

**Leading by Example:
Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models***

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Abstract

Among the arguments advanced in favor of descriptive representation is that female politicians may serve as role models, encouraging other women to be politically active. Furthermore, the term “role model” implies that women in political office likely have a larger impact on the political engagement of the young than the old. This paper tests both claims. Using data from three cross-national datasets, we find that female politicians do serve as political role models: Where there are more female members of parliament (MPs), adolescent girls are more likely to discuss politics with friends and to say that they will participate in politics as adults, and adult women are more likely to participate in and discuss politics. The presence of female MPs registers the same effect on the propensity for political discussion regardless of age, but the impact on women’s political activity is far greater among the young than it is the old.

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Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models

It is essential to provide positive female role models, who make women realise [sic] that getting involved into politics must not be left to men in suits.

Sandra Gidley
Member of Parliament (Liberal Democrat)
United Kingdom, 2004¹

We have had ten years' experience with a gender-equal government and an almost gender-equal parliament. Do you understand what this means for today's ten-year olds? For as long as they can remember, politicians and cabinet ministers are just as likely to have been women as men. Their idea of what is normal is very different from the one that I, a woman born in the 1950s, had. When I was little, almost all the politicians were men. This is what influenced my image of what is normal, an image that I work hard to combat. Women's entry into the political arena has been of tremendous importance.

Gertrud Åström
Government Analyst
Sweden, 2005²

Descriptive representation for women has been advocated—by both scholars and activists—for many reasons. The presence of female legislators, cabinet members, prime ministers, and presidents, it is argued, will help compensate for past and present injustice, provide a voice for overlooked interests, and contribute to the overall legitimacy of supposedly representative democratic institutions (Phillips 1995; also Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999). Female representatives also have been expected to spur engagement with and participation in politics among other women (e.g., Burns et al. 2001; Carroll 1985; Kittilson 2005). As exemplars of the possibility and potential of female political activism, female politicians may thus function as true role models, inspiring other women and girls to be politically active themselves. We might particularly expect female politicians to serve as role models for younger women who are still learning about the political world and their place within it.

¹ “Women Need Political Role Models—Gidley.” Press Release, Liberal Democrats (political party), United Kingdom. 27 April 2004. Accessed 9 February 2006 <<http://www.libdems.org.uk/news/story.html?id=6611&navPage=news.html>>.

² Karin Alfredsson. 2005. “Politics lead the way.” Sweden.se (The Official Gateway to Sweden). Accessed 9 February 2006 <http://www.sweden.se/templates/cs/CommonPage___12899.aspx#1>.

In most of the world, it is unusual, if not rare, for women and girls to observe other women in positions of political leadership. In 2006, women comprise about 17% of members of parliament (MPs) worldwide, with considerable variation from country to country; women currently hold 45% of seats in the lower house in Sweden, but just 13% of seats in Greece's lower house, for example (IPU 2006). In the late 1990s, women made up about 17% of the cabinet ministers in the world's established democracies, and only rarely held the most prestigious portfolios with considerable cross-national variation (Reynolds 1999). By 2000, only 39 nations had ever elected a woman president or prime minister (Norris and Inglehart 2001).

At the same time, men and women in the mass electorate differ in their propensity for political action across democratic states (Christy 1987; Jennings 1983; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). For example, Figure 1A displays differences in political activity among men and women across twenty-three democratic nations (European Values Survey), while Figure 1B displays the same for *intended* activity among adolescents across twenty democracies (IEA Civic Education Study).³ In almost every case, women are (or intend to be) less politically active than men, raising serious normative concerns about political equality and representation.

Figures 1A and 1B about here.

There are myriad potential explanations for the gender gap in political engagement and activity. In this paper, we focus on one factor that is often noted but has not received much empirical attention, particularly in cross-national research: the presence of descriptive representatives. Specifically, we ask whether cross-nationally, the presence of women in political office (in this case, parliament) has an impact on the political activity of women. Using three different datasets, we find that where there are more women in office, adult women are more likely to report that they discuss and participate in politics, and adolescent girls are more

³ Details on both surveys and the measures employed are found below and in the appendix.

likely to report that they discuss politics with their friends and intend to participate in politics as adults. The presence of female MPs registers the same effect on the propensity for political discussion across age cohorts, but the impact on political activism is far greater among the young than it is the old. That is, while female MPs stimulate political discussion among all women, regardless of age, it is largely among young women that the presence of female role models helps translate that political engagement into a greater propensity for political action.

Expectations and Evidence

Scholars and activists have long expected the presence of women in office to encourage greater political involvement among their fellow female citizens. Extant empirical work has focused primarily on the U.S., but the theoretical arguments and proposed causal mechanisms are applicable, and have been proposed (Kittilson 2005), cross-nationally. Some, but not all, previous findings have concerned psychological engagement (e.g., interest, attention), but scholars have been less likely to report effects on actual political activity. In this research, we seek to determine if female politicians serve as role models in the fullest sense—encouraging other women and girls to follow in their footsteps and engage in active political participation. We examine two kinds of political activity: political discussion with one’s friends and family, and activity within the political sphere, such as joining a political group or working for a party.

First, we ask whether female descriptive representatives encourage political discussion among women (*discussion hypothesis*). The mere presence of fellow group members may make politics a subject of women’s discussion. To the extent that female politicians raise issues of interest to women (e.g., Childs and Withey 2004; Swers 2002; Wolbrecht 2002), frame legislative decision-making in terms of women’s perspective (Walsh 2002), and encourage

political institutions to address women's policy concerns (i.e., provide substantive representation; see Lijphart 1991; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2002), female role models may spark women's discussion about political topics. Previous research finds that the presence of female politicians is associated with greater psychological engagement (interest, attention, efficacy) in the U.S. (Atkeson 2003; Burns et al. 2001; Koch 1997; Sapiro with Conover 1997) and in the UK (Norris et al. 2004), which may translate into a greater propensity for political discussion.⁴ With regard to discussion specifically, scholars have reported a positive effect for both proselytizing (encouraging others to vote for a particular candidate) and conversing about politics in general (Atkeson 2003; Hansen 1997; but see Lawless 2004).

