

**Partisan Hearts, Minds, and Souls:  
Candidate Religion and Partisan Voting**

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**Abstract**

Existing literature suggests that social group characteristics of political candidates should condition the effect of partisanship on vote choice, particularly when voters clearly associate a candidate's social group with a particular party. Owing to recent changes in the associations between religious groups and America's major parties, a candidate's religious affiliation is an especially informative case of such partisan group associations. Using survey experiments which vary a hypothetical candidate's religious affiliation, we find strong evidence that religious group associations affect the connection between partisanship and the vote. For example, identifying a candidate as an evangelical, a group widely viewed as Republican, increases Republican support and Democratic opposition, while identifying him as a Catholic, a group without a clear partisan profile, has no bearing on partisan voting. Furthermore, these effects are strongest when individuals are aware of group-party connections, and hold even when controlling for a voter's own religious affiliation and political ideology.

The literature on American elections has identified a myriad of factors that shape voters' choices. Far and away the most consistent and, typically, most important of these factors is party identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Markus and Converse 1979; Miller and Shanks 1996). However, the impact of partisanship on vote choice is not constant, varying by political context (Weisberg 2002; Miller 1978), across types of elections (Jacobson 2004; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001), and over time (Bartels 2000). One reason for this variation is that other factors condition the impact of party identification on the vote. For example, candidates' policy preferences (Page and Jones 1979; Fiorina 1981), group associations (Wlezien and Miller 1997), and experience in office (Fiorina 1981) may increase or decrease what we refer to as *partisan voting*: the influence of partisanship on voting behavior.

One factor that may have profound effects on partisan voting is the social group profile of particular candidates. Given the candidate-centered nature of American campaigns, it is important to understand how candidates' social characteristics influence voters' judgments and the relationship of such judgments to their partisan predispositions (Feldman and Conover 1983). Citizens generally have clear images of the types of groups that are associated with the two major political parties (Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991; Bastedo and Lodge 1980), and these group stereotypes can trigger partisan reactions from citizens (McDermott 2007; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Thus, the degree to which candidates' personal characteristics tap into voters' group-based stereotypes of the parties may have important consequences for the strength of partisan voting.

To assess this phenomenon, we turn to an important candidate trait: religion. The role of religion in American elections has received ever-increasing attention by journalists, political commentators and scholars. However, the overwhelming focus has been on how voters' own

religion affects their choices at the ballot box (Layman 2001; Campbell 2007; Green 2007), and, with the exception of a handful of articles on reactions to Catholic candidates (Converse 1966; McDermott 2007; Wilson 2007), there has been little scholarly attention to how voters respond to a candidate's religious affiliation. In this regard, one such response should reflect the degree to which voters link their party affiliations to candidate choice. A candidate whose religion conforms to party stereotypes may increase partisan voting, while a candidate whose religion contradicts party images may decrease partisan voting.

It is important to note that we focus on religion not because the theoretical foundation for this study is based on religion per se and not because candidates' religious orientations are more important than other social characteristics such as gender or race for voters' inferences about their party ties. Rather, we focus on religion because it is an especially interesting case of this broader connection to partisan voting in at least two ways. First, there have been substantial changes in the relationships between religious groups and the major parties in recent decades (Layman 2001; Kohut et al. 2000). This situation creates a particularly good opportunity for assessing how such connections occur, such as the degree to which the public holds social group images of the parties and individuals' reactions to such images fit the reality of contemporary party-group alignments. Second, the recent nature of these changes and the great diversity of American religion mean that there should be considerable variation, both across religious groups and across individuals, in the degree to which citizens include social groups in party images. This variation is especially useful for evaluating the circumstances under which a candidates' social-group ties condition partisan voting, such as the degree to which the public links the social group to a particular party and individuals are aware of those links. In short, while our focus is

on candidates' religious traits, the results of this inquiry have clear implications for the impact of candidate characteristics on the broader issue of partisan voting.

We examine the impact of candidate religion on partisan voting with an experiment embedded within national sample surveys. In our experiments, we provide respondents with descriptions of hypothetical congressional candidates and randomly vary our description of the candidate's religious affiliation. This allows us to isolate the effect of the candidate's religion on respondents' likelihood of voting for him, and also its conditional effect on the relationship between party identification and candidate support. We find that a candidate's religious traits can have a strong effect on partisan voting, but the effect varies with voters' awareness of how religious groups are associated with the major political parties.

### **Candidate Characteristics and Party Stereotypes**

Because candidates are the central feature in most American elections, it is hardly surprising that candidate social characteristics such as race (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Sigelman et al. 1995; Terkildsen 1993; Carsey 1995) and gender (McDermott 1997; Dolan 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Streb et al. 2008) have an impact on voters' choices. These characteristics could have a direct impact if citizens find such information relevant to the choices before them. For example, a woman might cogently choose a female candidate over a male opponent on the basis of gender. Candidates' social characteristics could have an indirect impact if citizens infer other kinds of relevant information from such characteristics. So, for example, a citizen might infer from a candidate's age that he or she has desirable experience and choose accordingly.

Because of the diverse demography of voters and candidates as well as the many kinds of information that could be relevant to elections, inference is likely to be the most common way that candidates' social characteristics influence vote choice (e.g. McDermott 1997). In fact, the

literature has documented the importance of such inferences to voters' decisions (Conover and Feldman 1989). Research finds that voters are “cognitive misers” who seek inexpensive and simple information about candidates in an environment where such information is both costly and complex (Popkin 1991). In this process, citizens use social group stereotypes—simple assumptions about what the group is like—as the basis for drawing inferences about candidates (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Two varieties of stereotypes are commonly recognized: trait stereotypes (assumptions about the attributes of group members) and belief stereotypes (assumptions about their attitudes) (e.g. Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).

Stereotypes regarding the major political parties are staples of American politics—a fact that is hardly surprising either, given that most elections involve a choice between a Democratic and a Republican candidate. These stereotypes include both partisan traits and partisan beliefs (Bastedo and Lodge 1980; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Sanders 1988; Conover and Feldman 1989; Rahn 1993), and an important source of these elements in party stereotypes are the social groups that regularly vote for the major political parties. Indeed, one of the major perspectives on party identification locates social group stereotypes at the very heart of partisanship itself. Drawing on and extending earlier work on the close connection between social groups and the major parties (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960), this perspective sees a citizen's party identification as rooted in his or her perceptions of the social groups that strongly support each party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991). Thus individuals identify with a particular party because of their affinity to the racial, ethnic, class, religious, or other social groups that they perceive to support the party, and/or their antipathy toward social groups perceived to support the rival party.

A related line of research amplifies this perspective by focusing on the parties *themselves* as the relevant social group (Greene 1999, 2002). Here identification with a party is much like any other group identification, only the relevant group is defined by political characteristics. This insight could be applied to any number of political groups, including “conservatives” and “liberals.” From the perspective of party stereotypes, partisanship could be thought of as identification with an aggregation of social and political groups that share a common trait—sort of a “group of groups.” Such group associations could easily be an element of party stereotypes, and citizens could draw inferences about a candidate’s partisanship from the social group(s) to which the candidate belongs.

This discussion suggests that party stereotypes originate in longstanding associations of social traits and policy beliefs with the major political parties. A good example is the identification of the upper class and opposition to social welfare programs with the Republicans, and the identification of the working class and support for social welfare with the Democrats. This association dates from the New Deal Era and persists down to the present, but such associations can change with shifts in the major party coalitions. Here a good example is white southerners: in the New Deal era this group was identified with the Democrats, but now is identified with the Republicans. White southerners were regarded as politically conservative in both eras, and their shift coincided with changes in the beliefs of the major parties. Hence party stereotypes are likely to have a basis in political reality, despite being simple and incomplete—or as James Guth puts it “a stereotype is truth with measurement error” (Green et al. 1996: xix).

The empirical truth behind party stereotypes suggests that there will be considerable variation in the association of traits and beliefs with each of the major parties. Some traits and beliefs can be strongly linked to the Democrats or Republicans, others weakly associated with

the parties, and still others not related to them at all. This variation is likely to have a temporal element, reflecting the history of the major party coalitions. In the end, the distribution of such associations among the citizenry will matter as well. After all, voters can only draw on stereotypical traits or beliefs if they hold such stereotypes in the first place.

### **Religion, Party Stereotypes, and Partisan Voting**

How might a candidate's religion influence voter's choices at the ballot box? First, a candidate's religion might have a direct effect on vote choice, with voters preferring a candidate of their own faith. Second, it might have an indirect effect—voters might infer traits or beliefs from a candidate's religion, and those inferences could influence voter decisions. One important trait that might be inferred in this fashion is the candidate's partisanship, thus activating partisan voting. Voters also might infer candidates' policy beliefs from their religious orientations, and those belief inferences, in turn, might lead to inferences about partisanship and thus shape the level of partisan voting.

Religion has long been associated with partisanship in the United States. In the mid-twentieth century, Roman Catholics were closely aligned with the Democrats and Mainline Protestants with the Republicans (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), while in the early days of the twenty-first century, Black Protestants are closely linked with the Democrats and Evangelical Protestants with the GOP (Campbell 2007). These associations are closely linked to party stereotypes, hence the common images of the “Catholic vote” in the 1950s and “born again” vote in the 2000s. In fact, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler note that one substantial change in American partisan politics since the 1980s has been that the “mobilization of Christian fundamentalist leaders on behalf of a conservative social agenda altered both the platform of the Republican party and how Republicans as a social group were perceived” (11-12).

