A major concern within the discipline of the history of science is that young historians be trained to avoid writing "whig histories," a type of history in which the science of the past is understood to lead up to, to anticipate modern science. For example, a whig history might suggest that what is important in John Philoponus's impetus theory in the sixth century was that it was influential in Galileo's later transformation of dynamics from the Aristotelian to the modern concept. In this same vein, whig histories often pronounce judgements on how "good" a theory was by how close it came to modern standards.
One failing in such a whig history is that it neglects to take seriously the context of the author. Rather than looking at the culture and intellectual milieu in which an author existed, a whig history only accounts for how an author fits into a chain of events leading up to modern science. In many cases, the whig historian creates a picture in which all past events were inexorably progressing towards modern science, which is often presented as the pinnacle (or very nearly) of human understanding of the natural world. Clearly, then, this type of history does not do justice to ancient authors. Whig history does not recognize an author's achievement in its own context; it may even totally neglect what the author was trying to do by focussing on the contribution the author made towards the development of modern science.
Even the label given to the discipline "history of science" shows how this discipline is prone to such an error. The English word "science" was not coined until the nineteenth century. At that time, it was meant to refer to the manner of investigation of the natural world in which professional "scientists" of Western Europe engaged. How, then, do we speak of "science" before this time, and particularly before the period of the Scientific Revolution, which many historians point to as the root of the modern method and institution of the investigation of the natural world?
In this essay, I will examine one of Augustine's works, the De ordine, in an attempt to understand how we can talk about the "science" of the period. I must use scare quotes around the word 'science', for Augustine had a very different goal in mind than that of modern science. There is some difficulty in even knowing where to start, for there is no equivalent in Late Antiquity to the modern professional scientist. Therefore, I will concentrate on Augustine's attitude to the mathematical portion of the liberal arts, the quadrivium. On the surface, this seems to be the part of the Roman educational system that most closely corresponds to our concept of science. We shall see if it truly does.
The basic goal of the De ordine is to offer a theodicy, an explanation of how there can be evil in the world while at the same time the all-powerful God can be wholly good. The problem lies not with God, Augustine says, but with us. We are not able to understand how everything that occurs in the world is part of God's design for the world; he writes, "all things harmonize into one design and are perfect" (I.2.4),[1] but humans are unable to see this without training. The means to rectify this error on our part is to learn to understand the order of the world. Understanding what order entails is the only way that we can come to God. It is also the only way in which we can hope to understand God's design for the world, and thereby know why any event happens the way it does, even if to us it seems evil. Again he writes,
Order is that which will lead us to God, if we hold to it during life; and unless we do hold to it during life, we shall not come to God. (I.9.27)
Understanding the order of creation is what will lead us to God, which will be the fulfillment of human life.
Humans are uniquely suited to this task for they are the only part of this earthly creation which is "rational." That is, humans are distinguished from the beasts in that they have reason, "a mental operation capable of distinguishing and connecting the things that are learned" (II.11.30). One learns of things of the world through the senses: material objects are seen, sounds are heard. Through the exercise of reason, humans come to recognize the way things are ordered in the material world. The senses gather the data which the reason examines. The reason then determines that certain things occur with a purposeful, reasonable end. For example, reason comes to know that a physician prescribes a certain treatment that will lead to better health (II. 11.32). Or again, the reason may come to know both the visual pleasure and the practical function that results from a well-designed house, results of the design of the architect (II.11.34)
It was from this exercise of reason that humans came upon the liberal arts (II.12.35 and following). Augustine details the order in which they came about. First came the attempt to communicate between humans by the function of making sounds with their mouths. This in turn led to the representation of these sounds by written symbols so that one did not need to be present to convey words, which resulted in the birth of grammar. Once the rules of grammar were fixed, the art of dialectics was brought into being. In this art, "reason itself exhibits itself" (II.13.38). Reason makes use of the rules of grammar to convey understanding and detect and avoid error in the use of language. There remained the problem that humans are fallible in their use of reason. Thus a pedagogical tool was needed to be able to persuade by appeal to emotions, since these often rule the human to a greater extent than reason. Thus rhetoric came to be.
So much for the trivium, the three liberal arts concerned with language. The next steps, according to Augustine, come under what we call the quadrivium (though we must note that Augustine does not divide them in this manner). The next step in the development of the arts was the recognition that words and language were arranged in certain patterns. Analysis of words revealed that words were spoken with variation of pitch. This led to the differentiation of the different parts of the sounds of language and was systematized ultimately into a system of number and proportion. This led to the science of music.
At this point, a certain shift has taken place that did not occur in the other arts. When human reason probed into the workings of language and the numeric proportions among them, it came to understand that the sounds which departed from the mouth were not the whole essence of language; in fact, something more fundamental lay behind the merely human creation of sounds. Numeric proportion lay behind these sounds, proportions which did not depend upon the "material stuff of vocal utterances" (II.14.41). Thus the contemplation of the language that they used allowed humans to progress and to see something beyond the mere material world; it allowed humans to know something eternal.
