Chapter 7
How Cognitive and Neurobiological Sciences Inform Values Education for Creatures Like Us

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Historically, not much of values education theory has been rooted in the neuro- and psychological sciences. Kohlberg's enterprise was rooted in philosophy (Kohlberg 1981), Piaget's in non-human biology (1932), Gilligan's in psychoanalytic theory (Gilligan 1982), Shweder's in cultural anthropology (Shweder 1993). Yet a prescription for moral or values education requires an up-to-date and frank assessment of human nature, needs, and possibilities (Flanagan 1991; McKinnon 1999). Like a chef, educators need to think about the nature of the ingredients with which they work and the potentials that lie within. In education, this requires having an empirically derived human psychology and an empirically grounded pedagogy. A smattering of each is provided here. After reviewing two main approaches to values education, I suggest new directions for values education more strongly rooted in recent findings of social sciences and in a Triune Ethics theory.

1 The Clash in Values Education

First, a dash of history painted with a broad brush (for more, see Lapsley & Narvaez 2006; Narvaez 2005). Two paradigms, derived from philosophical considerations, have driven perceived opposing views of values education in the USA. One philosophical paradigm represents particularist claims regarding virtue, or character ethics (MacIntyre 1981). The driving concerns of this view are the nature of a good life and the attributes necessary to live a good life (e.g., Anscombe 1958; Hursthouse 1999; McDowell 1997). The primary emphasis is on the agent and the deliberate cultivation of virtues or excellences. The individual is responsible for discovering what virtues and values are inherent in the self, and for cultivating them with the support of the community. In this view, nothing in a life is devoid of moral meaning.

The contrasting view, rule ethics, emphasizes universalist claims regarding justice and reasoning (Frankena 1973; Kant 1949). Rule ethics focuses on what is *the right thing to do* in a particular moral situation (e.g., Hare 1963; Rawls 1971). In this view, morality is largely limited to a narrow range of obligatory action and is propelled by reasoning about such action. Moral conduct is that which accords

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with applicable principles for a particular situation but only in narrow slices of life. Moral considerations exclude vocational and leisure activities as well as choice of friends. Few demands are made on individuals. Instead, moral obligation is reduced to that which can be formulated with respect to universal moral principles and becomes what is universally applicable (e.g., Kant's Categorical Imperative).

Both philosophical approaches are tied to educational approaches in the USA. Rule Ethics formed the underpinning of Kohlberg's theory and approach – what I call rational moral education. Aligned with an emphasis on what is the right thing to do, Kohlberg prioritized deliberative moral reasoning, developed through moral dilemma discussion (Blatt & Kohlberg 1975). Indeed, there is considerable research showing that explicit moral reasoning develops and is stimulated in the ways Blatt and Kohlberg suggested (e.g., McNeel 1994; Rest & Narvaez 1994).

The numerous critiques of Kohlberg's emphasis on objective moral reasoning range from the neglect of moral virtues other than justice (e.g., responsibility, Gilligan 1982), the cultural universality of measurement and theory (Shweder 1991), the lack of grounding in evolutionary science (Krebs 2005), and the neglect of intuition (Haidt 2001). Kohlberg transformed his approach with the just community schools, which emphasized applying reasoning in the context of community building and democratic polity (Power et al. 1989).

In sharp contrast to rational moral education stands what is called "traditional character education" (Wynne & Ryan 1993), which is related to Character Ethics. Here, the focus is on right action and developing a virtuous agent who naturally carries out moral action. Right habits should be developed through repeated practice. Although Aristotle is cited to support this approach, in practice it has not been very successful because of superficial application and an inadequate pedagogy (Kohn 1997a, b; Leming 1997; Narvaez 2006). Kohlberg (1981) excoriated this approach for promoting moral relativism with a "bag of virtues", whose content shifts with the purveyor.

Despite the perceived conflict between these two approaches to values education, they can be viewed as complementary (O'Neill 1996), especially in light of what psychological science is revealing about human behavior and decision-making. The Aristotelian emphasis on intuition development is more empirically aligned with everyday human behavior. Yet it is the deliberative reasoning that has convinced us of injustice (e.g., Atlantic slave trade).

