Semantic
Relations
A semantic relation is a relation that holds between
a thing—usually an arrangement—and a mental substance by virtue of which that thing has
semantic properties (such as, semantic
content).
Meaning
and Reference
I’ll call anything that has semantic content (a.k.a. meaning)
a ‘term’. I propose that the meaning of
a term T is something along these lines: an individual
essence E, such that someone grasped (or was aware
of) E while intending that T stand for a thing that exemplifies E. I propose
that people grasp the original meaning of a term by way of grasping individual
essences of the term’s meaning (yes, essences of essences!). (I hope to develop/explore
this theory in more detail in the future.)
Some terms have referents. The referent of a term T is whatever exemplifies the meaning of T.
A definition
of T is a proposition that says of T that it has the same meaning as some other
term, T*.
A definite
description is a term that contains other terms as parts. It is used to
express individual essences that are themselves complex
properties.
A proper name
is a term that contains no other terms as parts. Thus, a proper name is not
a merely disguised definite description. However, a proper name may have the
same meaning and/or referent as a definite description. (So, a name has a
meaning outside the context of a Russellian expansion.)
A term is empty
if it lacks a referent. For example, ‘The number greater than 1 but less
than 1’ is an empty term since nothing exemplifies the property of being the only number greater than 1 and
less than 1. Yet, empty terms still have a meaning.
A name of
a fictional character, such as
‘Clark Kent’, is an empty name. But it still has a meaning because it expresses
an unexemplified individual essence. (I suspect the essence is unexemplifiable because I suspect the
essence of a fictional character has this form, being the thing having such and such features in the story in which such and such happened, and yet there is
never (or rarely) a unique story (set
of propositions) in which such and such happened.)
A sentence is
an arrangement of terms that together express or brings to mind (or perhaps refers to) a proposition.
That is, each term expresses an individual essence (a meaning), and the order of the terms in the sentence
specifies which ordered complex of individual essences (proposition) the
sentence is designed to point out. For example, ‘John loves Sue’ expresses the
proposition that has being John, being Sue, and loves as parts,
such that the proposition is “true” just in case a thing that exemplifies being John stands in the loves relation
to a thing that exemplifies being Sue.
By contrast, ‘Sue loves John’ expresses a different proposition because the
word order is changed. It is of course arbitrary—a matter of convention—which
order of words gets associated with which ordered complex of individual
essences, just as it is arbitrary which things get dubbed to stand for which
other things (recall J.L. Austin making this point).
Semantics
and Minds
In my understanding, semantic properties cannot be
exemplified without mental properties being exemplified. That is, there can be
no meaning without minds. We might say that minds are prior to semantics. Thus, philosophy of language might be viewed as
a branch of the philosophy of mind.