

Policy, Preferences, and Participation: Government's Impact on Democratic Citizenship*

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Abstract

Do government policy decisions impact citizens' involvement in politics? Using panel data, we assess the extent to which variation in levels of political participation among citizens between 2000 and 2004 is linked to the nexus of citizens' preferences and government policy. We show that two policy decisions – military intervention in Iraq and the Bush tax cuts – did affect citizens' subsequent political participation, mobilizing the biggest policy winners and galvanizing the greatest policy losers to increase their political activity. However, the mechanism that explains increased participation differs between winners and losers. We also uncover evidence that policy realization, or citizens' retrospective perceptions of how well a policy played out, and political knowledge both moderate the effect of policy winning and losing on political participation.

Political participation is one of the primary avenues by which citizens influence the direction of public policy (Hill and Leighley 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Griffin and Newman 2005). Given this link, a large literature has been devoted to studying what leads some citizens to participate more than others.¹ But might one of the factors affecting participation in politics be citizens' reactions to government policies and specifically whether those policies are consonant with their preferences? In other words, do "policies make citizens" (Campbell 2003)? Although much attention has been devoted to public policies as an outcome of the political process, "political science has had little to say about the consequences of public policy outcomes for democratic citizenship" (Mettler and Soss 2004, 55). In this study, we examine whether the direction of government policy impacts citizens' subsequent participation in politics.

Using the 2000-2002-2004 National Election Studies (NES) panel, we assess the extent to which change in citizens' political participation from 2000 and 2004 is linked to being a winner or loser on specific policy outcomes. We find that government decisions do affect citizens' political participation, spurring the biggest winners to participate more and galvanizing the biggest losers to increase their political activity as well. We also probe the explanation for this increase in participation and find different mechanisms at work for winners and losers. Specifically, policy winners' increased participation is attributable to a boost in their sense of political efficacy, while policy losers' increased participation is due to this group's dissatisfaction with current policies. In addition, we find that policy realization (citizens'

¹ For instance, previous studies have shown that citizens' propensity to participate in politics is contingent on a variety of factors such as individual-level characteristics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995); social environment (Campbell 2006); and mobilization by political campaigns (Gerber and Green 2000).

retrospective perceptions of how well a policy played out) moderates the effect of policy decisions on participation. Finally, we show that the relationship between winning and losing and increased participation exists primarily among politically knowledgeable citizens. In sum, we provide evidence that citizens' levels of political participation are linked to the policy directions pursued by their government. As we discuss in our conclusion, our findings build on prior studies of citizens' reactions to government outcomes, including work on procedural and outcome fairness (e.g. Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; Tyler 1990); research on winning and losing elections (Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 2006); and work on the bureaucracy and efficacy (Madsen 1987).

Background And Expectations

Public policies themselves may have important effects on citizens' propensity to participate. Mettler and Soss (2004, 57) refer to this line of research as the "political tradition" which "explains mass opinion and behavior as politically constructed outcomes – that is, as outcomes that arise through the interaction of political institutions, organizations, policies, and actors." Accordingly, a small but growing literature assesses the extent to which public policy affects the political behavior and attitudes of citizens (Mettler 2002; Campbell 2003), or the extent to which "policy feedback" affects participation.² For instance, Mettler (2002) found that the G.I. Bill increased political involvement among its participants by more fully incorporating

² Another set of studies have looked at the effect of government decisions on citizens' attitudes, rather than their behavior (e.g. Hill and Hurley 1999) while a related literature examines the impact of descriptive representation (sharing the same race or gender as one's representative) on political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).

them into the political system and promoting civic norms, or what Pierson (1993) called an “interpretive effect.” Similarly, Campbell (2003) found that Social Security policy has had a significant effect on levels of political participation among senior citizens, primarily because it gave this group a larger personal stake in national politics and defined a group of citizens that became ripe for mobilization. When Social Security has been threatened in the form of lower benefits or more restrictive eligibility requirements, seniors have responded with increased participation which has had important effects on subsequent policy outcomes.³

While these studies are instructive, they only pertain to the segment of the population that receives benefits from a particular government program. However, citizens’ participation may be more broadly affected by government decisions that confer a wider benefit or cost – policies such as environmental regulation, immigration quotas, tax cuts, and ensuring affordable health care. Studying particularized benefits also does not allow for variation in preferences since we expect that, given the choice, program beneficiaries will always prefer more to less. Because many government policies impose clearer costs on one part of the population while creating benefits for another, they create both winners *and* losers. Finally, the explanatory power of prior studies is limited by their frequent reliance on cross-sectional data. The structure of such data does not allow researchers to tease out whether it is policy winning that influences participation or (as others have shown is also plausible) political participation that influences policy winning.⁴

³ Not all of the “particularized benefits” government allocates have a positive effect on participation. For instance, Soss (1999) found that welfare recipients are less likely to participate compared to non-recipients of similar socioeconomic status due to the stigma associated with this government program.

⁴ In a related literature, Anderson and LoTempio (2002) demonstrated that individuals who voted for the losing presidential candidate tend to report lower levels of trust in government. However, McCann et al.

In sum, past studies have only begun to examine the effects of policy outcomes on political participation. We ask how the interplay between what citizens want government to do, what government actually does, and how citizens perceive the results of government decisions (if at all) affects citizens' subsequent involvement in politics. We develop a theoretical framework to anticipate how policy decisions affect political participation, and then use panel data to assess change in individuals' participation as a reaction to public policies.

Based on the literature on particularized benefits and citizen participation, we know that citizens who are the beneficiaries of distributive government policies often feel more "externally efficacious," or that the government is attentive to their concerns (Campbell 2003). We extend this logic to the domain of public goods. That is, we anticipate that when government decisions concerning policies that affect the entire population run in a citizen's favor, that citizen's external efficacy will increase. As an often-used measure of external efficacy suggests, the citizen will be more likely to believe and indicate that the government "cares about people like me." For instance, in a cross-sectional analysis Weissberg (1975) found some early evidence that citizens whose preferences were reflected in government policy tended to feel more externally efficacious.

