

Political Coalitions, Face-To-Face Interactions, and the Public Sphere: An Examination of the Determinants of Repression with Protest Event Data

Marco Giugni and Dominique Wisler

Department of Political Science

University of Geneva

102 Boulevard Carl-Vogt

1211 Geneva 4

Switzerland

E-mail: marco.giugni@politic.unige.ch, dominik.wisler@politic.unige.ch

Abstract

In this paper we focus on the handling by the police of mass demonstrations in Switzerland during the past three decades. Our aim is to single out the determinants of police intervention during these protest events. We look at three sets of potential causes: (1) the configuration of power (i.e. political alliances and coalitions), (2) face-to-face interactions between protesters and the police during demonstrations, and (3) the broader public attention towards the protests. We test hypotheses regarding these three sets of causes using protest event data and applying both time-invariant methods and time-series analysis. The results show that (1) political alliances and coalitions do not have the impact that previous studies have predicted, (2) it is repression that causes violence rather than the other way around, and (3) the likelihood and modes of police intervention are influenced by the broader public attention given to ongoing protests.

Political Coalitions, Face-to-Face Interactions, and the Public Sphere: An Examination of the Determinants of Repression with Protest Event Data¹

Introduction

Social scientists have long inquired into the relationship between repression and political protest. In particular, a number of scholars have paid attention to the escalating or deterring effect of repression on protest (della Porta 1995, 1996; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; Koopmans 1997; Lichbach 1987; Mueller and Weede 1990; Opp and Roehl 1990; Rasler 1996; Wisler et al. 1996). To be sure, explaining why and how repression affects dissent is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between institutional politics and contentious politics. But we also need to shade light on the causes and determinants of repression. This aspect has generally been overlooked in empirical research. However, recently scholars have begun to systematically study the policing of protest (della Porta and Reiter 1998), among other with the aim of shading light on the causes of repression.

In this paper we focus on the handling by the police of mass demonstrations in Switzerland during the past three decades. Our aim is to single out the determinants of police intervention during these protest events. We look at three sets of potential causes: (1) the configuration of power (i.e. political alliances and coalitions), (2) face-to-face interactions between protesters and the police during demonstrations, and (3) the broader public attention towards the protests. We test hypotheses regarding these three sets of causes using protest event data and applying both time-invariant methods and time-series analysis. In addition, we make a distinction between policing in "ordinary" times and policing during cycles of protest, arguing that the dynamics of disruption and repression differ depending on which phase we are considering.

Data and methods

Data for the empirical part of this paper come from a larger study of protest policing in Switzerland. A sample of about 2200 public demonstrations that took place in the four largest Swiss cities (Basel, Bern, Geneva, and Zurich) between 1968 and 1994 forms the basis for the analyses that follow². A number of variables have been created for each demonstration, both referring to the characteristics of the event and the behavior of the police during that event.

¹ This paper was presented at the Second Conference on Protest Event Analysis, Berlin, 9-11 July 1998.

² Some of the analyses will include the years from 1965 to 1967 as well.

The data was collected mainly in local police archives in the four cities. If a descriptive bias is to be found in the data, it should be towards the police, especially when it comes to the description of the reasons of police intervention, This statement is worth making since repression is expected to affect the level of violence. Our analysis focuses on three groups of variables:

1. *Disruption and repression.* Several measures of disruption during demonstrations were coded. For the present purpose, we use two simple measures: a dummy variable indicating whether disorders (defined as administrative or penal infractions) were present or absent during the event or not and, in a similar vein, a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of violence. The mere presence of violence, however, does not tell us who started it. Since we are interested in the impact of disruption on repression and, in an ancillary fashion, in the opposite process, we need a measure that allows us to establish who set in motion the radicalization process, that is, whether the protesters have used violence first or, conversely, whether the intervention by the police came before any violence during the demonstration. A dummy variable indicates the starting of violence by the protesters.

Three dummy variables measuring police repression have been created: the first one indicates the presence of absence of intervention by the police during a demonstration; the second one measures police intervention before any violence provoked by the protesters, which gives us an indicator of the legalistic (vs. tolerant) behavior of the police; and the third one indicates the use of rubber bullets, a rather controversial heavy means of intervention in democratic contexts.³

2. *Configuration of power.* In order to test for the impact of political alliances and coalitions on repression, we focus on three covariates. First, the percentage of seats held by the Socialist party in each of the four cities at the time of each demonstration gives us a measure of the strength of the Left and allows us to test the hypothesis that the stronger the Left the lower the levels of repression. Second, we have constructed an dichotomous variable coded 1 if the Right has a majority of seats in the local parliament during the protest event and 0 if the Left has the majority. In other words, code 1 indicates that the law-and-order coalition has the majority in the parliament, whereas 0 means that the civil-right coalition has the upper hand. Third, we have a dichotomous variable indicating whether the police department is controlled by the Right (1) or the Left (0).

³ Rubber bullets, which were used above all in Zurich, were banned there by the local legislature in 1981. However, as the executive is in charge of the public order, the ban was found unconstitutional by the Federal court and rubber bullets have continued to be used.

3. *Press coverage.* Our third and last argument refers to the role of public attention for the behavior of the police. To that purpose, we have constructed an indicator of press coverage as a proxy for public attention to protesters and the police. It is a numeric variable measuring the size of articles reporting on public demonstrations in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ) and *Der Bund*. The bigger the articles, the more intense the spotlight of public attention. Our data on the NZZ concerns the full set of demonstrations, but the data of Der Bund is limited to the city of Bern. Data on the coverage of protest were collected in both newspapers through the consultation of the daily issues throughout the period considered (1968-1994).

Cross-sectional and time-series analyses are used to test our arguments. Logistic regression allows us to ascertain the impact of the configuration of power on police intervention. It must be used in place of OLS regression because the dependent variables are dichotomous, that is, we are interested in predicting the likelihood that police will intervene, as well as the style of such intervention, as a function of the strength of the law-and-order coalition (and, conversely, of the civil-rights coalition). OLS regressions are used to test the effect of time during and outside a protest cycle on the intensity (size) of press coverage of mass demonstrations.

Time-series analysis is first used to test hypotheses regarding the interactions between protesters and police during demonstrations. To this purpose, we have constructed a separate data set specifically organized for the analysis of temporal data. Demonstrations in the original sample have been aggregated for each year of the period under study. Observations in the new file are yearly or monthly cumulative percentages of variable of interest. The following variables are central to our study: violent events, events involving disorders, events whereby violence is initiated by the protesters, events whereby the police has intervened, events whereby the police has displayed a legalistic policing style (i.e. repression without or before the protesters provoke disorders or become violent). In addition, the file includes some covariates such as the strength of the Socialist party in the local parliament (measured through the percentage of seats). Time-series analysis is also used to study the spotlight of public attention during and outside a protest cycle. For the cycle under examination (May 1980 to April 1982 in Zurich), we have constructed monthly time series with the same variables on police and protest as described above, plus the median size of the press articles in terms of percentage of a page. Outside the cycle, we use the variables on a yearly basis.