2 The Nature of Value Judgments

Among values educators and theorists there has been a long-standing assumption, garnered from philosophy, that value judgments drive moral behavior (e.g., Blasi 1980; Kohlberg 1981; Piaget 1932). Most famously, adopting this philosophical view, Kohlberg emphasized the importance of moral reasoning and its development. Through moral dilemma discussion, cognitive conflict is generated and opportunities for multiple perspective-taking are provided. These have positive effects on moral reasoning development in which a student increases moral

judgment capacities. In fact, developing deliberative reasoning in this way facilitates just action by providing opportunities to think outside of cultural norms. Extensive reasoned argument was the catalyst for the 19th century's abolition of slavery, woman's suffrage, and civil and human rights. Nevertheless, there is only a weak link between moral reasoning and moral behavior (Blasi 1980; Thoma 1994). The explanation for the chasm between knowing and doing, evident across psychological fields, has recently become clearer and, consequently, is instigating a paradigm shift in mainstream psychology (Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

Despite the robust findings in Kohlberg's work (Rest et al. 1999), focusing on deliberative reasoning as the key to moral decision-making and behavior reflects a fading paradigm. Since philosophy began, conscious, deliberative reasoning has been considered primary in decision-making whereas the work of the unconscious has been considered secondary, oppositional to rationality, or even nonexistent. In the new paradigm, based on decades of research (and *not* based on Freud's conceptualizations), unconscious processing is dominant whereas conscious, deliberative processing is secondary and rare (Bargh 1997). "Higher mental processes that have traditionally served as quintessential examples of choice and free will – such as goal pursuit, judgment, and interpersonal behavior – have been shown recently to occur in the absence of conscious choice or guidance" (Bargh & Ferguson 2000, p. 926). Recent research demonstrates that humans are not rational agents in the classical sense, who make choices based on deliberative reasoning. Instead, most information processing is automatic (Bargh 1999). Most decisions are made without deliberation (Hammond 2000). Most of our daily activity is governed by cognitive processes that are preconscious and automatic (Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Bargh & Ferguson 2000). For example, humans are easily primed to make decisions without awareness (Bargh & Ferguson 2000) and decisions are often opportunistic, based on what pops into working memory (e.g., the "availability heuristic" of Tversky & Kahneman 1973).

In short, humans have two types of "minds" (e.g., Kahneman 2003). One is deliberative and conscious, a serial processor that uses logic. The other mind is intuitive and comprised of multiple nonconscious, parallel-processing systems. These two "minds" have been described in various ways, many contrasting the implicit nature of one with the explicit nature of the other (e.g., Kandel et al. 2000; Reber 1993). The explicit system includes declarative or semantic knowledge (knowing that). It extracts principles and theory from experience. The implicit, intuitive system includes procedural and conditional knowledge (knowing how) and learns by doing. It develops routines and automatic responses.

One of the more thorough descriptions of the implicit system (comprised of multiple unconscious systems) is provided by Hogarth (2001). He describes three levels of processing that underlie intuitive processes: basic, primitive, and sophisticated. They represent primitive, implicit, default processing systems (Reber 1993), meaning that they are robust when explicit systems are damaged; there is low variability of function among individuals; they are independent of age and IQ; and there is a commonality of processes across species. The basic information processing system, possessed by most animals, includes instinctive behaviors that regulate life (e.g., the feeling of hunger precipitated by a drop in blood sugar that results in the conscious desire to seek food).

The primitive information processing system learns implicitly and processes basic information devoid of meaning such as subsymbolic processing of environmental stimuli, mechanistic registration of the frequencies and covariation of events, inferring implicit rules of systems that are encountered (e.g., grammar). It too is possessed by many animals. The third system, the sophisticated unconscious, guides perceptual processing, attends to meaning and affect, and recognizes affordances (opportunities for action). These nonconscious processing systems are highly influenced by the social and physical environment. They are very sensitive to recurring patterns in the environment, so environments must be designed carefully for appropriate learning.

Of course, values education should not be approached as an "either/or" between rational moral education and character education, or between deliberation and intuition. Although rational moral education has emphasized the importance of reasoning and traditional character education has emphasized the importance of acting properly (from habits or intuition), both systems are required for moral agency and moral personhood. The intuitive mind makes decisions and takes actions without conscious awareness most of the time. Yet the deliberative mind is vital for guiding intuition development and countering poor intuitions (Hogarth 2001). In light of the dual nature (implicit/explicit) of the human mind, how should we approach values education? An approach that melds the two paradigms is moral expertise development.