Second, the presence of female politicians might encourage women to enter the political arena themselves (e.g., Burns et al. 2001; Carroll 1985); that is, might make it more likely that women are (or, in the case of young women, intend to be) politically active (*role model hypothesis*). The expectation is that seeing others "like them" active in political life may inspire women and girls to active political participation. Yet, while widely proposed as a rationale (one of many) for greater descriptive representation, previous research on American adults has not reported an impact of female politicians on women's active participation in formal politics, such as working for a political group or party. The presence of visible female politicians is positively associated with a range of anticipated activities among American adolescent girls (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006) and the presence of a successful female MP candidate predicts greater campaign volunteerism and turnout among women in the United Kingdom (Norris et al. 2004).

For both of these dependent variables (discussion and political activity), we further hypothesize that the impact of descriptive representatives is greatest among young people

⁴ Scholars have found evidence of a similar effect among other politically under-represented groups in the U.S., particularly African-Americans (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Gilliam 1996; Tate 1991; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Abney and Hutcheson 1981; but see Gay 2001; Leighley 2001), as well as Latinos (Pantoja and Segura 2003).

(*socialization hypothesis*). Young people are in the process of learning about the political world and their place within it, and thus their actions may be particularly open to influences in their environment. As individuals age many of their behaviors become more established and less malleable, and thus less influenced by such factors as the presence of female representatives.

The expectation that political attitudes and behaviors might be most open to influence at a younger age is supported by various strands of research. While controversial, an expectation that the attitudes of younger people are particularly malleable (the “impressionable years hypothesis” [Visser and Krosnick 1998]) and that attitudes become increasingly resist to change over the life cycle (the “increasing persistence hypothesis”) is widely held and often supported (for reviews, and challenges, see Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Visser and Krosnick 1998). In the United States, central political attitudes, particularly partisanship, have long been understood to be acquired during childhood (e.g., Campbell 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Greenstein 1965; Hess and Torney 1967; Sears 1975) and (controversially) largely stable through adulthood (most recently, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, following in a long tradition; but see Erickson, McKuen, and Stimson 2002; Fiorina 1981; Key 1966, among many others). Throughout the world, political activity appears to be habit-forming—participating at a young age is a strong predictor of participation later in life, and perhaps more importantly, not participating as one enters political adulthood makes future participation increasingly unlikely (Franklin 2004; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003; Jennings and Stoker 2004; Plutzer 2002)—suggesting that the attitudes of the young are more malleable and susceptible to cues than are those of older citizens who have already established their political habits. Scholars have hypothesized that dramatic political events (e.g., the New Deal) have a particularly strong and long-lasting impact on the political predispositions of young people as they enter political life

(e.g., Beck 1974; Beck and Jennings 1991; Inglehart 1981; Sears and Valentino 1997). To our knowledge, the possibility of age differences in the impact of female descriptive representatives on women's engagement and attitudes has not, however, been investigated in previous research.

Data and Method

We examine the impact of female politicians on the political activity of women and girls cross-nationally by employing three studies: the European Values Survey (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the Civic Education Study (CES).⁵ The EVS includes surveys of adults conducted in multiple nations during 1999-2002. The ESS similarly queries adults across an array of countries, and was conducted in 2004. The CES surveys adolescents and was conducted by the International Association for Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), the same organization that provides cross-national comparisons of academic performance, in 1999-2000.⁶ The target age for the CES was fourteen years old, which in most nations meant the eighth grade.⁷ By employing three distinct surveys, we are able to examine each hypothesis across more than one dataset, providing a reliability check that increases our confidence in the results. (Consult the appendix for details on each study and the construction of all variables).

To maximize comparability across these three datasets, the analysis has been limited to fully democratic countries, nations that have received the maximum democratization score on the

⁵ Details about the European Values Survey can be found in Inglehart et. al. (2005). More information regarding the European Social Survey is located in Jowell (2005) and at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>. For more on the CES, see Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schulz (2001) and <http://www.wam.umd.edu/~iea>.

⁶ In each nation, a representative sample of schools was selected; within each school one class of a civics-related course (i.e., history or social studies) was selected. Response rates among students were very high, averaging 94 percent; participation rates among schools were lower but still respectable (84 percent).

⁷ In nine countries, including the United States, respondents were in the ninth grade. Note that in Germany, three federal states refused to participate in the study. For more details on the development and methodology of the study see Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schulz (2001).

Freedom House index.⁸ The EVS, ESS, and CES models thus include twenty-three, twenty-two, and twenty nations respectively, with considerable overlap across datasets, as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1 about here.

Dependent Variables

We are interested in the effect of the presence of female political role models on propensity for political discussion and political activity. Among the adult datasets, the EVS (but not the ESS) contains a measure of political discussion, in which respondents are asked to indicate how often they talk about politics when they “get together with friends”: frequently, occasionally, never. We measure *Political Discussion* in the CES with two separate variables, one that asks about discussion with family members and another with friends. Both measures are indices that combine two questions about domestic and international politics and, like all the indices we discuss, have been standardized to have a standard deviation of 1.0. This standardization provides a common metric by which to compare the magnitude of effect sizes across the models and datasets.

To measure *Political Activity* in the EVS, we create an index that includes petition signing, boycotting, demonstrating, and membership in and volunteer work for a political party and/or a “local action group.” For petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations, respondents are asked whether they (1) would never participate in that activity; (2) might participate in it at some point in the future; or (3) have participated in that activity, while the questions about parties and groups ask if one is a member and/or is currently doing unpaid volunteer work for that organization. Because the diversity of response options do not lend themselves to an additive scale (since it is not clear how to weight probable against reported activity), we instead generate

⁸ Freedom House score data acquired from Kenworthy and Malami (1999). Note that the results are substantively identical if the nations with a lower Freedom House score are retained and the Freedom House score used as a control variable. Results available upon request.

a political activity index using factor analysis. Each respondent is thus assigned a factor score (minimum = 3.2, mean= 5, maximum = 6.98).

