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Scientific practices and their social context PDF (available through June 2012) This dissertation is, primarily, a contribution to a body of literature in philosophy of science that is often called the science and values debate. In brief, this debate concerns the legitimate influence that ethical and political values may have on scientific inquiry. In the terminology that I introduce, isolationists believe that this influence is only legitimate in certain aspects of scientific inquiry, such as the choice of research problems; however, these values may not legitimately influence the standards for knowledge itself, which must, on this view, remain ``value-free.'' By contrast, transactionists believe that this influence is, at least in principle, legitimate with respect to all aspects of scientific inquiry, including the standards for knowledge. This debate is normally, and inadequately, construed as an epistemological controversy: What role should values play in normative epistemology? I argue that it is in fact better construed in terms of the social relations between several kinds of concrete, goal-oriented, social or collaborative activities --- between different human practices. In the first few chapters, I develop a general conception of such practices, developing the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and drawing on John Dewey and work in philosophy of science of the past thirty years. I then develop two distinct conceptions of science as a practice, and use them to recast the science and values debate ``from the perspective of practice.'' The question, on this construal, is (for example) how should the practice of scientific inquiry be related to such activities as feminist activism and corporate profit-seeking? In the words of the title, the debate concerns the relationship between scientific practices and their social context. Key to this reconstrual are a pair of claims that I call the connection hypotheses. These hypotheses claim that the two basic positions in the science and values debate depend on the two distinct conceptions of science. One, a ``narrowly'' epistemic conception, leads to isolationism; the second, a ``broader,'' more pragmatic conception, leads to transactionism. In other words, the epistemological construal conceals rival assumptions concerning the goals and social organization of scientific inquiry. In the long final chapter (roughly the final 25% of the dissertation), I attempt to support the intuition that certain kinds of influence on scientific inquiry --- such as excessive commodification or manipulation for the sake of partisan political gain --- are forms of injustice, but others --- such as feminist critique of androcentric assumptions --- are not. To do so, I show how the conception of practice can be embedded within and inform a conception of justice from liberal political philosophy. This leads me to consider whether the conception of practice --- which emphasizes collaboration and social interdependence, and which is the product of a deeply anti-individualist intellectual tradition --- is really compatible with liberal individualism.	Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of [humanity]. John Dewey
Works in progress These papers are in draft form; please do not quote without contacting me first. Comments are highly appreciated! Rawls' rationalist conception of personhood (in preparation for journal submission) Otto Neurath: Physicalism, socialism, and the foundations of economics In this paper, I consider the work of Otto Neurath. In the first half of the twentieth century, Neurath was an economist, public educator, socialist activist, and logical empiricist. Over the last 15 years or so Neurath has received considerable attention by historians of philosophy of science as a member of the previously-neglected ``Left Vienna Circle,'' a precursor to certain contemporary positions in the science and values debate, and a pivotal figure in an alternative narrative of the history of twentieth-century philosophy of science. *[cites to Steel Belt narrative] In the first section, I consider an objection to this recent work on Neurath from feminist historian of science Sarah Richardson. Among other things, Richardson claims that Neurath embraced a version of the value-free ideal; while he was a Marxist, he was a ``Neutral Marxist,'' who treated Marxism as an academic theory rather than a social movement. While I find Richardson's objections unsupported by the evidence that she offers, I believe she does legitimately raise the question of the value of Neurath for contemporary debates over science and values. Then, in the second section, I offer my answer to this question by examining Neurath's work on the foundations of economics in the early 1920s. I argue that Neurath's contributions to logical empiricism, movement socialism, and economics were already deeply intertwined at this point. While I do not believe that Neurath offers anything like a philosophical account of the relationship between science and politics, he does offer contemporary thinkers some important examples and models. Scientific Practices and the Science and Values Debate In the first few sections of this paper, I introduce the central conceptions of my conception of practice, a certain kind of goal-oriented collaborative activity. Science is a primary example of such an activity, and I present two conceptions of science as a practice. I then use these conceptions to consider the relationship between scientific practices and ethical and political values. I argue that the two sides of this debate actually assume rival conceptions of scientific practice, and that this explains certain features of the debate. Consequently, it must be understood ``sociologically'' rather than epistemologically.
Publications Links are (descending order, as available) to DOI, the publisher's site for the article, or a local PDF. Offsite links open in a new tab. Is Longino's conception of objectivity feminist? Hypatia, Spring 2011 Helen Longino's account of objectivity has been highly regarded by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science. However, I have encountered three feminist philosophers who have all offered one especially compelling feminist critique of Longino's view: far from vindicating or privileging the work of feminist scientists, Longino's account actually requires the active cultivation of anti-feminist and misogynist scientists to balance out the possibility of feminist bias. I call this objection the Nazi problem, for the particular version that claims that her view requires even the active cultivation of Nazi scientists in objective inquiry. In this paper I consider one response to the Nazi problem, which I call the good faith argument. I show that the good faith argument itself is just as objectionable, on feminist grounds, as the Nazi problem it is meant to address. On the ideal of autonomous science Philosophy of science, December 2011 I show that the ideal of value-neutral science policy is deeply connected to libertarian political philosophy, and hence is neither truly value-neutral nor uncontroversial.