3 Moral Expertise

The proposal here is that we should treat moral virtue or excellence, like Plato and Aristotle, as a type of expertise (Narvaez 2005; Narvaez & Lapsley 2005). Experts differ from novices in several key ways. They have more and better organized knowledge (Sternberg 1998). They have declarative (explicit), procedural (implicit) and conditional knowledge. In short, they know what knowledge to access, which procedures to apply, how to apply them, and when. They perceive the world differently, noticing underlying patterns and seeing necessity where novices see nothing remarkable. Expert behavior is automatic and effortless. Experts function as more complex adaptive systems in their approaches to solving problems in the domain whereas novices miss the affordances available. Experts have highly developed intuitions as well as explicit knowledge. Moreover, their sense of self is highly connected to their skilled action. They are motivated for excellence.

As the ancients (e.g., Aristotle 1988; Mencius 1970) pointed out, virtue is a form of expertise. A virtuous person is like an expert who has highly cultivated skills – sets of procedural, declarative, and conditional knowledge – that are applied appropriately in the circumstance. In other words, moral exemplars in the fullest sense demonstrate moral (knowing the good) and practical wisdom (knowing how to carry it out in the situation). Expertise is applying the right virtue in the right amount at the right time.

What specifically does expertise look like in the moral domain? Moral experts demonstrate holistic orientations in one or more of four processes that comprise moral behavior: ethical sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical focus, and ethical

action (Narvaez & Rest 1995; Rest 1983). Experts in Ethical Sensitivity are better at quickly and accurately "reading" a moral situation and determining what role they might play. They role take and control personal bias in an effort to be morally responsive to others. Experts in Ethical Judgment have many tools for solving complex moral problems. They use reason about duty and consequences, responsibility, and religious codes. Experts in Ethical Focus cultivate ethical self-regulation that leads them to prioritize ethical goals. They foster an ethical identity that leads them to revere life and deepen commitment. Experts in Ethical Action know how to keep their "eye on the prize", enabling them to stay on task and take the necessary steps to get the ethical job done. They are able to intervene courageously and take initiative for others. Experts in a particular excellence have more and better organized knowledge about it, have highly tuned perceptual skills for it, have deep moral desire for it, and have highly automatized, effortless responses. In short, they have more *content* knowledge and more *process* knowledge. Expertise is a set of capacities that can be put into action. Suggested skills are listed in Table 1 (from Narvaez et al. 2003; 2004).

Children are virtual novices in every domain, including the moral domain. How do we cultivate their expertise? We should follow the training that future experts receive. Experts-in-training build implicit and explicit understandings about a domain, engaging both the deliberative and intuitive minds. Their practice is focused, extensive, and coached through contextualized, situation-based experience. Their environments are well structured, providing appropriate and accurate feedback (e.g., the chef-in-training gets feedback both from the food prepared and from the coach who judges it). Expert education in a particular domain cultivates reasoning and intuitions simultaneously. Immersion in the domain occurs at the same time that theory is presented, cultivating both intuitions and deliberative understanding (Abernathy & Hamm 1995). Through the course of expertise training, perceptions are fine tuned and developed into chronically accessed constructs; interpretive frameworks are learned and, with practice, applied automatically; action schemas are honed to high levels of automaticity (Hogarth 2001). What is painfully rule-based as a novice becomes, with vast experience, automatic and quick for an expert (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1990). "A wise (or virtuous) person is one who knows what is good and spontaneously does it" (Varela 1999, p. 4).

Expertise is highly skilled ethical coping in the situation. The mechanism of virtue development is the regularities rehearsed in the interaction among the person's needs, the environment's responsiveness, and the interpretation of both. So, for example, a child who is listened to by a parent only when she cries or whines, learns that not only are people unreliable but making a lot of emotional noise is an appropriate method for moving through the world. In contrast, a child with a parent who responds caringly and in an appropriate time frame to the child's needs learns that the world is a benevolent place where one can meet one's needs through social connection.

Before specifying the steps a teacher can take to develop moral expertise, it is important to review the nature of human moral propensities. I present a brief description of the Triune Ethics theory, a moral psychology theory.

