

CODEBOOK

QoG Time-series and Cross-section Datasets
November 15, 2006

THE **QOG** INSTITUTE
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT



GÖTEBORG
UNIVERSITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	11
COUNTRY AND TIME COVERAGE	11
COUNTRY AND CASE IDENTIFIER CODES	13
<i>ccode</i> Country Code Numeric.....	13
<i>ccodealp</i> 3-letter Country Code.....	13
<i>cname</i> Country Name	13
<i>ccodewb</i> Country Code World Bank	15
<i>ccodecow</i> Country Code Correlates of War	15
<i>year</i> Year	15
WII (WHAT IT IS) VARIABLES	15
BOTERO, DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF LABOR	15
<i>Employment Laws</i>	15
<i>bdlls_aeci</i> Alternative Employment Contracts Index.....	15
<i>bdlls_cihw</i> Cost of Increasing Hour Worked.....	16
<i>bdlls_cofw</i> Cost of Firing Workers.....	16
<i>bdlls_dpi</i> Dismissal Procedures Index.....	16
<i>bdlls_eli</i> Employment Laws Index.....	16
<i>Collective Relations Laws</i>	16
<i>bdlls_lupi</i> Labor Union Power Index.....	16
<i>bdlls_cdi</i> Collective Disputes Index.....	17
<i>bdlls_crli</i> Collective Relations Laws Index	17
<i>Social Security Laws</i>	17
<i>bdlls_oadbi</i> Old Age, Disability and Death Benefit Index	17
<i>bdlls_shbi</i> Sickness and Health Benefits Index.....	17
<i>bdlls_ubi</i> Unemployment Benefits Index.....	17
<i>bdlls_ssli</i> Social Security Laws Index.....	17
<i>Civil Rights</i>	18
<i>bdlls_drace</i> Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Race	18
<i>bdlls_dsex</i> Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Sex.....	18
<i>bdlls_stoml</i> Statutory Duration of Maternity Leave	18
<i>bdlls_mwa</i> Minimum Working Age.....	18
<i>bdlls_mmw</i> Mandatory Minimum Wage.....	18
<i>bdlls_cri</i> Civil Rights Index.....	18
BUENO DE MESQUITA, SMITH, SIVERSON & MORROW	18
<i>bdm_s</i> Selectorate Size	19
<i>bdm_w</i> Winning Coalition Size.....	19
<i>bdm_w_s</i> Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size.....	19
CHEIBUB & GANDHI.....	19
<i>chga_regime</i> Type of Regime	19
CINGRANELLI & RICHARDS - HUMAN RIGHTS DATASET	19
<i>ciri_assn</i> Freedom of Assembly and Association.....	20
<i>ciri_disap</i> Disappearance	20
<i>ciri_empinx</i> Empowerment Rights Index.....	20
<i>ciri_kill</i> Extrajudicial Killing.....	20
<i>ciri_move</i> Freedom of Movement.....	20
<i>ciri_physint</i> Physical Integrity Rights Index	20
<i>ciri_polpar</i> Political Participation	21
<i>ciri_polpris</i> Political Imprisonment.....	21
<i>ciri_relfre</i> Freedom of Religion.....	21
<i>ciri_speech</i> Freedom of Speech.....	21
<i>ciri_tort</i> Torture.....	21
<i>ciri_wecon</i> Women's Economic Rights	21
<i>ciri_wopol</i> Women's Political Rights.....	22
<i>ciri_worker</i> Workers Rights.....	22
<i>ciri_wosoc</i> Women's Social Rights	22
COPPEDGE	23

<i>copp_poly</i>	<i>Polyarchy Scale</i>	23
DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – REGULATION OF ENTRY.....		23
<i>dlls_proc</i>	<i>Number of Procedures</i>	23
<i>dlls_time</i>	<i>Time</i>	23
<i>dlls_cost</i>	<i>Cost</i>	23
DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES & SHLEIFER – COURTS.....		23
<i>dlls1_fie</i>	<i>Formalism Index (Eviction)</i>	24
<i>dlls1_fic</i>	<i>Formalism Index (Check)</i>	24
<i>dlls1_ide</i>	<i>Total Duration (Eviction)</i>	24
<i>dlls1_idc</i>	<i>Total Duration (Check)</i>	24
EVANS & RAUCH.....		24
<i>er_career</i>	<i>Career Opportunities</i>	24
<i>er_salary</i>	<i>Bureaucratic Compensation</i>	25
<i>er_merit</i>	<i>Meritocratic Recruitment</i>	25
FRASER INSTITUTE – ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD.....		26
<i>fi_legprop</i>	<i>Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights</i>	26
FREEDOM HOUSE.....		26
<i>Freedom in the World</i>		26
<i>fh_cl</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>	26
<i>fh_pr</i>	<i>Political Rights</i>	26
<i>fh_status</i>	<i>Status</i>	27
<i>Freedom of the Press</i>		27
<i>fh_press</i>	<i>Freedom of the press</i>	27
FREEDOM HOUSE/POLITY.....		27
<i>fh_polity2</i>	<i>Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)</i>	27
<i>fh_ipolity2</i>	<i>Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)</i>	27
GIBNEY & DALTON.....		28
<i>gd_ptsa</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International</i>	28
<i>gd_ptss</i>	<i>Political Terror Scale – US State Department</i>	28
IDEA (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE).....		28
<i>idea_tvpar</i>	<i>Total Vote (Parliamentary)</i>	28
<i>idea_tvpres</i>	<i>Total Vote (Presidential)</i>	28
<i>idea_vappar</i>	<i>Voting Age Population, VAP (Parliamentary)</i>	29
<i>idea_vappre</i>	<i>Voting Age Population, VAP (Presidential)</i>	29
<i>idea_rvpar</i>	<i>Registered Voters (Parliamentary)</i>	29
<i>idea_rvpre</i>	<i>Registered Voters (Presidential)</i>	29
HERITAGE FOUNDATION.....		29
<i>hf_prights</i>	<i>Property Rights</i>	29
INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE – THE PRS GROUP.....		29
<i>icrg_qog</i>	<i>ICRG indicator of Quality of Government</i>	29
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION.....		31
<i>ipu_w_lower</i>	<i>Women in national parliament (lower house)</i>	31
<i>ipu_w_upper</i>	<i>Women in national parliament (upper house)</i>	31
KNACK & KUGLER.....		31
<i>kk_gg</i>	<i>Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance</i>	31
LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES, POP-ELECHES & SHLEIFER– JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE.....		31
<i>llps_tensc</i>	<i>Tenure of Supreme Court Judges</i>	31
<i>llps_tenac</i>	<i>Tenure of Administrative Court Judges</i>	31
<i>llps_cl</i>	<i>Case Law</i>	32
<i>llps_ji</i>	<i>Judicial Independence</i>	32
<i>llps_roc</i>	<i>Rigidity of Constitution</i>	32
<i>llps_jr</i>	<i>Judicial Review</i>	32
<i>llps_cr</i>	<i>Constitutional Review</i>	32
POLITY IV.....		32
<i>p_democ</i>	<i>Institutionalized Democracy</i>	33
<i>p_autoc</i>	<i>Institutionalized Autocracy</i>	33
<i>p_polity</i>	<i>Combined Polity Score</i>	33
<i>p_polity2</i>	<i>Revised Combined Polity Score</i>	34
<i>p_parreg</i>	<i>Regulation of Participation</i>	34
<i>p_parcomp</i>	<i>The Competitiveness of Participation</i>	35

<i>p_xrreg</i>	<i>Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment</i>	36
<i>p_xrcomp</i>	<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment</i>	37
<i>p_xropen</i>	<i>Openness of Executive Recruitment</i>	37
<i>p_xconst</i>	<i>Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)</i>	38
<i>p_durable</i>	<i>Regime Durability</i>	39
<i>p_flag</i>	<i>Tentative Coding</i>	39
<i>p_fragment</i>	<i>Polity Fragmentation</i>	40
<i>p_sf</i>	<i>State Failure</i>	40
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES.....		40
<i>rsf_pfi</i>	<i>Press Freedom Index</i>	40
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL.....		41
<i>ti_cpi</i>	<i>Corruption Perceptions Index</i>	41
VANHANEN.....		41
<i>van_index</i>	<i>Index of Democratization</i>	41
<i>van_comp</i>	<i>Competition</i>	41
<i>van_part</i>	<i>Participation</i>	41
WORLD BANK – GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (A.K.A KKZ).....		41
<i>wbgi_vae</i>	<i>Voice and Accountability – Estimate</i>	42
<i>wbgi_vas</i>	<i>Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors</i>	42
<i>wbgi_van</i>	<i>Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources</i>	42
<i>wbgi_pse</i>	<i>Political Stability - Estimate</i>	42
<i>wbgi_pss</i>	<i>Political Stability – Standard Errors</i>	42
<i>wbgi_psn</i>	<i>Political Stability – Number of sources</i>	42
<i>wbgi_gee</i>	<i>Government Effectiveness - Estimate</i>	42
<i>wbgi_ges</i>	<i>Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors</i>	42
<i>wbgi_gen</i>	<i>Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources</i>	42
<i>wbgi_rqe</i>	<i>Regulatory Quality - Estimate</i>	43
<i>wbgi_rqs</i>	<i>Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors</i>	43
<i>wbgi_rqn</i>	<i>Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources</i>	43
<i>wbgi_rle</i>	<i>Rule of Law - Estimate</i>	43
<i>wbgi_rls</i>	<i>Rule of Law – Standard Errors</i>	43
<i>wbgi_rln</i>	<i>Rule of Law – Number of Sources</i>	43
<i>wbgi_cce</i>	<i>Control of Corruption - Estimate</i>	43
<i>wbgi_ccs</i>	<i>Control of Corruption – Standard Errors</i>	43
<i>wbgi_ccn</i>	<i>Control of Corruption – Number of Sources</i>	43
HTG (HOW TO GET IT) VARIABLES.....		43
ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON & ROBINSON.....		43
<i>ajr_settmort</i>	<i>Log Settler Mortality</i>	43
ALESINA, DEVLEESCHAUWER, EASTERLY, KURLAT & WASZIARG.....		44
<i>al_ethnic</i>	<i>Ethnic fractionalization</i>	44
<i>al_language</i>	<i>Linguistic fractionalization</i>	44
<i>al_religion</i>	<i>Religious fractionalization</i>	44
BARRO & LEE.....		44
<i>bl_asyf15</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Female)</i>	44
<i>bl_asyf25</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Female)</i>	44
<i>bl_asy15</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Male)</i>	44
<i>bl_asy25</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Male)</i>	45
<i>bl_asyt15</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Total)</i>	45
<i>bl_asyt25</i>	<i>Average Schooling Years (Total)</i>	45
CHEIBUB & GANDHI.....		45
<i>chga_hinst</i>	<i>Regime Institutions</i>	45
DATABASE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.....		45
<i>dpi_system</i>	<i>Regime Type</i>	45
<i>dpi_mdmh</i>	<i>Mean District Magnitude (House)</i>	45
<i>dpi_mdms</i>	<i>Mean District Magnitude (Senate)</i>	46
<i>dpi_ssh</i>	<i>Relative Size of Senate</i>	46
<i>dpi_pluralty</i>	<i>Plurality</i>	46
<i>dpi_pr</i>	<i>Proportional Representation</i>	46
<i>dpi_housesys</i>	<i>House: Plurality or Proportional?</i>	46

<i>dpi_sensys</i>	<i>Senate: Plurality or Proportional?</i>	46
<i>dpi_thresh</i>	<i>Vote Threshold for Representation</i>	46
<i>dpi_dhondt</i>	<i>D'Hondt</i>	46
<i>dpi_cl</i>	<i>Closed Lists</i>	46
<i>dpi_auton</i>	<i>Autonomous Regions</i>	47
<i>dpi_state</i>	<i>Election of State/Province Government</i>	47
<i>dpi_muni</i>	<i>Election of Municipal Government</i>	47
<i>dpi_author</i>	<i>Authority of Sub-national Governments</i>	47
<i>dpi_hig</i>	<i>Herfindahl Index for Government</i>	47
<i>dpi_gf</i>	<i>Government Fractionalization</i>	47
<i>dpi_hio</i>	<i>Herfindahl Index for Opposition</i>	47
<i>dpi_of</i>	<i>Opposition Fractionalization</i>	48
<i>dpi_hit</i>	<i>Herfindahl Index Total</i>	48
<i>dpi_tf</i>	<i>Total Fractionalization</i>	48
EASTERLY & LEVINE		48
<i>el_gunn1</i>	<i>Percent of Population not Speaking the Official Language</i>	48
<i>el_gunn2</i>	<i>Percent of Population not Speaking the Most Widely Used Language</i>	48
<i>el_avelf</i>	<i>Average Value of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization</i>	48
GOLDER, MATT		48
<i>gol_legmaj</i>	<i>Absolute Majority Provisions (Legislative Elections)</i>	49
<i>gol_legela</i>	<i>Alternative Vote (Legislative Elections)</i>	49
<i>gol_adm</i>	<i>Average District Magnitude</i>	49
<i>gol_legbor</i>	<i>Borda Count (Legislative Elections)</i>	49
<i>gol_coex</i>	<i>Coexistence System</i>	49
<i>gol_cond</i>	<i>Conditional System</i>	50
<i>gol_corr</i>	<i>Correction System</i>	50
<i>gol_dhondt</i>	<i>D'Hondt Formula</i>	50
<i>gol_dist</i>	<i>Districts</i>	50
<i>gol_droop</i>	<i>Droop Quota</i>	50
<i>gol_enep</i>	<i>Effective Number of Electoral Parties</i>	50
<i>gol_enepo</i>	<i>Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Others)</i>	50
<i>gol_enep1</i>	<i>Effective Number of Electoral Parties1</i>	51
<i>gol_enpp</i>	<i>Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties</i>	51
<i>gol_enppo</i>	<i>Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties (Others)</i>	51
<i>gol_enpp1</i>	<i>Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties1</i>	51
<i>gol_enpres</i>	<i>Effective Number of Presidential Candidates</i>	51
<i>gol_est</i>	<i>Electoral System Type</i>	51
<i>gol_est2</i>	<i>Electoral System Type 2</i>	52
<i>gol_fusion</i>	<i>Fusion Electoral System</i>	52
<i>gol_hare</i>	<i>Hare Formula</i>	52
<i>gol_imp</i>	<i>Imperiali Quota</i>	52
<i>gol_inst</i>	<i>Institution</i>	52
<i>gol_legel</i>	<i>Legislative Elections</i>	53
<i>gol_legplu</i>	<i>Legislative Elections (Plurality Rule)</i>	53
<i>gol_leglim</i>	<i>Limited Vote (Legislative Elections)</i>	53
<i>gol_multi</i>	<i>Linked Multi-Tier</i>	53
<i>gol_mdm</i>	<i>Median District Magnitude</i>	54
<i>gol_mixdep</i>	<i>Mixed Dependent</i>	54
<i>gol_mhare</i>	<i>Modified Hare Formula</i>	54
<i>gol_msl</i>	<i>Modified Sainte-Laguë Formula</i>	54
<i>gol_nos</i>	<i>Number of Seats</i>	54
<i>gol_polreg</i>	<i>Political Regimes</i>	54
<i>gol_preel</i>	<i>Presidential Election</i>	55
<i>gol_pest</i>	<i>Presidential Electoral System Type</i>	55
<i>gol_prero</i>	<i>Presidential Runoff</i>	55
<i>gol_legqmaj</i>	<i>Qualified Majority Requirement (Legislative Elections)</i>	55
<i>gol_riq</i>	<i>Reinforced Imperiali Quota</i>	56
<i>gol_legro</i>	<i>Runoff (Legislative Elections)</i>	56
<i>gol_sl</i>	<i>Sainte-Laguë Formula</i>	56
<i>gol_legsntv</i>	<i>Single Non-Transferable Vote (Legislative Elections)</i>	56