As we use percentages of the observed variables instead of counts of events, we can apply simple regression techniques⁴. One of the major problems in time-series analysis lies in the fact that usually the error terms are serially correlated, which goes against a basic assumption of linear regression. In the traditional OLS approach, this can often be solved in a quite easy fashion by including a lagged exogenous variable among the covariates. However, this increases the chances to find multicollinearity among the independent variables. Therefore, we prefer to avoid OLS regression and adopt instead a method that takes into account the likely serial correlation in the dependent variable (i.e. in the error terms) and does not require the inclusion of a lagged exogenous variable when autocorrelation is detected. More precisely, we use the AREG procedure in SPSS, which assumes that we are dealing with a first-order autoregressive process.⁵

Time-series analysis has two major advantages for the study of the relationship between repression and radicalization, one theoretical and the other practical. On the theoretical level, it is better suited to capture the dynamic nature not only of the phenomenon studied here, but of social life in general. But the greatest advantages for us here concerns the research practice: temporally-organized data allow us to examine the relationship between social movements and political authorities (in this case, the police) as they unfold over time. In particular, time-series data allows us to introduce lagged variables into the analyses. For example, we can test whether the intervention of the police at time t_0 has an impact of demonstrations at time $t-1$ or vice versa. Similarly, we can consider whether a diminishing public attention at time t_0 has an impact on repression at time $t-1$ during a protest cycle. Yet, in spite of the intrinsically dynamic nature of social movements, most previous studies have been conducted following a cross-sectional approach, hence totally collapsing the variable time. Only few works have adopted a cross-time perspective (Koopmans 1997; Rasler 1996). One of the aims of this paper is to show the promises of this perspective.

⁴ Had we opted for event counts in the dependent variable, we could have used alternative techniques based on Poisson or negative binomial models, which are better suited to deal with count data than ordinary regression based on normal distribution.

⁵ Concretely, this means that the observation at time t_0 is partly dependent on the observation at time $t-1$ on the same variable. Generally, the Durbin-Watson statistic can be used to check for this autocorrelation effect. Though less frequent, more complicated distributions such as higher-order autoregressive, moving-average, or mixed processes can also be encountered. These processes require more sophisticated techniques to be eliminated or incorporated into the model. We have checked for that using autocorrelation function, which confirmed that we can reasonably assume that our variables follow a first-order autoregressive process. In some cases, no significant serial correlation was found.

Political alliances and coalitions

In the first step of our analysis, we look at the impact of political alliances and coalitions on police intervention and repression. Recent work has underscored the role of political opportunity structures as determining the input possibilities for social movements (Costain 1992; della Porta 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 1996; Kriesi 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 1990; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Tarrow 1989, 1994). Political alliances with established and institutional actors are often seen as crucial resources for social movements. This aspect is fundamental in Tarrow's (1994) conception of political opportunity structures. In this view, the configuration of power within institutional political arenas helps explain the fluctuation of protest over time. For example, according to Kriesi et al. (1995), shifts in the configuration of power within the Left are responsible for the ebb and flows in the mobilization of new social movements in western Europe. In particular, the seizure of power by the Socialists in 1981 France had negative repercussions on the political activities of new social movements, leading to a dramatic decline of their mobilization.

The political opportunity model has also been used by social scientists to explain the output of the system in terms of the concrete strategies of authorities (repression or facilitation). In Kriesi et al.'s model, these strategies depend on the configuration of power (alliances) as well as on the authorities' prevailing strategies and the institutional structures. In a similar way, della Porta (1996) sees the policing of protest as a barometer of political opportunity structures. According to her analysis, however, the crucial factor to explain patterns of protest policing is the configuration of power. The strength of the civil-rights coalition depends especially on the position of the social democrats. When they join the coalition, protest policing becomes softer and civil-rights oriented.

Here we test the hypothesis that the configuration of power affects repression. More specifically, we should expect repression to be more frequent when the law-and-order coalition is predominant. This coalition puts a stronger emphasis on the use of institutional channels by social movements and tends to be more negative about public demonstrations, especially if disruptive, than the civil-rights coalition. Tables 1 to 3 show results from logistic regression analysis of three variables pertaining to the configuration of power on various measures of repression, controlling for certain movement-related characteristics and the place. In order to improve the fit of the models, we have selected those actions in which some level of disorders was present. Nevertheless, running the models with all events does not alter the coefficients in a significant fashion. Table 1 gives us a first, partly surprising, indication. It

deals with the factors predicting the presence or absence of interventions by the police during public demonstrations in the four cities under study.

Table 1

This table presents three models. Model 1 shows odds ratios and standardized coefficients for three variables measuring the configuration of power: the presence of a Right majority in the local legislative arena, the percentage of seats held by the Socialist party in that arena, and the political orientation of the police commander in chief. The only statistically significant effect regards the percentage of seats of the Socialist party, the principal component of the civil-rights coalition. Yet, this effect is opposite to what might be expected. A 10 % increase in party strength more than doubles the chances that the police will intervene during public demonstrations.⁶ On the other hand, having a majority of the Right coalition in the local parliament or a rightist police commander do not affect the likelihood of repression.⁷ Regarding the latter aspect, this counters our expectations that the closer we get to the operational level, the stronger the impact of the political coalition due to the higher margin of intervention during protest events.

Model 2 adds four movement-related variables. Of course, the intervention by the police during public demonstrations most likely depend on how disruptive they are. In addition, the size of the event might influence the probability of intervention, in the sense that smaller demonstrations are more easy to control. The police might also tend to be more repressive towards subcultural and countercultural movements, which can be seen as protesting without having specifically political claims, than towards instrumental movements, which are always considered as acting with a clear political aim. Finally, we include a measure of the support received from a given demonstration, which can come either from established actors such as governmental parties and unions or from outsiders such as new parties and citizen's associations. Only the first one of these four movement-related variables has a significant impact. Not surprisingly, violent demonstrations plays the biggest role. This effect is very strong, as violent demonstrations have almost 13 times more chances to be repressed than peaceful ones. In fact, as we will see, this factor is by far the most important one and the only one that is consistently significant after controlling by the other variables. The only problem is to determine the direction of causality between violence and repression, a

⁶ In order to make the odds ration more meaningful, we divided the percentage of seats by 10. This means that a 1 % increase in the data correspond to a real 10 % increase. This rule is applied in the first three tables.

⁷ The systematically non-significant effect of the indicator of legislative majority could partly be due to the skewed distribution of observations on this variable. In effect, only from 1990 to 1994 the Left has held a majority of seats and only in the city of Zurich. Analyses limited to this city did not provide different results.

question that we tackles in the next part of the paper. In contrast, neither the number of participants nor the movement type or the supporting coalition affects police intervention.