The ESS contains a similar battery of Political Activity, asking whether the respondent has participated in each activity “during the last twelve months.” The activities include contacting government officials, working in a political party, working in another organization, wearing a campaign badge, signing a petition, participating in a lawful demonstration, and boycotting. Factor analysis confirms that these items load together, and so they have been combined into an additive index (minimum = 0.34, mean = 1, maximum = 5.86). Note the considerable overlap in the activities queried in these two sources of data; the most significant difference is that the ESS asks about wearing a campaign badge and the EVS does not.

To examine the impact of female politicians on political activity among adolescents in the CES, we employ a set of items in which respondents were asked “When you are an adult, what do you expect that you will do?” followed by a list of activities that includes: join a political party, write letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns, and be a candidate for local or city office (minimum = 0, mean = 1.5, maximum = 4.44).⁹ While these are all conventional forms of political behavior and thus correspond to questions asked of adults in the EVS and ESS, it is nonetheless reasonable to ask whether questions regarding *Anticipated Political Activity* are a reliable guide to future activity. In the absence of longitudinal data, we are admittedly unable to determine if intentions to participate translate into actual behavior. While existing research indicates that young people who identify themselves as potential participants in the political sphere are more likely to develop into politically active adults

⁹ IEA researchers have used Item Response Theory to generate a scale combining these three items that weights them appropriately. For more details, see Schulz and Sibberns (2004). The scales produced by the IEA and included in the public-release version of the data correlate very highly with alternative methods of scaling, like factor analysis and additive scales.

(Campbell 2006), a more cautious interpretation of these questions is simply that they provide insight into adolescents' current state of mind: Do they envision themselves as politically active (Youniss, McLellan, and Yates 1997)?

Independent Variables

For each dependent variable, we are interested in determining whether the presence of female political leaders affects women's and/or girls' engagement and behavior. Each model thus requires an independent variable reflecting the presence of female politicians within a given country, which we gauge by the percentage of women in each nation's lower legislative house (*% Women*) at the time the survey was conducted (IPU 2005). As the country's premier law-making body, parliaments are the central political institutions of any ostensibly democratic nation-state. While women may serve in powerful and influential positions behind the scenes, their presence as MPs indicates a public and visible face for women politicians.¹⁰ The countries in our three datasets reflect considerable variation in the level of descriptive representation of women, ranging from just 6.3 percent in Turkey (in 1999) to 45.3 percent in Sweden (in 2004).

Our focus on the percentage of women in the national legislature (collective representation), rather than on the presence of female legislators in a respondent's geographic constituency (dyadic representation, see Weissberg 1978) distinguishes our work from most of the research on the role model effect in the United States.¹¹ We also are unique in focusing on

¹⁰ An obvious alternative would be to test the impact of having a woman as the head of government. However, in the countries and time periods represented in our three datasets, we have too few cases of such a circumstance to conduct reliable tests. Moreover, in every case except one (Lithuania, where a woman served for several weeks as acting prime minister), women have served only as presidents, a position that tends to be mostly ceremonial, during the period of our study. We have no cases of a female prime minister in the countries in our three surveys (Christensen 2006).

¹¹ The exception is research showing that over time, American adolescent girls became more interested in political activity, relative to boys, when the attention to women candidates nationally (collective representation) increased (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Lawless (2004) examines dyadic representation in the U.S. but speculates that the presence of women in the Congress as a whole (collective representation) may affect women's political engagement.

the impact of female elected officeholders rather than candidates.¹² Both of these choices are appropriate in the comparative context. Outside of the United States, multimember districts and party list voting mean that the direct relationship between citizens and an individual representative is obscured or not existent. Indeed, when the entire country is a single district (e.g., the Netherlands) the dyadic approach is simply not possible (Powell 2004). The candidate-centered nature of American elections means district- and state-level candidates are highly visible to American citizens in a way that is simply not found abroad, even in other nations with single-member, first past the post electoral systems, such as the UK and Australia. A system employing party lists also make it possible that female candidates are relegated to the bottom of parties' lists, as appears to have been the case in the past (Kittilson 2005).¹³ While certainly elections draw citizens' attention to the political sphere (thus making the impact of female candidates or officeholders more likely), our point is simply that elections in the comparative context are less likely to highlight individual legislative candidates.

In addition to the % Women MPs, we account for the respondent's gender (*Female*). We test whether women and girls are affected differently than men and boys by employing an interaction term between *Female* and % Women. A positive coefficient for this interaction would indicate that as the percentage of women in office rises, women's discussion and activity changes relative to that of men. The inclusion of the interaction term means that % Women (without interaction) reflects the impact of women in office on men and boys.

Finally, in the comparative context, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) report a relationship between descriptive female representation and confidence in the legislature at the collective (national) rather than dyadic level.

¹² Norris et al. (2004) are an exception in that they examine the impact of male and female MPs (winning candidates only, not all candidates) in the UK. In keeping with research on the American case, however, they examine the dyadic relationship.

¹³ It is worth noting that, for the reasons outlined in this paragraph, the inclusion of the United States in our analysis introduces a bias against our findings. And indeed, the overview scatterplots reported in Figure X do suggest that the United States, with a relatively low percentage of women in the lower house and a relatively high level of female political activity, is an outlier.