blog posts My current blog is Je fais, donc je suis. I spent several years blogging on politics and philosophy at my friend Ben's blog, The Staff of Ra. A few of my favourite posts: What is the state of nature? September 2005 Locke and Hobbes had very different conceptions of the state of nature, and I believe there is a parallel split in fundamental political philosophies in our own society. 20 questions for pro-choice people March 2006 Answers 19 questions put forth by an anti-choice ethicists. This is probably the most popular piece I've written for the blog. Defining radical feminism May 2007 What is radical feminism? What makes it different from other claims about the status of women and our notions of gender? A preliminary answer to these questions. Reconceptualizing underrepresentation August 2008 The underrepresentation of women and other groups within STEM (science-technology-engineering-mathematics) fields is usually regarded as a problem of numbers. I adapt Iris Marion Young's account of injustice as oppression to sketch an account of underrepresentation as a problem of injustice.	Pleonexia, a vice in the Aristotelian scheme, is now the driving force of modern productive work. Alasdair MacIntyre
Old papers Papers dated before Spring 2008 are primarily old seminar papers that I thought turned out especially well. Several of these papers are deprecated, and either do not (accurately, at least) reflect my current views or are flawed in important ways.
Philosophy of science Some thoughts on evolutionary theory March 2002 I consider Intelligent Design as a scientific, rather than pseudo-scientific theory. I argue that Intelligent Design is unacceptable as a scientific theory because it lacks explanatory power and cannot generate a fertile progressive research programme. The hole argument March 2007 I argue that the standard presentation of Einste's `hole argument' fails to capture Einstein's argument accurately, and that the standard solution by appeal to diffeomorphic equivalence is inappropriate for Einstein's version. Some implications for the significance of general covariance are indicated. On the ideal of autonomous science October 2007 (Note: Replaced with the most recent manuscript, March 2011) I show that the ideal of value-neutral science policy is deeply connected to libertarian political philosophy, and hence is neither truly value-neutral nor uncontroversial. A version of this paper was presented at the 2010 Philosophy of Science Association meeting in Montréal. Both the slides and a recording (MP4, 114 MB) of the talk are available. Is well-ordered science a well-ordered society? March 2008 In Science, truth and democracy Philip Kitcher describes an ideal for science policy that he calls well-ordered science. In an endnote, he claims well-ordered science is related to the well-ordered society of John Rawls' A theory of justice. I examine this connection. This paper is deprecated.	I distrust those people who know so well what God wants them to do, because I notice it always coincides with their own desires. Susan B. Anthony
Ethics and political philosophy Review of Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of justice November 2006 A book review Intuitions, capabilities, and Aristotle December 2006 I consider the charge that Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach is inappropriately intuitionistic. I show, not only how she can respond to this charge, but use this response to clarify the connection between the Capabilities Approach and Aristotelean ethics. Rawls on the priority of right and good February 2010 I first work out just what Rawls means by the priority of right and the priority of good. I then interpolate and discuss an argument (which I attribute to him -- incorrectly) against the priority of good. I argue that it is not successful, suggesting along the way that neither the priority of right nor the priority of good is really the best way to relate these two.	Justice should refer not only to distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation. Iris Marion Young
Philosophy of mathematics Kant, geometry of intuition, and intuition of geometry December 2003 A broad reply to Russell' s and Reichenbach's arguments that geometry is not synthetic a priori. This paper formed the basis for my writing sample for admission to Notre Dame. This paper is deprecated. Problems with foundationalism in the philosophy of mathematics January 2008 I show that, contrary to a line of argument common in the philosophy of mathematics literature, the sheer fact that all mathematical theories are interpretable in set theory does not imply that set theory can be a foundations for mathematics.	Taught from their infancy that beauty is woman's sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and, roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison. Mary Wollstonecraft
history of philosophy The proof of God and the possibility of materialism in Locke's Essay October 2004 Argues that there is an unavoidable contradiction between two sections of Locke's Essay concerning human understanding, dealing with materialism and his argument for the existence of God. The reality of Berkeley's objects December 2004 Examines the status of material objects in Berkeley's philosophy; non-trivial.	We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Martin Luther King, Jr.
miscellaneous On the consistency of Chisholm's axioms of epistemic logic April 2007 I examine Chisholm's epistemic logic, and show that one of his key axioms is equivalent to an unacceptably rigid methodological principle. Fictionalism and naturalism in mathematics April 2007 A short discussion of fictionalism and Quinean and Maddyean naturalism. A statistical analysis of The philosophical gourmet report 2009 May 2009 I analyze The philosophical gourmet for evidence of bias against women and to model the factors that contribute to its rankings. I conclude that it is not biased against women, but does exhibit a substantial bias towards departments with unearned authority. Dataset for this paper HTML version of this paper	Globally, the Racial Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world; locally, within Europe and the other continents, it designates Europeans as the privileged race. Charles Mills