We might also expect that policy winning will improve citizens' "internal efficacy," or their belief that they have the capacity for meaningful political action (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Citizens may conclude they have a greater capacity to affect government decisions when

(1996) found that "losing" at the presidential nomination phase (supporting a candidate that fails to win the nomination) does not cause citizens to abstain from future political participation (campaign work) in the general election campaign.

government acts in ways they like. Prior research suggests such a link. For example, Clarke and Acock (1989) found that citizens who supported a candidate who went on to win the election reported increased external *and internal* efficacy. Other studies of “empowerment” show that citizens who feel better represented are more likely to participate in politics (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). So, given the well-documented positive relationship between both types of political efficacy and political participation (e.g., Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Finkel 1985) we anticipate that when a citizen’s strong preference for the direction of government policy is in accord with what the government subsequently does, the citizen will generally feel more externally and internally efficacious and will tend to increase their involvement in politics.

A seemingly natural extension of this expectation is that those who find themselves on the losing end of policy decisions should feel less efficacious and, because they feel less efficacious, participate less in politics. While there is reason to believe that policy losers will feel less efficacious, other factors may offset this. Specifically, when citizens are dissatisfied with the government’s policy decisions, other research suggests that this dissatisfaction might lead to increased participation. For example, there is considerable evidence that candidates and policies that threaten individuals’ political interests lead to anxiety, and this anxiety to increased attention during political campaigns (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 2000).⁵ It is also commonly known that heightened political interest increases citizen participation (e.g., Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). So, there is reason to expect that when a citizen’s strong preference for the direction of government policy is not in accord with what the government subsequently does, their interest in politics and their participation will increase out

⁵ For some citizens, this anxiety is translated into political action (Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 2000).

of a sense of dissatisfaction. So, we anticipate that the biggest policy winners and losers will increase their involvement in politics more than those in between, but for different reasons.

Finally, we expect two factors should moderate these relationships. First, when the government pursues policies a group of citizens supports, they may feel more efficacious but we are unable to measure the behavioral effects of these attitudes until the next election. In the interim, observing the realization of the government's policy may serve to reinforce a citizen's prior opinion if the policy's outcomes are as expected, or it may lead to a conclusion that prior support/opposition for the policy was misguided. If the realization of a policy outcome confirms that a citizen's initial support for, or opposition to, the policy was merited, we expect this will magnify the effect of policy winning/losing on change in participation. However, if the realization of a policy outcome instead shows that the citizen's initial support for the policy was mistaken, we expect that the efficacy associated with the government's policy decision will be eroded and its effect on participation will be attenuated. The effect of dissatisfaction on participation should be moderated by policy realization in the same way.

Second, political knowledge likely plays an important role. If citizens are politically interested and knowledgeable, they are more likely to observe both the extent to which the government adopted their preferred policy and whether the realization of the policy they supported or opposed was consistent with their expectations (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). So, political knowledge should amplify the effect of policy winning/losing on participation.

Data and Method

It is a challenge to design a study that measures the effect of policy decisions on citizens' participation because when citizens are asked to report their participation after an election has taken place, these reports might be affected by whether citizens anticipate that they will be on the

winning or losing side of future policy outcomes. For instance, citizens who expect to be on the winning side of government decisions might be tempted to inflate their participation in the election, just as citizens often over-report support for the winning candidate in post-election surveys (Wright 1990). In addition, our initial measure of citizens' participation in 2000 may be influenced by their prior experience of being a winner or loser in the political system, making it difficult to isolate the effects of policy winning or losing during the period we study.

We contend that the circumstances of the 2000 election allow us to address these concerns. Specifically, prior to the 2000 election, the Republican Party had held a majority of the seats in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House for six years, and a Democrat had been president for eight years. So, in the 1990s it was rather difficult for citizens of any ideological bent to clearly identify whether they were policy winners or losers, which makes it unlikely that citizens' participation in 2000 was systematically influenced by being a winner or loser in prior years. This made the 2000 presidential election a watershed event. If the Republicans captured the White House, citizens would much more clearly be policy winners or losers over the subsequent four years. In addition, due to the historic aftermath of the 2000 election in which the winner remained in doubt over a month after the election, when the NES queried citizens about their political participation after the election most did not yet know if they stood to be policy winners or losers over the next four years.⁶ Therefore, it is unlikely that citizens' reported levels of participation in 2000 were influenced by the coming prospect of being a policy winner or loser.

⁶ However, Respondents surveyed in the post-election wave of the 2000 NES after the Bush v. Gore decision was rendered by the Supreme Court on December, 12, 2000, did know the winner of the election when surveyed about their participation. Excluding these Respondents from our analysis does not change the results.

We use the 2000-2002-2004 NES panel study for our analyses.⁷ In doing so, we follow the advice of Mettler and Soss (2004, 65), who stressed that “panel designs offer great advantages for establishing pre/post differences in political attitudes and, if used to construct a ‘rolling’ series of observations, could allow researchers to closely monitor the ways citizens’ attitudes shift in response to specific experiences with government.” These data offer two main advantages. First, the panel’s relatively brief four-year time span makes us more certain that changes in participation can be attributed to policy winning or losing and not more general life-cycle effects (Jennings and Niemi 1981). Second, a panel design largely controls for individual factors affecting participation (education, income, etc.) because for most citizens these remain relatively unchanged over a four year period. There is a drawback to using this data, however, because political participation may display little variance over such a short period (Plutzer 2002), making it difficult for us to observe any effects. In the following two sections, we define our measures of change in political participation and explain how we identify citizens as policy winners or losers.

Measuring Change in Political Participation

There is a vast literature on the factors that explain why some people participate in politics more than others (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), but relatively little attention paid to variation in citizens’ participation over time (but see Bowers 2004). In this study, we are interested in explaining changes in participation from 2000 to 2004. To do so, we construct an additive election participation index for 2000 and 2004 using citizen self-reports on eight survey items that asked whether they had engaged in the following activities during the election season:

⁷ A total of 748 Respondents participated in each of the panel’s three waves (2000, 2002, and 2004).