From this, human reason proceeded to look around this material world, again making use of the senses. But now, instead of merely seeing the imperfections of this world, the mind could abstract to the perfect shapes that exist only "in that realm ... of such a kind as intelligence comprehended" (II.15.42). The mind could perceive perfect lines, curves, and shapes which could not exist on this earth. Thus geometry came to be. Then looking above this world, human reason again used the senses to observe the heavens that circled about the earth and established the art of astronomy.[2] Again, through the eternal and unchanging nature of the objects of the heavens, human reason was lifted up to contemplate something beyond this mere material realm and understand the eternal nature of number and numeric proportion.
The quadrivium normally includes arithmetic, but it is difficult to detect exactly where Augustine would place it. We might see it where he describes how reason came to understand that number underlay human speech (II.14.40). But immediately following this, he calls music "the fourth step of ascent" (II.11.41). If music is the fourth step, then arithmetic cannot fit between it and the three arts of the trivium. We must, therefore, look to the end of the list. Again Augustine does not label any branch of study 'arithmetic'. But there is certainly a concentration on pure number; "[i]n all these branches of study, therefore, all things were being presented to reason as numerically proportioned" (II.15.43). Thus I think it best to place arithmetic at the end of his list of the quadrivial arts, as both the culmination and the fundamental essence of how reason comes to understand the order of the universe.
Through the diligent study of these arts, then, an individual can grasp "the meaning of simple and intelligible numbers" (II.16.44), which will allow that individual to answer the basic questions of our existence, such as how things change. Only when such basic questions can be answered can one move onto the understanding of God and God's design of the universe.
Augustine discussed the basic difficulty early in the work (I.2.3). Here he writes that the basic trait of the universe is that it is 'one'; though it is apparently made up of many diverse parts, it is truly 'one'. I interpret this to refer to the design of God (see also I.1.1). Though we see the many parts of the universe and the many apparently disparate events that occur in it, it is all to be considered as one whole unity because it is the result of God's design.
The quadrivial arts, then, are not for Augustine like our modern understanding of science. Though there is a concentration on number, it is not used in the same way as our modern science does. Our concept of number is that nature acts in predictable and quantifiable ways. Number is utilized to give precision to our predictions, with the hope that this leads us to a truer understanding of the reality of natural processes. In Augustine's case, number is what allows us to transcend the material world around us and look to the eternal, God. It is ironic that the part of the educational curriculum which we think is most closely related to "science" is actually in Augustine's thought diametrically opposed to what modern science wishes to do.
Augustine's view of the quadrivial arts and their function is clearly influenced by neo Platonic themes. The idea of the ascent of reason to a transcendent realm is at the heart of neo Platonic philosophy. In addition, the universe as one is also a recurrent theme. There also seem to be themes of neo-Pythagoreanism present, particularly the emphasis on number and numeric proportion as being the key to understanding, and the notion that through the contemplation of number one can abstract beyond the physical realm.
So what is the significance of Augustine's views for the history of science? First of all, we must note that Augustine changed his view on these matters later in life. In the De doctrina christiana, for example, the quadrivial arts are of less value than they were in the De ordine. Instead of being the culmination of the ascent to the transcendental, they are merely a part of the path to becoming a true Christian. In some senses, however, their function has not changed. He states that the mathematical sciences are one means by which the human mind can see the difference between this mutable realm and the eternal realm beyond the physical world (De doctrina, II.38.56). The function of the mathematical arts has remained largely the same, but their ultimate worth have been lowered in the context of Christian education.
This is not to say, however, that Augustine's discussion of the quadrivial arts sheds no light on the history of science. As I stated earlier in this essay, it is difficult to know exactly how to proceed in a discussion about Augustine's view of "science", if we take science to mean what it does in our modern context: the investigation into the reality of natural processes, with the goal of understanding the physical mechanisms that are at play. By such a definition, Augustine is not concerned with "science." But, I would argue, if we take such a definition, then very few individuals of Augustine's time period are concerned with science. The major intellectual movements which we learn of through Augustine do not share these concerns. In fact, it could be argued that many of the systems of religion or philosophy are focussed on things outside of this physical world. Christians are concerned with their souls, neo-Platonists are concerned with transcending this world, Manichees are concerned with escaping the bonds of physicality.
In Augustine's quadrivium we can see how these arts can be applied to the physical world. Astronomy predicts the locations of heavenly bodies and is useful in telling time. Geometry is useful to craftsmen; for example, architects use it when designing a house. Music can be simply enjoyed by its listeners. But the goal of the quadrivial arts for Augustine is to transcend the realm of the material world and allow the mind to ascend to a higher plane of contemplation, ultimately leading to God. Our modern notions of science are simply out of place when discussing Augustine's concept of the quadrivium.
1. All quotations are taken from the translation in the Fathers of the Church series.
2. The translator translates this as "astrology". The words astronomia and astrologia were both used in antiquity as the label for the study of heavenly motions and the influence of the heavenly bodies on the earth, and were thus interchangeable. These two aspects, the motion and the influence, were occasionally differentiated, but they did not get different labels. Clearly Augustine is referring to the study of the heavenly motions, what our modern language more properly labels astronomy. What we refer to as astrology is the notion that the heavenly bodies exert influences on earthly things. This is what Augustine refers to as the "torment for the curious" (II.15.42). So Augustine does not apply two different labels, but we must, in translating to our modern language, keep in mind the modern distinction.