At the individual level, we control for a number of variables that have a plausible connection to political participation, and might differ by gender. In the adult surveys (EVS and ESS), these include *Education* level, employment status (*Unemployed=1*), whether the respondent is either *Married* or living in a committed relationship. We also control for *Age* since, as explained below, it is a variable of theoretical interest. In the CES, we control for two measures of adolescents' socioeconomic status and home environment: the number of *Books at Home*¹⁴ and the education level the respondent expects to achieve (*Expected Education*).

It is critical to attend to the potential for a spurious correlation—that what appears to be an effect of the presence of female MPs may actually be the effect of a political or social context that facilitates both female representation and women's political activity. To this end, we control for a number of country-level factors associated with the representation of women, and which also may be related to women's active political participation. Most crucial are the cultural attitudes toward women and women's roles that characterize a society. Accordingly, we include a separate dummy for *Scandinavian* countries, which stand out as uniquely egalitarian in their gender norms (Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Paxton 1997). We employ a dichotomous variable for nations that were either part of the former Soviet Union, or within the *Eastern Bloc*. The number of years since female enfranchisement (*Suffrage*) gauges formal acceptance of female political roles and is a consistent predictor of women's representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000; but see Moore and Shackman 1996).¹⁵

¹⁴ Measures of socioeconomic status are notoriously difficult to obtain from adolescents, a problem that is only exacerbated in a cross-national study. The number of books in the home has been found to be a reliable indicator of socioeconomic status (see Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schulz 2001).

¹⁵ Other measures of the status of women—for example, ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Paxton 1997), presence and/or organizational strength of a women's movement (Paxton 1997), average number of children per woman (Moore and Shackman 1996), and abortion rights (Kenworthy and Lane 1999)—have all failed to predict the representation of women in earlier research.

We also include a direct measure of “gender ideology,” attitudes toward the role of women in society (Paxton and Kunovich 2003).¹⁶ In the ESS, an aggregate national mean for *Gender Ideology* is calculated from three questions that gauge attitudes toward gender equality, while in the EVS it is only possible to use a single question that asks whether men’s jobs should take priority over women’s when the economy is poor.¹⁷ In the CES, gender ideology is measured as a national mean of three gender role items that closely resemble those in the ESS.

We measure the relative socioeconomic development of women using the United Nation’s *Gender-related Development Index (GRDI)*, which has been shown to predict the representation of women (Reynolds 1999) and might also be associated with female engagement with politics. We include the share of women in the labor force (*Female Labor Force*) to tap into the population from which women leaders are most likely to emerge and as an indicator of the social acceptability of women in non-traditional roles (see Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and Shackman 1996; Oakes and Almqvist 1993; Paxton 1991).¹⁸ We account for the possibility that some parties and ideologies may facilitate the representation of women (Siaroff 2000; Caul 1999; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987; Duverger 1955) and likewise encourage girls’ political engagement by controlling for the proportion of the vote captured by left parties (*% Left*).¹⁹ We control for the general level of national affluence and

¹⁶ Paxton and Kunovich (2003) argue convincingly that the direct measurement of gender ideology is a superior predictor of the prevalence of female officeholders than proxies for cultural factors like a nation’s religious composition or the length of time since women’s suffrage. We err on the side of inclusion and account for all these potential factors.

¹⁷ The question about men’s jobs is the only gender ideology item asked in all EVS nations. Fortunately, a similar item appears in all three surveys.

¹⁸ The existing literature suggests that a superior measure is the percentage of women in professional and technical professions, but these data are incomplete for our set of nations.

¹⁹ In analyses not shown, we also have accounted for the impact of *Gender Quotas* on women’s representation with a dummy variable that indicates whether a country has any national laws or party rules requiring women’s inclusion in candidate lists (Kittilson 2006; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2005). Across the three datasets, only three nations do not have such quotas—Estonia, Finland, and the United States (and the U.S. is included only in the CES). Including the quota variable prevents the models from converging in some specifications, so in order to keep

industrialization (*Per Capita GDP*). Finally, proportional representation is strongly associated with greater descriptive representation for women (Rule 1987, 1981; Duverger 1955, among many others). We thus employ a measure of the *Electoral System* used by Kenworthy and Malami, a three point ordinal scale in which nations are coded “2 if their electoral system uses proportional representation exclusively, 1 if it is a mixed system, and 0 if proportional representation is not used at all” (1999, 252).

The nested structure of all three datasets—respondents sampled within nations—requires attention to the fact that the clustering of respondents within nations is a violation of the standard assumption for OLS regression that cases are fully independent from one another. In intuitive terms, the problem is that two respondents from, say, Sweden have more in common with one another than two respondents from Spain. For the national variables this is true by definition, since national-level variables are the same for every resident within a given country.

To address this issue, we employ a hierarchical linear modeling, or HLM, approach, which accounts for the grouped nature of the data by modeling the intercept of the individual-level equation as a function of the national-level variables, and allowing the intercept to vary randomly across nations (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).²⁰ The interaction term, Female X % Women, which constitutes the test of our hypotheses, is known in HLM parlance as a cross-level interaction because it models the relationship between variables at different levels of

the independent variables consistent across all the models, we have opted to omit the quota variable. This omission does not have a substantive effect on any of our results. <See the Reviewers Appendix for details.>

²⁰ In the tables reporting the results of the hierarchical models, we report the amount of individual-level variance explained. Following the suggestion of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), this has been calculated by comparing the individual-level variance in a model with no independent variables (a one-way random ANOVA, or Model 1) with the variance in the model as fully specified (Model 2). Specifically:

$$\frac{\sigma^2(\text{Model 1}) - \sigma^2(\text{Model 2})}{\sigma^2(\text{Model 1})}$$

aggregation. It too is allowed to vary randomly by nation. Using the ESS and EVS equations as an example, the model can be formally expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Political Activity} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Education}) + \beta_2 (\text{Unemployed}) + \beta_3 (\text{Married}) + \\
 &\beta_4 (\text{Age}) + \beta_5 (\text{Female}) + r \\
 \beta_0 &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (\% \text{ Women}) + \gamma_{02} (\text{Electoral System}) + \gamma_{03} (\text{Female Labor Force}) + \\
 &\gamma_{04} (\text{Per Capita GDP}) + \gamma_{05} (\text{Suffrage}) + \gamma_{06} (\text{Gender Ideology}) + \gamma_{07} (\text{Gender-} \\
 &\text{Related Development Index}) + \gamma_{08} (\% \text{ Left}) + \gamma_{09} (\text{Scandinavia}) + \gamma_{010} (\text{Eastern Bloc}) + \\
 &\mu_0 \\
 \beta_5 &= \gamma_{50} + \gamma_{51} (\% \text{ Women}) + \mu_5
 \end{aligned}$$