Importantly, over the course of the last sixty years, the connection between religion and the major parties has changed markedly, with white Evangelical Protestants shifting from the Democrats to the Republicans (Layman 2001), and white Catholics becoming divided evenly between the parties. The division of the Catholic vote is part of an even more fundamental shift: the development of a “God gap” between the two parties, with the more traditionally-religious members of most faith traditions becoming more attached to the GOP, while the less traditionally religious members—and non-religious people—grow more Democratic (Layman 2001; Legee et al. 2002; Green 2007). It is likely that these changes have shifted the religious elements of party stereotypes. As a consequence, there should be wide variation in the association of religious traits with the major political parties and public stereotypes about them so that different candidate religions may condition partisan voting in diverse ways. When candidates have religious affiliations that are consistent with party stereotypes (e.g. Catholic Democrats in earlier eras or evangelical Republicans today), the result should be increased partisan voting, while partisan voting should be diminished when candidates’ religions contradict party stereotypes. In addition, the relationship between candidate religion and partisan voting should vary across individuals according to how aware they are of the connection of particular groups to a party.

Religious affiliation and religiosity may tap into public stereotypes about not only the social group composition of the two parties, but also about particular policy and ideological viewpoints. Due to their unique theological perspectives and social traditions, some religious groups are closely linked to particular beliefs, with the connections between Evangelical Protestants and traditional morality, Black Protestants and civil rights, and Jews and liberalism providing good examples. In some instances, the policy inferences that citizens are likely to draw from candidates’ religious orientations—for example, an evangelical candidate as being

opposed to abortion and generally conservative on most issues—may closely parallel their images about the beliefs of a particular party (e.g. the Republican party as the pro-life and generally conservative party) and thus increase levels of partisan voting. In other cases, the policy images that the candidates' religions trigger in voters' minds—for example, a Catholic candidate as being opposed to both abortion and the death penalty—may not line up clearly with their images of either party's beliefs, and thus reduce the degree of partisan voting.

### **Surveys and Experiments**

This investigation employs data collected as part of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) conducted in the fall of 2006 (round 1), and then in a follow-up study conducted in the summer of 2007 using the same methodology (round 2).<sup>1</sup> Both surveys were administered on-line by Polimetrix, using a method of sample matching respondents to produce a representative sample of the American population. A comparison of these samples to other data reveals that they are a reasonably accurate reflection of the American electorate, although somewhat more politically knowledgeable than the population as a whole (for more details on the methodology and sampling strategy see Ansolabehere (2006, 2008); Rivers (2006); Vavreck and Rivers (2008)).

Any test of partisan stereotypes requires that voters associate specific social groups with the parties—that there are actually stereotypes widely held within the general population. To gauge the extent to which citizens associate particular groups with one of the two major parties, we asked the respondents to the round 2 survey the following simple question:

*For each of the following groups, please let us know whether you think that the members of this group are mainly Democrats, mainly Republicans or a pretty even mix of both.*

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<sup>1</sup> In the first round study, there were a total of 3,000 cases, with 2,000 cases in the second round. Since this paper does not employ all of the experimental manipulations embedded in either round of surveys, the number of cases in each model is smaller.

Respondents were then given an extensive list of groups, including the religious groups that come into play in our candidate support experiments (described below).

Table 1 indicates the perception of how a variety of social and political groups are associated with the major political parties (columns 1-3), listed by “net Republican image” (column 4). Clearly, citizens see large differences across the groups. For example “conservatives” are identified overwhelmingly as “mainly Republicans” (with a net Republican image of 74.5%) and “liberals” are clearly perceived as Democrats (net Republican image of -74.4%).<sup>2</sup> Likewise “people in business” are associated with the GOP (53%), while “union members” (-66.3%) and Blacks (-73.8%) are plainly seen as Democrats. These party-group images appear to have a strong basis in the reality of group voting behavior. They generally reflect the way CCES respondents from these groups reported actually voting in the 2006 elections (columns 5 and 6), and consequently the “net Republican vote” (column 7) has essentially the same order as the net Republican image.<sup>3</sup>

[Table 1 about here]

What about religious groups? Evangelical Christians are perceived as very strongly Republican (69.5% net Republican image)—in fact, the most clearly Republican group other than “conservatives.” In contrast, Catholics do not have a clear partisan profile (4.6% net Republican image), with a majority of respondents viewing Catholics as “a pretty even mix of both parties” (52.4%). The generic group “religious people” has a relatively strong Republican profile (40.5% net Republican image), while “non-religious people” are almost a mirror image in

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<sup>2</sup> The net Republican image was calculated by subtracting the percentage of respondents who say that members of a group are “mainly Democrats” from the percentage saying that they are “mainly Republicans.”

<sup>3</sup> For purposes of displaying the congressional vote, most groups were defined by self-identification. Business persons were business managers recoded from an open-ended occupation question and non-religious people were defined as people without a religious affiliation with low levels of religious observance. “Catholics” were defined as white Catholics; Evangelical Christians were defined as white, born-again Protestants. The net Republican vote was calculated by subtracting the percentage voting Democratic from the percentage voting Republican for each group.

public perceptions (-44.8% net Republican image). For both of these groups, however, a near plurality of respondents (roughly 45%) said the groups were a “pretty even mix of both parties.”

The questionnaires administered to these samples also contained embedded experiments designed to isolate the effects of religious traits on the respondents’ likelihood of voting for hypothetical candidates. To take into account the possible effects of ideological beliefs associated with party stereotypes, two candidate issue profiles were employed, one in which the hypothetical candidate stressed issues typically associated with conservatism as a rationale for his candidacy (“conservative candidate profile”) and one which stressed issues typically associated with liberalism (“liberal candidate profile”). The baseline description of the conservative profile candidate is as follows (issues in bold face):

*Now we would like to get your opinion about a candidate running for Congress outside of your state. Please read his description, and then tell us what you think about him.*

*John Robinson owns a local pharmacy. He is forty-one years old, married, and has three children. As one of the most prominent citizens in his community, he has long been active in local politics. In a recent newspaper article, this is what he said when he was asked why he has entered the congressional race:*

***“I am running for Congress because I want to see our values protected, our borders secure, our people safe, our economy strong, and our troops supported.”***

*If you lived in this candidate’s congressional district, how likely would you be to vote for him? [Very Likely, Somewhat Likely, Not Very Likely, Not At All Likely]*

The liberal profile candidate had an identical biography, but with a different set of issues:

***“I am running for Congress because I want to see good wages, a clean environment, effective healthcare, quality schools, and honest government.”***

The respondents appeared to perceive these candidates as having conservative and liberal policy positions. In the baseline condition, 94% of the self-identified Republican respondents indicated they were “somewhat” or “very” likely to vote for the candidate with the conservative profile, and only 65% reported support for the candidate with the liberal profile. Among self-

identified Democratic respondents, the pattern was reversed: 93% said that they supported the liberal profile candidate and 48% supported the conservative profile candidate.

The treatments provided the respondents with a religious cue by modifying the baseline description to include religious traits associated to one degree or another with party stereotypes.

Here is an example (with the religious trait in bold face):

*John Robinson owns a local pharmacy. He is forty-one years old, married, and has three children. As one of the most prominent **evangelical Christians** in his community, he has long been active in both **his church** and local politics. In a recent newspaper article, this is what he said when he was asked why he has entered the congressional race:*

*“As a **man of faith**, I am running for Congress because . . .*

The other religious traits used in the analysis here are “Catholic,” and a measure of generic religiosity, where the candidate was described with the words, “one of the most prominent members of the local church in his community, he has long been active in both his church and local politics.” Other treatments added partisan cues to the religious traits, describing the candidate as a Republican or Democrat.<sup>4</sup>

While these experiments do not accurately simulate vote choice in a congressional election, they do allow us to isolate the unique effects of these religious traits on the likelihood of voting for the candidate, something that is far more difficult with the observational data found in most surveys. Moreover, any biases introduced by the on-line administration of the questionnaire or sample design are likely to be far out-weighted by the advantages of assembling a large sample of respondents. To provide a sense of scale, a typical cell in these experiments has roughly 200 respondents—an order of magnitude larger than we could typically hope to employ

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<sup>4</sup> The evangelical and general religion cues were applied to both the conservative and liberal candidate profiles. The Catholic cue was only applied to the conservative candidate profile.

in a lab experiment.<sup>5</sup> In any event, these samples are far more representative than subjects recruited in laboratory settings (e.g. college sophomores).

The results from the partisan group associations suggest that certain types of religious cues should elicit an explicitly partisan response from voters, thus conditioning the impact of partisanship on vote choice. Because citizens clearly think of evangelicals as Republicans, we expect that candidates who are evangelicals should attract more support from Republican identifiers and less support from Democrats. Likewise, we expect a generically religious candidate to attract more support from Republicans and less from Democrats, but, given that “religious people” in general are less strongly associated with the GOP than are evangelicals, the activation of partisan voting should be less than for the evangelical candidate. In contrast, a Catholic candidate should not affect levels of partisan voting since Catholics are not strongly associated with either the Republicans or the Democrats.