Finally, Model 3 controls these relationships for a categorical variable measuring the city where the demonstrations have occurred. Controlling for the city makes the effect of the strength of the Socialist party disappear, but leaves intact the role of violent events and even let emerge a statistically weak but nevertheless interesting impact of the size of demonstrations. This indicates the presence of variations across space and weakens the argument that repression depends on political alliances and coalitions, while support the rather obvious idea that repression and disruption are intimately linked. Do these remark hold when we shift our attention to what explains the style of policing, instead of simply looking at police intervention? Table 2 presents results for this indicator.

Table 2

Again, three models are shown, each one adding a group of independent variables. Here we examine whether these variables increase the chances that the police represses the demonstrations before or in the absence of violence on the part of the protesters, that is, that it follows a legalistic policing style, as opposed to a tolerant style. Here we find two important effects that do not appear in the previous table (in addition to the much weaker effect of violence when controlled for movement-related variables). First, demonstrations supported by outsiders have twice the chances to be the object of a legalistic police intervention that those supported by a coalition of institutional actors. Although this factor is statistically significant only at the 1 % level, this finding suggests that police behavior has something to do with the characteristics of political (and, as we will see, public) support to protest. Second, the role of the police commander becomes statistically significant and very strong once we control for the city. In this case, when the police commander belongs to the Right, legalistic police practices have almost 5 times more chances to occur, independent of the violent or pacific character of protests, of demonstrations' size, of the movement type, and of the city. Thus, unlike the Socialist party variable, the impact of the police commander goes in the direction predicted by the argument that the law-and-order coalition is more inclined to repress social movements. However, this finding is not confirmed if we look at our third indicator of repression, the use of rubber bullets as a heavy means by the police to deter the protest, shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Similarly to the case of police intervention, the only significant variable among those pertaining to the political coalitions is that of the strength of the Socialist party. Furthermore,

this unexpected impact is even stronger, as a 10 % increase in the percentage of socialist seats makes the use of rubber bullets three times more likely to occur, when we control for the movement-related variables. We also see once again that violent protests are a strong predictor of repression, which becomes ten times more likely than in the case of peaceful demonstrations. What is new here is the significant effect of the movement type. Expressive movements have more chances to incur in the use of rubber bullets by the police when they stage a demonstration. This may be due to the fact that, once it is called to intervene to reestablish the public order, the police might be more prone to use a heavy hand against protesters that are seen as intrinsically more disruptive. If this hypothesis proves correct, the study of police culture becomes central to the analysis of the relationship between social movements and public order (Waddington 1994).

In conclusion, we can say that the configuration of power does not have the impact on repression predicted by existing theories. Only one of the three variables examined here – the strength of the Socialist party in the local legislative arena – is consistently significant once we control for the characteristics of movements. But what is more intriguing is that the direction of this relationship is contrary to what one might expect, at least if we do not consider variations between cities. Far from reducing the likelihood of repression, a strong Socialist party seems to bring to increasing police intervention and, moreover, to harder intervention. This effect, however, does not hold when we control the place (i.e. the city) in which the demonstration have occurred, suggesting an important variation across place of the impact of political alliances and coalitions. The Left majority is never significant, but this can be a result of the limitations of our data. Finally, the political affiliation of the police commander seems to play a role only with respect to the style of police intervention, but and again, important variations in the coefficient estimates before and after we control for the city suggests that place matters in this regard as well. But the most consistent finding is the strong relationship between violent demonstrations and repression. This brings us to discuss this aspect more in detail.

Interactions between Protesters and Police

Students of social movements have paid much attention to the effects of government repression on dissent. One conclusion that can be drawn from empirical research is that repression has both positive and negative effects on political protest (Rasler 1996). However, much less effort has been put to understand the reverse process, that is, how protest provokes repression. Such neglect stems from two assumptions that should instead become a matter of

empirical investigation. On the theoretical level, theories of political opportunity structures conceive of repression as deriving from the institutional aspects of the political system, leaving little space for the radicalization processes that can arise once an interactive chain between social movements and state officials (in particular, those associated with the police) is set in motion. On the substantive level, this question can be seen as having an obvious answer: the more disruptive and violent the protest, the more likely and the harder the repression.

Here we inquire into the role of face-to-face interactions between protesters and the police for the processes of repression and radicalization. We are above all interested in determining the direction of the causality. While, as the findings above show, it is very likely that violence and police intervention are strongly interrelated, an approach that conflates time into a single moment leaves the question open whether the former induces the latter or the other way around. Only a method that includes variations across time allows us to determine the direction of causality. A way to do so is to conduct time-series analysis with lagged variables. As our variables are yearly percentages of events, here we use a one-year lag.⁸ In a first step, we ran a series of bivariate regressions among two indicators of repression (police intervention and style of police intervention) and three indicators of disruption (disorders, violence, and starting of violence by the protesters during demonstrations). Each of these variables are reported at time t_0 and at time $t-1$. Results are shown in Table 4, which also gives both the standardized regression coefficients and the Durbin-Watson statistics for serial correlation among the error terms.⁹

Table 4

Without going into too much detail, a number of interesting patterns emerge from these data. First, the intimate connection between disruption and repression is confirmed, a finding which hardly surprises us. The more the police intervenes during public demonstrations, the more these tend to be characterized by disorders and, above all, to be violent. Of course, the reverse is also true. The more disorderly and violent a demonstration, the more likely the intervention by the police in order to reestablish the order. Disorders and violence are also statistically related to the legalistic style of police intervention (i.e. the police started first), although to a lesser extent. In the latter situation, it is clear that a legalistic

⁸ Of course, a different lag could also be used depending on the theoretical question addressed. For the present purpose, ideally we would have used a monthly or weekly lag. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to do so, for the number of observations is insufficient for some years to provide reliable results.

style provokes disruptive events rather than the other way around, for this type of intervention occurs by definition only during initially peaceful demonstrations.

Things look very different when we consider the relationship between repression and events in which violence was initiated by the protesters. Both police intervention and the legalistic style of intervention are negatively linked to the sparking of violence by protesters during public demonstrations. Due to the particular construction of this variable,¹⁰ this result is obvious for the policing style, but quite interesting as far as intervention is concerned. Thus, while the interaction between protesters and police forces produces a radicalization process that often leads to an escalation of political violence (della Porta 1995), our data suggest that repression discourages protesters from starting such escalation. Instead, repression diminishes the chances that social movements behave disruptively from the outset. This seems a reasonable conclusion. But, as far as we can tell from this static approach, this result could also be due to the counterintuitive fact that demonstrations in which protesters start the violence are less likely to be repressed. Only a time-sensitive analysis allows us to solve this puzzle. We can do so by means of regression analysis with lagged independent variables.