Table 1 Ethical skills

Ethical Sensitivity
ES-1: Understand Emotional Expression
ES-2: Take the Perspective of Others
ES-3: Connecting to Others
ES-4: Responding to Diversity
ES-5: Controlling Social Bias
ES-6: Interpretations Situations
ES-7: Communicate Well
Ethical Judgment
EJ-1: Understanding Ethical Problems
EJ-2: Using Codes and Identifying Judgment Criteria
EJ-3: Reasoning Generally
EJ-4: Reasoning Ethically
EJ-5: Understand Consequences
EJ-6: Reflect on the Process and Outcome
EJ-7: Coping
Ethical Motivation
EM-1: Respecting Others
EM-2: Cultivate Conscience
EM-3: Act Responsibly
EM-4: Help Others
EM-5: Finding Meaning in Life
EM-6: Valuing Traditions and Institutions
EM-7: Developing Ethical Identity and Integrity
Ethical Action
EA-1: Resolving Conflicts and Problems
EA-2: Assert Respectfully
EA-3: Taking Initiative as a Leader
EA-4: Planning to Implement Decisions
EA-5: Cultivate Courage
EA-6: Persevering
EA-7: Work Hard

4 The Triune Ethics of Moral Psychology

The Triune Ethics theory is derived from psychological, evolutionary, and neurosciences. Human morality has neurobiological roots that are apparent in the biological structures and circuitry of the human brain (Panksepp 1998), the neuronal wiring of the heart (Armour 1991; Armour & Ardell 1994) and the most recent addition to the brain, the prefrontal cortex (MacLean 1990). One can discern at least three distinctive systems that have evolved from our ancestors, some of which are reflected in the behavior of other animals (de Waal 1996). Triune Ethics theory (Narvaez 2006) identifies three types of value sets, rooted in neurobiology, that propel human moral action on an individual and group level: the Ethic of Security, the Ethic of Engagement, and the Ethic of Imagination.

The Ethic of Security is based primarily in instincts for survival and physical flourishing. Subcortically driven instincts for seeking (autonomous exploration) and emotional circuitry for fear and rage when autonomy or safety is thwarted are systems shared with all animals (Panksepp 1998). The security ethic is oriented to physical factors in two senses. First, it maintains physical survival through self-protection, exploration, and autonomy. This is apparent in organisms automatically exploring their environments and becoming enraged when prevented from doing so, and learning from experience what is unsafe (e.g., the visual cliff, the Garcia effect). Second, the security ethic is attendant to physical flourishing through status enhancement (hierarchy or pecking order) and in-group loyalty (purity). The security ethic is in ascendance when individuals seek out uniqueness of self or group. For example, it was reported that 90% of members of an evangelical congregation left after the pastor began to preach an inclusive rather than an exclusive message, saying that the whole world would be saved not just those of their brand of faith (National Catholic Reporter 2005). When a security ethic is a cultural norm, inclusivity is an unwelcome message.

The security ethic aligns with Kohlberg's preconventional stages 1–2 (although Kohlberg theory underestimated the group elements). Like Kohlberg's preconventional stages, the security ethic is very concerned with self-preservation and personal gain, although it operates primarily implicitly. It can easily dominate thought and behavior when the person or group is threatened (MacLean 1990), or when children are not properly nurtured (Pearce 2002). When the security ethic is triggered, defenses go up, in-group/out-group differences are emphasized, rivalry and the pecking order are stressed, and/or superorganismic (mob) thinking and behavior is set in motion (Bloom 1995). In order to minimize triggering the defense systems of the Security ethic, the environment must be emotionally and physically safe. Providing a safe, secure environment where basic needs are met allows students to minimize triggering the security ethic and allows an emphasis on the ethics systems (engagement and imagination) that better represent human aspirations. Control systems such as those in the prefrontal cortex are not fully developed until the early 1920s (Giedd et al. 1999) and are easily overtaken by the hindbrain's self-protective impulsivity (Bechara 2005) so that adults must still offer guidance until the brain is fully developed.

The Ethic of Engagement involves the emotional systems that drive us toward intimacy. Found among mammals and particularly among our closest Hominoid cousins, the bonobos (de Waal & Lanting 1997), these systems were identified as the locus of human moral sense by Darwin (1891; Loye 2002) because they are the root of our social and sexual instincts, manifesting empathy and parental care. An individual's morality has roots in these systems, but they are dependent on proper care in infancy to develop the brain circuitries necessary for successful social engagement and cultural membership (Greenspan & Shanker 1999; Panksepp 1998). Early parenting designs the brain: "Interpersonal experiences thus plays a special organizing role in determining the development of brain structure early in life and the ongoing emergence of brain function throughout the lifespan" (Siegel 1999, p. 21). Inadequate childcare leads to deficiencies in the

hormonal regulation and system integration that lead to sociality (Prescott 1996). The self in the present, in relationship, in emotional context, drives our relational moral orientation toward trust, love, and reciprocity or toward mistrust, uncertainty, and shame (Schore 1994).