### **Religious Traits and Partisan Voting**

To examine the degree to which candidates’ religious traits condition the impact of party identification on vote choice, we estimate a series of simple models with the following form:

$$\text{Likelihood of Support}_i = b_0 + b_1 \text{Party Identification}_i + b_2 \text{Treatment}_i + b_3 (\text{Party ID}_i \times \text{Treatment}_i)$$

Because the dependent variable, likelihood of voting for the candidate, is a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from being “very likely” to “not at all likely” to vote for the candidate, we estimate all of our models with ordered logit. Party identification is the standard seven-point scale, recoded to range from zero for strong Democrats to one for strong Republicans. The treatment variable is a dummy variable on which a score of one indicates the respondents who

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<sup>5</sup> The baseline cell is larger still, with over 600 respondents.

received a religious cue (description of the candidate as an evangelical, a Catholic, or with generic religiosity) and zero indicates respondents who received the baseline condition (no identification of the candidate's religion). The multiplicative interaction between party identification and the treatment variable allows us to estimate the difference in the impact of party identification on candidate support under the treatment condition and under the baseline condition. In other words, it represents the degree to which the religious trait affects the impact of party identification on the likelihood of voting for the candidate. Because the respondents were assigned to treatments randomly, there is generally no need for demographic controls.<sup>6</sup> Although our models are relatively simple, the ordered logit coefficients do not provide us with direct information about the substantive impact of the treatments on what we are really interested in: the relationship between party identification and the probability of supporting the candidate. Thus, rather than presenting the coefficient estimates,<sup>7</sup> Table 2 reports the impact of various religious cues (listed on the left-hand side of the table) on partisan voting, measured by the predicted probability of being "very likely" to vote for the relevant candidate by each category of party identification (listed across the top of the table).<sup>8</sup> For each religious cue, there are three

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<sup>6</sup> We compared all of the experimental treatment groups used in this analysis to the baseline group on a wide variety of socio-demographic variables (education, income, gender, age, region, race, religiosity, identification as a born-again Christian, and religious affiliation) as well as party and ideological identification. For five of the nine experimental treatments employed in the analysis, there were no statistically significant differences between the experimental group and the baseline group. For the four treatment groups for which there were statistically significant differences (the Catholic candidate cue with a conservative issue profile, the evangelical candidate cue with a liberal issue profile, the evangelical Democratic candidate cue with a liberal issue profile, and the generically religious Democratic candidate cue with a liberal issue profile), the differences were only on a small number of variables: gender and religiosity for the Catholic cue; education, gender, religiosity, and religious affiliation (specifically, an underrepresentation of mainline Protestants) for the evangelical cue (liberal profile); education, religiosity, and age for the evangelical Democrat cue; and age for the religious Democrat cue. To ensure that the differences between the experimental group and the baseline group in these cases did not influence our results, we re-estimated the models for these experimental treatments with controls for the variables on which there were statistically significant differences. In no case did the results we present here change in any noticeable way.

<sup>7</sup> The ordered logit coefficients are presented in Appendix A. (TO THE EDITOR AND REVIEWERS: SHOULD THIS PAPER BE ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION, WE INTEND TO POST THIS APPENDIX ONLINE.)

<sup>8</sup> Our ordered logit analyses produce probabilities of occupying each of the four categories of our ordinal candidate support variable. We show only the probability of being "very likely" to vote for the candidate in order to simplify the presentation of results. However, we show the predicted probabilities of being in each category of the candidate

important pieces of information in the table. First, we show the predicted probability for the candidate with no religious cue (baseline candidate) and the candidate with the religion trait (evangelical candidate, etc), and then the difference between the two estimates within each category of party identification. The width of 95 percent confidence intervals around each of the predicted probabilities (the probability + or – a given value) are provided in parenthesis, and if the confidence intervals for the baseline and treatment probabilities for a partisan group do not overlap, then the difference between them is statistically significant (at  $p < .05$ , indicated by a \*).<sup>9</sup> Second, the final column in Table 2 (“Impact of Party ID”) reports the difference in the predicted probability between the Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats for the baseline group and the treatment group. If the confidence intervals around those probabilities do not overlap, then the difference between them (and thus the effect of party identification on the probability of being very likely to vote for the candidate) is statistically significant (again at  $p < .05$ , and indicated by a \*). Finally, if the difference between the impact of party identification on the likelihood of supporting the candidate under the treatment condition and the baseline condition—in other words, the impact of the particular religious characteristic of the candidate on partisan voting—is statistically significant (at  $p < .05$ ), we signify that next to the “impact of party ID” value for the treatment group (with a † symbol). The differences within and between the partisan categories are the most important information in the table and hence are bolded. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of party identification on support for the baseline candidate and the candidate with the relevant religious orientation by showing the predicted probabilities in Table 2 in graphical form.

[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]

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support variable in Appendix B. (TO THE EDITOR AND REVIEWERS: SHOULD THIS PAPER BE ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION, WE INTEND TO POST THIS APPENDIX ONLINE.)

<sup>9</sup> Confidence intervals were calculated using the “spost” command in STATA, developed by Scott Long. See <http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/spost.htm> for more details.

The first segments of the table and figure provide the results for the evangelical candidate cue. Starting with the conservative policy profile, party identification, as expected for a conservative candidate, has a positive and statistically significant influence on candidate support even when there is no mention of the candidate's religion (baseline condition). The predicted probability of being very likely to support the candidate is only .09 (with a 95 percent confidence interval of +/- .03) for strong Democrats, but rises to .56 (confidence interval of +/- .07) for strong Republicans. However, identifying the candidate as an evangelical significantly increases the effect of partisanship on candidate support (the † symbol indicates that the interaction between party identification and the evangelical candidate dummy is statistically significant at  $p < .05$ ), with the difference between the predicted probabilities for strong Republicans and strong Democrats moving from .47 for the baseline group to .66 for the treatment group.

The table shows how partisan voting increases for an evangelical candidate: it is less that Republican identifiers are more supportive than that Democrats are less supportive of evangelical candidates. The probability of being very likely to vote for the candidate among strong Democrats decreases from .09 (+/- .03) when no religious affiliation is mentioned to .02 (+/- .02) when the candidate is described as an evangelical. Because the confidence intervals do not overlap, we can say that the evangelical cue produces a statistically significant drop-off in support among Strong Democrats. The same thing is true for weak Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic party. The probability of "very likely" candidate support does increase among weak Republicans and strong Republicans, but, because the confidence intervals around the probabilities for these groups under the baseline and treatment conditions do overlap, those increases are not statistically significant.

Turning to the liberal policy profile, support for the baseline candidate strongly and significantly declines as we move from strong Democrats to strong Republicans—just what we would expect for a liberal candidate. However, when the candidate is identified as an evangelical, the impact of partisanship changes dramatically, with a statistically significant *increase* in support as Republican ties grow. That is due partly to Republican identifiers becoming more favorably disposed toward the candidate: the probability of very likely support among strong Republicans undergoes a statistically significant increase from .10 (+/- .04) for the baseline candidate to .29 (+/- .04) for the evangelical candidate. But as before, the larger impact come from Democrats becoming much less likely to vote for the candidate. The probabilities of very likely support among the strong, weak, and leaning Democrats are all significantly and substantially lower for the evangelical candidate than for the baseline candidate. The fact that strong Republicans are more supportive than strong Democrats of this evangelical candidate *despite his liberal policy positions* illustrates the powerful influence that a candidate’s social group traits may exert on partisan voting, particularly when the group is closely tied to prevailing stereotypes about a particular party—as evangelical Christians are to voters’ images of the GOP.

The second segments of the table and figure report analogous results for a generically religious candidate. The effect of this religious cue on partisan voting is more muted, but the patterns are quite similar to those for the evangelical candidate. When the candidate has a conservative profile, the impact of partisanship grows stronger when the candidate is also described as being “religious,” with all three groups of Democrats becoming significantly less likely to support the candidate. When the candidate espouses a liberal issue agenda, Democrats abandon the generically religious candidate just as they deserted the evangelical candidate. However, Republicans are not any more likely to vote for a liberal who is religious than for a

liberal without any religious identifier. So, adding “religious” to the traits of a liberal candidate makes the drop in voter support that occurs as partisanship moves from Democratic to Republican significantly smaller, but it does not reverse the direction of the impact as with the evangelical candidate cue. Given that “religious people” are more closely associated with the GOP than the Democratic Party in the minds of voters, but are not as tied to the Republicans as evangelicals, this pattern of similar but less dramatic results fits our expectations.

The last segments in the table and figure present a null finding that is nonetheless highly informative about the nature of partisan group associations. Describing a conservative candidate as Catholic produces no change either in the probability of candidate support among any of the partisan groups or in the overall impact of party identification on the likelihood of candidate support.<sup>10</sup> This is exactly what one would expect, given that Catholics are not primarily identified with one party over another. Since Catholics are not associated clearly with a party stereotype, a Catholic cue neither activates nor deactivates partisan voting.

These results support both the association of religious groups with party stereotypes and the conditional effect of such traits on partisan voting. Because evangelical Christians are closely associated with the Republican Party, when voters hear that a candidate is an evangelical they likely infer that the candidate is a Republican. In turn, this inference increases the likelihood that Republicans will vote for the candidate and decreases the likelihood among Democrats, regardless of the candidate’s policy agenda. Because religious people in general are not as strongly linked to the GOP as evangelicals are in voters’ minds, a generically religious candidate provides a weaker cue of Republican affiliation than does an evangelical candidate, and the impact of such a candidate on partisan voting is accordingly weaker. However, because the electorate still associates religious people far more with the GOP than with the Democratic Party,

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<sup>10</sup> The Catholic cue was only asked for the conservative candidate profile.

a candidate's general religiosity still provides something of a partisan inference and shapes partisanship's influences on vote choice. The absence of an impact for the Catholic cue reflects the fact that Catholics do not currently have a strong association with one party or the other.

### **Recognition of Party Stereotypes and Partisan Voting**

If party stereotypes are central to explaining how religious traits condition partisan voting, then the impact of particular candidate traits should depend on whether or not the voter actually associates the candidate's group with one of the two parties. Accordingly, we have estimated the models for the evangelical and generically religious candidate again, only this time we have separated respondents who do and do not perceive a link between either evangelicals or "religious people" and the GOP (see Table 1).<sup>11</sup> The results are shown in Table 3

[Table 3 about here]

The evidence is clear that describing a candidate as religious triggers partisan voting only among respondents who are aware of an association between either evangelicals or "religious people" and the GOP. Among the unaware, the difference in the impact of party ID between the baseline and either the generically religious or the evangelical candidate is negligible, and in neither case is the impact statistically significant. Among the aware, however, there is such a difference. Among those who link religious people and the GOP, the impact of party identification on support for the baseline candidate is a massive  $-.72$ , while partisanship's effect on this group's support for the religious candidate is a positive, though not significant,  $.11$ . That is an enormous net difference of  $.83$  in the impact of party identification on candidate support.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> We only conduct this test using the liberal candidate profile because that was the only profile provided in the surveys in which we asked about partisan stereotypes.