Here we can see that our first interpretation was correct: the more frequent the police intervention at time t_0 , the lower the chances that public demonstrations at time $t-1$ turn violent because protesters have started the disorders first. The reverse causality, on the contrary, is not statistically significant. More generally, analyses with lagged variables suggest that previous repression affects present disruption of protest actions. In effect, all but one coefficient that explain the impact of repression on the disruptive character of demonstrations in the following year are significant, while none of the coefficients regarding the reverse causal path appears to be significant. The downward diagonal from left to right gives us a hint as to why it is so. This diagonal shows the strength of the autocorrelation of the five independent variables included in the table. While this effect is usually eliminated or controlled, it has an important theoretical meaning for our present purpose, for it measures the effect that repression (or disruption, for that matter) at time t_0 has on repression at time $t-1$. As we can see, protesters' disorders and violence are positively autocorrelated, while police intervention and style of intervention are not. This suggests that disruption depends more on its previous level than repression. In other words, while disorderly and violent behavior by

⁹ In this time-series analysis, as in all the following ones, we have lowered our requirements as to the level of significance of regression coefficients. We consider a 10 % level as significant, for the limited number of cases tend to yield low levels of significance in general.

protesters during a demonstration is a result both of the repression faced and of the disruption displayed in preceding phases, police behavior seems independent from what happened before and is therefore much more influenced by the concrete interactions at the moment of the demonstration. Unfortunately, due to multicollinearity problems, we are not able to compare the effect of repression and that of lagged disruption within a single multivariate model. But this aspect deserves closer examination.

Tables 5 and 6 show the results of multivariate regression analysis with the two indicators of repression as dependent variables. If we first look at Table 5, we see a highly significant relationship between violent protests and police intervention (Model 1). More precisely, since we are analyzing time-series data, the development over time of the percentage of violent demonstrations has an impact on the development over time of the percentage of demonstrations that have been repressed. So far so good. What is more interesting, though, is that the use of violence in previous occasions (in this case, during the preceding year) does not significantly affect police intervention in the present. These findings hold when we control for the strength of the Socialist party (Model 3), which is the variable that has proved to have the greater explanatory power in the logistic regression, except for violence of demonstrations of course. Incidentally, we remark that the counterintuitive impact of the Socialist party is confirmed.

Table 5

A similar pattern can be seen when we look at the percentage of events in which violence has been initiated by protesters (Models 2 and 4), although here we find the negative relationship between disruption and repression met above. Thus, police intervention seems more influenced by face-to-face interactions during a given demonstration than by the disruptive behavior displayed by protesters in previous periods, thus confirming the impression we got from bivariate analyses. We can see whether this conclusion holds when we look at the style of police intervention. Results are shown in Table 6.

Table 6

Data for this indicator gives us full confirmation of what we just found out. First, there is a strong relationship between violent protests and a legalistic policing style at time t_0 , but no effect with lagged variables. Second, we observe a similarly significant relationship between demonstrations in which violence has been sparked by protesters and this indicator of

¹⁰ In the original variables, we coded 1 all events that saw the intervention by the police before or in the absence of any disorders on the part of the protesters. Similarly, we coded 1 all events in which disorders were initiated by the protesters. Therefore, these two variables mirror each other.

repression, but the lagged variable is not statistically significant. Again, controlling for the strength of the Socialist party does not modify these results. Therefore, we can move to the last step in our analysis, which consists in examining whether there is an impact of previous repression on present disruption. Tables 7 gives the results for violent protests as the dependent variable.

Table 7

If we are certainly not shocked to see that police intervention is a good predictor of violent events at time t_0 , the most relevant finding regards the lagged variable. In effect, we observe a statistically significant relationship between intervention at time $t-1$ and violence during demonstrations at time t_0 . In other words, the more the police has intervened in previous occasions, the more violent the protesters in subsequent events. Thus, while repression depends solely on face-to-face interactions at the present time, disruption depends both on those interactions and on repression on previous occasions. However, as Table 8 shows, this does not holds for the indicator measuring the sparking of violence by protesters.

Table 8

Other things being equal, neither the development over time of the percentage of intervention by the police nor that of a legalistic policing style affect the likelihood that social movements will start the violence during subsequent demonstrations. On the other hand, we have further evidence that repression wielded or initiated by the police during face-to-face encounters with protesters diminishes the chances that the latter will be violent from the outset. Once again, these findings hold when we control for the (significant) role of the Socialist party's strength.

A recapitulation of the main results of time series analysis is needed at this point. First, it confirms that repression and disruption are strongly interrelated during face-to-face interactions, that is, during public demonstrations. By simply stating that, however, we still ignore which direction goes the causal arrow. Is repression provoking disruption and violence, as argue many students of social movements, or rather the other way around, as it would seem reasonable to conclude? Probably both. Yet, if we remains with a static approach that conflates time into a single moment, we will be unable to ascertain whether there really is a mutual reinforcing effect or whether one causal path prevails over the other. Time-series analysis with lagged variables gives a clue to argue that the latter case is true. Well aware of the limitations of our empirical analysis, we can reasonably say that disruption results both from the escalating process during a demonstration and from repression faced in previous occasions, whereas repression arises mainly from face-to-face encounters with protesters at

that demonstration. Second, to go back to our point of departure, it is safe to say that repression is less determined by disruptive or violent behavior on the part of the protesters than it is often suggested. Both police intervention and the style of intervention are causes of radicalization processes rather than their product. Thus, we must look somewhere else to find the determinants of repression. Next we turn to this task.

Mass media and protest policing

In this section, we discuss the role of the public sphere in shaping protest policing. Gamson (1990) argues that the presence of mass media weakens the police. The police is less likely to use overt coercion when it is under the spotlight of public attention. The British police, for example, has replaced the more traditional but also more dramatic charge using the club with tear gas as the dominant means for controlling disorders because the latter looks softer on television. Thus, a decrease in the coverage rate of protest is likely to affect repression. When there is a blind spot in the media, more overt coercive means can be used.

Mass media may also play an important role in the police institution as a proxy for public opinion. The police, as Loubet del Bayle (1992) has pointed out, has become increasingly professional and relatively autonomous from politics. As a result, the police looks increasingly outside the realm of politics to find the ground for their legitimacy. Therefore, it monitors the press to evaluate the public reception of their practices and the images that are produced in the public sphere are likely to affect its behavior.

Disruptive public demonstrations are framed by mass media in the public sphere. For journalists, two basic scenarios or frame packages are available as cultural resources: a civil-rights and a law-and-order frame. Depending on which scenario becomes dominant in the public sphere, the police is more or less inclined to use overt repression. In other words, the outcome of this framing struggle, which occurs almost systematically after each major tumultuous event becomes a key to understand the behavior of the police. Past criticisms are likely to promote a softer approach to protest policing. Let us say a few words about the two frame packages that are available as cultural resources to journalists to frame civil disorders.