gol_stv	Single Transferable Vote.....	56
gol_suppos	Superposition Electoral System.....	56
gol_upseat	Upper Seats.....	56
gol_uptier	Upper Tier.....	57
GERRING, THACKER & MORENO	57
gtm_centrip	Centripetalism.....	57
gtm_centrip2	Centripetalism (weighted).....	57
gtm_unit	Unitarism.....	57
gtm_parl	Parliamentarism.....	57
gtm_pr	Proportional Representation.....	58
HADENIUS & TEORELL	58
ht_region	The Region of the Country.....	58
ht_region2	The Region of the Country (alternative).....	58
ht_colonial	Colonial Origin.....	59
HESTON, SUMMERS & ATEN – PENN WORLD TABLE	59
pwt_openk	Openness to Trade.....	59
pwt_pop	Population.....	59
IDEA (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE)	59
idea_esd	Electoral System Design.....	59
LA PORTA, LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES, SHLEIFER & VISHNY	60
lp_legor	Legal origin.....	60
lp_lat_abst	Latitude.....	60
Religion	60
lp_catho80	Religion: Catholic.....	60
lp_muslim80	Religion: Muslim.....	60
lp_protmg80	Religion: Protestant.....	61
lp_no_cpm80	Religion: Other Denomination.....	61
LIPHART	61
li_execpty	Executive-parties Dimension.....	61
li_fedunit	Federal-unitary Dimension.....	61
PERSSON & TABELLINI	61
pt_federal	Federal Political Structure.....	62
pt_magn	Inverse of District Magnitude.....	62
pt_maj	Majoritarian Electoral Systems.....	62
pt_pind	Ballot Structure 1.....	62
pt_pindo	Ballot Structure 2.....	62
pt_pres	Forms of Government.....	62
pt_sdm	District Magnitude.....	62
pt_seats	Number of Seats.....	63
ROEDER	63
r_roberts	Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization.....	63
r_muller	Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization.....	63
r_atlas	Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization.....	63
r_elf61	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1961.....	63
r_elf85	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1985.....	63
SEDDON WALLACK, GAVIRIA, PANIZZA & STEIN	63
sgps_bicameral	Bicameral System.....	64
sgps_oneparty	Single Party System.....	64
sgps_ballot	Party Control over Ballot (lower/only house).....	64
sgps_ballot2	Party Control over Ballot (upper house).....	64
sgps_pool	Sharing of Votes Among Candidates (lower/only house).....	64
sgps_pool2	Sharing of Votes Among Candidates (upper house).....	64
sgps_vote	Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (lower/only house).....	64
sgps_vote2	Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (upper house).....	65
sgps_dm	District Magnitude (lower/only house).....	65
sgps_dm2	District Magnitude (upper house).....	65
sgps_smd	Proportion from Single-Member Districts (lower/only house).....	65
sgps_smd2	Proportion from Single-Member Districts (upper house).....	65
sgps_propn	Proportion from National Constituency (lower/only house).....	65
sgps_propn2	Proportion from National Constituency (upper house).....	65

WYG (WHAT YOU GET) VARIABLES	66
BUENO DE MESQUITA, SMITH, SIVERSON & MORROW.....	66
<i>bdm_hobbes</i> Hobbes Index.....	66
<i>bdm_short</i> Short.....	66
<i>bdm_nasty</i> Nasty.....	66
<i>bdm_solitary</i> Solitary.....	66
<i>bdm_poor</i> Poor.....	66
<i>bdm_brute</i> Brutish.....	66
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDEX.....	66
<i>esi</i> Environmental Sustainability Index.....	67
<i>esi_sysair</i> Air Quality.....	67
<i>esi_syswql</i> Water Quality.....	67
<i>esi_watsup</i> Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water source.....	67
<i>esi_co2pc</i> Carbon emissions per capita.....	67
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS	67
<i>fao_fcc90_00</i> Forest Cover Change 1990-2000.....	68
GLOBALBAROMETER/EUROBAROMETER	68
<i>gbar_satdem</i> Percentage of population satisfied with the working of democracy.....	68
HESTON, SUMMERS & ATEN – PENN WORLD TABLE	68
<i>pwt_rgdpc</i> Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series).....	68
<i>pwt_grgdpc</i> Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series).....	68
UCDP/PRIO ARMED CONFLICT DATASET (VERSION 3-2005).....	68
<i>ucdp_type1</i> Extrasystemic armed conflict.....	69
<i>ucdp_type2</i> Interstate armed conflict.....	69
<i>ucdp_type3</i> Internal armed conflict.....	69
<i>ucdp_type4</i> Internationalized internal armed conflict.....	69
<i>ucdp_count</i> Number of Conflicts.....	69
<i>ucdp_loc</i> Conflict Location.....	69
UNDP - HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT	70
<i>undp_hdi</i> Human Development Index.....	70
<i>undp_gini</i> Gini Index (inequality measure).....	70
<i>undp_gem</i> Gender Empowerment Measure.....	70
<i>undp_gdp</i> GDP/Capita PPP in constant USD.....	70
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS.....	70
<i>wdi_gni</i> GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$).....	70
<i>wdi_inet</i> Internet users (per 1,000 people).....	71
<i>wdi_lifexp</i> Life expectancy at birth, total (years).....	71
<i>wdi_mort</i> Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births).....	71
<i>wdi_hiv</i> Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population aged 15-49).....	71
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.....	71
<i>wef_gend</i> Gender Gap.....	71
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE.....	71
<i>wri_pa16</i> Protected Areas: Percent of Total Land Area.....	71
WORLD VALUES SURVEY.....	71
<i>wvs_a008m</i> Feeling of happiness (mean).....	72
<i>wvs_a008p</i> Feeling of happiness (%).....	72
<i>wvs_a009m</i> State of health (mean).....	72
<i>wvs_a009p</i> State of health (%).....	72
<i>wvs_a062m</i> How often discusses political matters (mean).....	72
<i>wvs_a062p</i> How often discusses political matters (%).....	72
<i>wvs_a165p</i> Most people can be trusted (%).....	72
<i>wvs_a168p</i> Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (%).....	72
<i>wvs_a170m</i> How satisfied are you with your life (mean).....	73
<i>wvs_a170p</i> How satisfied are you with your life (%).....	73
<i>wvs_a173m</i> How much freedom you feel (mean).....	73
<i>wvs_a173p</i> How much freedom you feel (%).....	73
<i>wvs_c006m</i> Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (mean).....	73
<i>wvs_c006p</i> Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (%).....	73
<i>wvs_e023m</i> Interested in politics (mean).....	74
<i>wvs_e023p</i> Interested in politics (%).....	74

wvs_e150m	How often follows politics in the news (mean).	74
wvs_e150p	How often follows politics in the news (%).	74
	Statements about the environment	74
wvs_b001m	Would give part of my income for environment (mean).	74
wvs_b001p	Would give part of my income for environment (%).	74
wvs_b002m	Increase in taxes if extra money used to prevent environmental pollution (mean).	74
wvs_b002p	Increase in taxes if extra money used to prevent environmental pollution (%).	74
wvs_b003m	Government should reduce environmental pollution (mean).	74
wvs_b003p	Government should reduce environmental pollution (%).	74
wvs_b008p	Environmental vs. economic growth (%).	75
wvs_b009p	Human & nature (%).	75
	Ideology	75
wvs_e033m	Self positioning in political scale (mean).	75
wvs_e033p	Self positioning in political scale (%).	75
wvs_e035m	Incomes more equal (mean).	76
wvs_e035p	Incomes more equal (%).	76
wvs_e036m	Private ownership of business (mean).	76
wvs_e036p	Private ownership of business (%).	76
wvs_e037m	Government more responsibility (mean).	76
wvs_e037p	Government more responsibility (%).	76
wvs_e039m	Competition is good (mean).	76
wvs_e039p	Competition is good (%).	76
	Confidence	76
wvs_e069m	Confidence: churches (mean).	77
wvs_e069p	Confidence: churches (%).	77
wvs_e070m	Confidence: armed forces (mean).	77
wvs_e070p	Confidence: armed forces (%).	77
wvs_e072m	Confidence: the press (mean).	77
wvs_e072p	Confidence: the press (%).	77
wvs_e073m	Confidence: labor unions (mean).	77
wvs_e073p	Confidence: labor unions (%).	77
wvs_e074m	Confidence: the police (mean).	77
wvs_e074p	Confidence: the police (%).	77
wvs_e075m	Confidence: parliament (mean).	77
wvs_e075p	Confidence: parliament (%).	77
wvs_e076m	Confidence: the civil services (mean).	77
wvs_e076p	Confidence: the civil services (%).	77
wvs_e077m	Confidence: social security system (mean).	77
wvs_e077p	Confidence: social security system (%).	77
wvs_e078m	Confidence: television (mean).	77
wvs_e078p	Confidence: television (%).	77
wvs_e079m	Confidence: the government (mean).	77
wvs_e079p	Confidence: the government (%).	77
wvs_e080m	Confidence: the political parties (mean).	77
wvs_e080p	Confidence: the political parties (%).	77
wvs_e081m	Confidence: major companies (mean).	78
wvs_e081p	Confidence: major companies (%).	78
wvs_e082m	Confidence: the environmental protection movement (mean).	78
wvs_e082p	Confidence: the environmental protection movement (%).	78
wvs_e083m	Confidence: the women's movement (mean).	78
wvs_e083p	Confidence: the women's movement (%).	78
wvs_e086m	Confidence: the european union (mean).	78
wvs_e086p	Confidence: the european union (%).	78
wvs_e087m	Confidence: nato (mean).	78
wvs_e087p	Confidence: nato (%).	78
wvs_e088m	Confidence: the united nations (mean).	78
wvs_e088p	Confidence: the united nations (%).	78
wvs_e110m	Democracy is developing in our country* (mean).	78
wvs_e110p	Democracy is developing in our country* (%).	78
	Political system	78

wvs_e114m	Having a strong leader (mean).	79
wvs_e114p	Having a strong leader (%).	79
wvs_e115m	Having experts make decisions (mean).	79
wvs_e115p	Having experts make decisions (%).	79
wvs_e116m	Having the army rule (mean).	79
wvs_e116p	Having the army rule (%).	79
wvs_e117m	Having a democratic political system (mean).	79
wvs_e117p	Having a democratic political system (%).	79
Democracy		79
wvs_e120m	In democracy, the economic system runs badly (mean).	79
wvs_e120p	In democracy, the economic system runs badly (%).	79
wvs_e121m	Democracies are indecisive (mean).	79
wvs_e121p	Democracies are indecisive (%).	79
wvs_e122m	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (mean).	79
wvs_e122p	Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (%).	79
wvs_e123m	Democracy may have problems but is better (mean).	79
wvs_e123p	Democracy may have problems but is better (%).	79
wvs_e124m	Respect for individual human rights (mean).	79
wvs_e124p	Respect for individual human rights (%).	79
Regime		80
wvs_e125m	Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean).	80
wvs_e125p	Satisfaction with the people in national office (%).	80
wvs_e128p	Country is run by big interest vs. all people (%).	80
Justifiable		80
wvs_f114m	Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean).	80
wvs_f114p	Justifiable: claiming government benefits (%).	80
wvs_f115m	Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean).	81
wvs_f115p	Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (%).	81
wvs_f116m	Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean).	81
wvs_f116p	Justifiable: cheating on taxes (%).	81
wvs_f117m	Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean).	81
wvs_f117p	Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (%).	81
WVS – indices		81
wvs_supm	Support for democracy (mean).	81
wvs_supp	Support for democracy (% solid democrats).	81
wvs_orm	Belong to organisations (mean).	81
wvs_volm	Voluntary work for organisations (mean).	81
wvs_theo	Support for theocracy (mean).	82
wvs_actm	Political Action (mean).	82
wvs_pm4	Post-Materialism 4-item index	82
wvs_pm4mp	Percent materialists.	83
wvs_pm4mpm	Percent postmaterialists.	83
wvs_pm12	Post-Materialism 12-item index	83
wvs_genm	Gender Equality Scale (mean).	83
wvs_relm	Religiosity Scale (mean).	83
Factor indices		84
wvs_selfexp1	Self-expression values I	84
wvs_selfexp2	Self-expression values II	84
wvs_selfexp3	Self-expression values III	84
wvs_secrat	Secular-rational values	84
Factor indices items		84
wvs_abort	Abortion is justifiable	85
wvs_homo	Homosexuality is justifiable	85
wvs_auth	Respect for authority	85
wvs_auton	Autonomy index	85
wvs_happy	Happiness	85
wvs_lib	Liberty and participation	85
wvs_lifsat	Life satisfaction	86
wvs_pet	Public self-expression	86
wvs_proud	National pride	86

<i>wvs_rel</i>	<i>Religiousness</i>	86
<i>wvs_tol</i>	<i>Tolerance of diversity</i>	87
<i>wvs_trust</i>	<i>Interpersonal trust</i>	87
REFERENCES	88

Introduction

One aim of the QoG institute is to make publicly available cross-nationally comparative data on QoG and its correlates. To accomplish this aim we have compiled both a cross-sectional data set with global coverage pertaining to the year of 2002 (or the closest year available), and a cross-sectional time-series dataset with global coverage spanning the time period 1946–2005. The data sets draw on a number of freely available cross-sectional data sources, including aggregated individual-level data, and contains three types of variables:

- WII (What It Is) variables, that is, variables pertaining to the core areas of the QoG compound (such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, and democracy)
- HTG (How To Get it) variables, that is, variables posited to promote the development of QoG (such as electoral rules, forms of government, federalism, legal & colonial origin, religion and social fractionalization); and
- WYG (What You Get) variables, that is, variables pertaining to some of the posited consequences of QoG (such as economic and human development, international and domestic peace, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and satisfied, trusting & confident citizens).

We have made a particular effort to compile the best available sources for measuring the following concepts (sources indicated within parentheses):

- Democracy (Cheibub & Gandhi; Freedom House; Polity, Vanhanen; World Bank Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability)
- Human Rights (Cingranelli & Richards; Freedom House; Gibney & Dalton)
- Security of Contract & Property Rights (Fraser Institute; Heritage Foundation; World Bank Governance Indicators: Rule of Law)
- Quality of Bureaucracy (Evans & Rauch; ICRG; World Bank Governance Indicators: Government Effectiveness)
- Corruption (Transparency International; ICRG; World Bank Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption)
- Electoral Systems (Gerring et al; Golder; IDEA; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions; Seddon Wallack et al.)
- Forms of Government/Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism (Cheibub & Gandhi; Gerring et al; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions)
- Federalism vs. Unitarism (Gerring et al; Persson & Tabellini; Database of Political Institutions)
- Ethno-Linguistic and/or Religious Fractionalization (Alesina et al.; Easterly & Levine; Roeder)

Country and Time Coverage

In the *cross-sectional* dataset we include all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002, plus Taiwan, for a total of 192 nations. If data for 2002 was not available, data for 2003 is used. If 2003 was not available, we use data for 2001 and then 2000 and so forth.

In the cross-sectional *time-series* dataset we include the same 192 nations, plus an addition of 13 historical nations that have ceased to exist: Tibet, Zanzibar, Pakistan pre 1972

(including East Pakistan, presently Bangladesh), North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, East and West Germany, Yugoslavia pre 1992 (the People's Republic of Yugoslavia), the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia pre 1993 (including Eritrea); this makes a total of 205 nations.