The engagement ethic reflects Kohlberg's stage 3 primarily and the relational focus of feminist approaches (e.g., Noddings 1992). Through caring relationships and a caring community, teachers can build on empathic tendencies toward an inclusionary compassion for all. Humans are at their most moral when the ethic of engagement is linked with the ethic of imagination.

The third is the Ethic of Imagination. The neocortex, particularly the prefrontal lobes, is the seat of imagination, and is not fully developed until the early or middle twenties. Some argue that the prefrontal lobes develop FULLY only under the right (nurturing) circumstances rarely found anymore in Western countries like the USA (Pearce 2002). The natural flow of childhood established over many thousands of years (e.g., natural childbirth, breast-feeding for several years, nearly constant close physical contact with others in the early years of life, play) have been deracinated by Western culture and adult self-preoccupation and fear.

The Ethic of Imagination is also the source of our deliberative reasoning, which can counter the intuitions and instincts that drive immorality with "free won't" (Cotterill 1998). Although humans have evolved to favor face-to-face relationships and have difficulty imagining those not present (such as future generations), the prefrontal lobes unique to humans provide a means for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate relations. When the Ethic of Imagination is integrated with the "heart-brain" (Armour 1991), transcendental consciousness may result (ibid). It is able to combine compassion with problem solving.

Value problems can occur when children are not properly nurtured and when a culture or environment stresses individual survival to the extent that, in both cases, the ethic of security predominates, promoting self-centered, and potentially violent behavior. Value problems on the individual level can derive from the security ethic circumventing or shutting down the engagement ethic while hijacking the imagination ethic, to the detriment of the individual or those at hand. Similarly, value problems among human groups derive from the ethic of security, one organism (the group) competing against another for survival (i.e., high status or perceived basic needs). The bias of the ethic of security is toward one's in-group in a me/not-me sense (not an emotional solidarity sense). In fact, animals are known to commit suicide for the good of the group. The ethic of security can enslave the ethic of imagination to narrow conceptions of acceptable reality (ideology). When competing ideologies face off, the superorganism tendencies (mob mentality) take over with the dualistic perception that one's perspective is moral and the opposing view is evil.

An individual's value problems can also derive from a lack of moral and practical wisdom (expertise), knowing which virtue(s) to apply, how and how much, in a particular situation. Few individuals are virtuous moral exemplars or experts who can do this the majority of the time. The rest of us struggle with (if not completely miss) value decisions on a daily basis: What is the moral thing to do here and now? How do I balance competing moral goals? Moral and practical wisdom require

extensive practice, especially in a complex pluralistic society. The Integrative Ethical Education model provides guidance for educators desiring to promote moral and practical wisdom.

5 Step-by-Step Values Education

The Integrative Ethical Education model (IEE; Narvaez 2005) provides an intentional, holistic, comprehensive, empirically derived approach to values education. It is rooted in what is known by ancient philosophy and current science to cultivate human flourishing. As Aristotle pointed out, human flourishing necessarily includes individuals and communities, and this is the perspective arising from research in cognitive neuroscience. With the proper care, humans are biologically wired to be empathic, social beings (e.g., de Waal 2006).

The IEE model is presented in a step-by-step format. The recommendations are empirically derived. It is recommended that new teachers start at the beginning and add each step as they feel comfortable. The steps are in the order of logic and importance. Figure 1 lists all the steps.



Fig. 1 Overall context: high expectations for behavior and learning

5.1 Step 1: Establish a caring Relationship with each Student

Ideally, the family home provides deep emotional nourishment for the child, but this rarely happens in a typical US household these days, due to both parents working and a variety of distracting activities. In a day when children are emotionally malnourished, much rides on the adults they see every day, educators. In fact the most important protective factors against poor outcomes for a child are caring relationships, first, with an adult in the family, second, with an adult outside the family (Masten 2003). Why is caring so vital? As mammals, we are primarily social-emotional creatures; the cool logic of a nonemotional Dr. Spock is a sign of pathology, not health.

Human minds and hearts are wired for emotional signaling and emotional motivation (Greenspan & Shanker 2004; Panksepp 1998). If these are ignored or mishandled by the educator, then the security ethic will predominate. The students will spend much of their energy in self-protection, leaving little energy for learning. The educator needs to establish healthy emotional signaling with each student in order to influence his or her emotional drive. An emotional connection provides the bridge for communication and influence. Without it, academic motivation is reliant on the residue of family motivation (which works fine for most Asian Americans but not so well for other students in American classrooms, Steinberg 1996; Li 2005). Teachers should individualize their care for students, like a good parent. Of course, this means getting to know the child, respectfully, as much as possible. As long as teachers maintain a humane classroom, students will be more likely to feel safe and engaged in learning, including moral learning.