The law-and-order coalition generally uses a manipulation model to do a diagnostic of the causes of violence and attribute the blame for the confrontation. This coalition tends to deny that there are a structural problem behind the violence, which is seen as the result of the agitation by wire-pullers, often acting behind the scene. These strategic leaders, in the time of cold war, were described as having links with Moscow and, today, they are considered as another epoch's dinosaurs. Violence, therefore, is not the result of an escalation but it is

“planned”. According to this frame package, police behavior is seen as basically correct, reactive, and the use of force necessary to restore the law. Tougher police measures are required as a necessary and inevitable solution to the problem. The civil-rights coalition, on the other hand, advocates dialogue and tolerance. Violence is interpreted as the top of the iceberg. Deep structural changes and a provocative police combine to produce a violent reaction from demonstrators. The model is both a model of “social change” and violence escalation. In this view, there is a need both for political reforms and a new police (Wisler and Tackenberg 1998).

In the following, we will show that the press displays a *systematic bias* towards a law-and-order frame package when it deals with protest by outsiders, whereas the civil-rights frame package is more often used in the case of institutional protest. As a result, the police applies different levels of repression on the basis of these winning scenarios in the public sphere. The police, of course, has an institutional memory with respect to the public sphere. Press reports are included in its archives on protest and serve its future practices. Therefore, we argue, the police anticipates public criticisms by deploying different strategies when dealing with different protest groups. But it also reacts to shifts in public opinion. Protest cycles, in particular, can be the locus of such shifts with regard to one single movement. Becker, for instance, uses the concept of *moral panic* to describe this phenomenon. During protest cycles, a favorable public sphere or, at least, a divided one, can suddenly close on a movement. Former allies shift their allegiances to the alternative coalition and the public sphere, as a result, become adversarial to the protesting movement. We analyze the cycle around the autonomous youth center in 1980-82 in Zurich. In the middle of the cycle, there was a clear shift in public opinion. As we will see, public support to the movement declined in the later phase of the mobilization and the media, as a result, stopped more or less to cover the protests. We will see that the police became aware of this shift and, as a result, flexed their repressive muscle after a long period of hesitation.

Framing, media and protest groups

To illustrate the systematic bias of the press in favor of institutional protest, we use a sample of press reports on about 30 violent mass demonstrations in three of the four cities under study (Bern, Geneva and Zurich). These demonstrations are similar with respect to the kind of violence that occurred, namely property damage, and the use of force by the police. Only included in the sample are events in which the police made use of rubber bullets, the club or

tear gas.¹¹ Data include information on several formal features of the article, such as the shares of the article devoted to violent and peaceful parts of the protest, the theme of the mobilization and the evaluation (comment) on the violence. Also coded are the use of labels to describe demonstrators as well as the type of violence. The attribution of blame with regard to the violence was also coded. Articles on institutional protest are 135, those on outsiders 147. We define institutional protest as mass demonstrations supported by a major political or social actor such as a political party or a union. Demonstrations that did not receive such support are coded as outsiders.

Press reports are significantly more thematic in the case of institutional movements (Table 9). About 45% of the article space is devoted to the theme raised by institutional demonstrators. In the case of outsider movements, this proportion falls to about 20%. By contrast, for the latter, the emphasis of the press is on violence: 50% as compared to 33% for institutional protest. These important differences reflect the relative strength of the civil-rights and law-and-order coalitions in the two cases. By focusing on the topic of the demonstration, journalists emphasize the structural problems affecting the demonstrating group. Violence is framed as “understandable”, “explainable”, given the particular condition faced by demonstrators in their daily problems and, more generally, is considered as a product of social change. On the other hand, when journalists focus on violence and center their article on the violent interaction with police forces, they decontextualize the protest. This is a basic discursive strategy of the law-and-order coalition.

The speakers or sources of the press article are also slightly different between institutional and outsiders' protest (not shown in the table). In the case of outsiders, the journalist is the main speaker or source interpreting the event ($\eta^2=.20$). In the case of institutional protest, the organizers and their allies get more space to articulate their demands themselves ($\eta^2=.17$). In the evaluation, we find similar results. The authorities and the police are significantly more framing the evaluation for outsiders ($\eta^2=.22$). In the case of institutional protest, organizers get more space to comment on the violence than outsiders ($\eta^2=.19$).

¹¹ The selection procedure was as follows. Violent demonstrations were identified in Wisler's dataset on protests in four cities between 1965 and 1994, as well as in his personal archive for recent cases. The whole period was then divided into three equivalent periods. For each period, 10 demonstrations were chosen: 5 supported by institutional actors and 5 by outsiders. Twelve newspapers were consulted: 6 liberal and 6 conservative. Included in the analyses are the first press reports of each newspaper after an event has occurred.

Table 9

The more institutional the protest, the less it is stigmatized in the press (Table 10). We can see that, in the case of institutional protest, two frames are recurrent: a frame stating that the demonstration was globally peaceful and a frame emphasizing the escalation that led to violence. We mentioned earlier that these frames are typically sponsored by the civil-rights coalition. In the case of outsiders, the description is quite different. Journalists prefer now a “proactive violence” model and tend to use the strong label of “riot”, whereas in the case of institutional protest the label is “incidents”. The rhetorical devices used here are euphemism in the case of institutional protest and amplification in the case of outsiders.

Table 10

Is there a link between these images and the strength of the civil-rights and law-and-order coalitions with regard to the two kinds of protest discussed here? As we have seen earlier, the type of movement and the supporting coalition influence the style and mode of police intervention. The police, in particular, tends to be more legalistic towards movements supported by a coalition of institutional actors. Furthermore, it is more likely to use rubber bullets with expressive movements than with institutional movements. The indicators of repression discussed earlier are above all indicators of coercive measures. However, as Waddington’s (1994) study on the London Metropolitan police shows, the police deploys a whole range of practices before a demonstration takes place in order to preventively control disorders. In particular, it tries to negotiate with and counsel the organizers of a protest march. In Switzerland, since the mid 1980s, one officer would also accompany the organizers during the march and function as liaison officer with the police headquarters.

According to our interviews, the police in Bern, for example, is less inclined to initiate a contact with outsiders than with institutional groups. Moreover, it tend not to help demonstrators to organize the event. In some instances, it doe not even redirect the traffic, leading to difficult and escalating situations with car drivers. This behavior of the police seems to be the result of the fact that it has nothing to loose by adopting such practices with outsiders. To some extent, it may even become the winner of an escalation with outsiders. Since the law-and-order coalition is usually dominant in the public sphere, this may reinforce the police’s institutional position as a gatekeeper of the law and fuel its demands for more resources.

Protest cycles and mass media

In addition to anticipating criticisms by targeting groups with different practices, the police reacts to shifts in public opinion. The protest cycle we analyze here lasted from May 1980 to April 1982. The movement emerged in the late spring 1980 with the demand of a youth autonomous center. Protests started in Zurich but soon spread to most large Swiss cities. Bern and Zurich experienced the strongest mobilization. We discuss the relationship between the press and repression – our main interest here - on the basis of an analysis of NZZ coverage in Zurich. Unfortunately, we do not possess systematic data on the evolution of the framing of protest in the Zurich public sphere. However, we collected parliamentary interventions in the local legislature and coded the size of the articles of the NZZ on protest events during this protest cycle. We first describe the evolution of public debates pertaining to the protest in Zurich, then we show that this evolution did indeed induce significant shifts in patterns of protest policing.