Unfortunately there exists no established international standard as to how historical cases, resulting either from country mergers or country splits, should be treated in a cross-sectional time-series setting. In an effort to apply as flexible rules as possible, allowing for any particular user to make alterations in accordance with his or her preferences, we have applied the following principles:

- After a merger of two countries the new country is considered a new case, even when the new state thus formed could be considered as a continuation of one of the merging states. This rule applies to (1) Vietnam, which merged from North and South Vietnam in 1975-76, (2) Yemen, which merged from North and South Yemen in 1990, and (3) Germany, which merged from East and West Germany in 1990. Our treatment of (a) Tanzania and Zanzibar and (b) China and Tibet make two **exceptions** to the rule, since we do not treat Tanzania and Tanganyika (the official name of Tanzania before unification with Zanzibar in 1964) or China before and after the occupation of Tibet in 1950 as separate countries.
- If a county has split up all the new countries are considered new cases, even when one of the new states thus formed could be considered as a continuation of the state that split up. This rule applies to (1) Pakistan, which was split into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, (2) the USSR, which was split into 15 post-Soviet countries in 1991, (3) Yugoslavia, which was split into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro (until 2001 continued to be called “Yugoslavia”) in 1991, (4) Czechoslovakia, which was split into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, and (5) Ethiopia, which was split into Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1993.
- Due to mentioned lack of an international standard, most of our data sources treat these cases of country mergers and splits differently. As a consequence, if a merger or a split has occurred and a data source does not treat the countries as different cases, we have **moved the data** for these countries to be consistent with our criteria. However, if a merger has occurred and a data source treats the countries as the same case even before the merger, or if a split has occurred and a data source treats the countries as different cases even before the split, we have not moved the data.
- To determine where to put the data for the year of the merger/split, we have relied on the “July 1st-principle”. If the merger or split occurred *after* July 1st, the data for this year belong to the historical country. This applies to Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in 1975,¹ Germany in 1990, and the USSR in 1991. For mergers/splits *before* July 1st, the data for this year are placed on the new country. This applies to Yemen in 1990, Yugoslavia in 1992, Ethiopia in 1993, and Czechoslovakia in 1993.

Thus, for **example**: If Germany in a data source is treated as a continuation of West Germany, we place data until and including 1990 on West Germany and leave Germany blank until and including 1990, since the merger of Germany occurred in October 1990 (*after* July 1st, 1990). If on the other hand Serbia and Montenegro in a data source is

¹ To date the merging of South and North Vietnam is a tricky issue that has been solved in different ways by most of our data sources. Some rely on the invasion of Saigon in April 1975, others on the official merger in July 1976. We take the “average” of these two dates, which leads to the merging “date” of *after* July 1, 1975.

treated as a continuation of Yugoslavia, we place the data until and including 1991 on Yugoslavia and from 1992 and onward on Serbia and Montenegro (which is left blank until and including 1991), since the split occurred from June 1991-March 1992 (*before* July 1st, 1992).

For each variable in the cross-sectional *time-series* data we specify the period covered as well as the following statistics:

n: Number of country-year observations

N: Number of countries covered

\bar{N} : Mean number of countries per year

\bar{T} : Mean number of years per country.

Country and Case Identifier Codes

ccode **Country Code Numeric**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

Numeric country code (ISO-3166-1 numeric).

5 of the ccodes are “non-ISO”:

994 – Tibet (ccodealp also “non-ISO”)

995 – Zanzibar

997 - Pakistan (pre 1972)

998 - Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North)

999 - Vietnam, Republic of (South)

ccodealp **3-letter Country Code**

<http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/index.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1

3-letter country code (ISO-3166-1 alpha3).

The alpha code (ccodealp) does not uniquely identify all countries. The following pairs of countries have identical alpha codes: Ethiopia (-1993) and Ethiopia (1993-); Yemen Arab Republic and Yemen; Pakistan (-1971) and Pakistan (1972-); West Germany and Germany.

All the numeric country codes (ccode) are however unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files.

cname **Country Name**

ccode	ccodealp	cname			
4	AFG	Afghanistan	44	BHS	Bahamas
8	ALB	Albania	48	BHR	Bahrain
12	DZA	Algeria	50	BGD	Bangladesh
20	AND	Andorra	52	BRB	Barbados
24	AGO	Angola	112	BLR	Belarus
28	ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	56	BEL	Belgium
32	ARG	Argentina	84	BLZ	Belize
51	ARM	Armenia	204	BEN	Benin
36	AUS	Australia	64	BTN	Bhutan
40	AUT	Austria	68	BOL	Bolivia
31	AZE	Azerbaijan	70	BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina

72	BWA	Botswana	376	ISR	Israel
76	BRA	Brazil	380	ITA	Italy
96	BRN	Brunei	388	JAM	Jamaica
100	BGR	Bulgaria	392	JPN	Japan
854	BFA	Burkina Faso	400	JOR	Jordan
108	BDI	Burundi	398	KAZ	Kazakhstan
116	KHM	Cambodia	404	KEN	Kenya
120	CMR	Cameroon	296	KIR	Kiribati
124	CAN	Canada	408	PRK	Korea, North
132	CPV	Cape Verde	410	KOR	Korea, South
140	CAF	Central African Republic	414	KWT	Kuwait
148	TCD	Chad	417	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
152	CHL	Chile	418	LAO	Laos
156	CHN	China	428	LVA	Latvia
170	COL	Colombia	422	LBN	Lebanon
174	COM	Comoros	426	LSO	Lesotho
178	COG	Congo	430	LBR	Liberia
180	COD	Congo, Democratic Republic	434	LBY	Libya
188	CRI	Costa Rica	438	LIE	Liechtenstein
384	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	440	LTU	Lithuania
191	HRV	Croatia	442	LUX	Luxembourg
192	CUB	Cuba	807	MKD	Macedonia
196	CYP	Cyprus	450	MDG	Madagascar
200	CSK	Czechoslovakia	454	MWI	Malawi
203	CZE	Czech Republic	458	MYS	Malaysia
208	DNK	Denmark	462	MDV	Maldives
262	DJI	Djibouti	466	MLI	Mali
212	DMA	Dominica	470	MLT	Malta
214	DOM	Dominican Republic	584	MHL	Marshall Islands
218	ECU	Ecuador	478	MRT	Mauritania
818	EGY	Egypt	480	MUS	Mauritius
222	SLV	El Salvador	484	MEX	Mexico
226	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	583	FSM	Micronesia
232	ERI	Eritrea	498	MDA	Moldova
233	EST	Estonia	492	MCO	Monaco
230	ETH	Ethiopia (-1992)	496	MNG	Mongolia
231	ETH	Ethiopia (1993-)	504	MAR	Morocco
242	FJI	Fiji	508	MOZ	Mozambique
246	FIN	Finland	104	MMR	Myanmar
250	FRA	France	516	NAM	Namibia
266	GAB	Gabon	520	NRU	Nauru
270	GMB	Gambia	524	NPL	Nepal
268	GEO	Georgia	528	NLD	Netherlands
276	DEU	Germany	554	NZL	New Zealand
278	DDR	Germany, East	558	NIC	Nicaragua
280	DEU	Germany, West	562	NER	Niger
288	GHA	Ghana	566	NGA	Nigeria
300	GRC	Greece	578	NOR	Norway
308	GRD	Grenada	512	OMN	Oman
320	GTM	Guatemala	997	PAK	Pakistan (-1971)
324	GIN	Guinea	586	PAK	Pakistan (1972-)
624	GNB	Guinea-Bissau	585	PLW	Palau
328	GUY	Guyana	591	PAN	Panama
332	HTI	Haiti	598	PNG	Papua New Guinea
340	HND	Honduras	600	PRY	Paraguay
348	HUN	Hungary	604	PER	Peru
352	ISL	Iceland	608	PHL	Philippines
356	IND	India	616	POL	Poland
360	IDN	Indonesia	620	PRT	Portugal
364	IRN	Iran	634	QAT	Qatar
368	IRQ	Iraq	642	ROU	Romania
372	IRL	Ireland	643	RUS	Russia

646	RWA	Rwanda	994	XTI	Tibet
882	WSM	Samoa	626	TLS	Timor-Leste
674	SMR	San Marino	768	TGO	Togo
678	STP	Sao Tome and Principe	776	TON	Tonga
682	SAU	Saudi Arabia	780	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
686	SEN	Senegal	788	TUN	Tunisia
891	SCG	Serbia and Montenegro	792	TUR	Turkey
690	SYC	Seychelles	795	TKM	Turkmenistan
694	SLE	Sierra Leone	798	TUV	Tuvalu
702	SGP	Singapore	800	UGA	Uganda
703	SVK	Slovakia	804	UKR	Ukraine
705	SVN	Slovenia	784	ARE	United Arab Emirates
90	SLB	Solomon Islands	826	GBR	United Kingdom
706	SOM	Somalia	840	USA	United States
710	ZAF	South Africa	858	URY	Uruguay
724	ESP	Spain	810	SUN	USSR
144	LKA	Sri Lanka	860	UZB	Uzbekistan
659	KNA	St Kitts and Nevis	548	VUT	Vanuatu
662	LCA	St Lucia	862	VEN	Venezuela
670	VCT	St Vincent and the Grenadines	704	VNM	Vietnam
736	SDN	Sudan	998	VNM	Vietnam, North
740	SUR	Suriname	999	VDR	Vietnam, South
748	SWZ	Swaziland	887	YEM	Yemen
752	SWE	Sweden	886	YEM	Yemen, North
756	CHE	Switzerland	720	YMD	Yemen, South
760	SYR	Syria	890	YUG	Yugoslavia
158	TWN	Taiwan	995	EAZ	Zanzibar
762	TJK	Tajikistan	894	ZMB	Zambia
834	TZA	Tanzania	716	ZWE	Zimbabwe
764	THA	Thailand			

ccodewb **Country Code World Bank**

ccodecow **Country Code Correlates of War**

year **Year**

WII (What It Is) Variables

Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Labor

(Cross-Section: covers the 1997-2002 period, N: 84)

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls

(Botero et al 2004)

Unless otherwise specified, higher values indicate higher worker protection. All dummy variables are equal to one or zero. All normalized variables lie between 0 and 1, where 0 (1) is the minimum (maximum) actual value in the sample of countries.

Employment Laws

bdlls_aeci **Alternative Employment Contracts Index**

Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if part-time workers enjoy

the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, (2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full time workers, (3) a dummy variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts are only allowed for fixed-term tasks, and (4) the normalized maximum duration of fixed-term contracts.

bdlls_cihw Cost of Increasing Hour Worked

Measures the cost of increasing the number of hours worked. We start by calculating the "maximum number of hours of work in a year before overtime" per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). Normal hours range from 1,758 in Denmark to 2,418 in Kenya. Then we assume that firms need to increase the hours worked by their employees from 1,758 to 2,418 hours during one year. A firm first increases the number of hours worked until it reaches the country's maximum normal hours of work, and then uses overtime. If existing employees are not allowed to increase the hours worked to 2,418 hours in a year, perhaps because overtime is capped, we assume the firm doubles its workforce and each worker is paid 1,758 hours, doubling the wage bill of the firm. The cost of increasing hours worked is computed as the ratio of the final wage bill to the initial one.

bdlls_cofw Cost of Firing Workers

Measures the cost of firing 20 percent of the firm's workers (10% are fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, we set the cost of firing equal to the annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing workers. The cost of firing workers is computed as the ratio of the new wage bill to the old one.

bdlls_dpi Dismissal Procedures Index

Measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (i) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than one worker, (ii) if the employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker, (iii) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker, (iv) if the employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker, (v) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal, (6) if there are priority rules applying to dismissal or layoffs, and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-employment.

bdlls_eli Employment Laws Index

Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: (1) Alternative employment contracts, (2) Cost of increasing hours worked, (3) Cost of firing workers, and (4) Dismissal procedures.

Collective Relations Laws

bdlls_lupi Labor Union Power Index

Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (i) if employees have the right to unionize; (ii) if employees have the right to collective bargaining; (iii) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (iv) if collective contracts are extended to third parties by law; (vi) if

the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards of Directors; and (7) if workers' councils are mandated by law.

bdlls_cdi Collective Disputes Index

Measures the protection of workers during collective disputes as the average of the following eight variables, (1) if wildcat, political and sympathy/solidarity/secondary strikes are legal (legal strikes), (2) if employer lockouts are illegal, (3) if workers have the right to industrial action, (4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or notification requirement before strikes can occur, (5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective agreement in force, (6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, (7) if third-party arbitration during a labor dispute is mandated by law, and (8) if it is illegal to fire or replace striking workers.

bdlls_crli Collective Relations Laws Index

Measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power and (2) Collective disputes.

Social Security Laws

bdlls_oadbi Old Age, Disability and Death Benefit Index

Measures the level of old age, disability and death benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the difference between retirement age and life expectancy at birth, (2) the number of months of contributions or employment required for normal retirement by law, (3) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover old-age, disability, and death benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net pre-retirement salary covered by the net old-age cash-benefit pension.

bdlls_shbi Sickness and Health Benefits Index

Measures the level of sickness and health benefit as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required to qualify for sickness benefits by law, (2) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover sickness and health benefits, (3) the waiting period for sickness benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net salary covered by the net sickness cash benefit for a two-month sickness spell.

bdlls_ubi Unemployment Benefits Index

Measures the level of unemployment benefits as the average of the following four normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required to qualify for unemployment benefits by law, (2) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover unemployment benefits, (3) the waiting period for unemployment benefits, and (4) the percentage of the net salary covered by the net unemployment benefits in case of a one-year unemployment spell.

bdlls_ssli Social Security Laws Index

Measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death benefits, (2) Sickness and health benefits, and (3) Unemployment benefits.

Civil Rights

bdlls_drace Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Race

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race, color or ethnicity in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing specifically with racial equality. The variable equals zero otherwise. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

bdlls_dsex Labor Discrimination on Grounds of Sex

Equals 1 if there is an affirmative statement prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex in: (1) the constitution; (2) the labor code; (3) a law dealing specifically with the equality of the sexes. The variable equals zero otherwise. We consider an affirmative statement as one which expresses the equality of man and woman or the prohibition of discrimination based on sex or gender. A general statement regarding the equality of citizens is not considered an affirmative statement.

bdlls_stoml Statutory Duration of Maternity Leave

Measures the length of the statutory duration of maternity leave for normal delivery/birth of a normal child with 100% of earnings. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean longer maternity leave (higher protection). Equals zero if maternity leave is unpaid. If payment for maternity leave is less than 100% of previous wages, the time is reduced proportionally. The highest observation in our sample is 12 months and the lowest observation is 0.

bdlls_mwa Minimum Working Age

Measures the age at which a child can be employed in an apprenticeship or in a full-time, non-farm, non-hazardous, non-night time job outside of the family business without requiring the permission of a public entity. The variable is normalized from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher protection. The highest value in our sample is 18 years and the lowest is 12 years.

bdlls_mmw Mandatory Minimum Wage

Equals one if: (1) there is a mandatory minimum wage defined by statute; or (2) there is a minimum wage established by mandatory (administratively extended) collective agreement, which is legally binding for most sectors of the economy. We ignore variations in the minimum wage laws stemming from: (1) reduced or sub minimum rates for youth, apprentices, students and disabled employees; (2) adjustments for regional cost of living; (3) exemptions for public employees and those serving in the armed forces; (4) the experience and marital status of the employee and; (5) specific exemptions for certain groups.

bdlls_cri Civil Rights Index

Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination as the average of the preceding five variables.

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm>

(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

bdm_s **Selectorate Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, \bar{N} : 134, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 170)

Selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. This variable is measured through the breadth of the selectiveness of the members of each country's legislature. A code of 0 means there is no legislature, 0.5 that the legislature is chosen by heredity or ascription or is simply chosen by the effective executive, and 1 that the members of the legislature are directly or indirectly selected by popular election.