There are many country-level variables that might plausibly confound the relationships we report. Accordingly, we have opted to err on the side of including a relatively large number of country-level variables in the model, even though this presents a high statistical hurdle for any country-level hypotheses, as the statistical power for level-2 variables is diminished. However, we stress that the results reported below are not dependent on the control variables included in the equations. The statistical relationships we report hold up for aggregate-level bivariate regressions, as well as hierarchical linear models with varying blocs of country-level variables. <Please consult the Reviewers Appendix for the presentation of multiple specifications.>

The Impact of Female MPs on the Political Engagement of Women and Girls

Table 2 reports the results for the dependent variables found in the EVS, Table 3 for the ESS, and Table 4 for the CES. Note that across all the datasets, the direction and significance of the national-level variables vary widely, reflecting that they cover different, albeit partially overlapping, sets of nations, and that there are apparently not consistent relationships between

national characteristics and individual-level political involvement. At the individual level, education is positive and significant in the EVS and ESS models, while expected education and books in the home are also positive and significant in the CES models. The other individual-level variables also are largely consistent across the two adult models—having more education and being married correspond to having a higher level of both political discussion and activity. Age is not a significant predictor of political activity in the ESS, although it is positively related to discussion and activity in the EVS. Being unemployed is negative in all the EVS and ESS models, but fails to achieve statistical significance in any of them.

Tables 2-4 about here.

Our attention centers on the interaction between Female and % Women. In the EVS, women's propensity for political discussion does appear to rise as the percentage of female MPs increases (Table 2, column 1; $p < 0.01$, two-tailed). Results from the CES indicate that the presence of women in office does not lead adolescent girls to discuss politics more with their family (the coefficient is positive, but fails to reach statistical significance; Table 4, column 1), but is a positive predictor of political discussion with their friends (Table 4, column 2; $p < 0.05$).

Figures 2A and 2B display the substantive interpretation of the significant interaction term for adult women in the EVS and adolescent girls in the CES. As will be our standard practice, we display the statistically significant results graphically, with other variables held constant at their means, in order to make the interpretation of the interaction term transparent. In both datasets, males have a higher level of political discussion than women but they do not discuss politics more as the percentage of women in office increases (the main, uninteracted effect for % Women is not significant in either the EVS or CES models). Women and adolescent girls, however, do talk about politics more in nations with more women serving in elective

office. Both figures show that while the gender gap in talking about politics does not disappear when moving between the minimum and maximum values for women in office, it does narrow. Specifically, in Figure 2A we see that females' political discussion rises 0.25 points on a 3-point scale, while in Figure 2B it rises 0.4 standard deviations.

Figures 2A and 2B about here.

Turning to political activity, we find support across two datasets for the role model effect. In the EVS model (Table 2, column 3), the interaction between Female and % Women is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$, two-tailed), while in the ESS (Table 3, column 1), the interaction term is positive but fails to achieve statistical significance ($p = 0.70$, two-tailed).²¹ Results from the CES (Table 4, column 3) also indicate a positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between Female X % Women and Anticipated Political Activity. Thus, across two datasets, the more female MPs, the more likely women and girls are to (intend to) engage in political activity.

A possible, or partial, explanation for the null findings in the ESS concerns the varied wording of the measures across surveys. The ESS only asks about what respondents have actually done in the last 12 months. The EVS, on the other hand, inquires as to whether respondents have *ever* participated (a longer time horizon) and perhaps more importantly, whether they expect to participate in the future. The CES, of course, also asks girls what they intend to do in the future. Thus, the EVS and CES (where we find a significant effect for female MPs) capture not only actual political activity (in the case of the EVS), but the impact of female MPs on whether women and girls envision themselves as politically active citizens in the future. By including the impact of female MPs on women's and girls' conceptions of themselves as

²¹ One possible reason for the different findings is the different set of nations covered by each dataset. However, running the EVS models, restricted only to nations also represented in the ESS, results in results quite similar to what we find with the full dataset.

politically active, rather than their actual behavior, a significant finding may be more likely. We note, however, that running a model in the EVS with a dependent variable that is an additive index of activities respondents report having done (with intended activity coded as 0) produces unchanged results; that is, the presence of female MPs continues to exhibit a statistically significant effect. <See the Reviewers Appendix for more details.>

Figures 3A and 3B graph the role model effect among adults (EVS) and adolescents (CES). As the percentage of female MPs increases, there is a corresponding increase in women's political activity (Figure 3A) of roughly a fifth of a standard deviation—a moderately sized impact. While even at the maximum number of women in office, women's involvement falls below that of men, the gap is considerably narrower. Note that the line for men is statistically insignificant, as can be inferred from the insignificant coefficient for % Women. Among adolescents (Figure 3B), we observe a line for males that slopes upward and is marginally significant ($p < 0.15$), and an upward-sloping—but steeper—line for females that is clearly significant ($p < 0.01$). The magnitude of the impact is 0.6 standard deviations. Perhaps more importantly, the net effect is that adolescent girls close the gender gap in anticipated activity as the percentage of women in office increases, matching and even slightly exceeding boys when women comprise roughly 33% (approximately the 75th percentile) of the national legislature.

