the route that accepted all forms of struggle to challenge the military regime and the nonviolent route. The attack on the Agas supermarket in 1979, the attack on the "flame of freedom" in which a policeman was killed, the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Roger Vergara, and several other attacks demonstrated the determination of some small but well-organized segments of society to take the armed route. In doing so, they did not respect the right to life and physical integrity of those whom they identified as government agents or private citizens who might accidentally suffer the consequences of their actions. Included here are the establishment of a guerrilla camp in Neltume, the attack on the house of the president of the supreme court, and the killing of four members of the investigative police in front of an army general's house.

The option for a path of nonviolent opposition to the regime was expressed through the denunciation of human rights violations in Chile issued by various persons and (primarily human rights) organizations; the legal, medical, social, and moral assistance provided by the human rights organizations then existing in Chile, headed by the Vicariate of Solidarity; and the call by a number of persons and sectors to vote "No" in the September 11, 1980, plebiscite, primarily on the grounds of the military regime's violation of its fundamental obligation to respect Chileans' human rights. In addition, some sectors and individuals who were not part of the opposition made it clear that they were opposed to the human rights violations that were being committed. They generally regarded them as excesses for which the government was not directly at fault.

Society as a whole did not yet react significantly in open solidarity with the victims of human rights violations. The prevailing attitude was rather one of indifference or unbelief, despite a gradual but slow growth in awareness on the
 
 

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matter. This growing awareness was impelled by events like the discovery of the bodies of a group of disappeared prisoners in a Lonquen mine. The government had told international organizations that these people were dead and that their bodies had been turned over to the Medical Legal Institute five years previously.

This relative improvement in respect for human rights during this period was due to several factors, including private efforts by civilians in the regime or close to it, even though they were not critical of the regime as a whole. The amnesty law issued on April 19, 1978, basically reflected the government's decision to regard the phase of civil war and subversion as a phase that had now been left behind. It accordingly granted full impunity for human rights violations committed to that date. The amnesty also encompassed crimes that might have been committed by people who belonged to the Popular Unity government. Officials thus presented the amnesty as a gesture of reconciliation.

The following are the most significant passages from a speech by the interior minister given June 15, 1978:

— Letter of the bishops of Chile "to Chileans far from their country, at Christmas time," dated December 25, 1977. In this document the bishops expressed their affection for those who were outside the country for various reasons, including "to avoid being jailed for political reasons."

— Letter from the Permanent Committee to the junta on the National Consultation (December 30, 1977). In this document the bishops rejected the formulations of those who divided the country into the "patriotic" and the "unpatriotic." They likewise rejected the conditions under which the consultation was to be held, and stated that it was important that the citizenry be able to have a say on important national issues.

— Letter of the Permanent Committee to workers for May Day (dated April 28, 1978). On that occasion the bishops said, "We would like you to be consulted and wish you could participate in the preparation and adoption of measures affecting you. Particularly when such measures are painful, they must be accepted and not imposed if they are to render their fruit."

— Statement of Permanent Committee of the Bishops (June 6, 1978) on the hunger strike by relatives of persons who had disappeared after arrest. The bishops again urged that information be provided on the whereabouts of citizens who had disappeared after arrest.

— Press statement of the Permanent Committee of the Bishops (July 13, 1978) which provided information on efforts to investigate the fate of those who had disappeared after arrest. The bishops stated that the true solution to the situation of disappeared prisoners "will end the anguish of people who have suffered greatly from uncertainty, bring peace to our country, and improve Chile's image in the eyes of the world."

— Statement of the Permanent Committee (November 9, 1978) on disappeared prisoners. The bishops said that "the answers given thus far (by government representatives) have not been satisfactory. In view of the evidence gathered and presented to the government, we believe that those persons called disappeared prisoners, who number several hundred, ought, with certain possible exceptions, to be regarded as having been arrested by government security services. . . The interior minister has assured us that human rights will not be violated while he is in his position. Nevertheless, we know that human rights continue to be violated on a lesser scale and sporadically."

— Statement of the Permanent Committee (May 25, 1979), on Decree Law No. 2621. In this statement the bishops expressed their support for a document on the matter issued by the National Justice and Peace Commission. They also said, "We ask those responsible for revising the text of this Decree Law that they try to situate it, insofar as necessary, within the principles of natural ethics and our humanistic and Christian tradition."

760

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c.3.3) National Justice and Peace Commission

The government remained continually hostile to all such media. One indication was the two month suspension imposed on Hoy in 1979, and the banning of news programming on the La Frontera and Araucania radio stations in Temuco. Finally it should be noted that during this period all the media, no matter what their tendency, provided information on terrorist attacks, and condemned them categorically.
 
 

762

The reaction to the issue of human rights and to terrorist actions varied among the various political parties, in accord with the sector each represented. Right-wing parties and organizations openly and categorically condemned terrorist actions. They also condemned the violation of human rights by government officials in doctrinal terms, but failed to acknowledge clearly enough that such violations were actually taking place in Chile. Centrist political parties and organizations (such as the Christian Democrat, Radical, and Social Democrat parties, and some Socialist factions) took a clear and firm stance in condemning human rights violations committed by government figures, and terrorist actions from the left and the right. Even though their condemnation was vigorous, it did not have the effect of halting human rights violations or terrorist actions.

The political parties of the left, which had reorganized to some extent after the persecution they had undergone, held to a stance of continually condemning actions that violated human acts and the military regime itself for violating those rights. They did not maintain an equally clear stance with regard to terrorist actions allegedly committed by extremist groups on the left. In fact some of them, such as the Communist party and the MIR, encouraged all forms of struggle, including armed struggle against the military regime. Armed groups advocating violence with ties to some left parties were formed, and they claimed credit for some of the terrorist actions carried out during this period. These matters are also discussed in Part Two, Chapter One of this report ("Political Framework").