Original source is Banks (1996).

bdm_w **Winning Coalition Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 9643, N: 199, \bar{N} : 179, \bar{T} : 48)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 180)

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society. This variable is measured as a composite index based on whether the regime is civil or military, the openness and competition of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of participation. The index varies from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest winning coalition)

Original sources are Banks (1996) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

bdm_w_s **Winning Coalition Size Relative to Selectorate Size**

(Time-series: 1946-1999, n: 7247, N: 196, \bar{N} : 134, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 170)

The Winning Coalition size relative to Selectorate size. W/S is transformed to avoid division by zero: $bdm_w / (\log((bdm_s + 1) * 10) / 3)$.

Cheibub & Gandhi

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 7846, N: 198, \bar{N} : 138, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 189)

<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>

(Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)

chga_regime **Type of Regime**

Coded 0 if democracy; 1 if dictatorship. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

Cingranelli & Richards - Human Rights Dataset

<http://www.humanrightsdata.org> (Dataset version: 2005.10.12)

ciri_assn Freedom of Assembly and Association

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3686, N: 198, \bar{N} : 154, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association are:

- (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens
- (1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for selected groups
- (2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens

ciri_disap Disappearance

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3591, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Disappearances:

- (0) Have occurred frequently
- (1) Have occurred occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

ciri_empinx Empowerment Rights Index

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3598, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Worker's Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Richards et al 2001).

ciri_kill Extrajudicial Killing

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3589, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Political or Extrajudicial Killings are:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

ciri_move Freedom of Movement

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3608, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Domestic and foreign travel is:

- (0) Restricted
- (1) Generally unrestricted

ciri_physint Physical Integrity Rights Index

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3576, N: 198, \bar{N} : 149, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture (ciri_tort), Extrajudicial Killing (ciri_kill), Political Imprisonment (ciri_polpris), and Disappearance indicators (ciri_disap). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). (Details on its construction and use can be found in Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

ciri_polpar Political Participation

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3606, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Political Participation is:

- (0) Very limited
- (1) Moderately free and open
- (2) Very free and open

ciri_polpris Political Imprisonment

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3596, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Are there any people imprisoned because of their political, religious, or other beliefs?

- (0) Yes and many
- (1) Yes, but few
- (2) None

ciri_relfre Freedom of Religion

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3607, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

There are restrictions on some religious practices by the government:

- (0) Yes
- (1) No

ciri_speech Freedom of Speech

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3607, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Government censorship and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and domestic news agencies) is:

- (0) Complete
- (1) Some
- (2) None

ciri_tort Torture

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3594, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Torture is:

- (0) Practiced frequently
- (1) Practiced occasionally
- (2) Have not occurred

ciri_wecon Women's Economic Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3536, N: 198, \bar{N} : 147, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

In measuring women's economic rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of flaws pertaining to women's economic rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws.

Regarding the economic equality of women:

- (0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.
- (1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

ciri_wopol Women's Political Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3591, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Regarding the political equality of women:

- (0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.
- (1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold *less than* five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions.
- (2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold *more than* five percent but *less than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
- (3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold *more than* thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.

ciri_worker Workers Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3604, N: 198, \bar{N} : 150, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

Worker's rights are:

- (0) Severely restricted
- (1) Somewhat restricted
- (2) Fully protected

ciri_wosoc Women's Social Rights

(Time-series: 1981-2004, n: 3487, N: 198, \bar{N} : 145, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

In measuring women's social rights we are primarily interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's social rights; and two, *government practices* towards women or how effectively the government enforces the law.

Regarding the social equality of women:

- (0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women.

- (1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a *moderate level* of discrimination against women.
- (2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a *low level* of discrimination against women.
- (3) All or nearly all of women's social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.

Coppedge

<http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm>

The Polyarchy scale is the one documented in Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25:1 (Spring 1990): 51-72; and used in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Inequality, Democracy, and Economic Development*, pp. 177-201 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). This has now been updated for 2000. The scale varies between 0 and 10 where lowest score represent the most democratic level.

copp_poly **Polyarchy Scale**

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 189)

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Regulation of Entry

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 84)

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/registration_new.dta

(Djankov et al 2002)

dlls_proc **Number of Procedures**

The number of different procedures that a start-up firm has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.

dlls_time **Time**

The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days. A week has five business days and a month has twenty two.

dlls_cost **Cost**

(Cross-Section: 1999, N: 83)

The cost to obtain legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. Includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc). The company is assumed to have a start-up capital of ten times per capita GDP in 1999.

Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Shleifer – Courts

(Cross-Section: the year vary, N: 101)

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/courts_dataset_july06.xls

(Djankov et al 2003)

dlls1_fie **Formalism Index (Eviction)**

dlls1_fic **Formalism Index (Check)**

The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in two forms of judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts: the **eviction** of a residential tenant for nonpayment of rent, and the collection of a **check** returned for nonpayment. The index is formed by adding up separate indices measuring: (1) whether the resolution of the case relies on the work of professional judges and attorneys, as opposed to other types of adjudicators and lay people; (2) the number of stages carried out mostly in written (as opposed to oral) form over the total number of applicable stages; (3) the level of legal justification (use of legal language) required in the process, (4) the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation, and recording of evidence; (5) the level of control or intervention of the appellate (superior) court's review of the first-instance judgement; (6) the formalities required to engage someone in the procedure or to hold him/her accountable of the judgement; and (7) the normalized number of independent procedural actions, i.e., steps of the procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demands interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.

dlls1_rde **Total Duration (Eviction)**

dlls1_rdc **Total Duration (Check)**

The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. The index equals the estimated duration, in calendar days, between the moment the plaintiff files the complaint until the moment the landlord repossesses the property (for the **eviction** case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the **check** collection case).

Evans & Rauch

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 34)

(Cross-Section: Questions cover the 1970-1990 period, N: 34)

<http://weber.ucsd.edu/%7Ejrauch/webstate/>

(Rauch and Evans 2000)

er_career **Career Opportunities**

The respondents were asked to choose 'the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy'.

"Career Opportunities" is an equal-weight index, ranging from 0 to 1, of the following five questions:

- Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)?
("none", "just agency chiefs", "agency chiefs and vice-chiefs", "all of top 2 or 3 levels").
- Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion are likely to already be members of the higher civil service?

(“less than 30%”, “30–70%”, “more than 70%”)

- Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry?

(“less than 50%”, “50–70%”, “70–90%”, “over 90%”)

- What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?

(“1–5 years”, “5–10 years”, “10–20 years”, “entire career”)

- What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his / her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? (if respondent circled ‘if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation’ or ‘in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments’ and not ‘in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more’ or ‘in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees’).

er_salary Bureaucratic Compensation

Bureaucratic Compensation concerns the change of bureaucratic compensation relative to the private sector. It is an equal-weight index of the following two questions:

- How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extralegal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?

(“less than 50%”, “50–80%”, “80–90%”, “Comparable”, “Higher”)

- Over the period in question (roughly 1970–1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector?

(“declined dramatically”, “declined slightly”, “maintained the same position”, “Improved their position”).

er_merit Meritocratic Recruitment

Meritocratic Recruitment addresses the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level. It is an equal-weight index of two questions, where each question and the index itself has been normalized to lie in the range 0–1.

- Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enters the civil service via a formal examination system?

(“less than 30%”, “30–60%”, “60–90%”, “more than 90%”)

- Of those that do *not* enter via examinations, what proportion has university or postgraduate degrees?

(“less than 30%”, “30–60%”, “60–90%”, “more than 90%”).

Fraser Institute – Economic Freedom of the World

(Time-series: 1970-2003, n: 1020, N: 129, \bar{N} : 102, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

<http://www.freetheworld.com/>

(Gwartney and Lawson 2004; 2005)

fi_legprop Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 correspond to ‘no judicial independence’, ‘no trusted legal framework exists’, ‘no protection of intellectual property’, military interference in rule of law’, and ‘no integrity of the legal system’ and 10 correspond to ‘high judicial independence’, ‘trusted legal framework exists’, ‘protection of intellectual property’, no military interference in rule of law’, and ‘integrity of the legal.

The index consists of the following indicators:

- Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes
- Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulation
- Protection of intellectual property
- Military interference in rule of law and the political process
- Integrity of the legal system

Freedom House

<http://www.freedomhouse.org>

Freedom in the World

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 5555, N: 202, \bar{N} : 174, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 192)

Note: The 1982 edition of *Freedom in the World* covers the period Jan 1981- Aug 1982 (=1981 in our dataset). The 1983-84 edition covers the period Aug 1982 – Nov 1983 (=1983 in our dataset). This leaves 1982 empty.

For 1972, South Africa was in the original data rated as “White” (fh_cl: 3, fh_pr: 2, fh_status: Free) and “Black” (fh_cl: 6, fh_pr: 5, fh_status: Not Free). We treat South Africa 1972 as missing.

fh_cl Civil Liberties

Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

fh_pr Political Rights

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The more specific list of

rights considered vary over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

fh_status Status

F = Free

PF = Partly Free

NF= Not Free

Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and for Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free".

Freedom of the Press

(Time-series: 1994-2004, n: 2045, N: 192, \bar{N} : 186, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 192)

fh_press Freedom of the press

The operative word for this survey is "everyone." All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are through the UN system (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) committed to universality of information freedom-a basic human right. We recognize that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some developed countries restrict content diversity. We seek to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The scale ranges from 0 (Most free) to 100 (Least Free).

Freedom House/Polity

fh_polity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 4549, N: 171, \bar{N} : 147, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

fh_ipolity2 Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)

(Time-series: 1972-2004, n: 5555, N: 202, \bar{N} : 174, \bar{T} : 28)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 are most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this

average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

Gibney & Dalton

<http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/Gibney%20Doc/Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2004.xls>

(Gibney and Dalton 1996)

gd_ptsa Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International

(Time-series: 1980-2004, n: 3293, N: 181, \bar{N} : 132, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 147)

gd_ptss Political Terror Scale – US State Department

(Time-series: 1980-2004, n: 4038, N: 182, \bar{N} : 162, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 176)

Human rights score (1 to 5 scale)

- Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

- Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

- Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

- Level 4: The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

- Level 5: The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)

<http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm>

The total number of registered voters (Registered Voters) and voting age population (Voting Age Population, VAP) can both be used as indicators for electoral turnout. Data are only given for election years.

idea_tvpar Total Vote (Parliamentary)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 1353, N: 172, \bar{N} : 22, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 37)

Total number of votes cast in parliamentary elections.

idea_tvpres Total Vote (Presidential)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 441, N: 103, \bar{N} : 8, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 25)

Total number of votes cast in presidential elections.

idea_vappar Voting Age Population, VAP (Parliamentary)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 1213, N: 167, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 1)

Total people of the population in voting age in parliamentary elections.

idea_vappre Voting Age Population, VAP (Presidential)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 371, N: 95, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 13)

Total people of the population in voting age in presidential elections.

idea_rvpar Registered Voters (Parliamentary)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 1287, N: 170, \bar{N} : 21, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 40)

Total number of registered voters in parliamentary elections.

idea_rvpre Registered Voters (Presidential)

(Time-series: 1946-2006, n: 404, N: 103, \bar{N} : 7, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 26)

Total number of registered voters in presidential elections.

Heritage Foundation

(Time-series: 1994-2005, n: 1793, N: 163, \bar{N} : 149, \bar{T} : 11)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm>

hf_prights Property Rights

This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also accounts for the possibility that private property will be expropriated. In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The less certain the legal protection of property is, the higher a country's score is. Similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property are, the higher a country's score is.

International Country Risk Guide – The PRS Group

(Time-series: 1984-2003, n: 2576, N: 145, \bar{N} : 129, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 139)

<http://www.icrgonline.com>

<http://www.countrydata.com>

icrg_qog ICRG indicator of Quality of Government

The mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1.

Corruption (originally 6 points)

This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process.

The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.

Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.

The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

(Note: In the original data, the value for Iceland 1985 is "6.1667". We have replaced this presumably incorrect value with the value "6").

Law and order (originally 6 points)

Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

Bureaucracy Quality (originally 4 points)

The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at <http://www.countrydata.com>

Inter-Parliamentary Union

<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm>

ipu_w_lower **Women in national parliament (lower house)**

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 1508, N: 188, \bar{N} : 168, \bar{T} : 8)

(Cross-section: Dec. 2002, N: 162)

Percent women in single house or lower house.

ipu_w_upper **Women in national parliament (upper house)**

(Time-series: 1997-2005 (December or latest available), n: 545, N: 82, \bar{N} : 61, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: Dec. 2002, N: 162)

Percent women in upper house or senate.

Knack & Kugler

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 180)

[http://www.bellanet.org/indicators/docs/2ndGen.Index\(11.05.02\).doc?ois=yes&template=blank.htm](http://www.bellanet.org/indicators/docs/2ndGen.Index(11.05.02).doc?ois=yes&template=blank.htm)

(Knack and Kugler 2002)

kk_gg **Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance**

The Index is built on nine indicators: the regulation of entry, contract enforcement, contract intensive money, international trade tax revenue, budgetary volatility, revenue source volatility, telephone wait times, phone faults, and the percentage of revenues paid to public officials in bribes, as reported in surveys of business firms. The index is computed by first normalizing each indicator using the standard normal distribution, and then aggregating these scores through a percentile matching procedure. Larger numbers indicate better governance.

(Note: In the original data Samoa are given two different values. We do not include any of the values in our dataset.)

La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & Shleifer– Judicial Independence

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb_data.xls

(La Porta et al 2004)

llps_tensc **Tenure of Supreme Court Judges**

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes three possible values: (0) if tenure is less than six years, (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, and (2) if tenure is lifelong.

llps_tenac **Tenure of Administrative Court Judges**

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 70)

This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases. The variable takes three possible values: (0) if tenure is less than six years, (1) if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, and (2) if tenure is lifelong.

llps_cl Case Law

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 69)

This variable is a dummy taking value: (1) if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law, and (0) otherwise.

llps_ji Judicial Independence

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 69)

Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of llps_tensc, llps_tenac, and, llps_cl.

llps_roc Rigidity of Constitution

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 71)

This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature have to approve, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval of a majority of state legislature is required.

llps_jr Judicial Review

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 71)

This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or Constitutional Court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: (0) if there is no review of constitutionality of laws, (1) if there is limited review of constitutionality of laws, and (2) if there is full review of constitutionality of laws.

llps_cr Constitutional Review

(Cross-section: the year vary, N: 71)

Constitutional review is computed as the normalized sum of llps_jr and llps_roc.

Polity IV

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm>

(Marshall and Jaggers 2002)

Missing codes:

(-66) Interruption periods.

(-77) Interregnum periods.

(-88) Transition periods.

p_democ Institutionalized Democracy

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

p_autoc Institutionalized Autocracy

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high)

"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable p_parcomp), the regulation of participation (variable p_parreg), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables p_xropen and p_xrcomp), and constraints on the chief executive (variable p_xconst).

p_polity Combined Polity Score

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

p_polity2 **Revised Combined Polity Score**

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7294, N: 172, \bar{N} : 126, \bar{T} : 42)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 157)

The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

-66 Cases of foreign “interruption” are treated as “system missing.”

-77 Cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to a “neutral” Polity score of “0.”