5.2 Step 2: Establish a Caring Supportive Classroom Climate

Since much of our behavior is based on our tacit knowledge or intuitions (Hogarth 2001; Sternberg 2001), adults must create environments that "tune up" the right intuitions in children. The environment includes the climate or atmosphere which refers to the culture of the social environment in both a broad and a specific sense. In the broad sense the climate includes the structures of the social environment, the overt and hidden systems of rewards and punishment, the goals and aspirations of the social group, and the general discourse about goals. In the specific sense, climate has to do with how people treat one another, how they work together, how they make decisions together, what feelings are encouraged, and what expectations are nurtured. A positive climate meets the needs of the child and fosters a sense of belonging to the larger group (Baumeister & Leary 1995).

Values educators should ensure that the school and classroom environments are teaching the right intuitions, intuitions that promote prosocial behavior, virtue and moral identity development. Prosocial behavior is nurtured in climates that foster flourishing and the "developmental assets" that support resiliency (Benson et al.

1998; Wang et al. 1998). In fact, caring schools and classrooms have specific features that are associated with multiple positive outcomes for students. According to Solomon et al. (2002), caring school and classroom communities have the following characteristics: (a) student autonomy, self-direction, and influence; (b) student interaction, collaboration, and participation in open discussion; (c) teacher warmth, acceptance, support and modeling; (d) training in social skills; and (e) opportunities for helping others. A well-structured environment for teaching character has these characteristics. A caring classroom (and school) climate with high expectations for achievement and behavior is related both to high achievement and to moral behavior (Zins et al. 2004).

In a caring classroom, discipline is not punishment but is coached character development. Educators can use the ethic of imagination ("who should I be?") to promote and emphasize the ethic of engagement (e.g., how can we show respect for one another? How can we help one another feel cared for in the classroom?). Educators can foster awareness of the heart intelligence that leads to prosocial behavior and happiness (HeartMath 2001).

One way to build a positive climate and positive emotion is through play. Play is fundamental for development in every species that requires time to learn to be an adult (Fagan 1981). Most of what is learned is learned implicitly through full engagement (Hogarth 2001; Reber 1993) which happens with play (Montague 1983). Children play until they become enculturated to do otherwise. Playfulness enhances the engagement ethic; good humor is able to defuse the defensiveness of the security ethic by activating the frontal lobes with laughter (Wiseman 2002).

5.3 *Step 3: Teach Ethical Skills Across the Curriculum and Extracurriculum*

In simpler times, children learned morality through observation and direct contact with adults during the basic chores and activities of life at home and in the local community. Divorced from the everyday life of most adults and placed in the artificial learning setting of the school, children's social life revolves around the classroom and school. It is here they learn how to get along with peers, how to participate in group work and decision-making, how to be a citizen, and many other skills they take with them into adulthood. "The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life" (Dewey 1909/1975, p. 14). As Dewey argues, the school should be constructed as a social institution that integrates intellectual and moral training.

It bears emphasizing that the good life is not lived in isolation. One does not flourish alone. IEE is implemented in and with a community. It is the community who establishes, and nourishes the individual's moral voice, providing a moral anchor. Indeed, both Plato and Aristotle agreed that a good person is above all a good citizen. Hunter (2000) suggests that we find the answers to our existential questions in the particularities that we bring to a civic dialogue: "Character outside of a lived community, the entanglements of complex social relationships, and their

shared story, is impossible" (p. 227). It is in the community that students apply and hone their ethical competencies.

What competencies should be emphasized in school? IEE suggests that the Four Component Model (Narvaez & Rest 1995; Rest 1983) provides a functional view of moral behavior. Seven skills for each of the four components (sensitivity, judgment, focus, action) have been identified (for more details, see Narvaez 2005; Narvaez et al. 2004). Many of the suggested skills are required for living a good life and/or for active democratic citizenship. These are skills of emotional intelligence, getting along with others, active and effective citizenship (Narvaez et al. 2003).

In the Minnesota Community Voices and Character Education project, teacher teams decided which skills to emphasize during academic instruction. Using materials provided by the project leaders and teacher-designed lessons, the skills approach had a significant effect on those schools who implemented broadly over one year's time (see Narvaez et al. 2004).