<sup>12</sup> The fact that the baseline candidate triggers a greater degree of partisan voting among aware respondents than among the non-aware respondents is likely due to respondents who are aware of the connection between religious people and the GOP almost certainly being more politically aware, and thus partisan, in general. What is most interesting and relevant for this paper is that the negative impact of partisanship for the unaware becomes positive for the respondents who recognize the link between religious people and the Republican party.

The analogous net difference in the impact of partisanship on voters who connect evangelicals and the GOP (comparing the baseline to the evangelical cue) is also substantial: .74 (-.52 to .22).

These results are consistent with the argument that social-group party stereotypes lead voters to make inferences about candidates. For those who are aware of the religiosity-Republican connections, knowing that a candidate is religious suggests that he is a Republican, leading Republicans to be more likely to vote for him and Democrats less so. For voters who do not make this connection, evidence that a candidate is religious imparts little information about his partisanship, and the impact of party identification on their voting decisions is unaltered.

### **The Effect of Combined Religion and Party Cues**

Our experiments also provided some respondents with information about not just the candidate's religion, but also his party affiliation. The relationship between religious groups and citizens' social group images of the parties should make religious and partisan cues interact in important ways to shape the degree of partisan voting. If a religious trait (such as being an evangelical) is closely connected to a particular party (such as the GOP) in voters' minds, then the religious trait and party label may convey the same information about the candidate's partisanship. Thus, providing individuals with both cues may not have an impact on partisan voting beyond that exerted by just the religious cue. However, if a religious trait is moderately associated with a party stereotype (such as generic religiosity and the GOP), then each cue may provide additional information about the candidate's partisanship, thus increasing the degree of partisan voting beyond the impact of the religious cue alone. Finally, if a religious trait runs counter to a party stereotype (such as an evangelical Democrat), then the two cues may provide mixed signals to voters and reduce the effect of party identification on vote choice.

In Table 4, we show the conditional effects of identifying the partisanship of evangelical and generically religious candidates on partisan voting. The first half of the table focuses on evangelical candidates and shows the predicted probabilities of being very likely to vote for the candidate for four different experimental groups: a candidate with neither a religion or party cue (baseline candidate), an evangelical candidate with no party cue, an evangelical Republican candidate, and an evangelical Democratic candidate.<sup>13</sup> Below the probabilities, we show the differences in predicted probabilities between each of the two respondent groups provided with a party cue (evangelical Republican and evangelical Democrat) and both the baseline group and the group asked simply about an evangelical candidate. The bottom half of the table shows the analogous probabilities and differences in probabilities for a generically religious candidate.

Turning first to the evangelical Republican treatment, the degree of partisan voting is no different than when the candidate is described simply as an evangelical. The overall impact of party identification is virtually identical for the two treatments, as the presence of an evangelical Republican candidate significantly reduces the probability of very likely support among all three types of Democrats and significantly increases that probability among strong Republicans, just as the presence of a candidate described simply as an evangelical did. Moreover, none of the differences within partisan groups between respondents who received the evangelical treatment and those receiving the evangelical Republican treatment are statistically significant. The

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<sup>13</sup> All of these probabilities are for the liberal issue profile only because that was the only profile used in the survey in which we identified the party affiliations of the candidate. The probabilities for the three types of evangelical candidates were computed from three separate ordered logit models in which respondent party identification, a dummy variable for the particular candidate treatment (evangelical without a party cue, evangelical Republican, or evangelical Democrat), and their interaction were the independent variables. The predicted probabilities for the baseline candidate were identical across the three models. The probabilities for the evangelical candidate with no party cue (liberal profile) were taken directly from the same figures in Table 2. The probabilities for the three types of generically religious candidates were computed in the same way, and the probabilities for the baseline group were also identical across those models.

candidate's evangelical affiliation and GOP affiliation clearly seem to be conveying the same information to respondents—both cues indicate that the candidate is a Republican.

[Table 4 about here]

The presence of a candidate who is both an evangelical and a Democrat produces a very different effect on partisan voting. Rather than partisanship's influence being very similar to that for the evangelical candidate with no party label, the impact of moving from strong Democrat to strong Republican on the probability of being very likely to support the evangelical Democratic candidate is statistically indistinguishable from that for the candidate with no religious or party identifiers (-.49 for the baseline candidate and -.31 for the evangelical Democrat, with the interaction between the evangelical Democratic treatment and party identification not approaching statistical significance). In fact, *weak and strong Republicans are no less likely to support a Democrat who is an evangelical than they are to support the baseline candidate, for whom no information about partisanship (or religion) is provided.* Being an evangelical does not outweigh the importance of party label for Republican respondents—they are significantly less likely to support the evangelical Democrat than the evangelical candidate with no party label. However, among weak and strong Republicans, “evangelical” neutralizes the impact of “Democrat”—notable given the powerful effect of a candidate's party label.

For Democratic respondents, the combination of evangelical and Democratic cues does more than just neutralize the positive influence of the candidate's Democratic affiliation on support for him. Although they have a higher probability of being “very likely” to vote for the evangelical Democrat than for the evangelical candidate with no party label, strong and weak Democrats (as well as Democratic leaners) actually are significantly *less likely* to support a liberal Democrat who is also an evangelical than they are to vote for a liberal candidate without

any partisan or religious labels. A candidate who is both an evangelical and a Democrat seems to present voters with conflicting cues. It is almost as if respondents are being told that the candidate is *both* a Republican and a Democrat, surely a perplexing circumstance.<sup>14</sup>

The bottom half of Table 4 shows the results when we combine the generic religion cue with party labels. While adding “Republican” to “evangelical” seemed to be redundant in the minds of respondents, respondents do not associate “religious people” as closely with the GOP as they do evangelicals. Thus, adding a Republican cue to a generic religious cue should impart more information than just describing a candidate as religious, and the results suggest that that is the case. Portraying the candidate simply as religious negated the highly negative effect of party identification on support for the baseline liberal candidate, but did not produce a positive partisan impact. In contrast, the relationship between partisanship and support for a religious Republican is positive and statistically significant, and all three groups of Democratic identifiers are less likely to support the religious Republican than the candidate who is simply religious. It is as if the “religious candidate, no party” respondents are being told that the candidate might be a Republican, while the “religious Republican” respondents are having that possibility confirmed.

The weaker connection between religious people and the GOP in the public’s party stereotypes is also evident in the effect that the religious and Democratic combination has on partisan voting. “Evangelical” seemed to slightly outweigh “Democrat” in how some respondents (namely Democrats) responded to the candidate with that mixture of traits.

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<sup>14</sup> The fact that Democrats do not simply feel the same about an evangelical Democrat as they do about a liberal candidate with no party or religious labels, but actually seem to like the evangelical Democrat *less* may reflect a broader mistrust of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. Bolce and DeMaio (1999a, 1999b, 2007) show that Democrats have an antipathy toward “Christian fundamentalists,” and we found a similar pattern in one of our own 2006 CCES modules. In response to the question “Can most fundamentalist Christians be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with fundamentalist Christians?,” majorities of all three Republican groups (including three-fourths of strong Republicans) said that most fundamentalists can be trusted. In contrast, majorities of all three Democratic groups (including nearly two-thirds of strong Democrats) answered that one can’t “be too careful in dealing with fundamentalist Christians.” It is possible that Democrats may not only infer that an evangelical candidate is a Republican, but that such a candidate is also not trustworthy.

However, the religious candidate cue simply seems to cancel out the effects of Democratic partisanship as the overall impact of party identification on candidate support for this candidate is virtually identical to that for the baseline candidate. Moreover, while Republican respondents are significantly less likely to support a religious Democrat than the baseline candidate, the differences in probabilities are modest, and there are no differences in the probabilities for Democratic respondents. In this case, it is as if respondents who might have suspected that a religious candidate is a Republican are having that possibility disconfirmed.

### **The Impact of Voters' Own Religion and Ideology**

While we have focused our attention on party stereotypes in activating partisan voting, there are at least two alternative—or perhaps complementary—explanations for the observed effects. The first possibility is that voters support candidates with whom they share a religious orientation. Evangelicals may be more likely to vote for evangelical candidates than for non-evangelical candidates with similar political and policy profiles, and highly-religious voters may be more likely to vote for religious candidates. Thus, because some religious orientations are closely related to party identification, what our results may be capturing is religious, rather than partisan, voting. For example, perhaps the reason why strong Republicans are more likely to vote for a liberal candidate who is evangelical than for a liberal candidate with unknown religious orientations is not that the candidate's evangelicalism triggers Republican partisanship, but simply that evangelical voters are more likely than other voters to be strong Republicans.

A second alternative explanation is that our results reflect ideology rather than partisanship. One perspective on partisanship is that people identify with a party because their beliefs match the party's beliefs—or are at odds with the rival party's beliefs (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), and some religious groups are strongly

associated with particular issue positions and ideology. For example, McDermott finds that participants in survey experiments similar to ours viewed evangelical candidates as “more ideologically conservative than average” (2008, p. 25),<sup>15</sup> while Bolce and DeMaio (1999a, 1999b) find that a commonly held stereotype of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians is that they are conservative. If voters respond to religious cues by making inferences about candidates’ beliefs and ideologies, and partisanship is based in ideology, then the connections we have shown between candidate religion and partisan voting in fact may be connections between candidate religion and ideological voting. Democratic voters, for instance, may be less likely to support an evangelical candidate not because they infer that he is Republican, but because they surmise that he is conservative and they are themselves liberals.