The results are suggestive that, as the percentage of women in office increases, boys are more likely to express an intention to be active in politics, and more definitive that girls' anticipated political activity rises. The steeper slope for girls indicates that they are especially receptive to female role models, but the upward-sloping line for boys intriguingly suggests that

political systems with greater female involvement are perceived as more open and accepting for all—males as well as females.

Figures 3A and 3B about here.

Female Role Models and Political Socialization

Testing the socialization hypothesis requires data from both young and old. The CES can not speak to this question since all of the respondents are of roughly the same age, although our finding of a strong role model effect among adolescents in the CES is consistent with—even a necessary condition for—the socialization hypothesis. The EVS and ESS, however, do include a range of ages among their respondents and thus provide an opportunity to evaluate the socialization hypothesis directly. To do so, we estimate a second set of ESS and EVS models in which Age is interacted with both the respondent's sex and the percent female MPs: *Age X Female X % Women*. A negative coefficient for this triple interaction term indicates that the role model effect lessens with age.

The socialization hypothesis is not supported for political discussion (available only in the EVS, Table 2): the triple interaction term is clearly non-significant (column 2), although the double interaction remains significant (as it is in the baseline model, column 1), suggesting that female MPs positively influence political discussion for all women, regardless of age. Thus, these results support the conclusion that all women, regardless of age, talk about politics more as the percentage of female MPs in their nation's lower house increases.

The results for political activity, however, are consistent with the socialization hypothesis. In both adult datasets (Tables 2 and 3), the presence of female MPs has a significantly greater impact on the political activity of younger rather than older women; Age X

Female X % Women is negative and statistically significant ($p > 0.01$) in both models. The presence of the triple interaction testing for an age effect is not only itself significant in the ESS models (Table 3, column 2; $p < 0.01$), but its inclusion makes the double interaction (Female X % Women), which was non-significant in the baseline model (column 1), become significant ($p > 0.01$) as well. The fact that the triple interaction is significant in the ESS when Female X % Women was not in the baseline model underscores the importance of differentiating the role model effect by age lest we reach the (false) conclusion that female MPs fail to affect the political activity of women.²² Examining the role model effect among all women may mask the impact of female MPs if that impact is found mostly, or even only, among the young.

The interpretation of interaction terms rests on simultaneously accounting for multiple coefficients, some of which have opposite signs, and can thus be complex. To simplify the presentation, Figure 4A and 4B provide a graphical display of the socialization effect, again holding all control variables at their means. For simplicity's sake, we have opted to show only two lines on each graph. Each line represents how variation in the percentage of women in office affects the political activity of females who are twenty and sixty-years old, respectively.²³ The results from the EVS (4A) reveal a line sloping slightly downward for sixty-year olds but a sharply upward-sloping line for twenty-year olds. Consequently, in nations with a low percentage of women in office, there is little difference in the political activity of twenty and sixty year-old women. As the percentage of women in office rises, the gap between the lines widens—younger women become more politically active than their elders by about a quarter of a standard deviation. In Figure 4B (results from the ESS), slope of the line for sixty-year olds is

²² An alternative method of modeling the socialization effect is to limit the data to females only, and interact % Women and Age. Results are substantively the same when we employ that strategy.

²³ In other words, we have omitted the presentation of the lines for male respondents. Figures with those lines included can be provided upon request. The choice of twenty and sixty as the ages to display is arbitrary, and meant only to illustrate differences across a reasonable age range.

essentially flat, but the slope for the younger women is sharply positive—increasing by 0.25 standard deviations. In this case, young women express a greater willingness to be politically active than older women when the percentage of female MPs exceeds roughly 20 percent (roughly the mean).

Figures 4A and 4B about here.

We have found that the socialization hypothesis holds for political activity, but not discussion. One possible explanation is that these divergent findings may be consistent with the rationale underlying the socialization hypothesis: A less demanding activity, such as partaking in political discussion as part of daily life, is more easily stimulated among all women by the presence of female MPs. Propensity toward a more demanding activity, such as engaging in political activity beyond conversation by signing a petition, joining a political party, or volunteering for a local organization, may be especially difficult to stimulate (or discourage) among older citizens whose habits are established, but still open to being shaped by political context among the young. In other words, discussion demands less effort or change in behavior, and thus may be more malleable at every age. Activity, on the other hand, requires greater commitment and behavior alteration, and thus may be less malleable as citizens age.²⁴

Discussion and Conclusion

A number of normative theorists have proposed—and hoped—that greater numbers of women in political office will have many positive effects: compensate for past and present

²⁴ We also note that the evidence favoring the socialization hypothesis addresses, at least partially, the concern that we have reversed the direction of the causal relationship between the percentage of women in office and the political activity of women. Perhaps there are more female members of parliament within a nation because women are more politically active, and not the other way around. While this is a plausible hypothesis, it is far less plausible that there are more women in office because *young* women are more politically engaged.

injustice, provide a voice for overlooked interests, and contribute to the overall legitimacy of a democratic system (Phillips 1995; also Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999). Many related expectations, such as the prediction that women legislators will place issues of interest to women on the agenda and support policies that benefit women, have received strong empirical support (Lijphart 1991; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; see Reingold 2006). Scholars and advocates also have expected that female descriptive representatives would affect other women's engagement with and participation in the political sphere (e.g., Burns et al. 2001; Dovi 2002; Carroll 1985; Kittilson 2005), but there have been few tests, and almost no large-N cross-national studies, of these effects outside of the United States.

Our analysis suggests that, as exemplars of the possibility and potential of female political activism, female politicians in democratic nations do function as true role models, inspiring women and girls to be politically active themselves. Women of all ages are more likely to discuss politics, and younger women become more politically active, when there are more women in parliament. This research thus suggests that the active political involvement of younger women, who are still in the process of political socialization, is particularly open to influence by the presence of female MPs.