(1) voting, (2) contributing to a candidate's political campaign, (3) contributing to a political party, (4) attending a meeting or rally in support of a particular candidate, (5) working for a political campaign, (6) displaying a button or sign in support of a particular candidate, (7) trying to influence the vote of others by talking with them, and (8) contributing to a group that supported or opposed candidates. Summing the binary indicators for these items yields a 0-8 scale with a higher value indicating greater participation.⁸ Compared to assessing each individual participatory act independently, an additive scale allows for more variation and a more nuanced measure of change in an individual's participatory habits.⁹ For each individual, we then subtract the index value for 2000 from the value for 2004 to yield a measure of change in participation; this variable ranges from -4 to +6 with positive values indicating greater participation in 2004 compared to 2000. For example, a value of +3 for change in participation indicates that a Respondent engaged in three more participatory acts in 2004 than in 2000. The

⁸ We use an additive scale rather than factor analyses to ease interpretation of our findings. A tabulation of this scale is included in Table B-1 of the Web Appendix. As the table shows, over 60% of Respondents in the sample changed their level of political participation between 2000 and 2004. This significant variation is somewhat at odds with previous work that contends participation is rather "fixed" over time (e.g., Plutzer 2002).

⁹ Given the lower costs associated with voting compared to the other seven items that compose the participation index, there is some concern that voting may be driving any link we find between policy decisions and citizens' participation. To account for this possibility, we performed all of the analyses we present below, excluding voting from the participation index. With the exception noted in text below, the results were not different from those we report.

mean of change in participation in this data is 0.46, the standard deviation is 1.36, and it is (roughly) normally distributed.¹⁰

Defining Policy Winning and Losing

To determine if citizens are policy winners or losers, we first measure their preferences in seven issue areas: proposed military action against Iraq, federal tax cuts, partial birth abortion, school vouchers, use of the death penalty, gays in the military, and affirmative action.¹¹ For each policy area, we use NES support/oppose responses as well as a binary question that queries the strength of Respondents' preferences to construct a four-point scale of policy preferences with

¹⁰ We suspect that the positive mean for change in participation is partially explained by Respondents reacting to being questioned in 2000 by participating more in 2004. In other words, the panel survey itself might have increased participation among Respondents on average given that political participation (especially voting) is viewed as a socially desirable behavior. For instance, Traugott and Katosh (1979) find that survey Respondents significantly increased their registration and voting levels in the election immediately after they were interviewed. In addition, according to data from the Federal Election Commission, actual turnout increased from 51.3% in 2000 to 55.3% in 2004. Scholars have also commented on the increase in other forms of political participation (displaying a campaign button, yard sign, etc.) in 2004 as compared to 2000 (Abramowitz and Stone 2006).

¹¹ Question wording and tabulations of preferences for the seven issues are provided in the Web Appendix. The military action in Iraq item was queried in the fall of 2002 (before the military campaign began in March of 2003) and the other six issues in the fall of 2000. Only half of the respondents were queried about the intensity of their preference on school vouchers in the 2000 NES, so the sample size is smaller for this issue.

conservative preferences coded higher.¹² The seven issues we examine represent a wide array of salient areas in which the government could have made a policy decision in the years to come.¹³

We model change in participation as a function of an un-squared and squared measure of citizen preferences for each issue domain. We adopt this quadratic specification in light of our expectation that the relationship between policy winning/losing and participation is not linear. Specifically, we expect participation to increase most for the largest policy winners *and* losers.¹⁴

Our Respondents hold preferences on a variety of other issues that we cannot specifically measure. To account for the effect of citizens winning and losing on the broad spectrum of issues beyond the seven we model, we include un-squared and squared measures of party identification.¹⁵ In addition, political parties often target their core supporters for mobilization, and there is some evidence that that this was especially true during the 2004 election (Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Abramowitz and Stone 2006). To account for party mobilization effects during the campaign season, we control for self-reports of change in party mobilization from

¹² For all preferences, 1 = strong liberal, 2 = weak liberal, 3 = weak conservative, and 4 = strong conservative.

¹³ The highest correlation in preferences across the seven issues is 0.31 while most fall under 0.2. We take this as evidence that the seven items are measuring separate policy attitudes as opposed to some general political ideology.

¹⁴ An alternative to looking at the effect of winning or losing on specific policies is to examine whether voting for the winning or losing candidate in an election impacts subsequent participation (also see Clarke and Acock 1989; Craig et al. 2006). We leave this question for future study.

¹⁵ Party identification is measured on a 1-7 scale with Republican coded higher. We opted for a quadratic specification over a “folded” partisanship measure to allow for the possibility that changes in participation are not symmetric across party identifications.

2000 to 2004.¹⁶ We also control for change in Respondents' interest in politics with the expectation that citizens who become more interested in politics are also likely to increase their participation. To account for election-specific contextual effects, we control for whether there was a Senate race in the Respondent's state in 2000 and/or 2004, as well as change in the competitiveness of the presidential election contest in each Respondent's state from 2000 and 2004.¹⁷ We also include Respondents' level of education in 2000 to account for the possibility that citizens with higher levels of educational attainment may be more likely to change their participation. Finally, we control for participation in 2000 given the possibility of ceiling and floor effects.

Results

We first ask whether change in citizens' participation between 2000 and 2004 relates to

¹⁶ The question wording for the party mobilization item was "As you know, the political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year?" A Respondent who was contacted in 2000 but not 2004 is coded -1, a Respondent not contacted in 2000 but contacted in 2004 is coded +1, and a Respondent that was either contacted or not contacted in both years is coded 0.

¹⁷ The Senate race variable was coded +1 for Respondents whose state had a Senate race in 2004 but not 2000, 0 for Respondents whose state had a Senate race in both years, and -1 for Respondents whose state had a Senate race in 2000 but not 2004. Change in Presidential Election Competitiveness is computed by subtracting the two-party proportion vote for Bush in 2000 from 50 and the vote for Bush in 2004 from 50 and taking the absolute value of each measure. We then subtract the value for 2004 from the value for 2000 such that a positive number indicates a more competitive election in 2004 than in 2000 while a negative number indicates a less competitive election.

their policy preferences. Figure 1 reports the average change in participation by citizens' preferences for the direction of policy in seven policy domains. We find that the pattern of preferences and change in participation varies considerably across issues. For the Iraq war, tax cuts, gays in the military, and affirmative action, strong opponents *and* strong supporters increased their participation significantly more than those without strong preferences. Below, we will see that the apparent relationship between preferences regarding gays in the military, and affirmative action and change in participation for strong winners and losers is a result of confounding factors. In the remaining issue domains, citizens with strong preferences increased their participation about as much as citizens without strong preferences, and sometimes less.