It is worth noting that just as partisanship can be related to social groups, ideology can be as well. Conover and Feldman (1981) show that liberal-conservative self-identification is rooted in group affect and symbols of social differentiation and conflict. Thus, even if a candidate’s social group memberships produce inferences about his or her ideology and thus trigger voting on the basis of individuals’ ideological orientations, this vote may still be group-based or affective voting rather than issue-based or ideological voting. Suppose, for example, that a conservative voter is more likely to vote for an evangelical candidate than for a non-evangelical candidate not because he or she assumes that the candidate is a Republican, but because he or she infers that the candidate is conservative. Such a situation may represent a vote based on the individual’s well-formed conservative principles, but it also may be a vote based simply on the individual liking conservatives as a group.

To assess whether these alternative explanations account for the conditional effect of candidate religion on partisanship’s impact on candidate support, we re-estimate our models of

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<sup>15</sup> McDermott apparently did not include a party cue in her experiments.

partisan voting and include a measure of ideology and its interaction with the dummy variable for the particular candidate religion (or candidate religion and party) treatment, as well as a measure of the relevant respondent religious characteristic and its interaction with the particular treatment dummy. In all of these models, ideology is measured by the respondent's self-placement on a five-point scale, ranging from very conservative to very liberal. In the models assessing the impact of evangelical candidate cues, our measure of respondent religion is a dummy variable for evangelical Protestants. For the generic religion cue, we constructed a factor score of religiosity which includes frequency of religious attendance, importance of religion, and frequency of prayer.<sup>16</sup> Because partisanship, ideology, and religious orientation are closely related—particularly for evangelicals (Layman and Green 2006)—and all three variables are interacted with the same treatment variable, there is a good deal of collinearity in the models, giving the effect of candidate religion on partisan voting a high statistical bar to clear.

In Table 5, we report the results of these models for the six candidate religion and religion and party treatments that produced statistically significant changes in the impact of party identification on candidate support (i.e. the models in which the interaction between the treatment and party identification was significant) in Tables 2 and 4: the evangelical and religious candidate treatments without party cues with both the conservative and liberal policy profiles, the evangelical Republican treatment, and the religious Republican treatment.<sup>17</sup> We do so in the same fashion as Table 2, showing the predicted probabilities of being very likely to vote

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<sup>16</sup> Principal components factor analyses with round 1 data and round 2 data both produced a single factor (eigenvalue of 2.21 in round 1 and 2.31 in round 2), with each of the three religious variables loading at .8 or higher. Our classification of evangelical Protestants is based on religious affiliation (e.g. Green 2007).

<sup>17</sup> The interactions between party identification and the Catholic, evangelical Democrat, and religious Democrat treatments were not statistically significant in the partisan voting models that did not include ideology and the relevant respondent religious characteristic. When we included these variables and their interactions with the treatment variables in the models for those three treatments, the interaction terms still were not significant, and the differences between the predicted probabilities for the baseline and treatment conditions within partisan groups remained quite similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 4.

for our candidate under the baseline and treatment conditions for each of the seven categories of the party identification scale.<sup>18</sup>

[Table 5 about here]

With only one exception, the religion-party treatments continued to produce a statistically significant change in the impact of partisanship on candidate support, even with ideology, respondent religion, and their interactions with the treatment included in the models. The positive impact of party identification on the probability of being very likely to vote for either an evangelical candidate or a generically religious candidate with a conservative policy profile is still significantly and substantially larger (.45 for the evangelical candidate and .33 for the religious candidate) than it is for the baseline candidate with the same issue profile (.20 in both models). The conditional effects on partisan voting of the evangelical cue for the liberal policy profile and the evangelical Republican cue are muted in these models. The effects of party identification on support for liberal candidates with these characteristics actually were positive and statistically significant in Tables 2 and 4, and now they are simply not significant. However, even with ideology, respondent religion, and their interactions with the candidate treatments added to the models, the presence of an evangelical or evangelical Republican candidate still

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<sup>18</sup> To compute these probabilities, we held ideology constant at its midpoint (.5 on a 0 to 1 scale) in all of the models, the dummy variable for evangelicals constant at 0 in the models for the evangelical candidate treatments, and religiosity constant at its midpoint (.5 on a 0 to 1 scale) in the models for the religious candidate treatments. The focus of this table is not on whether the candidate treatments condition the effects of ideology or respondent religion on voting behavior, but on whether the treatments continue to condition the effect of partisanship when we allow them to also condition the impact of ideology and religion. As can be seen in the coefficient estimates in Appendix A, the interactions between respondent religion and the candidate treatment are positive and statistically significant (at  $p < .10$  or less) in the models for the evangelical candidate with a conservative issue profile, the religious candidate with a conservative issue profile, the religious candidate with a liberal profile, and the religious Republican candidate. The interactions between ideology and the candidate treatment are statistically significant ( $p < .10$  or less) in the models for the evangelical candidate with a liberal profile, the evangelical Republican candidate, and the religious Republican candidate. Each of those statistically significant interaction terms has a positive coefficient, meaning that evangelicals, highly religious people, and conservatives are more likely to support a candidate described as either evangelical, religious, evangelical Republican, or religious Republican than they are to support the baseline candidate.

negates the significant negative effect of party identification that naturally appears for a candidate with a liberal issue profile.

The one exception in Table 5 is for the generic religion cue and the liberal policy profile. This treatment continues to make the impact of partisanship on the likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate less negative than it is for the baseline liberal candidate. Now, however, the difference in partisanship's effect is not statistically significant.

In short, the conditional effects that candidate religion exerts on partisan voting are muted when we account for its influence on ideological and religious voting. However, ideology and religion by no means account for all of these conditional effects. Moreover, other aspects of our findings suggest that the effects of the religion cues on partisan voting are not merely owing to ideology. For example, if the respondents were simply reacting to the policy positions of our hypothetical candidate, party identification should continue to have a negative impact on the likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate even if the candidate's religion were associated with the Republican Party. Instead, we found that Republicans are more likely—and Democrats less likely—to support the same liberal candidate when he is identified as an evangelical, a group clearly associated with the GOP. The impact of awareness of party stereotypes suggests a similar conclusion: if these relationships were based on ideology, then awareness of party stereotypes should not have an effect on the likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate. It appears that religion has considerable impact as a party trait independent of ideology.

It could be, however, that party beliefs and ideology play a complementary role to social group traits in activating partisanship. Such a possibility is certainly consistent with Conover and Feldman's (1981) findings that ideology is rooted in group affect—and also in Abramowitz and Sanders (2006) findings that ideology operates within social groups. Traits and beliefs are both

plausible ways for voters to infer a candidate's partisanship—as well as plausible ways to infer a candidate's ideology. Nonetheless, social group traits would appear to offer a more parsimonious inferential process, something that might well be preferred by citizens who are cognitive misers.

### **Conclusions and Discussion**

Our experimental results provide the mirror image of models which correlate religion and vote choice in observational surveys, confirming the significance of religion as a major cleavage in contemporary American politics. However, where previous research has revealed the impact of voters' own religion on their vote choice, we have investigated the impact of a candidate's religion on such choices. We have shown that a candidate's religion can have a powerful indirect impact on the vote by activating partisan predispositions. Key to this impact is voters' inferences based on the religious traits that are elements of party stereotypes. However, the importance of religious traits depends upon the degree of citizens' awareness of the association of religious groups with partisan stereotypes, and ultimately, the actual linkage of such groups to parties. Evangelicals are strongly linked to the GOP—to the point that the term “evangelical” may have become synonymous with “Republican” in the minds of many voters.<sup>19</sup> Generic religiosity shows a similar but weaker pattern, representing a religious group that is not as strongly linked to the major political parties. Not all religious groups have identifiable partisan profiles. Catholics currently do not, and there may be analogous religious groups allied with the Democrats, either now or in the future, as there were in the past.

These results underscore that religion and partisanship have become closely bound in contemporary American politics. For many voters, religion has been absorbed into party stereotypes. In this context, partisan stereotypes can be self-reinforcing: the more voters perceive

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<sup>19</sup> Some evangelical leaders were worried about just this connection—see the “Evangelical Manifesto” released in 2008. Available at <http://www.anevangelicalmanifesto.com/>

the Republicans as the party of religion, the more religiously devout voters will identify as Republicans, which will likely reinforce the perception of the Republicans as the religion party. While, today, just under half of voters make a religion-Republican association, that percentage will grow if Republican candidates continue to embrace religion. Consequently, the religious divide between the parties would persist and perhaps even widen.

However, party images can—and do—change. The Republicans have not always been perceived as the party of religion or evangelicals. Democrats were once seen as the party of Catholics, but are no longer so. Outside of religion, the change in the racial groups associated with America's two major parties has been well documented (Carmines and Stimson 1989). A change in religious stereotypes might be coming, as some within Democratic ranks have called for the party to more openly embrace religion. Accordingly, Democratic candidates have increasingly employed religious rhetoric and symbolism (see Dionne 2007; Sullivan 2007). Therefore, perhaps we are at the high point of the religion-Republican connection.

From a broader theoretical perspective, these findings and future possibilities offer another reason why the impact of partisanship varies: sometimes the characteristics of candidates activate citizens' partisan predispositions, maximizing their impact on vote choice, but at other times they fail to activate or even deactivate partisanship, and minimize or even neutralize its effects. For many people, partisanship is a bundle of information stored in party stereotypes, including social traits. How such information is perceived and used helps determine the impact of partisanship at the ballot box.