5.4 *Step 4: Use an Apprenticeship Model: Novice-to-Expert Pedagogy*

Teachers are often less reflective about pedagogy when it comes to character than when it comes to academics. They fall for the "posters on the wall" or "trait of the month" approach when this would be laughable for an academic subject. Moreover, in traditional character education it is typical to emphasize rote learning and compliance, rather than real understanding (Kohn 1997a, b).

Learning involves an active and interactive process of transforming conceptual structures through selective attention and by relating new information to prior knowledge (Anderson 1989). Best practice instruction provides opportunities for students to develop more accurate and better organized representations and the procedural skills required to use them (ibid). In order to do this, children must experience an *expert-in-training pedagogy* for each skill that they learn. Teachers can set up instruction to help students develop appropriate knowledge by designing lessons according to the following four levels of activities (Narvaez et al. 2004; Narvaez 2005):

Level 1: *Immersion in examples and opportunities*. Teachers provide models and modeling of the goal, draw student attention to the "big picture" in the subject area, and help the students learn to recognize basic patterns.

Level 2: *Attention to facts and skills*. Teachers focus student attention on the elemental concepts in the domain in order to build more elaborate concepts.

Level 3: *Practice procedures*. The teacher allows the student to try out many skills and ideas throughout the domain to build an understanding of how skills relate and how best to solve problems in the domain.

Level 4: *Integrate knowledge and procedures*. The student finds numerous mentors and/or seeks out information to continue building concepts and skills. There

is a gradual systematic integration and application of skills and knowledge across many situations.

How should values education be structured? As in training for expertise, educators should instruct both the deliberative mind and the intuitive mind. The intuitive mind is cultivated through imitation of role models and the appropriate feedback from the environment. The deliberative mind can be coached in fine-tuning action and in how to select good environments for intuition development. By providing theoretical explanation and chance for dialogue, the deliberative mind builds understanding. By providing a grand prosocial narrative, the child internalizes a personal narrative and the deliberative mind's imagination is engaged in activities that bring it about.

5.5 Step 5: Foster Student Self-Regulation

Plato understood human existence to be a problem to the self, "the problem of deciding what to become and endeavoring to become it" (Urmson 1988, p. 2). In other words, the final responsibility for character development lies with the individual. In their choices and actions, orientations and time allocations, individuals address the question: Who should I be? In an enriched moral environment, students are provided with tools for self-regulation in character formation.

Individuals can be coached not only in skills and expertise but in domain-specific self-efficacy and self-regulation (Zimmerman et al. 2002). The most successful students learn to monitor the effectiveness of the strategies they use to solve problems and, when necessary, alter their strategies for success (Anderson 1989). Coaching for self-regulation requires enlisting the deliberative mind to help the intuitive mind. Armed with theoretical knowledge, the deliberative mind, for example, plays a critical role in learning by selecting the environments from which the intuitive mind learns effective behaviors, thereby accelerating implicit learning (Hogarth 2001). For example, different intuitions are developed when reading a good book than when playing violent video games. Students can learn the metacognitive skills that moral experts have, such as self-monitoring of attention away from temptations, self-cheerleading when energy flags, and selecting or designing the environment to maximize goal completion (Zimmerman 1998). Self-regulation (equilibration) has been a central, driving force of evolution, and development within organisms (e.g., Darwin) along with reflective abstraction (Piaget's *prise de conscience*; Gruber & Voneche 1995).

6 Teacher Moral Expressiveness

People's values are evident in the automatic behaviors they display. These behaviors reflect automatized, social-cognitive schemas derived from social and practical experiences in the world (Lapsley & Narvaez 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley 2005).

Highly reliant on specific cultural orientations, the parameters for our values are laid out in day-to-day experience in our communities. Like children in other times, children in this era learn to value what is favorably and frequently presented to them. Unfortunately, today this means that children's values are in the hands of advertisers and media purveyors, because children spend more time with media influences than any previous generation, and most of what is presented favorably and frequently has to do with celebrity, products, status, and wealth, all of which do not lead to human happiness (Kasser 2002).

Intuitions today are highly influenced by the marketing ploys of capitalism. Marketeers have become adept at tapping into human propensities to seek meaning, a sense of belonging and a sense of autonomy. To the detriment of building a sense of community and citizenship, current marketing encourages intuitions that divide families and communities by their "demographic" category. Instead of marketing and programming for the whole family, as in the past, current marketeers pull the family apart according to its demographic interests. The ploys are so skilled that the individual senses that the product is the right one for him/her (Quart 2003).