-88 Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to “system missing” values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value “0”.

p_parreg **Regulation of Participation**

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Regulation of Participation: Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

- (1) Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.
- (2) Multiple Identities: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected – but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.
- (3) Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population

- historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).
- (4) Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
 - (5) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

p_parcomp The Competitiveness of Participation

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The Competitiveness of Participation: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated ("1") on Regulation of Participation are coded "0" (Not Applicable) for competitiveness. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

- (0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable p_parreg).
- (1) Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.
- (2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:
 - i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).
 - ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
 - iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

- (3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.
- (4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted or Factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.
- (5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

p_xrreg Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment: In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:

- (1) Unregulated: Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.
- (2) Designational/Transitional: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).
- (3) Regulated: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated

competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

p_xrcomp Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, p.1483)." For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Four categories are used to measure this concept:

- (0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).
- (1) Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.
- (2) Dual/Transitional: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
- (3) Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

p_xropen Openness of Executive Recruitment

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Openness of Executive Recruitment: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (p_xrreg), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded "0" (Not Applicable). Five categories are used:

- (0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (variable p_xrreg).
- (1) Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc. who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.
- (2) Dual Executive–Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

- (3) Dual Executive–Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
- (4) Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

p_xconst Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

- (1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
 - i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
 - ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
 - iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
 - iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
 - v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
 - vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

Note 3.4: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.
- (2) Intermediate Category
- (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
 - i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
 - ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
 - iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
 - iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
 - v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
 - vi. There is an independent judiciary.
 - vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

- (4) Intermediate Category
- (5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.
Examples:
 - i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
 - ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
 - iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
 - iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
- (6) Intermediate Category
- (7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
 - i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
 - ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
 - iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

p_durable Regime Durability

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7327, N: 172, \bar{N} : 126, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a threepoint change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the p_durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the p_durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.

p_flag Tentative Coding

(Time-series: 1946-2003, n: 7356, N: 172, \bar{N} : 127, \bar{T} : 43)

Trichotomous "flag" variable indicating confidence of codings (recent year codings only)

- (0) Confident: Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been "artificially smoothed" to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.
- (1) Tentative: Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are "free floating," that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.
- (2) Tenuous: Best judgement coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

p_fragment Polity Fragmentation

(Time-series: 1978-2003, n: 664, N: 161, \bar{N} : 26, \bar{T} : 4)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Polity Fragmentation: This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that can not exercise effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of “state failure” (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, or civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare as a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.

- (0) No overt fragmentation
- (1) Slight fragmentation: Less than ten percent of the country’s territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
- (2) Moderate fragmentation: Ten to twenty-five percent of the country’s territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.
- (3) Serious fragmentation: Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country’s territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

p_sf State Failure

(Time-series: 1949-2003, n: 135, N: 30, \bar{N} : 3, \bar{T} : 5)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 160)

Variable p_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code “1”) every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of “complete collapse of central authority” or “state failure” (i.e., -77). The variable p_sf is also coded “1” for years when a state disintegrates and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

Reporters Sans Frontières

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 135)

http://www.rsf.org/article.php?id_article=4116

rsf_pfi Press Freedom Index

The Press Freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country’s media. The index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom).

Transparency International

(Time-series: 1996-2006, n: 1158, N: 167, \bar{N} : 105, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 101)

<http://www.transparency.org/>

ti_cpi **Corruption Perceptions Index**

The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption.

The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

WARNING: Year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints have been collected and different questions have been asked. For a more detailed discussion of comparability over time in the CPI, see Lambsdorff 2005.

Vanhanen

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 8230, N: 197, \bar{N} : 139, \bar{T} : 42)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 186)

<http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html>

(Vanhanen 2000)

van_index **Index of Democratization**

This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who actually voted in the election (Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy).

van_comp **Competition**

Calculated by subtracting the percentage of the votes won by the largest party from 100.

van_part **Participation**

The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election.

World Bank – Governance Indicators (a.k.a KKZ)

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4sra.html>

(Kaufmann et al 2006)

These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.

The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries. Kaufmann et al 2006 however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time. As a consequence, even the standardized estimates, particularly when converted to country rank-orders, can be used as time-series data if interpreted with caution.

wbgi_vae **Voice and Accountability – Estimate**
wbgi_vas **Voice and Accountability – Standard Errors**
wbgi_van **Voice and Accountability – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1337, N: 192, \bar{N} : 191, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

“Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

wbgi_pse **Political Stability - Estimate**
wbgi_pss **Political Stability – Standard Errors**
wbgi_psn **Political Stability – Number of sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1242, N: 192, \bar{N} : 177, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 178)

“Political Stability” combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

wbgi_gee **Government Effectiveness - Estimate**
wbgi_ges **Government Effectiveness – Standard Errors**
wbgi_gen **Government Effectiveness – Number of Sources**

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1310, N: 192, \bar{N} : 187, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

“Government Effectiveness” combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs”

required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

wbgi_rqe Regulatory Quality - Estimate
wbgi_rqs Regulatory Quality – Standard Errors
wbgi_rqn Regulatory Quality – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1298, N: 188, \bar{N} : 185, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

wbgi_rle Rule of Law - Estimate
wbgi_rls Rule of Law – Standard Errors
wbgi_rln Rule of Law – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1292, N: 192, \bar{N} : 185, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure to the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

wbgi_cce Control of Corruption - Estimate
wbgi_ccs Control of Corruption – Standard Errors
wbgi_ccn Control of Corruption – Number of Sources

(Time-series: 1996-2005, n: 1265, N: 188, \bar{N} : 181, \bar{T} : 7)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 188)

“Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.

HTG (How To Get it) Variables

Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 79)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 79)

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/politics_data.xls

(Acemoglu et al 2001 as used in La Porta et al 2004)

ajr_settmort Log Settler Mortality

Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization.

Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wasziarg

<http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls>

(Alesina et al 2003)

al_ethnic Ethnic fractionalization.

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 189)

(Cross-section: 1979-2001 (varies by country), N: 187)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher number, the more fractionalized society. The definition of ethnicity involved a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-index (see el_elf60) in for example Latin America, where people of many races speak the same language.

al_language Linguistic fractionalization

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 182)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 181)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic group. The higher number, the more fractionalized society.

al_religion Religious fractionalization

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 191)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 190)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group. The higher number, the more fractionalized society.

Barro & Lee

<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html>

(Barro & Lee 2000)

bl_asyf15 Average Schooling Years (Female)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 928, N: 109, \bar{N} : 103, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 15 and over.

bl_asyf25 Average Schooling Years (Female)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 920, N: 107, \bar{N} : 102, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the female population aged 25 and over.

bl_asyf15 Average Schooling Years (Male)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 928, N: 109, \bar{N} : 103, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 15 and over.

bl_asym25 Average Schooling Years (Male)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 920, N: 107, \bar{N} : 102, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the male population aged 25 and over.

bl_asyt15 Average Schooling Years (Total)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 928, N: 109, \bar{N} : 103, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 104)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 15 and over.

bl_asyt25 Average Schooling Years (Total)

(Time-series: 1960-1999, n: 921, N: 107, \bar{N} : 102, \bar{T} : 9)

(Cross-section: 1999, N: 103)

Average schooling years in the total population aged 25 and over.

Cheibub & Gandhi

(Time-series: 1946-2002, n: 7846, N: 198, \bar{N} : 138, \bar{T} : 40)

(Cross-section 2002, N: 189)

<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>

(Cheibub and Gandhi 2004)

chga_hinst Regime Institutions

Six-fold classification of political regimes, coded 0 if a parliamentary democracy, 1 if a mixed democracy, 2 if a presidential democracy, 3 if a civilian dictatorship, 4 if a military dictatorship, and 5 if a monarchic dictatorship.

Database of Political Institutions

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

(Beck et al 2000; 2001)

dpi_system Regime Type

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4832, N: 182, \bar{N} : 161, \bar{T} : 27)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 171)

The variable captures whether countries are presidential, assembly-elected presidential, or parliamentary.

(0) Direct presidential

(1) Strong president elected by assembly

(2) Parliamentary

dpi_mdmh Mean District Magnitude (House)

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2782, N: 154, \bar{N} : 92, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 148)

dpi_mdms Mean District Magnitude (Senate)

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 716, N: 37, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 31)

The average number of representatives elected by each electoral district in a country.

dpi_ssh Relative Size of Senate

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1414, N: 76, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 47)

Number of senate seats/ (number of house seats + number of senate seats).

dpi_plurality Plurality

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3423, N: 165, \bar{N} : 114, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 148)

Dummy variable, 1 if the electoral rule is plurality.

dpi_pr Proportional Representation

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2976, N: 157, \bar{N} : 99, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 142)

Dummy variable, 1 if the electoral rule is proportional representation.

dpi_housesys House: Plurality or Proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3329, N: 162, \bar{N} : 111, \bar{T} : 21)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 145)

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the House seats? (1 if Plurality, 0 if Proportional).

dpi_sensys Senate: Plurality or Proportional?

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 504, N: 26, \bar{N} : 17, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 23)

If Plurality and Proportional Representation - which governs the majority/all of the Senate seats? (1 if Plurality, 0 if Proportional).

dpi_thresh Vote Threshold for Representation

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1742, N: 92, \bar{N} : 58, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 81)

The vote threshold for representation, in percent.

(Note: Poland = 8% for coalition).

dpi_dhondt D'Hondt

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1682, N: 90, \bar{N} : 56, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 83)

Dummy variable, 1 if the D'Hondt system is used.

dpi_cl Closed Lists

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2000, N: 104, \bar{N} : 67, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 90)

Dummy variable, 1 if closed lists are used.

dpi_auton Autonomous Regions

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4546, N: 177, \bar{N} : 151, \bar{T} : 26)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 155)

Dummy variable, 1 if there are autonomous regions.

(Note: In the dataset Venezuela and Vietnam receives a value of two, for which there is no explanation in the data documentation).

dpi_state Election of State/Province Government

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 3220, N: 148, \bar{N} : 107, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 122)

One dimension of information on sub-national governments is whether state/provincial governments are locally elected. Coded zero if neither the local executive nor the local legislature are directly elected by the local population that they govern; one if either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of government) or appointed; and two if they are both directly and locally elected. If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the “state/province” level.

dpi_muni Election of Municipal Government

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2050, N: 105, \bar{N} : 68, \bar{T} : 20)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 92)

Are the municipal governments locally elected? Coded the same as the state/provincial government, dpi_state above (0-2). If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, the lowest level is considered as the “municipal” level.

dpi_author Authority of Sub-national Governments

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 1605, N: 74, \bar{N} : 54, \bar{T} : 22)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 63)

Dummy variable, 1 if Sub-national governments, have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.

dpi_hig Herfindahl Index for Government

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4076, N: 176, \bar{N} : 136, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 159)

The index measures the sum of the square of the share of seats for all parties in the government.

dpi_gf Government Fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4074, N: 176, \bar{N} : 136, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

Government fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the government will be of the same party.

dpi_hio Herfindahl Index for Opposition

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2808, N: 151, \bar{N} : 94, \bar{T} : 19)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 137)

The index measures the sum of the square of the share of seats for all parties in the opposition.

dpi_of Opposition Fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 2808, N: 151, \bar{N} : 94, \bar{T} : 19)

Opposition fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of the same party

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 137)

dpi_hit Herfindahl Index Total

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4056, N: 176, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

The index measures the sum of the square of the share of seats for all parties in the government or the opposition.

dpi_tf Total Fractionalization

(Time-series: 1975-2004, n: 4056, N: 176, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 158)

Total fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies belonging to the parties in the government or the opposition will be of the same party

Easterly & Levine

<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20700002%7EpagePK:64214825%7EpiPK:64214943%7EtheSitePK:469382,00.html>

(Easterly and Levine 1997)

el_gunn1 Percent of Population not Speaking the Official Language

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 148)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 143)

The share of the population of each country for whom the language spoken at home is not the official language of the country.

Original source: Gunnemark (1991).

el_gunn2 Percent of Population not Speaking the Most Widely Used Language

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 149)

(Cross-section: 1990, N: 144)

The share of the population not speaking the most widely used language.

Original source: Gunnemark (1991).

el_avelf Average Value of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 152)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 146)

Average value of el_gunn1, el_gunn2 and three other ethnolinguistic fractionalization variables taken from Muller (1964), Roberts (1962) and Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

Golder, Matt

<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html>

(Golder 2005)

Golder's data code electoral institutions used in democratic legislative and presidential elections, where democracy is defined according to `gol_polreg` below. Note that (with the exception of `gol_legel` and `gol_prael`) data for 'non-democratic regimes' is coded as 'missing'. Also note that (with the exception of `gol_est` and `gol_pest`) variables on electoral institutions are coded zero (0) for 'non-election years', whereas the other variables are the same as for the most recent year of election in each country. There are some countries that had two elections (legislative or presidential) in the same year: Argentina 1973, Bangladesh 1996, Denmark 1953, Greece 1989, Iceland 1959, Ireland 1982, Saint Lucia 1987, Sri Lanka 1960, Thailand 1992, and United Kingdom 1974. As a result, it is not possible to provide data for both elections that occurred in the same year in the country-year data format. In those cases where there were two elections, data is from the second election. Those interested in data from the first elections should consult Golder's original data.

`gol_legmaj` Absolute Majority Provisions (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses absolute majority provisions, zero otherwise.

`gol_legala` Alternative Vote (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the alternative vote, zero otherwise.

`gol_adm` Average District Magnitude

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2797, N: 122, \bar{N} : 51, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, `gol_adm`=7.94 in Denmark after 1971 since there are 135 seats allocated in the lowest tier between 17 districts.

`gol_legbor` Borda Count (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified borda count, zero otherwise.

`gol_coex` Coexistence System

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

This is a dummy variable equal to one if a country uses a coexistence system in a given election and zero otherwise. Coexistence systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems (see `gol_mixdep`).

gol_cond Conditional System

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

This is a dummy variable equal to one if a country uses a conditional system in a given election and zero otherwise. Conditional systems are a sub-type of dependent mixed systems (see `gol_mixdep`).

gol_corr Correction System

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

This is a dummy variable equal to one if a country uses a correction system in a given election and zero otherwise. Correction systems are a sub-type of dependent mixed systems (see `gol_mixdep`).

gol_dhondt D'Hondt Formula

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the d'Hondt formula, zero otherwise.

gol_dist Districts

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2795, N: 121, \bar{N} : 51, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature.

gol_droop Droop Quota

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the droop quota, zero otherwise.

gol_enep Effective Number of Electoral Parties

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

Effective number of electoral parties based on formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

gol_enepo Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Others)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2600, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

This is the percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results.

gol_enep1 Effective Number of Electoral Parties1

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2584, N: 112, \bar{N} : 47, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 99)

Effective number of electoral parties once the 'other' category has been corrected by using the the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997). The method of bounds essentially requires calculating the effective number of parties treating the 'other' category as a single party (smallest effective number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties as if every vote in the 'other' category belonged to a different party (largest effective number of parties) and taking the mean.

gol_enpp Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2739, N: 118, \bar{N} : 50, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties constructed using the formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

gol_enppo Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties (Others)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2739, N: 118, \bar{N} : 50, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 103)

This is the percentage of the seats going to parties that are collectively known as 'others' in official electoral results

gol_enpp1 Effective Number of Parliamentary or Legislative Parties1

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2694, N: 116, \bar{N} : 49, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 101)

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties once the 'other' category has been corrected by using the the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997).

gol_enpres Effective Number of Presidential Candidates

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2842, N: 123, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Effective number of presidential candidates based on the formula from Amomim Neto and Cox (1997).

gol_est Electoral System Type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2810, N: 123, \bar{N} : 51, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 107)

Variable indicating the type of electoral system used:

- (1) Majoritarian (employs plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, limited vote, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote or modified Borda count in a single electoral tier)
- (2) Proportional (employs party list or single transferable vote in a single electoral tier)
- (3) Multi-tier (employs a single electoral formula, majoritarian or proportional, across multiple tiers)
- (4) Mixed (employs a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in one or more electoral tiers)

gol_est2 Electoral System Type 2

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2810, N: 123, \bar{N} : 51, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 107)

Variable indicating the type of electoral system used, where multi-tier systems are recoded as being majoritarian (only concerns Papua New Guinea and Mauritius) or proportional (concerns all others):

- (1) Majoritarian
- (2) Proportional
- (3) Mixed

gol_fusion Fusion Electoral System

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if a fusion electoral system is used and zero otherwise. Fusion systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems.

gol_hare Hare Formula

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the hare formula, zero otherwise (see gol_mixdep).

gol_imp Imperiali Quota

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the Imperiali quota, zero otherwise.

gol_inst Institution

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Classification of political regimes in which democracies are distinguished by the type of executive (0 Dictatorship, 1 Parliamentary Democracy, 2 Mixed Democracy, 3 Presidential Democracy). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges. For the

criteria for determining whether a regime is a dictatorship see `gol_regime`. A presidential regime is one in which the government serves at the pleasure of the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government. A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature. A system in which the government must respond both to the legislative assembly and to an elected president is classified as mixed. Typically, these mixed systems are characterized by a president who is elected for a fixed term with some executive powers and a government that serves at the discretion of the legislature.