[Figure 1 About Here]

The relationship between participation and policy winning/losing should be strongest for issue areas in which the government made a major policy decision between 2000 and 2004. The reason is that citizens need a clear signal of whether they were policy winners or losers as a result of government action in order for their subsequent participation to be affected. The decisions to send nearly 300,000 U.S. troops into combat in Iraq in 2003 and to enact the largest federal tax cut in the nation's history in 2001 are instances of policy decisions that clearly created winners and losers based on citizens' preferences. In contrast, while there was (sometimes extensive) media coverage of the other five issue areas during the period we study, government policy decisions that clearly created winners and losers did not take place.¹⁸

¹⁸ In *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the United States Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. However, the case was heard in conjunction with *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), in which the Court struck down the University's point-based undergraduate admission policy, which was essentially deemed a quota system.

For two issues, the link between policy winning/losing and participation that we observe in Figure 1 appears not to be the result of confounding. Table 1 presents estimates of the relationship between preferences for our seven issues and change in participation between 2000 and 2004 using an OLS estimator and including the controls described previously.¹⁹ We model a quadratic relationship between policy preferences and political participation given the expectations developed above. A negative estimated effect for the un-squared term and a positive estimated effect for the squared term indicates that the biggest policy winners and losers both increased their participation more than those in the middle. We find that preferences are related to change in participation for military action in Iraq and tax cuts (columns 1 and 2) but

The U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" (DADT) policy was at issue in a Supreme Court case that was decided after our period of study. In *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court ruled that the federal government, under the Solomon Amendment, could constitutionally withhold funding from universities if they refuse to give military recruiters access to school resources. Law schools had been unwilling to allow recruiters onto campus because they viewed the DADT policy as discriminatory. The closest to a clear policy decision occurred for partial birth abortion when Congress passed and President Bush signed a ban on the procedure in October of 2003. However, the law was immediately appealed and subsequently declared unconstitutional by three different U.S. district courts. Not until April 2007 did the Supreme Court (in a 5-4 decision) rule that the ban does not violate the Constitution. So, we contend that during period we study (2000-2004), this was a domain where a clear policy decision was not present.

¹⁹ Because measures of participation in 2000 and 2004 are scalar, the measure of change in participation is categorical, suggesting ordered probit/logit may be appropriate. However, the number of categories in the dependent variable (11) allows us to use an OLS estimator to ease interpretation of the results.

not for the other five issues.²⁰ Specifically, those who strongly supported or opposed military action in Iraq and tax cuts increased their participation from 2000 to 2004 more than those without strong preferences on these issues.

[Table 1 About Here]

The estimates for other variables in our models confirm the validity of the participation index. Both strong Democrats and strong Republicans were more likely to increase their participation from 2000 to 2004.²¹ Being contacted by a political campaign increases participation (Gerber and Green 2000) and more educated individuals were also more likely to increase their participation.

That there are several issues in Table 1 where citizens with strong preferences were not more likely to increase their participation helps to alleviate any concern that the results for military involvement in Iraq and tax cuts are driven by issue intensity alone, even absent government action creating clear winners and losers. In other words, there are some issue domains where strength of preference alone does not appear to generate increased participation. Moreover, roughly the same proportion of citizens held strong preferences across the seven issues. So, it does not appear that the link between participation and policy winning or losing on

²⁰ The affirmative action estimates are significant at the $p < .10$ level if voting is omitted from the participation index. All our other conclusions are unchanged.

²¹ The results we report below are not substantially different if we replace the partisanship measures with measures of political ideology. The results are also unchanged when we add a control for “global” preference intensity which is derived by summing the number of intense preferences a respondent reports across the seven issues.

the Iraq war and tax cuts is due to citizens holding more intense preferences for these two issues as compared to the other five.²²

A variation on this concern is that the biggest winners and losers are more likely to increase their participation not due to any reaction to government policy, but because these citizens are more likely to be interested in politics. In other words, what we measure as strength of preference may simply be a proxy for political interest. We find that this is not the case. Across the seven issue areas, more politically interested Respondents are not significantly more likely to report strong preferences compared to Respondents less interested in politics.²³ Thus, we are confident that the link we find between policy winning and losing and political participation is not simply an artifact of more interested citizens being more likely to increase their participation.

Explaining the Link between Policy Winning/Losing and Change in Political Participation

Why do winners and losers both increase their participation? Above, we developed separate mechanisms for each group of citizens. Specifically, we theorized that winners increase

²² The percentage of citizens reporting a strong preference (either in support of or in opposition to) a given issue is as follows: military intervention in Iraq 73%, tax cuts 69%, partial birth abortion 82%, school vouchers 73%, death penalty 67%, gays in the military 68% and affirmative action 70%. Also, correlating preference intensity across the seven issues reveals no correlation higher than 0.2, indicating that it is not the same set of Respondents who hold strong preferences across all issues.

²³ Specifically, for each issue we ran a chi square test that compared preference intensity (0 for not strong, 1 for strong) for those who report paying attention to government and public affairs “most of the time” or “some of the time” to those paying attention “only now and then” or “hardly at all.” We find that there is no significant difference in strength of preference based on political interest for any of the issues.

their participation because the government's pursuit of policies they support makes them more politically efficacious. In contrast, we anticipated that losers increase their participation due to dissatisfaction with current policies. In this section, we empirically test these expectations. Because we only find a relationship between winning/losing and change in participation for the Iraq war and tax cuts domains in Table 1, we focus on these issues when pursuing our explanations.

To begin, we want to know if efficacy mediates the relationship between policy winning and increased participation. To measure change in efficacy, we created an additive index of five items where greater efficacy is coded higher (on a 1-3 scale) and subtracted the value for 2000 from 2004 such that a positive value indicates an increase in efficacy.²⁴ The five items we use are as follows: (1) "Public officials don't care much what people like me think," (2) "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," (3) "I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics," (4) "I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people," and (5) "How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?"²⁵

Notably, this index is novel in that it combines measures of "external" efficacy with measures of "internal" efficacy (Finkel 1985; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). In doing so, the measure reflects our expectation, developed above, that policy winning will not only improve

²⁴ The 2000 NES used a 1-5 scale for each item while the 2004 NES used a 1-3 scale. So, for the 2000 survey we collapsed the first and second categories and the fourth and fifth categories to generate a 1-3 scale. Summing the five 1-3 scales produces an index that ranges from 5 to 15.

²⁵ The mean for change in efficacy is 0.33 and the standard deviation is 2.39.

citizens' sense that government is responsive to their concerns (external efficacy) but also their sense that they are capable of participating in politics (internal efficacy).