It should also be mentioned that Decree Law No. 3621 (issued February 1, 1981), expressly abolished the legal provisions that empowered professional associations to examine' and sanction violations of professional ethics. It also defined the nature of these organizations as trade or professional organizations, and made it legal to practice a profession without belonging to such an association.
 
 

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g.2.1) National Commission for the Rights of Youth (CODEJU)

764

abolishing the death penalty, the signing of international human rights treaties, and carrying out educational activities on human rights.

Some human rights violations during this subphase had serious affects on some of these institutions, particularly the Chilean labor union movement, and had a profound impact on the country. Such was the killing of the labor leader Tucapel Jimenez by unknown people on February 27, 1982, while he was trying to bring the labor movement together, and the 1982 expulsion of three opposition leaders.

765

organizations because such rights were being violated in our country. As examples of the latter we may single out:

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i.3) Other organizations

2. SECOND SUBPHASE—REACTION OF MAJOR SECTORS OF SOCIETY TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BETWEEN MID-1983 AND 1990

and the route of active nonviolence, which by using its right to dissent, sought to promote a peaceful transition toward a democratic regime that would fully respect human rights.

At the same time the peaceful opposition became increasingly cohesive during this period. Political parties were reorganized even though they were still prohibited; sector and occupational associations (labor unions, student organizations and professional associations) reorganized; multiparty alliances (such as the Democratic Alliance) and multi-sector alliances (such as the Assembly of Civilian Forces and the Unified Labor Federation) were also formed; agreements with a vast appeal and support such as the National Accord and Broad Political Pacts, and the political platform of the coalition of opposition parties [Concertacion]^d were drawn up and signed.

__________
d)Concertacion: The Concertacion is a coalition composed of eighteen center and moderate left parties who worked to successfully defeat the continuation of the military regime and to vote into office President Patrick* Aylwin on December 14, 1989.
 
 

768

This process culminated with the victory of the "No" vote in the October 5, 1988 plebiscite; die approval of the constitutional reforms submitted to a plebiscite in 1989; and the presidential election December 14, 1989. In each of these developments the issue of human rights played a major role.

The resignation of the head of the police Cesar Mendoza, who was a junta member, and of other high-ranking police officials when they were found to be involved in the triple murder of Santiago Nattino, Manuel Guerrero, and Jose Manuel Parada (known as the case of the "slit throats") was a reaction to human rights violations from within the government.
 
 

769

By and large there were no other reactions within the regime to human rights violations. This observation does not refer to private efforts to improve the situation made by some people within the regime. However, there were some grave actions that violated human rights, a portion of which were exacerbated by terrorist attacks made by the advocates of armed struggle. In this category fall the reprisals for the attack on General Pinochet, including the case of Jose Carrasco, Felipe Rivera, Gaston Vidaurrazaga, and Abraham Mouskablitt.

These matters are also discussed in Part Two, Chapter One of this report ("Political Framework").

The government was openly hostile to the vicariate and demonstrated that hostility in various ways. These included the expulsion of its vicar, the Spanish priest Ignacio Gutierrez in November 1984, and putting a doctor and a lawyer of the Vicariate of Solidarity on trial for the professional attention they provided to a wounded man who was allegedly implicated in an act of terrorism. These persons were arrested, tried, and imprisoned as a result. In January 1989, the military prosecutor's office attempted to confiscate the files of the cases the Vicariate had undertaken, but the Vicariate refused.

On March 29, 1985, the body of Jose Manuel Parada, who worked at the Vicariate, appeared with his throat slit along with those of Santiago Nattino and Manuel Guerrero. The fact that government agents were involved caused public outrage.

FASIC, the ecumenical organization, continued to do its work. We refer back to what was said about that institution in the earlier period.

772

Although it does not believe the killing of the French priest Andre Jarlan was a deliberate action by government officials, the Commission believes that it should be mentioned because of the great impact it had. The killing happened on a day of protest in early September 1984. A bullet fired by police hit Jarlan as he was praying in a room of the parish house in the La Victoria shantytown in Santiago.

c.4) Participation of the Catholic church in the National Accord

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Until the appearance of Fortin Mapocho in 1984 and La Epoca in 1987 (after they had overcome great obstacles placed by the government), the work of promoting and defending human rights took place primarily in opposition magazines such as Hoy, Cauce, Analisis, Apsi, Mensaje, Solidaridad, Pluma y Pincel, La Bicicleta, and over radio stations that inclined toward the opposition, such as Radio Chilena, Radio Cooperativa, and Radio Santiago. It should also be noted that some pro-government and independent media allowed journalists to refer to the basic principles of respect for human rights under any circumstance or to provide news on violations of those rights (magazine Quo Pasa).

With regard to the reaction of parties to human rights violations and terrorist activities, the following points may be noted:

The Seventh Congress of the Bar Association in 1986 should be mentioned. One of the topics was "Safeguarding Human Rights and Assuring Their Enforcement." The agreed upon resolutions included a categorical denunciation of the situation of human rights violations at that time in the country, and a series of specific recommendations to end that situation. The particular concern of the Medical Association in its seminars on medical ethics in 1986 should also be mentioned. At that gathering, the findings of the investigation to determine the responsibility of medical professionals in the application of torture to political prisoners were presented. The Journalists Association presented to the Supreme Court the issue of the government policy of preventing the media from reporting the truth.

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g.2) Human rights organizations

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