`gol_legal` Legislative Elections

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Indicates the number of elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year. Partial elections such as those taking place in Costa Rica 1946, Poland 1989, Laos 1958, or Luxembourg 1948, 1951 are coded 0. This variable does not include elections to constituent assemblies such as those in Pakistan 1955, Nicaragua 1984, Sudan 1965, 1968, Italy 1946, or France 1946. It also excludes the 1960 election in Somalia since this was only a legislative election for Somaliland (later to become the northern region of Somalia).

18 democratic legislative elections occur in years where `gol_regime` is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of `gol_regime` is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

`gol_legplu` Legislative Elections (Plurality Rule)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the plurality rule, zero otherwise.

`gol_leglim` Limited Vote (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the limited vote, zero otherwise.

`gol_multi` Linked Multi-Tier

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

A dummy variable equal to one when a multi-tier electoral system has linked tiers and zero otherwise. Linkage occurs whenever unused votes from one electoral tier are used at another level or if the allocation of seats in one tier is conditional on the seats received in another tier.

gol_mdm Median District Magnitude

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2338, N: 116, \bar{N} : 43, \bar{T} : 20)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 104)

Median district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier. The median legislator is determined by finding the number of legislators elected in the lower tier and dividing by two. For further details on this variable see Amomim Neto and Cox (1997).

gol_mixdep Mixed Dependent

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one when the two electoral formulas used in a mixed system are dependent, and zero otherwise. A dependent mixed system is one in which the application of one formula is dependent on the outcome produced by the other formula. An independent mixed system is one in which the two electoral formulas are implemented independently of each other.

gol_mhare Modified Hare Formula

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified hare formula, zero otherwise.

gol_msl Modified Sainte-Laguë Formula

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified Sainte-Laguë formula, zero otherwise.

gol_nos Number of Seats

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2837, N: 123, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Total number of seats in the lower house of the legislature during the election year.

gol_polreg Political Regimes

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Transition years are coded as the regime that exists (0 Democracy, 1 Dictatorship) as of December 31st in that year. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000). A regime is democratic if those who govern are selected through contested elections.

gol_preel Presidential Election

(Time-series: 191946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Indicates the number of direct presidential elections held in that year. This variable does not signify that the election chose either the nominal or effective head of government. For example, gol_preel=1 if there is an election for president in mixed systems, even though the nominal and effective head of government is the prime minister. This variable does not include plebiscites or referenda as have occurred in countries like Taiwan and the Maldives.

18 democratic presidential elections occur in years where gol_regime is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of gol_regime is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic.

gol_pest Presidential Electoral System Type

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 286, N: 61, \bar{N} : 6, \bar{T} : 5)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 15)

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used in presidential elections.

- (1) Plurality
- (2) Absolute majority
- (3) Qualified majority
- (4) Electoral College
- (5) STV

gol_prero Presidential Runoff

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2842, N: 123, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no presidential runoff; 1 if there is a presidential runoff. Presidential elections are coded as having runoff provisions if a successful candidate must win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote to become president.

gol_legqmaj Qualified Majority Requirement (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses a qualified majority requirement, zero otherwise.

gol_riq Reinforced Imperiali Quota

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the reinforced Imperiali quota, zero otherwise.

gol_legro Runoff (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no legislative runoff; 1 if there is.

gol_sl Sainte-Laguë Formula

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the Sainte-Laguë formula, zero otherwise.

gol_legsntv Single Non-Transferable Vote (Legislative Elections)

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the single non-transferable vote, zero otherwise.

gol_stv Single Transferable Vote

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 2846, N: 124, \bar{N} : 52, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 108)

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the single transferable vote, zero otherwise.

gol_suppos Superposition Electoral System

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

This is a dummy variable that equals one when there is a superposition electoral system, zero otherwise. Superposition systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems (see gol_mixdep).

gol_upseat Upper Seats

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

The number of seats allocated in electoral districts or constituencies above the lowest tier. This variable may include seats allocated in several different upper tiers.

gol_uptier Upper Tier

(Time-series: 1946-2000, n: 7420, N: 195, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 38)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 186)

Percentage of seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest tier.

Gerring, Thacker & Moreno

<http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.html>

(Gerring et al 2005)

Gerring, Thacker and Moreno only include country-years that obtains a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2). (For details, see Gerring et al. 2005: p.572)

gtm_centrip Centripetalism

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 2981, N: 142, \bar{N} : 73, \bar{T} : 21)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 124)

Sum of gtm_unit, gtm_parl, and gtm_pr.

gtm_centrip2 Centripetalism (weighted)

(Time-series: 1960-2000, n: 2981, N: 142, \bar{N} : 73, \bar{T} : 21)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 124)

Centripetalism is a moving weighted sum of gtm_unit, gtm_parl, and gtm_pr, beginning in 1901 and ending in 2000. For details, see Gerring et al (2005).

gtm_unit Unitarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3710, N: 161, \bar{N} : 88, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism

- Nonfederalism is coded as 0 = federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority), 1 = semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 = nonfederal.

- Nonbicameralism is coded as 0 = strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent), 1 = weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent), or 2 = unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

gtm_parl Parliamentarism

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3710, N: 161, \bar{N} : 88, \bar{T} : 23)
(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the *degree of separation* (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential), and if there is any separation at all, (b) the *relative power* of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more

presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme:

- (0) presidential
- (1) semi-presidential
- (2) parliamentary

gtm_pr Proportional Representation

(Time-series: 1960-2001, n: 3711, N: 162, \bar{N} : 88, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 146)

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by $M > 1$, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the *closed-list-PR* electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows:

- (0) majoritarian or preferential-vote
- (1) mixed-member majority or bloque vote
- (2) closed-list-PR

Hadenius & Teorell

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 205)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 192)

(Teorell and Hadenius 2005)

ht_region The Region of the Country

This is a tenfold politico-geographical classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are the following:

- (1) Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
- (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
- (3) North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)
- (4) Sub-Saharan Africa
- (5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zealand)
- (6) East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
- (7) South-East Asia
- (8) South Asia
- (9) The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand)
- (10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

ht_region2 The Region of the Country (alternative)

To flag some of the most contested cases, we have in the alternative variable, *ht_region2*, coded Cyprus (considering the Greek majority of their population) as belonging to category (5), Haiti (considering their non-Spanish colonial legacy and membership in Caricom) as belonging to category (10), and Mongolia (considering their post-communist legacy) as belonging to category (1).

ht_colonial Colonial Origin

This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. Following Bernard et al (2004), we have excluded the British settler colonies (the US, Canada, Australia, Israel and New Zealand), and exclusively focused on "Western overseas" colonialism. This implies that only Western colonizers (excluding, e.g., Japanese colonialism), and only countries residing in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" (excluding, e.g., Ireland & Malta), have been coded. Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 years or longer. The categories are the following:

- (0) Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power
- (1) Dutch
- (2) Spanish
- (3) Italian
- (4) US
- (5) British
- (6) French
- (7) Portuguese
- (8) Belgian
- (9) British-French
- (10) Australian

Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

(Heston et al 2002)

pwt_openk Openness to Trade

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5765, N: 164, \bar{N} : 113, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 133)

Total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP. Constant prices, reference year 1996. GDP is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year.

pwt_pop Population

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5751, N: 164, \bar{N} : 113, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 134)

Population, thousands.

IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)

<http://www.idea.int/esd/index.cfm>

idea_esd Electoral System Design

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 191)

The ESD-categories are the following:

- (1) Alternative Vote (AV)
- (2) Borda Count (BC)
- (3) Block Vote (BV)

- (4) First Past The Post (FPTP)
- (5) List Proportional Representation (List PR)
- (6) Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP)
- (7) No provisions for direct elections (N)
- (8) Party Block Vote (PBV)
- (9) Parallel Systems
- (10) Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
- (11) Single Transferable Vote (STV)
- (12) Two-Round System (TRS)
- (13) Limited Vote (LV)

La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny

<http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/LaPorta%20PDF%20Papers-ALL/Quality%20of%20Govt-All/Quality%20of%20Govt.xls>

(La Porta et al 1999)

lp_legor Legal origin

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 190)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 189)

Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country. There are five possible origins:

- (1) English Common Law
- (2) French Commercial code
- (3) Socialist/Communist Laws
- (4) German Commercial Code
- (5) Scandinavian Commercial Code

lp_lat_abst Latitude

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)

(Cross-section: NA, N: 187)

The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1).

Religion

Original sources: Barret (1982), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (1995), Statistical Abstract of the World (1995), United Nations (1995) and CIA (1996).

lp_catho80 Religion: Catholic

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 187)

Catholics as percent of population 1980.

lp_muslim80 Religion: Muslim

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 187)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 187)

Muslims as percent of population 1980.

lp_protmg80 Religion: Protestant

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 184)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 184)

Protestants as percent of population 1980.

lp_no_cpm80 Religion: Other Denomination

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 184)

(Cross-section: 1980 (1990-1995 for countries of recent formation), N: 184)

Percent of population belonging to other denomination 1980. Defined as $100 - lp_catho80 - lp_muslim80 - lp_protmg80$.

Lijphart

(Cross-section: 1996, N: 36)

<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>

(Lijphart 1999)

li_excpty Executive-parties Dimension

The executive-parties dimension is a factor index of the following five variables:

1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.

li_fedunit Federal-unitary Dimension

The federal-unitary dimension is a factor index of the following five variables:

1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

Persson & Tabellini

http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1169&tbn=albero&id_folder=177

(Persson and Tabellini 2003)

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section an average of the Freedom House indices for civil liberties and

political rights (fh_cl and fh_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960-1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003: pp.74-77).

pt_federal Federal Political Structure

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2340, N: 61, \bar{N} : 60, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 83)

Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise.

pt_magn Inverse of District Magnitude

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

Inverse of district magnitude, defined as districts (the number of electoral districts in a country, including the number of primary as well as secondary and tertiary if applicable) over seats (see pt_seats).

pt_maj Majoritarian Electoral Systems

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2179, N: 61, \bar{N} : 56, \bar{T} : 36)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Dummy variable for electoral systems. Equals 1 if all the lower house is elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

pt_pind Ballot Structure 1

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party lists). Computed as $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt_seats}$, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems.

pt_pindo Ballot Structure 2

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Continuous measure of the ballot structure defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on open lists. Computed as $1 - \text{list}/\text{pt_seats} * \text{clist}$, where list is the number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems and clist is a dummy variable for closed party lists.

pt_pres Forms of Government

(Time-series: 1960-1998, n: 2340, N: 61, \bar{N} : 60, \bar{T} : 38)

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 85)

Dummy variable for forms of government. Equal to 1 in presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not chief executive, or there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

pt_sdm District Magnitude

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 77)

District magnitude (i.e., as seats over districts), computed as a weighted average, where the weight on each district magnitude in a country is the share of legislators running in district of that size.

pt_seats **Number of Seats**

(Cross-section: 1990-1998 (average values over the nine-year period), N: 84)

The number of seats in lower or single chamber for the latest legislature of each country. It is also related to the number of districts in which primary elections are held.

Roeder

<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>

(Roeder 2001)

r_roberts **Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 53)

(Cross-section: Year unknown, N: 49)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.

Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Roberts (1962).

r_muller **Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 108)

(Cross-section: Year unknown, N: 101)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.

Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Muller (1964).

r_atlas **Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 129)

(Cross-section: 1960, N: 121)

Measures probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.

Reprint from the index published in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274).

Original source: Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

r_elf61 **Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1961.**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 150)

(Cross-section: 1961, N: 139)

r_elf85 **Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1985.**

(Time-series: Country constant, N: 179)

(Cross-section: 1985, N: 171)

Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.

Seddon Wallack, Gaviria, Panizza & Stein

http://www.iadb.org/res/index.cfm?fuseaction=Publications.View&pub_id=WP-463

(Seddon Wallack et al 2003, Seddon et al 2002)

sgps_bicameral Bicameral System

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2988, N: 165, \bar{N} : 125, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 158)

Dummy variable, 1 if bicameral system.

sgps_oneparty Single Party System

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2867, N: 163, \bar{N} : 119, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 154)

Dummy variable, 1 if single-party system.

sgps_ballot Party Control over Ballot (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2961, N: 165, \bar{N} : 123, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 156)

sgps_ballot2 Party Control over Ballot (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 589, N: 36, \bar{N} : 25, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 30)

Ballot describes relative strength of parties and citizens in shaping candidates' access to ballots and influencing their chances of being elected. A code of zero means that voters can only choose a party and cannot demonstrate a preference for any individual. Closed-list electoral systems, where parties present a fixed slate of candidates that must be voted on as a whole, are the most common type in this category. A code of one means that voters can choose among a limited set of candidates. Those limits are set *de jure* by party leaders and electoral laws or *de facto* by implausibility of successful independent candidacies. Systems where there are high formal and informal barriers to independent candidates are coded as one. Systems where voters choose from an essentially unrestricted set of representatives are coded as two.

sgps_pool Sharing of Votes Among Candidates (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2935, N: 165, \bar{N} : 122, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 156)

sgps_pool2 Sharing of Votes Among Candidates (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 583, N: 35, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 30)

Pool measures the extent to which candidates can ride their parties' reputation to electoral success. Systems that pool votes across all candidates in a party are coded as zero. Individuals in these settings attain seats in the legislature if their party attracts votes, regardless of the level of personal support they attract from voters. Systems where votes are pooled across a subset of the party are coded as one. The group among which votes are shared is smaller, increasing the reward for attracting personal support. Electoral systems where voters can direct support to individual candidates are coded as two. Candidates have a greater incentive to attract personal support, as their colleagues' popularity will not earn them any votes.

sgps_vote Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2935, N: 165, \bar{N} : 122, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 156)

sgps_vote2 Candidate- or Party-specific Voting (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 583, N: 35, \bar{N} : 24, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 30)

Vote measures limitations on the number of candidates that voters can support. The values range from zero for a single vote for a party, one for multiple votes across candidates (who may or may not have to be from the same party), and two for a single vote for a single candidate. Electoral systems where voters cast two votes –one for a local candidate and another for a national candidate – are coded as one. The multiple votes may also be spread across time, as in systems where there are multiple rounds of elections to narrow the field of candidates. While systems with open primary elections are counted as having multiple votes, systems with rare tie-breaking runoffs are not. Candidates in the latter systems do not regularly expect to have to expand their audiences after the first round. Single-member districts are coded as two except in single-party states, as people are voting for a candidate.

sgps_dm District Magnitude (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2827, N: 164, \bar{N} : 118, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 155)

(Note: In the original data the Dominican Republic are given two different values for 1986. We have calculated the mean value of the two.)

sgps_dm2 District Magnitude (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 733, N: 48, \bar{N} : 31, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 37)

A weighted average of the various district magnitudes, with weights determined by how many legislators run in districts of each size. The variable “avdm” would be calculated as $(200*200+100*1)/300$ equal approximately 133 in a system with one 200-member national district and 100 single-member districts. Standard calculation of average district magnitude by dividing the number of seats by the number of districts would lead to a figure of 2.97 (=300/101), which obscures the fact that most legislators run in very large districts.

sgps_smd Proportion from Single-Member Districts (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2645, N: 157, \bar{N} : 110, \bar{T} : 17)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 146)

sgps_smd2 Proportion from Single-Member Districts (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 725, N: 47, \bar{N} : 30, \bar{T} : 15)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 37)

Proportion of legislators from single-member districts.

sgps_propn Proportion from National Constituency (lower/only house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 2934, N: 165, \bar{N} : 122, \bar{T} : 18)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 156)

sgps_propn2 Proportion from National Constituency (upper house)

(Time-series: 1978-2001, n: 1143, N: 73, \bar{N} : 48, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 2001, N: 57)

Proportion of legislators from national constituencies.

