Temporal
Relations
A temporal relation is a relation of earlier than or later than to a certain degree. These relations hold between propositional situations (think abstract states of
affairs), which, if they are maximal, are times
(note, I take situations to just be propositions, or arrangements of
individual essences). A time is a maximal state of affairs that is present or
that stands in an earlier than or later than relation to some other maximal
state of affairs.
For information about temporal relations, see here.
Is
Time a Dimension of Space?
A dimension of space is itself a spatial relation. By contrast, time is not a spatial
relation. Time is the complex that contains all times standing in earlier than
and later relations.
I have a couple reasons for thinking that the
earlier than and later relations are not themselves spatial relations. First,
spatial relations hold between substances, whereas temporal relations hold
between propositional situations—like the situation in which dinosaurs roam the
Earth. Second, spatial relations are symmetric, whereas earlier than and later than
are asymmetric. Someone might reply that to
the left of is an asymmetric spatial relation. My reply back is that to the left of is a three place
relation, and it seems to me that earlier
than is a two place relation: for example, the situation in which the
dinosaurs roam the earth is earlier than the situation in which humans roam the
earth. The asymmetry of the earlier than and later than relations is what
grounds time’s arrow.
Presentism
I used to have what some would call “eternalist” view. [Disclaimer: my views on this topic expressed next are presently in flux and do not completely reflect my current thinking.] But since then, I’ve become skeptical
that “eternalism” is even intelligible. The same goes
for “presentism.” Here’s why. I’ve come to think that
‘is’ expresses the relation of exemplification. If I say that John is tall, I’m
saying that John exemplifies tallness. If I say that the Axiom of Choice is
true, I’m saying of the proposition, the Axiom of Choice, that it exemplifies
truth. That being the case, I don’t know what ‘is presently’ or ‘is timelessly’
express. If they express anything at all, what they express is simply the
relation of exemplification. I’m not familiar with any other species of exemplification.
Now consider the proposition that dinosaurs roam the
earth. Call this D. I’m inclined to think that D has the relational property of
being earlier than any and every actual
situation (true proposition). D exists and bears temporal relations to
other situations. However, D is not itself true.
I’m tempted to say that eternalism
is the view that every time is actual (that is, every
propositional situation that is itself a time is true). But this seems to lead
to what appears to me to be an absurdity: namely, that no substance can change from having a certain property to
lacking it. For, if a substance could change from having a certain property to
lacking it, and if all times are actual, then the substance would both have and lack that
property, which is a contradiction. To avoid this contradiction, we must deny
that any substance could change from having a property to lacking it. But I’m
not willing to deny that.
Does that make me a “presentist”? I really don’t
know. I suspect that those who call themselves ‘presentists’
would be more sympathetic to my views than those who call themselves ‘eternalists’ (or ‘growing [or shrinking] block theorists’).
The
A-Theory of Time
The A-theory of time considers ‘past’, ‘future’, and
‘present’ to be primitive terms. Or more metaphysically speaking, it’s a theory
that says that the properties of being
past, being future, and being present are not simple properties.
They are not, for example, relational properties analyzable in terms of earlier than and later than.
I suggest that we can analyze the A-terms as
follows:
(1) ‘x
is present’ =def ‘x is true’ (or ‘x obtains’).
(2) ‘x
is past’ =def ‘x is earlier than something that is present’.
(3) ‘x
is future’ =def ‘x is later than something that is present’.
Timelessness
Given my analysis of ‘is’, ‘time’, and ‘present’
above, the sentence that ‘x is timeless’ expresses the proposition that x
exemplifies not being true and not being
earlier than or later than anything that is true. I very much doubt
anything could exemplify that property. Thus, I doubt that anything could be
timeless.
Truth
Makers for Tensed Propositions
See the section on tensed propositions in Chapter 4 of my dissertation on propositions.
Missing
your Mom
Suppose your Mom has died. But you miss her. That
means you bear a relation of missing to your Mom, which in turn means that your
Mom exists after all. But how can she still exist if she has died? I propose
that what you miss, strictly speaking, is her
presence, which is itself a situation. So, strictly speaking, you stand in
a missing relation to a situation about your Mom—namely the situation in which your Mom is present. For a theory of how situations can be
about things that do not exist, see Chapter 3 of my
dissertation.