[Table 2 About Here]

According to the estimates reported in Table 2, columns 1 and 2, supporters of military action in Iraq and tax cuts were more likely than policy losers to report greater efficacy in 2004 than in 2000, even after accounting for partisanship, a more general measure of winning and losing. Indeed, policy losers who were intense in their opposition to these policies actually saw a decrease in their efficacy on average.²⁶ In each case, the estimate is statistically significant at $p < .01$. Substantively, moving from a loser with a strong preference to a winner with a strong preference for either issue produces a little less than a one point increase on the change in efficacy index (or roughly one-third of a standard deviation).

Next, we examine whether in our data an increase in efficacy from 2000 to 2004 tends to lead to an increase in political participation. Because we expect this mechanism is only at work among policy winners, we split the sample into those who supported military action in Iraq and federal tax cuts (winners) and those who did not (losers). We then model change in participation as a function of change in efficacy and the now-familiar controls, expecting to find that as efficacy increases among winners (but not losers), an increase in participation follows. The estimates reported in Table 2, columns 3 to 6 show this to be the case. An increase in efficacy coincides with an increase in participation among policy winners but not among losers. In other words, change in efficacy helps to explain a change in participation only for those whose preferences were reflected in government policy. Substantively, for winners on either issue

²⁶ Strong opponents on the Iraq war experienced a mean decrease of .30 points on the efficacy scale from 2000 to 2004, while strong opponents of tax cuts' efficacy fell .28 points on average.

moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above for change in efficacy produces a 0.3 increase on the change in participation index, or about a fifth of a standard deviation.

Next, we test a separate mechanism for policy losers. We want to know if being a policy loser with strong preferences is linked to a greater sense of dissatisfaction, and a greater sense of dissatisfaction is linked to increased political participation. Admittedly, there is no ideal measure of political dissatisfaction in the NES panel. We identified the feeling thermometer as an appropriate measure given its frequent use in studies of political disapproval and anxiety (Ragsdale 1991; Marcus and Mackuen 1993). To measure political dissatisfaction, we calculate the change in a Respondent's 0-100 thermometer rating of George W. Bush from 2000 to 2004. Using Respondents' thermometer ratings of Bush reflects, in part, their evaluations of the policies pursued by the administration. To measure dissatisfaction, we subtract each Respondent's Bush rating for 2004 from the rating for 2000 so a Respondent who felt more negative towards Bush in 2004 compared to 2000 will be associated with a positive value for change in dissatisfaction.²⁷ We then regress Respondents' change in dissatisfaction on their preferences regarding military action in Iraq and tax cuts, again controlling for partisanship. As we report in Table 3, columns 1 and 2, we find that as support for military activity in Iraq and tax cuts decreases, political dissatisfaction increases, which is indicated by a negatively signed and statistically significant coefficient. Substantively, moving from strong support for the Iraq war to strong opposition produces a sixteen point drop in a Respondent's thermometer evaluation of George W. Bush, while moving from strong support to strong opposition to the tax cuts produces a four point drop.

²⁷ The mean change in political dissatisfaction is -1.5 and its standard deviation is 25.3.

[Table 3 About Here]

We then model change in participation as a function of change in dissatisfaction. Since we expect that the mechanism is only at work among policy losers, we split the samples into policy winners and policy losers for both issues. We then regress change in participation on change in dissatisfaction along with the set of controls. The estimates in columns 3 to 6 show that an increase in dissatisfaction is associated with an increase in political participation among policy losers, but not among winners. Substantively, for losers on either issue moving from one standard deviation below the mean of change in dissatisfaction to one standard deviation above produces a 0.4 increase in the change in participation (about a quarter of a standard deviation).²⁸

Policy Realization and Political Knowledge as Moderators

We next assess whether the impact of policy decisions on political participation is conditioned by whether policies play out as citizens expect. To begin, we compared Respondents' retrospective evaluations of the war in Iraq queried in the fall of 2004 to their initial level of support in 2002. Not surprisingly, those who initially opposed the war were much more likely to respond that the war was "not worth it" while those who initially supported the war were much more likely to respond that the war was "worth it." More interesting, however, is the difference in retrospective perceptions between Respondents with opposed preferences. Fully 91% of Respondents who were initially strongly opposed to military action in 2002

²⁸ To further test if efficacy (Table 2) and dissatisfaction (Table 3) mediate policy winning/losing and participation, we conducted a Sobel test (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). For three of the four models, the test revealed a significant mediating relationship. Efficacy as a mediator between policy winning and increased participation on the Iraq war was just outside conventional levels of statistical significance ($p=.14$).

maintained that it was not worth it in 2004, meaning that only 9% of these strong opponents “changed their minds” between 2002 and 2004. In contrast, among those who were initially strong supporters of the war, only 68% still believed that the war was worth it, meaning that fully 32% of initial strong supporters had changed their minds. Taken as a whole, nearly four times as many strong supporters (as compared to strong opponents) changed their minds about the war.

Given this pattern, we should not be surprised that policy losers on the Iraq war generally increased their participation from 2000 to 2004 much more than did policy winners, as we observed in Figure 1 and Table 1, column 1. Among policy losers, those who had their concerns about the war confirmed were substantially more likely to increase their participation than those who eventually concluded that the war was worth it (see Figure 2). Among those who strongly supported the proposal to enter Iraq in 2002, those who concluded that U.S. involvement was worth it in 2004 increased their participation much more than those who changed their minds about the war.

[Figure 2 About Here]

We also compared change in participation by Respondents’ initial support for tax cuts in 2000 and their evaluations of the overall health of the economy in 2004.²⁹ Not surprisingly, strong supporters of tax cuts held a more favorable view of the economy in 2004 than did opponents. However, we are more interested in the proportion of Respondents who changed their minds, or who strongly opposed (or supported) tax cuts in 2000 but thought the economy was doing rather well (or not well) in 2004. There is considerable evidence of attitude change among initial supporters. Fully 34% of strong supporters in 2000 thought that the economy was

²⁹ Unfortunately, Respondents were not queried about their retrospective evaluations of the tax cuts in 2004.

worse or much worse in 2004. By comparison, just 18% of strong opponents thought that the economy was better or much better in 2004. Among initially strong opponents of tax cuts, close to half said that the economy was worse or much worse in 2004, compared to a little more than one-third of the members of the other three groups. All of these observations are consistent with a greater increase in participation among strong opponents to the tax cuts than among strong supporters, just as we observed in Figure 1 and Table 1, column 2.