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**Table 1. Party Images and the 2006 Congressional Vote**

	Party Image of Group (“Members of this group are . . .”) <sup>a</sup>				Reported 2006 Congressional Vote		
	Mainly Republicans (1)	Pretty Even Mix of Both (2)	Mainly Democrats (3)	Net Republican Party Image (4)	Republican (5)	Democrat (6)	Net Republican Vote in 2006 (7)
Conservatives	79.58	12.30	5.08	<b>74.5</b>	86.3	13.7	<b>72.6</b>
Evangelical Christians	73.67	18.85	4.23	<b>69.5</b>	70.2	29.8	<b>40.4</b>
People in Business	59.33	31.30	6.25	<b>53.0</b>	63.6	36.4	<b>27.2</b>
Religious People	45.83	45.24	5.34	<b>40.5</b>	62.8	37.2	<b>25.6</b>
Catholics	24.73	52.45	20.08	<b>4.6</b>	52.7	47.3	<b>5.4</b>
Non-religious people	2.92	45.37	47.67	<b>-44.8</b>	34.8	65.2	<b>-30.4</b>
Hispanics	7.40	32.74	56.26	<b>-48.9</b>	35.0	65.0	<b>-30.0</b>
Union members	5.09	20.10	71.44	<b>-66.3</b>	32.9	67.1	<b>-34.2</b>
Blacks	2.18	18.36	75.98	<b>-73.8</b>	20.1	79.9	<b>-59.8</b>
Liberals	4.68	12.85	79.11	<b>-74.4</b>	7.7	92.3	<b>-84.6</b>

Note: Entries are row percentages.

<sup>a</sup> Percentages do not equal 100 because those who skipped the question are not included.

<b>Table 2. Candidate Religion and Partisan Voting:</b> Predicted probabilities of being “very likely” to support the candidate by party identification and candidate religion treatment								
Religion Treatment and Issue Profile	Party Identification							Impact of Party ID (Strong Rep - Strong Dem)
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Leans Dem.	Indep.	Leans Rep.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	
<i>Evangelical Cue</i>								
Conservative Profile								
Baseline Candidate	.09 (±.03)	.14 (±.03)	.19 (±.03)	.27 (±.04)	.35 (±.05)	.46 (±.06)	.56 (±.07)	<b>.47*</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.02 (±.02)	.06 (±.02)	.11 (±.03)	.20 (±.05)	.34 (±.07)	.51 (±.10)	.68 (±.11)	<b>.66*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.07*</b>	<b>-.08*</b>	<b>-.08*</b>	<b>-.07</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.12</b>	
Liberal Profile								
Baseline Candidate	.59 (±.12)	.49 (±.09)	.38 (±.07)	.29 (±.06)	.21 (±.06)	.15 (±.06)	.10 (±.05)	<b>-.49*</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.10 (±.04)	.13 (±.04)	.15 (±.04)	.18 (±.05)	.21 (±.06)	.25 (±.07)	.29 (±.04)	<b>.19*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.49*</b>	<b>-.26*</b>	<b>-.23*</b>	<b>-.11</b>	<b>-.001</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.19*</b>	
<i>Religious Cue</i>								
Conservative Profile								
Baseline Candidate	.09 (±.02)	.14 (±.03)	.19 (±.03)	.27 (±.04)	.35 (±.05)	.46 (±.05)	.56 (±.06)	<b>.47*</b>
Religious Candidate	.04 (±.02)	.08 (±.02)	.13 (±.02)	.22 (±.04)	.34 (±.06)	.49 (±.07)	.63 (±.09)	<b>.59*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.05*</b>	<b>-.06*</b>	<b>-.06*</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.07</b>	
Liberal Profile								
Baseline Candidate	.60 (±.11)	.49 (±.09)	.38 (±.07)	.28 (±.06)	.20 (±.06)	.14 (±.06)	.09 (±.05)	<b>-.51*</b>
Religious Candidate	.25 (±.08)	.24 (±.07)	.23 (±.05)	.22 (±.05)	.21 (±.05)	.20 (±.06)	.19 (±.07)	<b>-.06†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.35*</b>	<b>-.25*</b>	<b>-.15*</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.10</b>	
<i>Catholic Cue (Conservative Profile Only)</i>								
Baseline Candidate	.08 (±.02)	.12 (±.03)	.18 (±.03)	.25 (±.03)	.35 (±.04)	.45 (±.05)	.55 (±.06)	<b>.47*</b>
Catholic Candidate	.10 (±.04)	.13 (±.04)	.18 (±.04)	.24 (±.05)	.32 (±.06)	.41 (±.07)	.49 (±.11)	<b>.39*</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>-.002</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.06</b>	
Note: Entries are predicted probabilities of being very likely to support the candidate. The numbers in parentheses are 95 percent confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities divided by two; i.e. the confidence interval is the predicted probability + or - the number in parentheses.								
* The difference in predicted probabilities (either between the treatment and baseline conditions for a particular partisan group or between strong Republicans and strong Democrats for a particular experimental condition) is statistically significant (p < .05).								
† The impact of party identification on the likelihood of supporting the candidate is significantly (p < .05) more positive for the treatment condition than for the baseline condition (i.e. the interaction between party identification and the religious treatment variable is statistically significant in the ordered logit model).								

**Table 3. Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and Partisan Voting:** Predicted probabilities of being “very likely” to support the candidate by party identification, candidate religion treatment, and awareness of religious group affiliation with the Republican party (liberal profile only).

Religion Treatment and Awareness of Group Ties to GOP	Party Identification							Impact of Party ID (Strong Rep - Strong Dem)
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Leans Dem.	Indep.	Leans Rep.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	
<b>Evangelical Cue (Not aware)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.54 (±.26)	.46 (±.20)	.39 (±.16)	.32 (±.15)	.26 (±.15)	.21 (±.16)	.16 (±.17)	<b>-.38</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.16 (±.14)	.18 (±.13)	.19 (±.11)	.20 (±.10)	.21 (±.11)	.23 (±.14)	.24 (±.18)	<b>.08</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.38</b>	<b>-.28</b>	<b>-.20</b>	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.08</b>	
<b>Evangelical Cue (Aware)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.61 (±.12)	.50 (±.11)	.38 (±.08)	.28 (±.07)	.19 (±.06)	.13 (±.06)	.09 (±.04)	<b>-.52*</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.09 (±.05)	.11 (±.04)	.14 (±.05)	.17 (±.05)	.21 (±.06)	.25 (±.08)	.31 (±.10)	<b>.22*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.52*</b>	<b>-.39*</b>	<b>-.24*</b>	<b>-.11</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.22*</b>	
<b>Religious Cue (Not Aware)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.42 (±.16)	.37 (±.13)	.32 (±.10)	.27 (±.09)	.23 (±.09)	.19 (±.10)	.16 (±.11)	<b>-.26</b>
Religious Candidate	.30 (±.13)	.25 (±.10)	.22 (±.08)	.18 (±.07)	.14 (±.07)	.12 (±.07)	.10 (±.07)	<b>-.20</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.10</b>	<b>-.09</b>	<b>-.09</b>	<b>-.07</b>	<b>-.06</b>	
<b>Religious Cue (Aware)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.77 (±.14)	.63 (±.14)	.46 (±.12)	.30 (±.10)	.17 (±.08)	.09 (±.06)	.05 (±.04)	<b>-.72*</b>
Religious Candidate	.20 (±.10)	.21 (±.09)	.23 (±.08)	.25 (±.08)	.27 (±.09)	.29 (±.11)	.31 (±.14)	<b>.11†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.57*</b>	<b>-.42*</b>	<b>-.23*</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.20*</b>	<b>.26*</b>	
Note: See table 2 for explanation.								
* The difference in predicted probabilities is statistically significant (p < .05).								
† The impact of party identification on the likelihood of supporting the candidate is significantly (p < .05) more positive for the treatment condition than for the baseline condition.								

**Table 4. Candidate Religion, Candidate Party, and Partisan Voting:** Predicted probabilities of being “very likely” to support the candidate by party identification and candidate party and religion (liberal profile only)

Religion and Party Treatments	Party Identification							Impact of Party ID (Strong Rep - Strong Dem)
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Leans Dem.	Indep.	Leans Rep.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	
<b>Evangelical</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.59 (±.12)	.49 (±.09)	.38 (±.07)	.29 (±.06)	.21 (±.06)	.15 (±.06)	.10 (±.05)	<b>-.49*</b>
Evangelical Candidate, No Party	.10 (±.04)	.13 (±.04)	.15 (±.04)	.18 (±.05)	.21 (±.06)	.25 (±.07)	.29 (±.04)	<b>.19*†</b>
Evangelical Republican Candidate	.06 (±.03)	.08 (±.03)	.11 (±.03)	.14 (±.04)	.17 (±.05)	.22 (±.07)	.27 (±.09)	<b>.21*†</b>
Evangelical Democratic Candidate	.37 (±.09)	.28 (±.07)	.22 (±.05)	.17 (±.04)	.12 (±.03)	.09 (±.03)	.06 (±.03)	<b>-.31*</b>
<i>Differences within Partisan Group</i>								
Evan. Republican vs. baseline	<b>-.53*</b>	<b>-.39*</b>	<b>-.27*</b>	<b>-.15*</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.17*</b>	
Evan. Republican vs. Evan. no party	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>-.02</b>	
Evan. Democrat vs. baseline	<b>-.22*</b>	<b>-.21*</b>	<b>-.16*</b>	<b>-.12*</b>	<b>-.09*</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>-.04</b>	
Evan. Democrat vs. Evan. no party	<b>.27*</b>	<b>.15*</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>-.09*</b>	<b>-.16*</b>	<b>-.23*</b>	
<b>Generic Religion</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.60 (±.11)	.49 (±.09)	.38 (±.07)	.28 (±.06)	.20 (±.06)	.14 (±.06)	.09 (±.05)	<b>-.51*</b>
Religious Candidate, No Party	.25 (±.08)	.24 (±.07)	.23 (±.05)	.22 (±.05)	.21 (±.05)	.20 (±.06)	.19 (±.07)	<b>-.06†</b>
Religious Republican Candidate	.06 (±.03)	.08 (±.03)	.11 (±.04)	.16 (±.04)	.21 (±.06)	.27 (±.08)	.35 (±.11)	<b>.29*†</b>
Religious Democratic Candidate	.60 (±.10)	.43 (±.09)	.28 (±.07)	.17 (±.04)	.09 (±.04)	.05 (±.02)	.03 (±.01)	<b>-.57*</b>
<i>Differences within Partisan Group</i>								
Rel. Republican vs. baseline	<b>-.54*</b>	<b>-.41*</b>	<b>-.27*</b>	<b>-.12*</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.26*</b>	
Rel. Republican vs. Rel. no party	<b>-.19*</b>	<b>-.16*</b>	<b>-.12*</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.16</b>	
Rel. Democrat vs. baseline	<b>.001</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>-.10</b>	<b>-.11*</b>	<b>-.11*</b>	<b>-.09*</b>	<b>-.06*</b>	
Rel. Democrat vs. Rel. no party	<b>.35*</b>	<b>.19*</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>-.12*</b>	<b>-.15*</b>	<b>-.16*</b>	

Note: See table 2 for explanation.