Table 11 compares the main factors explaining the size of press articles during and outside a protest cycle.¹² The first column displays OLS regression coefficients outside a protest cycle for the NZZ coverage of protest in the four cities under study from 1965 to 1994. The other three columns are limited to the cycle of May 1980 to April 1982. The second column shows coefficients for NZZ coverage of the cycle in the four cities; in the third column, the same analysis is limited to the cycle in Zurich. The fourth column displays coefficients of the coverage of the Bern protest cycle by *Der Bund*.¹³ This table allows us to observe the importance of time during a protest cycle. Over the whole period (1965-1994), the size of NZZ articles appears to have slightly diminished. This expresses the declining news value of public demonstrations over time. However, the overall contribution of this factor to the selection of news is small ($\beta = .044$). While marginal in ordinary circumstances (as compared to the other factors), time becomes crucial in the case of a cycle. Press coverage is very intense at the beginning of the cycle and then declines progressively. This pattern is visible across sources. Time ranks second after the number of participants in predicting the size of an article in the NZZ. For *Der Bund*, the small number of cases (31) might be explain

¹² In another study based on the same sample of protest events, the main factors affecting press coverage were violence, the number of participants, and the location of the protest (Wisler 1998; Wisler and Barranco 1998).

¹³ The article size is coded as a percentage of a full page in the NZZ. The logarithm was applied to the dependent variable in order to correct for its skewed distribution. Violence and the number of participants are as in the preceding analyses (respectively, a dichotomous variable and the logarithm of participation). City measures the distance from Zurich (Zurich=1, Bern=2, Basel=3, Geneva=4). Time is a continuous variable indicating the day of occurrence of the event.

why the coefficients are not significant. However, the standardized coefficient referring to time is similar to that of the NZZ.

Table 11

What explains this pattern of press coverage? We may attribute the progressive shortening of press reports to a professional news value: novelty. According to many studies, this is a criteria for the selection of news (Hall 1978, Rochon 1991). Over time, protest cycles lose their novelty and, as a result, journalists are less likely to cover intensively the events. This interpretation, as obvious as it looks, may not tell the whole story. In fact, if we look closer at the cycle, we find that in its later phases both demonstrators and the police become more violent (della Porta and Tarrow 1986). This, as such, should have enhanced the news value of the later phase of the cycle. But it did not. In fact, the more violent the protest, the less it was covered. In fact, as we would like to argue here, the shutting off of the media spotlight during the protest cycle could be better explained by an alignment in the public sphere towards a law-and-order frame. This shift from a strongly divided public sphere towards a more consensual law-and-order orientation can be observed in the local parliament (see table). Until May 1981, the civil-rights coalition was very active to support protest. Sixteen parliamentary interventions were discussed in the local parliament. After this date, and partly in view of the next election of March 1982, the civil-rights coalition became silent. Only one intervention was made during the following nine months. The law-and-order coalition, by contrast, become louder. The fact that the media stopped reporting extensively on protest expresses, in our opinion, the sudden silence of the civil-rights coalition. Protest and protest policing became no longer controversial and the law-and-order coalition won the framing struggle.

The impact of media spotlight on protest policing

Now we can come to the main point: What is the relationship between the media spotlight and repression? Can we observe, as was argued by Gamson (1990), a more vulnerable police under the presence of journalists and the spotlight of the media? Or, a related but somewhat different argument, do police interpret a diminishing attention by the media of protest as a sign that repression has become more legitimate? Figure 1 shows the respective evolution of the size of the NZZ, the level of police interventions, and the use of rubber bullets.

Figure 1

This figure allows us to visualize the changes that occurred during the protest cycle. Very broadly, we observe that media coverage increased in the early months of the cycle but

decreased more or less progressively later on. At the same time, while repression is erratic and incoherent during the first months of the cycle (Karstedt-Henke 1980), it became increasingly consistent and repressive in later stages. If we have a closer look, we observe that an increase in coverage of the cycle in September 1980 was immediately followed by a dramatic decrease in repression in the next month. In the following months, the average size of the press articles decreases sharply and this dramatic decrease was followed by a spectacular increase in repression. The fact that despite the stronger repression the press did not renew its attention on protest seems to have been interpreted by the police as a sign that repression had become legitimate. This interpretation is confirmed by our interviews. The former chief of the riot police in Zurich stated that:

“The more demonstrations lasted in the (early) 1980s, the more pressure was exerted from the right: "now you must do something", the "citizen are fed up", "now you have to finish this business", and so on (...) At the beginning, we probably waited too much. In principle, we tolerated all demonstrations. We said the official demonstration will be tolerated, but no illegal ones and, when they happened, we tolerated them anyway. On the demonstrators' side, this behavior created the feeling that we would not intervene and that the streets belonged to the movement. The *turning point* occurred *less from a shift of police tactics than from a shift in public opinion*. The population was fed up. The demands of the movement were more or less all satisfied. People asked: "What do they want?"; "It is only a question of a show of power in the streets?"; "they make small groups!". Of course, in the police, we observed this shift and, of course, we could feel that public opinion was now backing us.”
(interview, DW, June 1995)

A more formal test of the relationship between media spotlight and repression can be performed with time-series analysis. Using monthly aggregates of our measures of repression and intensity of press coverage, we can test the hypothesis of a dynamic causal link between these two institutions. We can also ascertain whether the presence of journalists (NZZ at time $t-1$) during a protest event or rather past coverage (NZZ at time t_0) induce changes in patterns of protest policing. The effect of these factors are controlled by the previous level of violence. This allows us to discuss once again, but in the special case of a protest cycle, whether the radicalization of protest triggers a radicalization of repression.

Table 12 shows that the intensity of press coverage at time t_0 significantly affects the level of repression at time $t-1$. In contrast, the previous level of violence and the actual level

of coverage have no effect on repression. This pattern can be observed for two measures of repression: the proportion of intervention in situations of public disorders and the relative use of rubber bullets to curb violence. The shorter the articles in the NZZ, the more likely the police intervention and the use of hard and controversial coercive means. In the two cases, the model explains about one quarter of the variance.

Table 12

Our analysis provides an explanation of the radicalization of protest policing at the end of a protest cycle. Indeed, it is often asserted that what makes protest decline is precisely the increase of repression and the subsequent radicalization of protest. Repression increases, according to our results, as the result of a decline of interest of the public sphere in the fate of protest. This is interpreted by the police as a critical moment. More coercion is believed to be no longer controversial since mass media do not report it anymore. From this moment on, repression is likely to increase and become consistent. The figure above shows that at the end of the cycle, repression was very consistent.