Evidence favoring the role model effect has normative implications, given continuing gender disparities in political engagement—in general and among young people in particular (see Rosenthal et al. 2001, 2003). In 11 of 20 countries in the Civic Education study (see Figure 2), girls are significantly less likely than boys to report that they envision themselves as politically active adults. In only two countries—Finland and the United States—are girls significantly more interested in political activity than are boys. Given that participatory habits develop in adolescence and largely persist throughout one's life (Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004), there is good

reason to believe that gaps in anticipated involvement among adolescents develop into gaps in actual engagement among adults, as correspondence between the female-male differences in Figures 1B (adolescents) and 1A (adults) suggest. Women thus risk not having their voices heard, or not heard as loudly, as men in their nation's democratic processes. However, our analysis should leave advocates of gender equality hopeful, as these results suggest that the gender gap in political involvement can be ameliorated. Where there are female role models in political life, adolescent girls and young women in particular are more likely to envision themselves as active participants in politics. Women, it appears, lead by example.

Appendix

European Values Survey

Education

Owing to national differences in education systems, the EVS converts education level to the following categories:

1. Inadequately completed elementary education
2. Completed (compulsory) elementary education
3. (Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification
4. Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification
5. Full secondary, maturity level certificate
6. Higher education—lower-level tertiary certificate
7. Higher education—upper-level tertiary certificate

Married

What is your current marital status? (Married=1)

Unemployed

Are you yourself employed now or not? (Unemployed=1)

Political Discussion

When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

1. Never
2. Occasionally
3. Frequently

Gender Ideology (aggregated as a national mean)

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.

1. Agree
2. Neither
3. Disagree

Political Activity

The Political Activity Index is comprised of items from two questions in the EVS.

1. Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

1. Signing a petition
2. Joining in boycotts
3. Attending lawful demonstrations

2. Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say

(a) which, if any, do you belong to.

Political parties or groups

Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality

(b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?

Political parties or groups

Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality

These items have been combined into a single factor, which was rotated using the varimax method.

Variable	Loading
Signing a petition	0.5157
Joining in boycotts	0.5041
Attending lawful demonstrations	0.5218
Belonging to political party	0.4575
Voluntary work for party	0.4408
Belonging to community action group	0.3972
Voluntary work for group	0.3782
Eigenvalue	1.497

European Social Survey

Education

How many years of full-time education have you completed?

Married

Lives with husband/wife/partner

Unemployed

Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last seven days?
(Unemployed and actively looking for a job=1)

Gender Ideology (aggregated as a national mean)

I am now going to read out some statements about men and women and their places in the family. Using this card, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family

Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children

When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

Variable	Loading
Paid work	0.5401
Home and children	-0.2735
Scarce jobs	0.5764
Eigenvalue	0.699

Political Activity

There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last twelve months, have you done any of the following?

1. Contacted a politician, government, or local official? 2. Worked in a political party or action group? 3. Worked in another organization of association? 4. Worn or

displayed a campaign badge/sticker? 5. Signed a petition? 6. Taken part in a lawful public demonstration? 7. Boycotted certain products?

Civic Education Study

Expected Education

How many years of further education do you expect to complete after this year?

0. 0 years 1. 1-2 years 2. 3-4years 3. 5-6 years 4. 7-8 years 5. 9-10 years 6. >10 years

Books at Home

About how many books are there in your home? (Do not count newspapers, magazines, or books for school)

1. < 11 2. 11 to 50 3. 51 to 100 4. 101 to 200 5. > 200

Gender Ideology (aggregated as a national mean)

Women should have the same rights as men in every way.

When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women

Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Agree 4. Strongly agree

Political Discussion

How often do you have discussions of what is happening in the [country] government?

How often do you have discussion of what is happening in international politics?

With people of your own age?

With parents or other adult family members?

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often

Anticipated Political Activity

When you are an adult, what do you expect that you will do?

Join a political party

Write letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns

Be a candidate for local or city office

1. I will certainly not do this 2. I will probably not do this 3. I will probably do this
4. I will certainly do this

The analysis employs variable POLATMLE in the public-release version of the Civic Education Study.

Nation-level Variables (various sources)

% Women in Lower House

As reported by the Inter-Parliamentary Union's "Women in Parliaments" database, as of December, 1999. The data are available on-line at <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>.

Gender Ideology (aggregated from each survey, as described above)

Gender Related Development Index

A composite measure of gender differences in (a) life expectancy; (b) adult literacy and enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education; and (c) estimated earned income. For more details, see United Nations Development Programme (2003).

Scandinavia

Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden

Former Eastern Bloc

Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia

The following variables were created by Kenworthy and Malami (1999), who have generously made their data available at <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/research.html> [accessed July 25, 2005]. Information and sources listed below.

Years Since Suffrage

Year women gained voting rights in national elections [which we subtracted from the year of the survey]. From Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995, Table 1).

Female Labor Force

Female share of the paid labor force. For CES and EVS models, from United Nations (1995, Table 11). For ESS (for which we used more recent data), from United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Data available at http://www.unece.org/stats/trend/trend_h.htm.

Electoral System

Structure of the electoral system. Coded 2 if voters choose among party lists in multimember districts which average five or more seats per district; 1 if party lists are used but district sizes average fewer than five seats, or a combination of party list and candidate voting is used, or voters choose among individual candidates in single-member districts. Authors' coding from Inter-Parliamentary Union (1998).

Per Capita GDP

Real gross domestic product per capita (in US \$), 1994. For CES and EVS, from UNDP (1997, Table 1). For ESS (for which we used more recent data), from United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Data available at http://www.unece.org/stats/trend/trend_h.htm.

% Left

The sum of the vote shares of socialist, social democratic, communist, green, and women's parties. (In the few cases where the left vote percentage was unavailable, the left vote seat share was used as a proxy).