WYG (What You Get) Variables

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow

<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm>

(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003)

Hobbes-index

This index reflects an attempt to measure how far nations have come from the state of nature, which Hobbes (in Leviathan, 1651) described as when life is short, nasty, solitary, poor and brutish. To capture these life's miseries, the Hobbes index is ranged from 0 to 100 by combining cross-national indicators of the number of deaths per capita (short), the presence of civil liberties (nasty), and media communications (solitary), national income (poor), and the annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war (brutish). Higher values indicate longer distance from the state of nature.

bdm_hobbes Hobbes Index

(Time-series: 1972-1997, n: 1865, N: 145, \bar{N} : 72, \bar{T} : 13)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 142)

bdm_short Short

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 2982, N: 184, \bar{N} : 107, \bar{T} : 16)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 179)

The yearly number of deaths per 1,000 population.

bdm_nasty Nasty

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4061, N: 167, \bar{N} : 145, \bar{T} : 24)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 158)

The Freedom House index of civil liberties.

bdm_solitary Solitary

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4603, N: 191, \bar{N} : 164, \bar{T} : 24)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 181)

The number of Radios per capita.

bdm_poor Poor

(Time-series: 1972-1999, n: 4007, N: 172, \bar{N} : 143, \bar{T} : 23)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 166)

The logarithm of per capita income.

bdm_brute Brutish

(Time-series: 1972-1997, n: 4984, N: 197, \bar{N} : 192, \bar{T} : 25)

(Cross-section: 1997, N: 187)

The annual experience with civil war, revolution, and international war.

Environmental Sustainability Index

<http://www.yale.edu/esi/>

(Esty et al 2005)

esi Environmental Sustainability Index

(Cross-section: 1991-2004 (MRYA - Most Recent Year Available for the stated range), N: 146)

The ESI is a composite index tracking a diverse set of socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional indicators that characterize and influence environmental sustainability at the national scale. The indicators are: Air Quality, Biodiversity, Land, Water Quality, Water Quantity, Reducing Air Pollution, Reducing Ecosystem Stress, Reducing Population Pressure, Reducing Waste & Consumption Pressures, Reducing Water Stress, Natural Resource Management, Environmental Health, Basic Human Sustenance, Exposure to Natural Disasters, Environmental Governance², Eco-efficiency, Private Sector Responsiveness, Science and Technology, Science and Technology, Participation in International Collaborative Efforts, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Reducing Transboundary Environmental Pressures. Each indicator consists of up to 12 variables. The higher a country's ESI score, the better positioned it is to maintain favorable environmental conditions into the future.

esi_sysair Air Quality

(Cross-Section: 1993-2004 (MRYA), N: 146)

Consists of four indicators:

- Urban population weighted NO2 concentration
- Urban population weighted SO2 concentration
- Urban population weighted TSP concentration
- Indoor air pollution from solid fuel use

esi_syswql Water Quality

(Cross-Section: 1994-2003 (MRYA), N: 146)

Consists of four indicators:

- Dissolved oxygen concentration
- Electrical conductivity
- Phosphorus concentration
- Suspended solids

esi_watsup Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water source

(Cross-Section: 1991-2004 (MRYA), N: 166)

esi_co2pc Carbon emissions per capita

(Cross-Section: 2001, N: 181)

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

(Cross-section: 1990-2000, N: 173)

www.fao.org/forestry/site/24690/en

²The indicator Environmental Governance include following variables: Percentage of total land area under protected status, Ratio of gasoline price to world average, Percentage of variables missing from the CGSDI "Rio to Joburg Dashboard", Knowledge creation in environmental science, technology, and policy, IUCN member organizations per million population, Local Agenda 21 initiatives per million people, Corruption measure, Rule of law, Civil and Political Liberties, World Economic Forum Survey on environmental governance, Government effectiveness and Democracy measure.

(FAO 2005)

fao_fcc90_00 Forest Cover Change 1990-2000

Average annual change rate (%) 1990-2000 of forest and other wooded land.

Globalbarometer/Eurobarometer

(Cross-section: 2001-2003 (varies by country), N: 71)

Globalbarometer (2001-2003) <http://www.globalbarometer.org>

Eurobarometer (no. 56, oct-nov 2001)

http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm

Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002.2)

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm

gbar_satdem Percentage of population satisfied with the working of democracy.

Percentage answering very satisfied or fairly satisfied on the following question:

“In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?”

The question was asked in the Global Barometer Surveys as well as the Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. Several countries participate in the Global Barometer as well as the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. For those countries, the values from Global Barometer have been chosen. (The countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). There are country variations in the possible answers. Answers such as “Don’t Know” and “No answer” are not included in the percentage base.

Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table

http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

(Heston et al 2002)

pwt_rgdpcch Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5728, N: 164, \bar{N} : 112, \bar{T} : 35)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 131)

Real GDP per capita (Chain) is a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of consecutive years, t-1 and t (t=1951 to 2000), to the current price component shares in year t-1 to obtain the DA growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for each year t is then applied backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.

pwt_grgdpcch Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)

(Time-series: 1950-2000, n: 5563, N: 151, \bar{N} : 111, \bar{T} : 37)

(Cross-section: 2000, N: 130)

Growth rate of Real GDP per Capita.

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 3-2005)

(Time-series: 1946-2004, n: 7889, N: 184, \bar{N} : 134, \bar{T} : 43)

(Cross-section:2002, N: 171)
<http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>
(Gleditsch et al. 2002)

The UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database is a free resource of information on armed conflicts of the world. The project records all armed conflicts following the definitions of Uppsala Conflict Data Program. All variables in the database follow strict definitions presented in a codebook (see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php>).

Classifications of armed conflicts:

- Minor armed conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period.
- Intermediate armed conflict: More than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year.
- War: At least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.

ucdp_type1 Extrastemic armed conflict

These conflicts occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.
0: No extra-state conflict, 1: Extra-state minor armed conflict, 2: Extra-state intermediate armed conflict, 3: Extra-state war

ucdp_type2 Interstate armed conflict

These conflicts occurs between two or more states.
0: No interstate conflict, 1: Interstate minor armed conflict, 2: Interstate intermediate armed conflict 3: Interstate war

ucdp_type3 Internal armed conflict

These conflicts occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.
0: No internal conflict, 1: Internal minor armed conflict, 2: Internal intermediate armed conflict, 3: Internal war

ucdp_type4 Internationalized internal armed conflict

These conflicts occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states.
0: No Internationalized internal conflict, 1: Internationalized internal minor armed conflict, 2: Internationalized internal intermediate armed conflict, 3: Internationalized internal war.

ucdp_count Number of Conflicts

The number of conflicts in which the government of the country is involved.

ucdp_loc Conflict Location

Consists of four indicators:
(0) Country is not listed as location of a conflict
(1) Country is listed as location of a minor armed conflict
(2) Country is listed as location of an intermediate armed conflict
(3) Country is listed as location of a war

UNDP - Human Development Report

<http://hdr.undp.org/>

(UNDP 2004)

undp_hdi Human Development Index

(Time-series: 1975-2003, n: 1079, N: 177, \bar{N} : 135, \bar{T} : 6)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 175)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars.

undp_gini Gini Index (inequality measure)

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 126)

Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequalities.

undp_gem Gender Empowerment Measure

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 78)

A composite index measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment: economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making and power over economic resources. The variable is ranged from 0 to 1 where a higher value indicates a higher level of gender empowerment.

undp_gdp GDP/Capita PPP in constant USD

(Cross-section: 2002, N: 174)

The sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated capital assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.

PPP (purchasing power parity) A rate of exchange that accounts for price differences across countries, allowing international comparisons of real output and incomes. At the PPP US\$ rate, PPP US\$1 has the same purchasing power in the domestic economy as \$1 has in the United States.

World Development Indicators

<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/>

wdi_gni GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$).

(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 171)

wdi_inet Internet users (per 1,000 people).

(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 152)

wdi_lifexp Life expectancy at birth, total (years).

(Cross-Section: 2002, N: 180)

wdi_mort Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births).

(Cross-section: 2003, N: 181)

wdi_hiv Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population aged 15-49).

(Cross-section: 2003, N: 148)

World Economic Forum

(Cross-section: 2002 or most recent year available, N: 58)

<http://www.weforum.org/gendergap>

wef_gend Gender Gap

All scores are reported on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing maximum gender equality. The study measures the extent to which women have achieved full equality with men in five critical areas:

- Economic participation
- Economic opportunity
- Political empowerment
- Educational Attainment
- Health and well-being

World Resources Institute

(Cross-section: 2004, N: 181)

http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=7

wri_pa16 Protected Areas: Percent of Total Land Area

Protected areas: IUCN Categories I-IV and other, percent of total land area.

The proportion of a country or region's total land area that is assigned terrestrial protected area status by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). Both IUCN categories I-VI and terrestrial protected areas that are not assigned to a category by IUCN are included here. A protected area is defined by IUCN as "an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means." See <http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/> for more information on the IUCN categories.

Original source: UNEP-WCMC (2004)

World Values Survey

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: Varies by variable, see below)

<http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03975.xml>

(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. EUROPEAN AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS INTEGRATED DATA FILE, 1999-2002, RELEASE I [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version)

Answers in italics are included in the percentage.

wvs_a008m **Feeling of happiness (mean).**

wvs_a008p ***Feeling of happiness (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

- (1) *Very happy*
- (2) *Quite happy*
- (3) Not very happy
- (4) Not at all happy

wvs_a009m **State of health (mean).**

wvs_a009p ***State of health (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...

- (1) *Very good*
- (2) *Good*
- (3) Fair
- (4) Poor
- (5) *Very poor*

wvs_a062m **How often discusses political matters (mean).**

wvs_a062p ***How often discusses political matters (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?

- (1) *Frequently*
- (2) Occasionally
- (3) Never

wvs_a165p ***Most people can be trusted (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- (1) *Most people can be trusted*
- (2) Need to be very careful

wvs_a168p ***Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (%)*.**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 35)

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

- (1) *Would take advantage*
- (2) *Try to be fair*

wvs_a170m **How satisfied are you with your life (mean).**

wvs_a170p *How satisfied are you with your life (%).*

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

- (1) *Dissatisfied*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *Satisfied*

wvs_a173m **How much freedom you feel (mean).**

wvs_a173p *How much freedom you feel (%).*

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

- (1) *Not at all*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *A great deal*

wvs_c006m **Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (mean).**

wvs_c006p *Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (%).*

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?

- (1) *Dissatisfied*
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)

- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *Satisfied*

wvs_e023m Interested in politics (mean).

wvs_e023p *Interested in politics (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 70)

How interested would you say you are in politics?

- (1) *Very interested*
- (2) *Somewhat interested*
- (3) Not very interested
- (4) Not at all interested

wvs_e150m How often follows politics in the news (mean).

wvs_e150p *How often follows politics in the news (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 58)

How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?

- (1) *Every day*
- (2) *Several times a week*
- (3) Once or twice a week
- (4) Less often
- (5) Never

Statements about the environment

I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

wvs_b001m Would give part of my income for environment (mean).

wvs_b001p *Would give part of my income for environment (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 55)

wvs_b002m Increase in taxes if extra money used to prevent environmental pollution (mean).

wvs_b002p *Increase in taxes if extra money used to prevent environmental pollution (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 68)

wvs_b003m Government should reduce environmental pollution (mean).

wvs_b003p *Government should reduce environmental pollution (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 55)

- (1) *Strongly agree*
- (2) *Agree*
- (3) Disagree

(4) Strongly disagree

wvs_b008p *Environmental vs. economic growth (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 48)

Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?

- (1) *Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some losses of jobs.*
- (2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.

(3 – "other answer" is recoded as missing)

wvs_b009p *Human & nature (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 36)

For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views:

- (1) *Human beings should master nature*
- (2) Humans should coexist with nature

(3 – both, 4 - neither and 5 – other answer are recoded as missing)

Ideology

wvs_e033m *Self positioning in political scale (mean).*

wvs_e033p *Self positioning in political scale (%).*

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

- (1) Left
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) Right

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

wvs_e035m Incomes more equal (mean).
wvs_e035p *Incomes more equal (%)*.
 (Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 69)

Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort				
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>

wvs_e036m Private ownership of business (mean).
wvs_e036p *Private ownership of business (%)*.
 (Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 65)

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased					Government ownership of business and industry should be increased				
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>

wvs_e037m Government more responsibility (mean).
wvs_e037p *Government more responsibility (%)*.
 (Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for					People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves				
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>

wvs_e039m Competition is good (mean).
wvs_e039p *Competition is good (%)*.
 (Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 69)

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people				
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>

Confidence

I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- (1) *A great deal*
- (2) *Quite a lot*
- (3) *Not very much*
- (4) *None at all*

wvs_e069m Confidence: churches (mean).
wvs_e069p *Confidence: churches (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

wvs_e070m Confidence: armed forces (mean).
wvs_e070p *Confidence: armed forces (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

wvs_e072m Confidence: the press (mean).
wvs_e072p *Confidence: the press (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e073m Confidence: labor unions (mean).
wvs_e073p *Confidence: labor unions (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e074m Confidence: the police (mean).
wvs_e074p *Confidence: the police (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e075m Confidence: parliament (mean).
wvs_e075p *Confidence: parliament (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e076m Confidence: the civil services (mean).
wvs_e076p *Confidence: the civil services (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

wvs_e077m Confidence: social security system (mean).
wvs_e077p *Confidence: social security system (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 32)

wvs_e078m Confidence: television (mean).
wvs_e078p *Confidence: television (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e079m Confidence: the government (mean).
wvs_e079p *Confidence: the government (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e080m Confidence: the political parties (mean).
wvs_e080p *Confidence: the political parties (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e081m Confidence: major companies (mean).

wvs_e081p Confidence: major companies (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 62)

wvs_e082m Confidence: the environmental protection movement (mean).

wvs_e082p Confidence: the environmental protection movement (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

wvs_e083m Confidence: the women's movement (mean).

wvs_e083p Confidence: the women's movement (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

wvs_e086m Confidence: the european union (mean).

wvs_e086p Confidence: the european union (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 46)

wvs_e087m Confidence: nato (mean).

wvs_e087p Confidence: nato (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 45)

wvs_e088m Confidence: the united nations (mean).

wvs_e088p Confidence: the united nations (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

wvs_e110m Democracy is developing in our country* (mean).

wvs_e110p Democracy is developing in our country* (%).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 66)

On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

- (1) *Very satisfied*
- (2) *Rather satisfied*
- (3) Not very satisfied
- (4) Not at all satisfied

*In Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia the question was: "How satisfied are you with democracy in your country? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?"