[Figure 3 about here]

We then determined the average change in participation by perceptions of the health of the economy and initial support for tax cuts (see Figure 3). Respondents who strongly supported the tax cuts in 2000 and reported that economic conditions were better in 2004 increased their participation at quite a bit greater rate than did tax cut supporters who were less positive about the health of the economy. This is consistent with Bartels' observation that many of the citizens who supported the tax cut did not stand to benefit much from it, if at all (Bartels 2005). Figure 3 shows that once the tax cut was implemented and it did not have the effect on the economy that many citizens hoped for, these citizens were less likely to increase their participation in 2004.

Conversely, those who opposed tax cuts but were later optimistic about the health of the economy increased their activity much less than those who were pessimistic about the economy or thought it was performing about the same. Among initially weak supporters and opponents of tax cuts, those who were pessimistic about the economy increased their participation more than optimists. In sum, we find evidence that policy realization moderates the effect of policy decisions on participation. Specifically, Respondents whose retrospective evaluation of the Iraq

war or tax cuts was consistent with their initial preferences increased their participation at a greater rate than those who changed their minds on the issue.³⁰

Finally, for a relationship between government policy decisions and participation to meaningfully exist, citizens must have at least some idea that they are a policy winner or loser.³¹ By extension, we would expect that more informed citizens will be more sensitive to government policies. For example, while virtually all Americans were probably aware that the United States had taken military action in Iraq by 2004, it seems likely that the effect of this policy decision on citizens' attitudes and behavior will depend on the depth of this knowledge – whether they had an accurate impression of the U.S. commitment, including the number of troops committed and the dollars appropriated. Ideally, we would have at our disposal some measure of the accuracy of citizens' knowledge of these specifics in the policy areas we examine. Unfortunately, the

³⁰ To test the statistical significance of these effects, we re-estimated the models reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, splitting the sample by those whose initial preference on military intervention and tax cuts matched their later evaluations of policy success and those who did not. We found that the relationship between policy winning/losing and increased participation is at work primarily among those whose preferences prior to and after the implementation of the policy were consistent (e.g. opponents of the Iraq war in 2002 who indicated in 2004 that the war was not “worth it”). We take this as additional evidence of the importance of policy realization as a moderator between policy winning/losing and political participation.

³¹ Some previous work has questioned the ability of citizens to acquire accurate political information and to use it to participate intelligently in politics (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), while other work shows that citizens are able to acquire the information they need to participate intelligently in politics (e.g. Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Of more direct relevance for our study, Hacker and Pierson (2005) report that about half of the public knew that there was a tax cut.

NES panel did not query the details of Respondents' factual knowledge about these specific issues. In its stead, we created a political knowledge factor score for each Respondent using principal component analysis of the 2000 NES³², where a higher score indicates a Respondent is more politically knowledgeable.³³ We then split the sample into those above the mean of the knowledge factor score and those below the mean and re-estimated the model specified in Table 1. We report the results of this analysis in Table 4.

[Table 4 About Here]

Table 4 indicates that the effects of policy decisions on participation *only* exist among those with a greater than average level of political knowledge. Specifically, strong opponents

³² In a recent Memorandum (see <http://www.electionstudies.org/announce/newsltr/20080324PoliticalKnowledgeMemo.pdf>), the NES Principal Investigators reported coding problems with two of the political knowledge items in the 2000 administration of the survey. Specifically, arguably correct responses to the William Rehnquist and Tony Blair identification items were coded as incorrect. We do not use the Blair item in constructing our knowledge measure. Moreover, the errors in coding the Rehnquist item would not affect our results so long as respondents whose participation was more susceptible to being affected by policy were not more likely to be miscoded as unknowledgeable. Even so, we repeated our analyses excluding the Rehnquist item from the construction of our knowledge measure and obtained very similar results.

³³ Combining multiple survey items into a single scale is often used to measure a citizen's general level of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Ketner 1996). For our measure, we used six items from the 2000 NES: (1) self-reported interest in politics; identification of which party controlled (2) the House of Representatives, and (3) the Senate; and correct identification of the offices held by (4) Trent Lott, (5) William Rehnquist, and (6) Janet Reno. The eigenvalue of the lone retained factor was 2.46. The loadings for the items were .40, .47, .49, .36, .32, and .39, respectively.

and strong supporters with higher levels of political knowledge both increased their participation at higher rates than Respondents with weaker preferences. The estimates for Respondents with lower levels of political knowledge are similarly signed but nowhere near statistically significant. This finding also provides support for our claim that being a policy winner or loser affects subsequent political participation since knowing one is a policy winner or loser is an essential ingredient for this to occur.³⁴

Conclusion

We uncover evidence that the policy decisions government makes impact citizens' propensity to participate in the political system. For two important and recent public policies, military involvement in Iraq and the 2001 federal tax cut, we find that public policy both spurs winners to participate more and galvanizes losers to increase their political activity. Notably, this relationship holds even controlling for partisanship, a more global measure of policy winning or losing. In other words, winning and losing on the specific policies that the government enacts seem to affect participation above and beyond any effect of having one's preferred (or not preferred) party in power. We also find that different mechanisms explain increased participation among policy winners and losers, with winners' increased participation

³⁴ An alternative interpretation of the findings in Table 4 is that citizens with greater political knowledge are more likely to hold strong preferences on the Iraq war and tax cuts issues and this explains their increased participation (since we expect more knowledgeable citizens to increase their participation at a greater rate). However, chi square tests that compared preference intensity (0 for not strong, 1 for strong) for those with a political knowledge score above the mean to those with a score below the mean reveal no significant difference in preference intensity based on political knowledge for either issue.

attributable to a boost in their sense of political efficacy and losers' increased participation attributable to this group's dissatisfaction with the direction of policy.

An important caveat to these results is that we cannot be sure that we have accounted for all of the efforts of political parties to mobilize their supporters. What we have interpreted as citizens reacting to experiencing policy success or failure might instead reflect the end result of strategic efforts by political parties to mobilize citizens who parties themselves perceive to be winners or losers. That is, citizens may increase their participation not based on their direct perception that they are a policy winner or loser, but because parties believe them to be and strategically direct resources to getting them to the polling booth. Our control for party mobilization will not fully account for this if citizens do not appreciate that they are the targets of mobilization. Still, our evidence that policy realization and political knowledge condition the effect of policy decisions suggests that something beyond strategic party behavior is at work.