\* The difference in predicted probabilities is statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ).

† The impact of party identification on the likelihood of supporting the candidate is significantly ( $p < .05$ ) more positive for the treatment condition than for the baseline condition.

**Table 5. Are the Results Due to Ideology and Religious Orientations?** Predicted probabilities of being “very likely” to support the candidate by party identification and the candidate treatments, controlling for ideology, religious orientation, and their interactions with the candidate religion treatment


Religion and Religion/Party Treatment	Party Identification							Impact of Party ID (Strong Rep - Strong Dem)
	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Leans Dem	Indep.	Leans Rep	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	
<b>Evangelical Cue (Conservative Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.12 (±.04)	.15 (±.03)	.17 (±.03)	.21 (±.04)	.24 (±.05)	.29 (±.06)	.33 (±.08)	<b>.20*</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.03 (±.02)	.05 (±.02)	.08 (±.03)	.14 (±.04)	.23 (±.07)	.34 (±.12)	.48 (±.16)	<b>.45*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.09*</b>	<b>-.10*</b>	<b>-.09*</b>	<b>-.07</b>	<b>-.01</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.15</b>	
<b>Evangelical Cue (Liberal Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.50 (±.14)	.41 (±.11)	.33 (±.08)	.26 (±.07)	.20 (±.07)	.15 (±.07)	.11 (±.07)	<b>-.39*</b>
Evangelical Candidate	.11 (±.16)	.12 (±.05)	.13 (±.05)	.14 (±.05)	.15 (±.05)	.17 (±.06)	.18 (±.09)	<b>.07†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.39*</b>	<b>-.29*</b>	<b>-.20*</b>	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.07</b>	
<b>Religious Cue (Conservative Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.13 (±.04)	.15 (±.03)	.18 (±.03)	.21 (±.03)	.25 (±.04)	.29 (±.05)	.33 (±.08)	<b>.20*</b>
Religious Candidate	.06 (±.03)	.09 (±.03)	.13 (±.03)	.17 (±.03)	.23 (±.05)	.30 (±.08)	.39 (±.12)	<b>.33*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.07*</b>	<b>-.06*</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>-.04</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.06</b>	
<b>Religious Cue (Liberal Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.54 (±.15)	.44 (±.11)	.35 (±.08)	.27 (±.07)	.20 (±.07)	.14 (±.07)	.10 (±.07)	<b>-.44*</b>
Religious Candidate	.35 (±.13)	.30 (±.10)	.26 (±.07)	.21 (±.06)	.18 (±.06)	.15 (±.07)	.12 (±.08)	<b>-.23*</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.19</b>	<b>-.14</b>	<b>-.09</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.02</b>	
<b>Evangelical Republican (Lib. Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.50 (±.14)	.40 (±.11)	.32 (±.08)	.24 (±.07)	.18 (±.07)	.13 (±.07)	.09 (±.06)	<b>-.41*</b>
Evangelical Republican Candidate	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.08 (±.06)	<b>.004†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.42*</b>	<b>-.32*</b>	<b>-.24*</b>	<b>-.16*</b>	<b>-.10</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>-.01</b>	
<b>Religious Republican (Lib. Profile)</b>								
Baseline Candidate	.53 (±.15)	.43 (±.11)	.33 (±.08)	.24 (±.07)	.18 (±.06)	.12 (±.06)	.08 (±.06)	<b>-.45*</b>
Religious Candidate	.06 (±.04)	.08 (±.04)	.11 (±.04)	.14 (±.05)	.19 (±.06)	.24 (±.10)	.30 (±.15)	<b>.24*†</b>
Difference within Partisan Group	<b>-.47*</b>	<b>-.35*</b>	<b>-.22*</b>	<b>-.10</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>-.12</b>	<b>.22*</b>	

Note: See table 2 for explanation.

\* The difference in predicted probabilities is statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ).

† The impact of party identification on the likelihood of supporting the candidate is significantly ( $p < .05$ ) more positive for the treatment condition than for the baseline condition.

Figure 1: The Impact of Party Identification on Support for the Baseline Candidate and Candidates with Religious Identifiers



## Appendix A (Online Only): Ordered Logit Coefficients

Tables A1 through A4 show the coefficients from the ordered logit models used to compute the predicted probabilities shown in Tables 2 through 5.

<b>Table A1. Candidate Religion and Partisan Voting:</b> The effect of candidate religion cues, party identification, and their interactions on candidate support (coefficients for analyses in Table 2)					
Independent Variables	Evangelical Cue (Conservative Profile)	Evangelical Cue (Liberal Profile)	Generic Religion Cue (Conservative Profile)	Generic Religion Cue (Liberal Profile)	Catholic Cue (Conservative Profile)
Party Identification <sup>a</sup>	2.50*** (.23)	-2.56*** (.43)	2.52*** (.22)	-2.66*** (.45)	2.62*** (.24)
Evangelical Cue <sup>b</sup>	-1.23*** (.26)	-2.54*** (.35)	—	—	—
Generic Religion Cue <sup>b</sup>	—	—	-.79*** (.20)	-1.48*** (.35)	—
Catholic Cue <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	—	.15 (.25)
Party Identification X Evangelical Cue	1.74*** (.45)	3.84*** (.59)	—	—	—
Party Identification X Generic Religion Cue	—	—	1.09** (.35)	2.28*** (.57)	—
Party Identification X Catholic Cue	—	—	—	—	-.43 (.42)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.11	.07	.11	.05	.09
$\chi^2$ (df=3)	240.85	59.99	286.61	42.74	176.86
(N)	(822)	(390)	(995)	(375)	(834)

Note: Entries are ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All independent variables are coded to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable ranges from being “not at all likely” to support the candidate (1) to being “very likely” to support the candidate (4).

<sup>a</sup> Ranges from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

<sup>b</sup> Comparison category includes respondents in the baseline condition.

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p < .05

**Table A2. Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and Partisan Voting:** The effect of candidate religion cues, party identification, and their interactions on candidate support by awareness of religious group affiliation with the Republican party (coefficients for analyses in Table 3)

Religion Cue and Awareness of Group Ties to GOP				
Independent Variables	Evangelical Cue (Aware)	Evangelical Cue (Not Aware)	Religious Cue (Aware)	Religious Cue (Not Aware)
Party Identification	-2.80*** (.48)	-1.79 (.96)	-4.15*** (.67)	-1.33* (.62)
Evangelical Cue	-2.82*** (.40)	-1.79* (.74)	—	—
Generic Religion Cue	—	—	-2.61*** (.52)	-.53 (.46)
Party Identification X Evangelical Cue	4.36*** (.66)	2.28 (1.26)	—	—
Party Identification X Generic Religion Cue	—	—	4.73*** (.85)	-.08 (.81)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.08	.03	.11	.03
$\chi^2$ (df=3)	57.29	6.98	46.54	14.56
(N)	(302)	(88)	(181)	(194)

Note: See Table A1 for explanation.  
\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p<.05

**Table A3. Candidate Religion, Candidate Party, and Partisan Voting:** The effect of candidate religion and party cues, party identification, and their interactions on candidate support (coefficients used to compute probabilities for religion and party cues in Table 4)

Independent Variables	Evangelical Republican Cue	Evangelical Democratic Cue	Religious Republican Cue	Religious Democratic Cue
Party Identification <sup>a</sup>	-2.63*** (.44)	-2.48*** (.44)	-2.80*** (.45)	-2.95*** (.48)
Religious/Party Cue <sup>b</sup>	—	—	-3.14** (.38)	.04 (.34)
Evangelical/Party Cue <sup>b</sup>	-3.09*** (.37)	-.97** (.37)	—	—
Party Identification × Religious/Party Cue	—	—	4.94*** (.63)	-1.08 (.58)
Party Identification x Evangelical/Party Cue	4.37*** (.60)	.40 (.55)	—	—
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.09	.08	.09	.16
χ <sup>2</sup> (df=3)	79.73	81.87	80.62	140.42
(N)	(377)	(400)	(361)	(369)

Note: See Table A1 for explanation.  
\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p<.05

**Table A4. Are the Results Due to Ideology and Religious Orientations?** The effects of party identification, ideology, respondent religious orientation, and their interactions with the candidate religion treatment on candidate support (coefficients for analyses in Table 5)

Independent Variables	Evangelical Cue (Conservative Profile)	Evangelical Cue (Liberal Profile)	Religious Cue (Conservative Profile)	Religious Cue (Liberal Profile)	Evangelical Republican (Liberal Profile)	Religious Republican (Liberal Profile)
Candidate Religion/Religion and Party Treatment	-1.17** (.37)	-3.77*** (.48)	-1.16*** (.32)	-2.56*** (.51)	-5.06*** (.56)	-4.53*** (.59)
Party Identification <sup>a</sup>	1.29*** (.29)	-2.11*** (.55)	1.21*** (.28)	-2.31*** (.60)	-2.26*** (.56)	-2.51*** (.61)
Party ID × Treatment	2.16*** (.58)	2.63*** (.72)	1.02* (.49)	.95 (.81)	2.31** (.77)	4.44*** (.88)
Ideological Identification <sup>b</sup>	3.02*** (.41)	-1.97** (.73)	2.83*** (.42)	-1.15 (.83)	-2.07** (.74)	-1.22 (.83)
Ideological ID × Treatment	-.76 (.83)	3.44*** (.95)	.14 (.68)	.95 (1.08)	5.29*** (1.14)	2.09 <sup>†</sup> (1.15)
Respondent Religion <sup>c</sup>	.49* (.20)	.57 (.37)	.97*** (.23)	-.54 (.50)	.59 (.37)	-.57 (.51)
Respondent Religion × Treatment	.80 <sup>†</sup> (.46)	-.12 (.48)	.68 <sup>†</sup> (.41)	2.66*** (.69)	.25 (.51)	1.18 <sup>†</sup> (.68)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.17	.09	.18	.09	.13	.12
χ <sup>2</sup> (df=7)	346.44	82.36	423.58	66.02	114.41	88.34
(N)	(778)	(372)	(904)	(327)	(368)	(315)

Note: See Table A1 for explanation

<sup>a</sup> Ranges from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

<sup>b</sup> Ranges from very liberal to very conservative

<sup>c</sup> Dummy variable for evangelical Protestants for models with an evangelical candidate treatment. Religiosity factor score for models with a religious candidate treatment.