Conclusion

In this paper we have inquired into the determinants of police intervention and repression during mass demonstrations. The case of Swiss cities has served as the empirical basis for our analyses. We have focused on three sets of factors, corresponding to three steps in our study. First, we have examined the argument that a change in the configuration of power has an impact on the modalities and extent of police intervention during mass demonstrations. In particular, we wanted to test whether a Left-dominated configuration of power is conducive to a civil-rights approach towards the protest, while a Right-dominated one leads to a law-and-order approach and, hence, to a more repressive police. Although the results are somewhat contradicting and not always easy to interpret, we can reasonably argue that political alliances and coalitions do not have the impact that previous studies have predicted. At a minimum, such effect is not systematically found in the four cities studied here. Sometimes the effect is even contrary to both existing theories and common sense, as in the case of the strength of the Socialist party. Second, we have looked at the dynamics of disruption and repression during face-to-face interactions between protesters and the police. Not surprisingly, these two factors are strongly interrelated. By means of time-series techniques, however, we have been able to show that it is repression that causes violence rather than the other way around. This, at least, is what suggests an investigation with lagged variables. Third, if we could show that the configuration of power and face-to-face interactions explain repression only to a certain

extent, we have seen that the likelihood and modes of police intervention are influenced by the broader public attention given to ongoing protests. Our analysis of media coverage during the protest cycle in Zurich at the beginning of the 1980s suggests that repression is likely to increase when social movements get out of the media spotlight, that is, when attention in the public sphere towards a given protest diminishes and, consequently, the police has more room as well as legitimacy to intervene.

Finally, from a methodological point of view, we have tried to show that protest event analysis can benefit from the use of time-sensitive methods such as time series analysis. Not only is this approach better equipped to grasp the dynamic nature of social life, but it allows us to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between contention and institutional politics that traditional approaches cannot perform. Instead, we have tried to show how cross-sectional and cross-time analyses can complement each other to improve our knowledge on the political process of social movements.

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Table 1: Logistic regression from police intervention on selected independent variables

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R
Legislative majority (1 = right)	1.605 [.378]	.000	1.867 [.437]	.007	1.119 [.504]	.000
Strength of Socialist party	2.111*** [.121]	.191	1.490** [.147]	.073	1.261 [.253]	.000
Police commander (1 = right)	.907 [.202]	.000	.957 [.237]	.000	1.425 [.336]	.000
Violent protest (1 = yes)	–	–	12.663*** [.196]	.408	12.859*** [.199]	.406
Number of participants	–	–	.872 [.089]	–.019	.860+ [.090]	–.029
Movement type (1 = expressive)	–	–	1.243 [.197]	.000	1.196 [.198]	.000
Supporting coalition (1 = outsiders)	–	–	.913 [.279]	.000	.881 [.283]	.000
City	–	–	–	–	–	.040+
Geneva	–	–	–	–	.630+ [.251]	–.038
Bern	–	–	–	–	1.072 [.212]	.000
Basel	–	–	–	–	1.767+ [.314]	.036
Zurich	–	–	–	–	.839 [.266]	.000
–2 Log likelihood	957.951		736.633		728.957	
R ² (Nägelkerke)	.076		.384		.394	
Degrees of freedom	3		7		10	
N	815		802		802	

NOTES: In order to make odds ratios more easily interpretable, the strength of the Socialist party has been divided by 10, meaning that a unity change in this variable corresponds to a real change of 10 % in socialist seats in local parliament. The natural logarithm has been used for the number of participants in demonstrations the natural logarithm. Each category of the categorical variable (city) is compared to the overall effect (deviation). Standard errors of B in brackets.

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$; + $p \leq .1$

Table 2: Logistic regression from style of police intervention on selected independent variables

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R
Legislative majority (1 = right)	1.617 [.508]	.000	1.542 [.518]	.000	.517 [.757]	.000
Strength of Socialist party	2.273*** [.152]	.196	1.889*** [.164]	.136	1.692+ [.293]	.042
Police commander (1 = right)	1.356 [.283]	.000	1.453 [.288]	.000	4.687* [.617]	.078
Violent protest (1 = yes)	–	–	2.270*** [.213]	.136	2.259*** [.214]	.134
Number of participants	–	–	.920 [.105]	.000	.921 [.105]	.000
Movement type (1 = expressive)	–	–	1.260 [.215]	.000	1.178 [.219]	.000
Supporting coalition (1 = outsiders)	–	–	1.971+ [.367]	.045	1.910+ [.370]	.039
City	–	–	–	–	–	.068*
Geneva	–	–	–	–	.644 [.305]	–.011
Bern	–	–	–	–	.513* [.272]	–.076
Basel	–	–	–	–	3.771** [.504]	.084
Zurich	–	–	–	–	.802 [.321]	.000
–2 Log likelihood	665.448		633.813		621.993	
R ² (Nagelkerke)	.085		.134		.157	
Degrees of freedom	3		7		10	
N	809		796		796	

NOTES: In order to make odds ratios more easily interpretable, the strength of the Socialist party has been divided by 10, meaning that a unity change in this variable corresponds to a real change of 10 % in socialist seats in local parliament. The natural logarithm has been used for the number of participants in demonstrations the natural logarithm. Each category of the categorical variable (city) is compared to the overall effect (deviation). Standard errors of B in brackets.

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$; + $p \leq .1$

Table 3: Logistic regression from use of rubber bullets by the police on selected independent variables

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R	Odds ratio	R
Legislative majority (1 = right)	.555 [.485]	.000	.509 [.531]	.000	.637 [.934]	.000
Strength of Socialist party	4.649*** [.198]	.304	3.349*** [.223]	.208	1.049 [.364]	.000
Police commander (1 = right)	1.606 [.372]	.000	1.773 [.391]	.015	1.514 [.876]	.000
Violent protest (1 = yes)	–	–	9.099*** [.296]	.292	9.908*** [.302]	.298
Number of participants	–	–	.921 [.121]	.000	.940 [.121]	.000
Movement type (1 = expressive)	–	–	2.163** [.261]	.104	2.106** [.267]	.096
Supporting coalition (1 = outsiders)	–	–	.717 [.378]	.000	.871 [.391]	.000
City	–	–	–	–	–	.056*
Geneva	–	–	–	–	.003 [6.910]	.000
Bern	–	–	–	–	4.846 [2.329]	.000
Basel	–	–	–	–	5.219 [2.400]	.000
Zurich	–	–	–	–	13.667 [2.347]	.000
–2 Log likelihood	529.264		438.109		407.363	
R ² (Nägelkerke)	.220		.389		.444	
Degrees of freedom	3		7		10	
N	809		796		796	

NOTES: In order to make odds ratios more easily interpretable, the strength of the Socialist party has been divided by 10, meaning that a unity change in this variable corresponds to a real change of 10 % in socialist seats in local parliament. The natural logarithm has been used for the number of participants in demonstrations the natural logarithm. Each category of the categorical variable (city) is compared to the overall effect (deviation). Standard errors of B in brackets.