Our finding that citizens often increase their involvement in politics when government policies do not run in their preferred direction relates more broadly to literatures on citizens' relationships with democratic governance (including institutions, policy processes and outcomes, and bureaucracy). These include research on procedural and outcome fairness (e.g. Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; Tyler 1990); research on winning and losing elections (Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 2006); and Madsen's (1987) work on the bureaucracy and efficacy. For instance, Tyler, Casper, and Fisher (1989) show that citizens' "allegiance" to the government depends on their sense of procedural fairness in government decision making, and that the favorability of outcomes interacts with citizens' ex ante allegiance to affect their current allegiance as well. Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2005) find that citizens' acceptance of policies that they oppose varies across national institutions. Our study builds on these studies and shows

that citizens who are on the losing end of policy decisions are less likely to acquiesce when policies they oppose play out in ways that confirm their concerns. Moreover, many citizens who are policy losers not only retain their sense that the government is legitimate, they often increase their civic involvement.

Our results also engage the debate concerning whether citizens fully appreciated the details of the 2001 federal tax cut (Bartels 2005; Hacker and Pierson 2005). One view is that citizens were “ill informed” about the specifics of the tax cut, but broadly supported it (Bartels 2005). Another view is that citizens were rather opposed to it, and a good deal of the support that existed was manufactured (Hacker and Pierson 2005). Our study intersects with this debate in at least two respects. First, we take citizens’ reported support for or opposition to the tax cuts at face value. In this respect, we follow Bartels’ approach. Second, we show that citizens who were more knowledgeable about politics were chiefly the individuals whose participation was subsequently affected by the tax cuts. Moreover, we show that many citizens who knew about and initially supported the cuts but later concluded that the economy was less healthy increased their participation less than initial supporters of the cuts who were more optimistic about the state of the economy four years later. These results are consistent with Bartels’ finding that more politically knowledgeable citizens were more likely to oppose the cuts (i.e. they had a more accurate picture of the likely impact of the cuts on middle and lower income voters) (but see Lupia et al. 2007). They are also consistent with Hacker and Pierson’s contention that much of the initial support for the cuts was manufactured – once citizens observed the results of the cuts for the economy the effect of the cuts on their sense of efficacy and ultimately their participation was attenuated.

Our findings also inform our understanding of the consequences of increasing political polarization within government (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Notably, the two policies where we find that the strength of citizens' preferences predicts an increase in their participation show a good deal of polarization in the public (see Web Appendix Table B-2). If, when government makes decisions, those who are most spurred to increase their future participation are citizens who held strong preferences on a given policy to begin with, then this could lead to a further polarization of the input provided to elected officials. Therefore, the impact of policy outcomes on subsequent political participation could have the important effect of further distorting the public's political "voice" towards a more polarized tenor.

Finally, if winning or losing on one or two issues over a four year span is related to subsequent participation, we suspect that the link is even stronger over a longer period of time. Thus, future studies should attempt to measure the impact of public policies on participation over a much longer time span and across additional policy domains. From this first analysis, it is clear that the relationship between citizens' preferences and the policies that the government adopts is an important future avenue of investigation for researchers attempting to explain variation in political involvement by individuals over time.

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Tables

TABLE 1: POLICY PREFERENCES AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>Iraq War</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Partial Birth Abortion</i>	<i>School Vouchers</i>	<i>Death Penalty</i>	<i>Gays in the Military</i>	<i>Affirm. Action</i>
Preference	-0.803*** [0.299]	-0.571** [0.258]	-0.159 [0.345]	-0.299 [0.442]	0.067 [0.280]	-0.268 [0.253]	-0.415 [0.270]
Preference ²	0.129** [0.058]	0.101** [0.050]	0.018 [0.066]	0.042 [0.087]	-0.029 [0.053]	0.040 [0.051]	0.080 [0.053]
Partisanship	-0.416*** [0.117]	-0.492*** [0.106]	-0.498*** [0.109]	-0.666*** [0.187]	-0.484*** [0.110]	-0.489*** [0.109]	-0.467*** [0.111]
Partisanship ²	0.056*** [0.014]	0.061*** [0.013]	0.061*** [0.014]	0.084*** [0.023]	0.059*** [0.014]	0.060*** [0.013]	0.058*** [0.014]
Δ Mobilization	0.161* [0.086]	0.114 [0.077]	0.128 [0.080]	0.005 [0.131]	0.119 [0.081]	0.114 [0.079]	0.135* [0.082]
Δ Political Interest	0.007 [0.063]	0.022 [0.055]	0.031 [0.058]	-0.023 [0.100]	0.031 [0.059]	0.034 [0.058]	0.080 [0.058]
Δ Presidential Competitiveness	-0.022 [0.017]	-0.025 [0.015]	-0.023 [0.016]	-0.030 [0.026]	-0.025 [0.016]	-0.023 [0.016]	-0.033** [0.016]
Δ Senate Election	-0.125* [0.073]	-0.079 [0.065]	-0.093 [0.068]	-0.070 [0.117]	-0.112 [0.068]	-0.098 [0.067]	-0.111 [0.070]
Education	0.074** [0.034]	0.107*** [0.030]	0.131*** [0.031]	0.156*** [0.050]	0.111*** [0.031]	0.103*** [0.031]	0.121*** [0.032]
Participation in 2000	-0.452*** [0.042]	-0.471*** [0.040]	-0.474*** [0.040]	-0.512*** [0.064]	-0.462*** [0.041]	-0.461*** [0.040]	-0.453*** [0.041]
Constant	2.460*** [0.385]	2.096*** [0.346]	1.668*** [0.414]	2.000*** [0.576]	1.518*** [0.380]	1.765*** [0.325]	1.679*** [0.351]
R ²	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.24	0.19	0.19	0.20
N	620	727	692	263	704	711	657

Dependent variable: Change in 8 item participation index between 2000 and 2004.

Cell entries are OLS estimates; standard errors in brackets.