Political system

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country.

- (1) *Very good*
- (2) *Fairly good*
- (3) Bad
- (4) Very bad

wvs_e114m Having a strong leader (mean).
wvs_e114p *Having a strong leader (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_e115m Having experts make decisions (mean).
wvs_e115p *Having experts make decisions (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_e116m Having the army rule (mean).
wvs_e116p *Having the army rule (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_e117m Having a democratic political system (mean).
wvs_e117p *Having a democratic political system (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Democracy

I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly after I read each one of them?

- (1) *Agree strongly*
- (2) *Agree*
- (3) *Disagree*
- (4) *Strongly disagree*

wvs_e120m In democracy, the economic system runs badly (mean).
wvs_e120p *In democracy, the economic system runs badly (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

wvs_e121m Democracies are indecisive (mean).
wvs_e121p *Democracies are indecisive (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

wvs_e122m Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (mean).
wvs_e122p *Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

wvs_e123m Democracy may have problems but is better (mean).
wvs_e123p *Democracy may have problems but is better (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

wvs_e124m Respect for individual human rights (mean).
wvs_e124p *Respect for individual human rights (%)*.
(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 66)
How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in our country)? Do you feel there is:

- (1) *A lot of respect for individual human rights*
- (2) *Some respect*
- (3) Not much respect
- (4) Not respect at all

Regime

wvs_e125m Satisfaction with the people in national office (mean).

wvs_e125p *Satisfaction with the people in national office (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

- (1) *Very satisfied*
- (2) *Fairly satisfied*
- (3) Fairly dissatisfied
- (4) Very dissatisfied

wvs_e128p *Country is run by big interest vs. all people (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

- (1) *Run by few big interests*
- (2) Run for all people

Justifiable

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

- (1) Never justifiable
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) *Always justifiable*

wvs_f114m Justifiable: claiming government benefits (mean).

wvs_f114p *Justifiable: claiming government benefits (%)*.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_f115m **Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (mean).**

wvs_f115p ***Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (%).***

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 62)

wvs_f116m **Justifiable: cheating on taxes (mean).**

wvs_f116p ***Justifiable: cheating on taxes (%).***

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_f117m **Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (mean).**

wvs_f117p ***Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (%).***

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

WVS - indices

wvs_supm **Support for democracy (mean).**

wvs_supp **Support for democracy (% solid democrats).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 73)

Democracy-scale according to Klingemann (1999): In the first step, we added up respondent's support of the statements "Having a democratic political system" and "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". Support for these statements could be expressed in four categories: "very good" (code 3), "fairly good" (code 2), "fairly bad" (code 1) and "very bad" (code 0) in the first statement and "agree strongly" (code 3), "agree" (code 2), "disagree" (code 1) and "disagree strongly" (code 0) in the latter. People's support for these statements has been added up to a 0-to-6 scale, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, we added up people's support of the statements "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" and "Having the army rule". Analogous to the first step, this creates a 0-to-6 scale of support for autocracy. In the third step, we subtracted the "support for autocracy" scale from the "support for democracy" scale to create an overall index of "autocratic versus democratic support," ranging from -6 (maximum autocratic support) to +6 (maximum democratic support). In the fourth step, we calculated for each country the percentage of people scoring on at least +4 on this index (since from +4 onward you are closer to the maximum democratic support (+6) than to the neutral point (0)). Hence, we obtain the percentage of "solid democrats" for each country.

wvs_orgm **Belong to organisations (mean).**

wvs_volm **Voluntary work for organisations (mean).**

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 56 (volm), 58 (orgm)).

Average number of organisations (0-14).

Which of the following organisations do you belong to or do voluntary work for?

- social welfare service for elderly
- church organisation
- cultural activities
- labor unions
- political parties
- local political
- third world development or human rights

- conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
- professional associations
- youth work
- sports or recreation
- women's group
- peace movement
- organisations concerned with health

wvs_theo Support for theocracy (mean).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 60)

Support for theocracy is a 0-1 scale composed of four items.

“How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following”:

- “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office” (agree coded high).
- “Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections” (agree coded low).
- “It would be better for [this country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office” (agree coded high).
- “Religious leaders should not influence government decisions” (agree coded low).

wvs_actm Political Action (mean).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

Average number of the following political actions that the respondents actually have done (0-5).

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories

wvs_pm4 Post-Materialism 4-item index

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

The Post-Materialism indices measures the extent to which the respondent gives top priority to economic and physical security, on one hand; or to autonomy and self-expression. The Post-Materialism 4-item index is based on the respondent’s first and second choices in the following questions:

“People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the second most important?”

	1st choice	2nd choice
I. Maintaining the order of the nation	1	1
II. Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
III. Fighting rising prices	3	3
IV. Protecting freedom of speech	4	4

The first and third options tap materialist priorities, while the second and fourth options tap postmaterialist priorities. If both materialist items are given high priority, the score is “1”; if both postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is “3”; if one materialist item and one postmaterialism item are given high priority the score is “2”.

- (1) Materialist
- (2) Mixed
- (3) Postmaterialist

wvs_pm4mp Percent materialists.

wvs_pm4pmp Percent postmaterialists.

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

wvs_pm12 Post-Materialism 12-item index

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 47)

The Post-Materialism 12-item index is based on the respondent's views on what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. The following items are postmaterialist priorities drawn from three questions. The score is the average number of these postmaterialist items that are given priority.

- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- Protecting freedom of speech.
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.

(0) Materialist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5) Postmaterialist

wvs_genm Gender Equality Scale (mean).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

(Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Gender Equality Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of five items:

- "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," (agree coded low).
- "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women," (agree coded low).
- "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl," (agree coded low).
- "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (agree coded low).
- "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (disapprove coded low).

wvs_relm Religiosity Scale (mean).

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

(Inglehart and Norris 2003)

Religiosity Scale is a 0-100 scale composed of six items:

- "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...a religious person, not a religious person, or a convinced atheist?" (% religious).

- “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (% once a week or more).
- “How important is God in your life?” (% “very” scaled 6-10)
- “Do you believe in God?” (% Yes).
- “Do you believe in life after death?” (% Yes).
- “Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?”

Factor indices

wvs_selfexp1 Self-expression values I

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 72)

(Inglehart and Welzel 2003)

Principal components factor index based on wvs_tol, wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust and wvs_lifsat.

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs_tol (see below).

wvs_selfexp2 Self-expression values II

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 72)

(Welzel et al 2003)

Principal components factor index based on wvs_tol, wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust, wvs_lifsat and wvs_rel.

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data regarding wvs_tol (see below).

wvs_selfexp3 Self-expression values III

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 74)

(Inglehart and Baker 2000)

Principal components factor index based on wvs_pet, wvs_lib, wvs_trust, wvs_happy and wvs_homo.

wvs_secrat Secular-rational values

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

(Inglehart and Baker 2000)

Principal components factor index based on wvs_rel, wvs_auton, wvs_abort, wvs_proud and wvs_auth.

Factor indices items

Please tell me for each of the following statements (abortion/homosexuality) whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

- (1) Never justifiable
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)

- (8)
- (9)
- (10) Always justifiable

wvs_abort Abortion is justifiable

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

wvs_homo Homosexuality is justifiable

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

wvs_homo is dichotomized as follows:

- (0) Not justifiable (1 above)
- (1) Justifiable (2-10 above)

wvs_auth Respect for authority

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?. Greater respect for authority.

- (1) Good
- (2) Don't mind
- (3) Bad

wvs_auton Autonomy index

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?

- A. Independence.
- B. Determination
- C. Religious faith
- D. Obedience

- (0) Not mentioned
- (1) Important

Autonomy index is computed as (A+B)-(C+D), generating the following five-point scale:

- (-2) Obedience/Religious Faith
- (-1)
- (0)
- (1)
- (2) Determination, perseverance/Independence

wvs_happy Happiness

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

See variable wvs_a008m above.

- (0) Not very happy/ Not at all happy
- (1) Very happy/ Quite happy

wvs_lib Liberty and participation

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Rank first and second choice).

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Give people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

Respondents first and second priorities for “giving people more say in important government decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” added to a four-point index, assigning 3 points for both items on first and second rank, 2 points for one of these items on first rank, 1 point for one of these items on second rank and 0 for none of these items on first or second rank.

wvs_lifsat Life satisfaction

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)
10-point rating scale for life satisfaction (=wvs_a170m).

wvs_pet Public self-expression

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 76)

I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances, do it: signing a petition.

- Have done
- Might do
- Would never do

“Have done” coded (1) and dichotomized against (0).

wvs_proud National pride

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)
How proud are you to be (NATIONALITY)?

- (1) Very proud
- (2) Quite proud
- (3) Not very proud
- (4) Not at all proud

wvs_rel Religiousness

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 77)

How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 1 means very important and 10 means not at all important.

- (1) Very
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)

- (9)
- (10) Not at all

(In the original question (1) is not at all important and (10) very important).

wvs_tol Tolerance of diversity

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 75)

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

- A. People who have AIDS.
- B. Homosexuals

- (0) Mentioned
- (1) Not mentioned

Scores added for neighbours with AIDS and homosexual neighbours to create a 0-2 scale (where 2 means tolerant).

WARNING: Some inconsistencies found in the original data. Two examples: In Jordan 95.5 percent mentioned that they would not like to have people with AIDS as neighbours compared to only 1.7 percent in Egypt. 98.4 percent of the people in Jordan would not like homosexuals as neighbours, but only 0.9 percent of the Iranians say the same.

wvs_trust Interpersonal trust

(Cross-section: 1999-2002 (varies by country), N: 78)

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- (0) Need to be very careful
- (1) Most people can be trusted

(=wvs_a165p recoded).

References

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J.A. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *The American Economic Review*, 91(5): 1369-1401.
- Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., and Wacziarg, R. 2003. Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8: 155-194.
- Amomim Neto, O. and Cox, G. 1997. Electoral Institutions: Cleavage Structures and the number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 149-174.
- Atlas Narodov Mira*. 1964. Moscow: Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute at the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the Soviet Union.
- Banks, A. S. 1996. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Binghamton, NY: Center for Social Analysis, State University of New York at Binghamton.
- Barrett, D. B., ed. 1982. *World Christian Encyclopedia: a Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900-2000*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. 2000. "New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2283.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, *World Bank Economic Review*, 15(1): 165-176.
- Bernard, M., Reenock, C., and Nordstrom, T. 2004: The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival. *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 225-50.
- Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2004. The Regulation of Labor. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 119(4): 1339-1382.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M. and Morrow, J. D. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 1996. *CIA World Factbook*, published online.
- Cheibub, J. A. and Gandhi, J. 2004. "Classifying Political Regimes: A Sixfold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Cingranelli, D. L. and Richards, D. L. 1999. Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2): 407-418.
- Coppedge, M. and Reinicke, W. 1990. Measuring Polyarchy. *Studies in Comparative International Development* No. 25(1): 51-72.
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2002. The Regulation of Entry. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117: 1-37.
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2003. Courts: The Lex Mundi Project. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118: 453-517.

- Easterly, W. and Levine R. 1997. Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 4: 1203-1250.
- Eckstein, H. and Gurr, T. R.. 1975. *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
- Esty, D. C., Levy, M., Srebotnjak, T., and de Sherbinin, A. 2005. *2005 Environmental Sustainability Index: Benchmarking National Environmental Stewardship*. New Haven: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2005. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.
- Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C. and Moreno, C. 2005. Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4): 567-581.
- Gibney, M., and Dalton, M. 1996. The Political Terror Scale. *Policy Studies and Developing Nation*, 4: 73-84.
- Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., and Strand, H. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5): 615–637.
- Golder, M. 2005. “Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World.” *Electoral Studies*, 24: 103-121.
- Gunnemark, E. V. 1991. *Countries, Peoples and Their Languages: the Linguistic Handbook*. Göteborg, Sweden: Länsstryckeriet.
- Gurr, T. R. 1974. Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971. *American Political Science Review*, 68: 1482-1504.
- Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. 2004. *Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
- Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. 2005. *Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
- Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. 2005. “Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy”, C&M Working Papers 6, IPSA, August 2005 (http://www.concepts-methods.org/working_papers/20050812_16_PC%206%20Hadenius%20&%20Teorell.pdf).
- Heston, A., Summers, R., and Aten, B. Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
- Inglehart, R., and Baker, W. E. 2000. Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1): 19-51.
- Inglehart, R., and Norris, P. 2003. *Rising Tide, Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R., and Welzel, C. 2003. Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages. *Comparative Politics*, 36(1): 61-79.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2006. Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005, The World Bank.

- Klingemann, H.-D. 1999 "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in Norris, P. ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 31-56.
- Knack, S., and Kugler, M. 2002. "Constructing an Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance". PREM Public Sector Group, World Bank.
- Laakso, M., and Taagepera, R. 1979. "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe". *Comparative Political Studies* 12:3-27.
- Lambsdorff, J. G. 2005. "Determining Trends for Perceived Levels of Corruption". Discussion Paper of the Economics Department, Passau University, No 38-05, October 2005.
- La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1999. The Quality of Government. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 15(1): 222-279.
- La Porta, R., Glaeser, F., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 2004. Do Institutions Cause Growth. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(3): 271-303.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C. and Shleifer, A. 2004. Judicial Checks and Balances. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2): 445-470.
- Lijphart, A. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy - Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K. 2002. 'Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002: Dataset Users' Manual. Maryland: University of Maryland.
- Midlarsky, M. 1997. *Inequality, Democracy, and Economic Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Muller, S. H. 1964. *The World's Living Languages: Basic Facts of Their Structure, Kinship, Location, and Number of Speakers*. New York, NY: Ungar.
- Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Pzeworsky, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J. A. and Fernando, L. 2000. "Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990". New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rauch, J.E., and Evans, P.B. 2000. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries. *Journal of Public Economic*, 75: 49-71.
- Richards, D. L., Gelleny, R. and Sacko, D. 2001. Money With A Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries. *International Studies Quarterly*. 45(2): 219-239.
- Roberts, J. 1962. "Sociocultural change and communication problems," in *Study of the Role of Second Languages in Asia, Africa, and Latin America*, Frank A. Rice, ed. Washington DC: Center for Applied Linguistics of the Modern Language Association of America. 105-123.
- Roeder, P. G. 2001. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985. <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>

- Seddon, J., Gaviria, A., Panizza, U. and Stein, E. 2002. "Political Particularism Around the World". Research Department Working Paper 463, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Seddon Wallack, J., Gaviria, A., Panizza, U and Stein, E. 2003. Particularism Around the World. *World Bank Economic Review*, 17 (1): 133-143.
- Statistical Abstract of the World* .1995. New York, NY: Gale Research, Inc.
- Taagepera, R. 1997. "Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data." *Electoral Studies* 16:145-151.
- Taylor, C. L., and Hudson, M. C. 1972. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Teorell, J. and Hadenius, A. 2005 "Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-N Evidence", mimeo., Department of Government, Uppsala University.
- United Nations. 1995. *Demographic Yearbook*, New York, NY: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, United Nations.
- UNDP 2004. Human Development Report 2004 : Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World.
- United Nations Environment Programme - World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC). 2004. *World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA)*. CD-ROM. Available on-line at: <http://sea.unep-wcmc.org/wdbpa/download/wdpa2004/index.html>. Cambridge, U.K
- Vanhanen, T. 2000. A New Dataset For Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(2): 252-65.
- Welzel, C., Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H.-D. 2003. The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-cultural Analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3): 341-373.
- Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, 8th ed. 1995. Detroit: Gale Research.