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$; + $p \leq .1$

Table 4: Bivariate regressions of various indicators of repression and radicalization (standardized coefficients)

	Dependent variables				
	Police intervention	Police started first	Disorders	Violent protest	Protesters started first
Police intervention	–	–	.718*** [1.872]	.920*** [2.021]	–.661*** [1.980]
Police intervention (t–1)	.314 [1.792]	–	.355* [1.793]	.544*** [1.848]	–.344* [1.919]
Police started first	–	–	.330* [1.690]	.408** [1.740]	–.822*** [1.862]
Police started first (t–1)	–	–.257 [1.924]	.199 [1.761]	.358* [1.762]	–.435** [1.956]
Disorders	.779*** [1.843]	.368* [1.841]	–	–	–
Disorders (t–1)	.162 [1.693]	.092 [1.862]	.439** [1.908]	–	–
Violent protest	.922*** [2.038]	.552*** 1.952]	–	–	–
Violent protest (t–1)	.225 [1.689]	.255 [1.857]	–	.340* [1.794]	–
Protesters started first	–.641*** [1.732]	–.792*** [2.060]	–	–	–
Protesters started first (t–1)	.055 [1.571]	.113 [1.812]	–	–	.169 [1.945]

NOTES: Prais-Winsten method of estimation with first-order autoregressive process assumed. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation in brackets. N=27 (26 for lagged variables).

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 5: ML regression coefficients from police intervention on selected independent variables (unstandardized coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
AR1	-.282 [.215]	.506*** [.177]	-.408* [.202]	.272 [.222]
Violent protest	.792*** [.075]	–	.765*** [.067]	–
Violent protest (t–1)	-.094 [.076]	–	-.108 [.065]	–
Protesters started first	–	-.287*** [.066]	–	-.283*** [.063]
Protesters started first (t–1)	–	-.095 [.066]	–	-.087 [.064]
Strength of Socialist party	–	–	.103** [.042]	.253** [.115]
Constant	1.673 [1.006]	42.683*** [9.571]	-10.601** [5.016]	10.206 [16.735]
Log likelihood	-66.517	-78.060	-63.487	-76.445
N	26	26	26	26

NOTES: All variables are percentages over totals. AR1 represents the first-order autoregressive process. Standard errors in brackets.

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 6: ML regression coefficients from style of police intervention on selected independent variables
(unstandardized coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
AR1	.028 [.226]	.202 [.212]	.013 [.230]	-.346 [.217]
Violent protest	.509** [.205]	–	.451** [.207]	–
Violent protest (t–1)	.083 [.207]	–	-.067 [.204]	–
Protesters started first	–	-.459*** [.073]	–	-.504*** [.056]
Protesters started first (t–1)	–	-.077 [.074]	–	-.064 [.059]
Strength of Socialist party	–	–	.201 [.156]	.313*** [.061]
Constant	6.055* [3.144]	58.592*** [9.396]	-18.033 [18.846]	22.2327** [8.734]
Log likelihood	-90.402	-80.773	-89.513	-76.273
N	26	26	26	26

NOTES: All variables are percentages over totals. AR1 represents the first-order autoregressive process. Standard errors in brackets.

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 7: ML regression coefficients from violent protest on selected independent variables (unstandardized coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
AR1	-.183 [.210]	.234 [.212]	-.314 [.211]	.228 [.216]
Police intervention	.999*** [.108]	–	1.078*** [.102]	–
Police intervention (t–1)	.304** [.109]	–	.321*** [.099]	–
Police started first	–	.391** [.168]	–	.372* [.182]
Police started first (t–1)	–	.361** [.171]	–	.353* [.176]
Strength of Socialist party	–	–	-.117** [.055]	.062 [.182]
Constant	-1.053 [1.262]	2.437 [3.594]	12.482* [6.432]	-4.922 [21.751]
Log likelihood	-69.491	-87.512	-67.268	-87.544
N	26	26	26	26

NOTES: All variables are percentages over totals. AR1 represents the first-order autoregressive process. Standard errors in brackets.

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 8: ML regression coefficients from radicalization started by protesters on selected independent variables
(unstandardized coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
AR1	.056 [.215]	-.141 [.214]	-.147 [.215]	-.496** [.189]
Police intervention	-1.489*** [.388]	-	1.575*** [.374]	-
Police intervention (t-1)	.173 [.391]	-	-.065 [.363]	-
Police started first	-	-1.317*** [.220]	-	-1.526*** [.171]
Police started first (t-1)	-	-.035 [.225]	-	-.066 [.163]
Strength of Socialist party	-	-	.416* [.215]	.465*** [.103]
Constant	97.902*** [5.081]	102.365*** [3.689]	49.415* [25.316]	47.759*** [12.298]
Log likelihood	-69.491	-87.512	-67.268	-87.544
N	26	26	26	26

NOTES: All variables are percentages over totals. AR1 represents the first-order autoregressive process. Standard errors in brackets.

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 9: Structure of a press report on violent protest and two types of groups (percentages, eta)

	Institutional	Outsider	Eta
Theme	44.86	19.96	.45***
Peaceful	13.00	10.12	.10
Violence	29.85	50.64	.39***
Evaluation	11.93	19.13	.17**
	100%	100%	
N=282	135	147	

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 10: Labels of violent demonstrations and attribution of causality of violence for two types of group
(percentages)

	Institutional	Outsider
Peaceful	20.0	6.1
Incidents	31.1	13.6
Escalation	37.8	34.7
Planned violence	12.6	25.2
Riot	3.0	19.0
Unclear	1.5	1.4
N	100% 135	100% 147
Cramer V	.36	

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 11: OLS regression of several factors on the size of the press coverage of mass demonstrations (standardized coefficients)

	NZZ		Der Bund	
	All cities (full sample)	All cities (cycle)	Zurich (cycle)	Bern (cycle)
Violence	.239***	.206***	.232***	.320
Participants	.295***	.352***	.428***	.277
Time	-.044**	-.248***	-.365***	-.226
City	.273***	.320	-	-
R ²	.24	.41	.41	.17
N	2180	180	73	31

NOTES: The dependent variable is a numeric variable (percent of a full page).

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Table 12: The media spotlight and forms of coercion during the protest cycle in Zurich (1980-82) (unstandardized coefficients)

	Intervention	Rubber bullets
Press (t-1)	-55.119* [23.474]	-71.950* [33.107]
Press	-1.490 [23.124]	-5.692 [32.432]
Violence (t-1)	.021 [.216]	-.231 [.304]
R2	.24	.25
N	23	23
Durbin-Watson	1.74	1.76

NOTES: Press is the median size of articles; violence is the percentage over the total. Prais-Winsten method of estimation. Standard errors in brackets.

*** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .1$

Figure 1: Repression, rubber bullets, and press coverage during the protest cycle in Zurich (1980-82)