* denotes $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

TABLE 2: POLICY WINNING, POLITICAL EFFICACY, AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Δ Efficacy	Δ Efficacy	<i>Iraq War</i>		<i>Tax Cuts</i>					
			Δ Participation	Δ Participation	Δ Participation	Δ Participation	Δ Participation	Δ Participation		
			Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Iraq Preference	0.242*** [0.087]									
Tax Cuts Preference		0.259*** [0.076]								
Δ Efficacy			0.055** [0.028]	-0.021 [0.042]	0.051** [0.026]	-0.022 [0.039]				
Partisanship	0.049 [0.050]	0.072 [0.044]	-0.284* [0.159]	-0.437* [0.233]	-0.477*** [0.149]	-0.473** [0.187]				
Partisanship ²			0.045** [0.019]	0.033 [0.031]	0.063*** [0.018]	0.050** [0.024]				
Δ Mobilization			0.074 [0.113]	0.388** [0.171]	0.113 [0.107]	0.152 [0.139]				
Δ Political Interest			-0.037 [0.085]	-0.088 [0.119]	-0.048 [0.072]	0.080 [0.105]				
Δ Presidential Competitiveness			0.001 [0.021]	-0.057* [0.034]	-0.018 [0.021]	-0.022 [0.027]				
Δ Senate Election			-0.131 [0.094]	-0.086 [0.144]	-0.194** [0.089]	0.087 [0.118]				
Education			0.080* [0.043]	0.044 [0.068]	0.086** [0.040]	0.104* [0.058]				
Participation in 2000			-0.446*** [0.053]	-0.506*** [0.085]	-0.474*** [0.054]	-0.436*** [0.069]				
Constant	-0.606** [0.281]	-0.696*** [0.258]	0.949*** [0.342]	2.288*** [0.492]	1.408*** [0.306]	1.593*** [0.435]				
R ²	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.19				
N	562	660	359	187	392	246				

Cell entries are OLS estimates; standard errors in brackets.

* denotes $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

TABLE 3: POLICY LOSING, POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION, AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			<i>Iraq War</i>		<i>Tax Cuts</i>	
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	Δ	Δ	Δ	Δ	Δ	Δ
	<i>Dissatisfaction</i>	<i>Dissatisfaction</i>	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Participation</i>
			Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Iraq Preference	-5.365*** [0.834]					
Tax Cuts Preference		-1.361* [0.755]				
Δ Dissatisfaction			0.002 [0.003]	0.007* [0.004]	0.000 [0.002]	0.009*** [0.003]
Partisanship	-1.311*** [0.477]	-1.703*** [0.442]	-0.331** [0.148]	-0.280 [0.219]	-0.503*** [0.139]	-0.396** [0.172]
Partisanship ²			0.052*** [0.017]	0.017 [0.030]	0.068*** [0.017]	0.043* [0.022]
Δ Mobilization			0.131 [0.104]	0.229 [0.156]	0.165* [0.099]	0.042 [0.125]
Δ Political Interest			0.037 [0.076]	-0.098 [0.116]	0.010 [0.068]	0.094 [0.097]
Δ Presidential Competitiveness			-0.012 [0.020]	-0.044 [0.031]	-0.029 [0.019]	-0.021 [0.025]
Δ Senate Election			-0.130 [0.087]	-0.113 [0.134]	-0.195** [0.083]	0.083 [0.107]
Δ Education			0.088** [0.040]	0.028 [0.064]	0.091** [0.038]	0.107** [0.053]
Participation in 2000			-0.451*** [0.049]	-0.509*** [0.081]	-0.473*** [0.050]	-0.477*** [0.064]
Constant	19.424*** [2.680]	8.968*** [2.557]	0.943*** [0.319]	2.026*** [0.456]	1.342*** [0.286]	1.487*** [0.389]
R ²	0.10	0.03	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21
N	631	741	405	210	434	285

Cell entries are OLS estimates; standard errors in brackets.

* denotes $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

TABLE 4: POLICY PREFERENCE, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Iraq War</i>		<i>Tax Cuts</i>	
<i>Political Knowledge</i>	> Mean	< Mean	> Mean	< Mean
Preference	-0.938** [0.410]	-0.447 [0.442]	-0.723** [0.366]	-0.192 [0.366]
Preference ²	0.160** [0.080]	0.065 [0.084]	0.134* [0.072]	0.034 [0.070]
Partisanship	-0.380** [0.164]	-0.397** [0.167]	-0.501*** [0.151]	-0.438*** [0.147]
Partisanship ²	0.049** [0.020]	0.054*** [0.021]	0.059*** [0.019]	0.055*** [0.018]
Δ Mobilization	0.017 [0.119]	0.331*** [0.125]	-0.018 [0.108]	0.274** [0.110]
Δ Political Interest	-0.010 [0.102]	0.056 [0.080]	-0.007 [0.092]	0.088 [0.069]
Δ Presidential Competitiveness	-0.021 [0.023]	-0.031 [0.025]	-0.025 [0.021]	-0.033 [0.022]
Δ Senate Election	-0.077 [0.103]	-0.183* [0.103]	0.017 [0.094]	-0.171* [0.091]
Education	0.013 [0.049]	0.078 [0.052]	0.052 [0.045]	0.113** [0.044]
Participation in 2000	-0.451*** [0.056]	-0.510*** [0.068]	-0.476*** [0.053]	-0.526*** [0.062]
Constant	3.016*** [0.523]	1.874*** [0.593]	2.744*** [0.486]	1.407*** [0.504]
R ²	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.22
N	337	283	380	347


Dependent variable: Change in 8 item participation index between 2000 and 2004.

Cell entries are OLS estimates; standard errors in brackets.

* denotes $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.


Figures

FIGURE 1: CITIZENS' POLICY PREFERENCES AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BETWEEN 2000 AND 2004




Data Source: National Election Studies 2000-2002-2004 Panel.

FIGURE 2: MEAN CHANGE IN PARTICIPATION FROM 2000 TO 2004 BY SUPPORT FOR ENTERING IRAQ IN 2002 AND BELIEF THAT THE IRAQ WAR WAS WORTH IT IN 2004



Data Source: National Election Studies 2000-2002-2004 Panel.

FIGURE 3: MEAN CHANGE IN PARTICIPATION FROM 2000 TO 2004 BY SUPPORT FOR TAX CUTS IN 2000 AND IMPRESSIONS OF THE HEALTH OF THE ECONOMY IN 2004



Data Source: National Election Studies 2000-2002-2004 Panel.