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p < .05; <sup>†</sup>p < .10

## Appendix B (Online Only): Predicted Probabilities

Tables B1 through B12 show the predicted probabilities of having each level of candidate support by party identification from each of the analyses shown in Tables 2 through 5.

**Table B1:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification, baseline and evangelical candidates with conservative policy profiles (Table 2)

Party ID	Baseline Candidate				Evangelical Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.21	.35	.34	.09	.48	.33	.16	.02
Weak Democrat	.15	.31	.40	.14	.31	.37	.26	.06
Democratic Leaner	.11	.25	.45	.19	.18	.33	.37	.11
Independent	.07	.20	.46	.27	.10	.25	.45	.20
Republican Leaner	.05	.15	.45	.35	.05	.15	.45	.34
Weak Republican	.03	.11	.41	.46	.03	.09	.38	.51
Strong Republican	.02	.07	.35	.56	.01	.05	.26	.68

**Table B2:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – baseline and evangelical candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 2)

Party ID	Baseline Candidate				Evangelical Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.02	.04	.35	.59	.18	.27	.45	.10
Weak Democrat	.03	.06	.42	.49	.15	.25	.48	.13
Democratic Leaner	.04	.09	.48	.38	.13	.22	.50	.15
Independent	.06	.13	.52	.29	.11	.20	.52	.18
Republican Leaner	.09	.17	.53	.21	.09	.17	.53	.21
Weak Republican	.13	.22	.50	.15	.07	.15	.53	.25
Strong Republican	.19	.27	.44	.10	.06	.13	.52	.29

**Table B3:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – baseline and generically religious candidates with conservative policy profiles (Table 2)

Party ID	Baseline Candidate				Religious Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.20	.37	.34	.09	.36	.39	.21	.04
Weak Democrat	.14	.32	.40	.14	.24	.38	.31	.08
Democratic Leaner	.10	.27	.44	.19	.14	.32	.40	.13
Independent	.07	.21	.46	.27	.08	.24	.45	.22
Republican Leaner	.05	.15	.45	.35	.05	.16	.45	.34
Weak Republican	.03	.11	.40	.46	.03	.10	.39	.49
Strong Republican	.02	.08	.34	.56	.02	.06	.29	.63

**Table B4:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – baseline and generically religious candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 2)

Party ID	Baseline Candidate				Religious Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.01	.05	.35	.60	.05	.16	.54	.25
Weak Democrat	.02	.07	.43	.49	.05	.17	.54	.24
Democratic Leaner	.03	.10	.49	.38	.05	.18	.54	.23
Independent	.04	.15	.53	.28	.06	.19	.54	.22
Republican Leaner	.06	.20	.54	.20	.06	.20	.54	.21
Weak Republican	.09	.27	.50	.14	.06	.21	.54	.20
Strong Republican	.14	.33	.44	.09	.07	.21	.53	.19

**Table B5:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – baseline and Catholic candidates with conservative policy profiles (Table 2)

Party ID	Baseline Candidate				Catholic Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.19	.38	.34	.08	.17	.37	.37	.10
Weak Democrat	.13	.33	.41	.12	.12	.32	.42	.13
Democratic Leaner	.09	.27	.46	.18	.09	.27	.46	.18
Independent	.06	.21	.48	.25	.06	.22	.48	.24
Republican Leaner	.04	.15	.46	.35	.05	.17	.47	.32
Weak Republican	.03	.11	.42	.45	.03	.13	.44	.41
Strong Republican	.02	.07	.35	.55	.02	.09	.40	.49

**Table B6:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification and awareness of evangelical Christians being “mainly Republicans”—evangelical candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 3)

Party ID	Do not identify evangelicals as being “mainly Republicans”				Identify evangelicals as being “mainly Republicans”			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.11	.23	.50	.16	.21	.28	.42	.09
Weak Democrat	.10	.22	.50	.18	.17	.25	.47	.11
Democratic Leaner	.09	.21	.51	.19	.14	.22	.50	.14
Independent	.09	.20	.51	.20	.11	.20	.52	.17
Republican Leaner	.08	.19	.52	.21	.09	.17	.54	.21
Weak Republican	.08	.18	.52	.23	.07	.14	.54	.25
Strong Republican	.07	.17	.52	.24	.05	.11	.53	.31

**Table B7:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification and awareness of religious people being “mainly Republicans”– religious candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 3)

Party ID	Do not identify “religious people” as “mainly Republicans”				Identify “religious people” as being “mainly Republicans”			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.02	.13	.56	.30	.09	.20	.51	.20
Weak Democrat	.02	.15	.57	.25	.08	.19	.52	.21
Democratic Leaner	.03	.18	.58	.21	.07	.18	.52	.23
Independent	.04	.22	.57	.18	.07	.16	.52	.25
Republican Leaner	.05	.25	.56	.14	.06	.15	.52	.27
Weak Republican	.06	.29	.53	.12	.06	.14	.51	.29
Strong Republican	.07	.34	.50	.10	.05	.13	.51	.31

**Table B8:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – evangelical Republican and evangelical Democratic candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 4)

Party ID	Evangelical Republican Candidate				Evangelical Democratic Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.27	.30	.37	.06	.04	.12	.48	.37
Weak Democrat	.22	.28	.43	.08	.06	.15	.50	.28
Democratic Leaner	.17	.25	.47	.11	.09	.19	.50	.22
Independent	.14	.22	.51	.14	.12	.24	.48	.17
Republican Leaner	.10	.18	.54	.17	.16	.28	.44	.12
Weak Republican	.08	.15	.55	.22	.21	.31	.39	.09
Strong Republican	.06	.12	.54	.27	.27	.33	.33	.06

**Table B9:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification – religious Republican and religious Democratic candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 4)

Party ID	Religious Republican Candidate				Religious Democratic Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.18	.36	.40	.06	.01	.03	.36	.60
Weak Democrat	.13	.32	.46	.08	.02	.05	.49	.43
Democratic Leaner	.10	.27	.52	.11	.04	.10	.59	.28
Independent	.07	.22	.55	.16	.07	.16	.60	.17
Republican Leaner	.05	.17	.57	.21	.12	.24	.54	.09
Weak Republican	.04	.13	.56	.27	.22	.31	.42	.05
Strong Republican	.03	.10	.53	.35	.35	.34	.29	.03

**Table B10:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification from models controlling for ideology, religious orientation, and their interactions with the candidate religion treatment – evangelical candidates with conservative and liberal policy profiles (Table 5)

Party ID	Evangelical Candidate, Conservative Profile				Evangelical Candidate, Liberal Profile			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.40	.39	.18	.03	.15	.26	.48	.11
Weak Democrat	.27	.41	.27	.05	.14	.25	.49	.12
Democratic Leaner	.17	.38	.37	.08	.13	.24	.50	.13
Independent	.10	.30	.46	.14	.12	.23	.51	.14
Republican Leaner	.06	.21	.50	.23	.11	.22	.52	.15
Weak Republican	.04	.14	.48	.34	.10	.20	.53	.17
Strong Republican	.02	.09	.41	.48	.09	.20	.53	.18

**Table B11:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification from models controlling for ideology, religious orientation, and their interactions with the candidate religion treatment – religious candidates with conservative and liberal policy profiles (Table 5)

Party ID	Religious Candidate, Conservative Profile				Religious Candidate, Liberal Profile			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.19	.41	.34	.06	.02	.10	.53	.35
Weak Democrat	.14	.37	.40	.09	.03	.12	.55	.30
Democratic Leaner	.10	.32	.46	.13	.03	.15	.56	.26
Independent	.07	.26	.50	.17	.04	.18	.57	.21
Republican Leaner	.05	.20	.52	.23	.05	.20	.56	.18
Weak Republican	.04	.15	.51	.30	.06	.24	.55	.15
Strong Republican	.02	.12	.47	.39	.08	.27	.53	.12

**Table B12:** Predicted probability of having each level of candidate support by party identification from models controlling for ideology, religious orientation, and their interactions with the candidate religion treatment – evangelical Republican and religious Republican candidates with liberal policy profiles (Table 5)

Party ID	Evangelical Republican Candidate				Religious Republican Candidate			
	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not at all Likely	Not Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Strong Democrat	.18	.26	.48	.08	.14	.34	.46	.06
Weak Democrat	.18	.26	.48	.08	.10	.29	.53	.08
Democratic Leaner	.18	.26	.48	.08	.08	.24	.57	.11
Independent	.17	.26	.49	.08	.06	.20	.60	.14
Republican Leaner	.17	.26	.49	.08	.04	.16	.61	.19
Weak Republican	.17	.26	.49	.08	.03	.12	.61	.24
Strong Republican	.17	.26	.49	.08	.02	.09	.59	.30