The effects can be seen in the manifestation of ethics today. The ethic of security is aggravated when we see what there is to have that others have and we do not ("affluenza" Hamilton & Denniss 2005), promoting addictive seeking and status seeking. The ethic of imagination is hijacked by artificially manufactured desires of consumer culture so that virtue becomes being a good consumer (or being a good citizen means going shopping, as President Bush recommended to US citizens after the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001). The ethic of engagement is twisted into deep interaction with video games and communication with others through media like instant messaging and cell phones; individuals often feel more connected to personalities on television than to their neighbors.

How do parents and educators compete with the massive media culture and the expert peddlers? – by providing favorable and frequent experiences of moral engagement. Educators can market morality in the same way that advertisers market products – by fostering a teacher discourse that draws attention to moral issues and providing opportunities for satisfying social experiences.

Humans learn from stories, those told to us and those told about us (Schank 1999). Advertisers are skilled story tellers, emphasizing the sense of "belonging" that buying a product will bring. Teachers can foster a narrative to counter the hedonism and status-enhancing messages of the media. First, teachers should first and foremost be role models. They should learn to put moral thinking into words. They can think out loud about their own moral decisions, tell stories about striving for moral goals, read stories that develop the child's moral imagination. Second, they should encourage students to construct their own moral goals (e.g., how are you going to make the world a better place for everyone?). Individuals operate according to the narratives they tell themselves (McAdams 1993; Schank 1999). Adults helps structure narratives by the types of questions they ask (e.g., how did you help someone in school today? What positive actions did you take over

vacation? What positive goals do you have for today?) (Nelson & Gruendel 1981). Adults influence children's narratives by what they emphasize, expect, and encourage in the environments they design for children. Third, children (people) learn best through experience. Children's memories should be filled with positive concrete experiences in which they helped others and teachers should remind them of these times.

7 Values Education Policies

To determine values education policy one needs a broad awareness of human psychology and human flourishing, human learning and development, and the importance of context. Here are some suggestions.

Essentially, policies that support values education are those that support children and families. Public policies should promote a sense of safety and security in children and their families (e.g., safe neighborhoods, good schools, maternal/paternal benefits for childcare, affordable housing, full-time wages that can support a family, high quality daycare). Unfortunately, the USA in the early 21st century has fewer of these supports for those who are not fairly wealthy. Sweden's recent 3-year guarantee of maternal benefits is a good idea, but such policies must certainly also be accompanied by parental educational initiatives that include information about the vital importance for brain and social development of breast-feeding, infant holding through the first year, play, and so on (Prescott 1996; Schore 1994). Little of this information is known by the population of the USA. Parents need such education before having children.

Adults need to be better educated about what children need. Too often, adults forget that children are different from them. For example, children process information differently (Piaget 1929), are frightened by different things at different ages (Cantor 1998), are highly impressionable, and imitate what they see (Bandura 1978). The environments of public schools, school buses, and even the family home itself should be scrutinzed by adults. When adults realize what intuitions particular environments foster they will be more conscientious about the environments in which they place children.

Schools can emphasize caring community and foster the steps as noted above. Schools can take up the slack for families and communities by implementing programs that develop empathy and foster compassion (e.g., Roots of Empathy; Schonert-Reichl et al. 2005).

Overall, we can strengthen the connections among children's life spaces: home, school, and community at various levels. Children who live with coordinated systems are adaptationally advantaged (Bronfenbrenner 1979). The type of person a child becomes is determined in large part by the dynamic interaction among community, family, and culture.

8. Conclusion

Successful values education is the process of tuning up intuitions, fostering reasoning, and developing skills and motivations for moral behavior. The goal of values education should not be merely "problem free" – individuals who do not hurt others (a negative duty orientation). Nor should it be, in the language of positive youth development, only "fully prepared", because fully prepared can be mere individualistic prudentialism – getting what you want for yourself. Rather, the goal of values education should be becoming *morally adept* (Lapsley & Narvaez 2006). Moral adeptness requires both negative and positive duties. It means having many skills for ethical living including skills to minimize Security ethic worries and maximize Engagement ethics through nurturing play; it means fostering transcendental morality through the Imagination ethic. Ethical people shape the world in ways that bring about more joy and love in individuals and communities, leading to greater human and global flourishing.

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