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Table 1. Nations Covered by the Civic Education Study, European Values Survey, and European Social Survey

	<i>Civic Education Study</i>	<i>European Values Survey</i>	<i>European Social Survey</i>
Australia	•		
Austria		•	•
Belgium	• ²⁵	•	•
Britain	• ²⁶	•	•
Cyprus	•		
Czech Republic	•	•	•
Denmark	•	•	•
Estonia	•	•	•
Finland	•	•	•
France		•	•
Germany	•	•	•
Greece	•	•	•
Hungary	•	•	•
Iceland		•	•
Ireland		•	•
Italy	•	•	
Lithuania	•	•	
Luxembourg		•	•
Malta		•	
Netherlands		•	•
Norway	•		•
Poland	•	•	•
Portugal	•	•	•
Slovenia	•	•	•
Spain		•	•
Sweden	•	•	•
Switzerland	•		•
United States	•		

²⁵ French Belgium only.

²⁶ England only.

Table 2. Results from the European Values Survey (Hierarchical Linear Models)

	<i>Political Discussion</i> (1)	<i>Political Discussion</i> (2)	<i>Political Activity</i> (3)	<i>Political Activity</i> (4)
Female X % Women	0.003 (0.0009)***	0.004 (0.002)*	0.005 (0.002)***	0.013 (0.004)***
Female X % Women X Age		-0.00002 (0.00005)		-0.0002 (0.00009)**
% Women	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Female	-0.223 (0.020)***	-0.143 (0.047)***	-0.287 (0.044)***	-0.335 (0.103)***
Age	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.005 (0.0006)***	-0.007 (0.0008)***	-0.006 (0.001)***
Female X Age		-0.002 (0.001)**		0.0009 (0.002)
Individual-level Variables				
Education	0.083 (0.005)***	0.081 (0.005)***	0.128 (0.005)***	0.127 (0.005)***
Married	0.084 (0.010)***	0.078 (0.010)***	0.025 (0.019)	0.018 (0.021)
Unemployed	-0.054 (0.012)***	-0.052 (0.021)***	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.039)
National-level Variables				
Electoral System	0.054 (0.049)	0.055 (0.046)	-0.127 (0.066)*	-0.050 (0.055)
Female Labor Force	0.012 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.003 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)
Per Capita GDP	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.0007)***	0.002 (0.0007)**
Suffrage	-0.001 (0.002)**	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Gender Ideology	0.129 (0.221)	0.147 (0.221)	0.459 (0.210)**	0.444 (0.235)*
Gender Related Development Index	-2.966 (1.806)	-2.782 (1.835)	2.932 (2.506)	4.965 (2.500)*
% Left	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Scandinavia	-0.172 (0.123)	-0.171 (0.128)	0.181 (0.173)	0.112 (0.176)
Eastern Bloc	-0.204 (0.249)	-0.130 (0.247)	0.106 (0.415)	0.015 (0.390)
Intercept	5.517 (4.399)	4.854 (4.264)	-7.209 (8.411)	-9.821 (7.846)
N	27,750	27,750	25,426	25,426
Nations	23	23	23	23
Variance explained	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.14

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Table 3. Results from the European Social Survey (Hierarchical Linear Models)

	<i>Political Activity (1)</i>	<i>Political Activity (2)</i>
Female X % Women	0.0007 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)
Female X % Women X Age		-0.0002*** (0.00006)
% Women	0.007 (0.002)	0.002 (0.007)
Female	-0.068* (0.045)	-0.251** (0.089)**
Age	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Female X Age		0.004 (0.002)**
Individual-level Variables		
Education	0.058 (0.001) ***	0.058 (0.005)***
Married	0.063 (0.010) ***	0.062 (0.011) ***
Unemployed	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.028)
National-level Variables		
Electoral System	-0.157 (0.093)	-0.133** (0.058)
Female Labor Force	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.016)
Per Capita GDP	0.001 (0.0009)	0.001 (0.0009)
Suffrage	-0.0002 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.002)
Gender Ideology	-0.897 (0.380)**	-0.945 (0.300)***
Gender Related Development Index	10.635 (4.030)**	11.218 (3.547)***
% Left	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Scandinavia	1.019 (0.253)***	1.006 (0.221)***
Eastern Bloc	0.047 (0.186)	0.050 (0.078)
Intercept	-7.548 (3.597)*	-8.207 (2.778)**
N	40,682	40,682
Nations	22	22
Variance explained	0.05	0.05

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 4. Results from the Civic Education Study (Results from Hierarchical Linear Models)

	<i>Political Discussion with Family</i> (1)	<i>Political Discussion with Friends</i> (2)	<i>Anticipated Political Activity</i> (3)
Female X % Women	0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.002)**	0.006 (0.002)***
% Women	0.0004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.008)	0.013 (0.007) †
Female	0.002 (0.021)	-0.191 (0.034)***	-0.211 (0.044)***
Individual-level Variables			
Expected Education	0.129 (0.010)***	0.094 (0.010)***	0.058 (0.008)***
Books at Home	0.085 (0.008)***	0.046 (0.006)***	0.033 (0.007)***
National-level Variables			
Electoral System	0.136 (0.054)**	0.205 (0.068)**	0.194*** (0.031)
Female Labor Force	-0.266 (0.197)	0.203 (0.352)	-0.786* (0.178)
Per Capita GDP	0.053 (0.295)	-0.503 (0.461)	-1.492 (0.279)***
Suffrage	-0.359 (0.117)***	-0.373 (0.169)**	-0.330 (0.098)***
Gender Ideology	0.763 (0.283)**	1.034 (0.348)**	0.238 (0.149)
Gender Related Development Index	-6.254 (2.916)*	-5.638 (3.474)	4.379 (1.848)**
% Left	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.003)***
Scandinavia	-0.264 (0.150)	-0.486 (0.222)*	-0.157 (0.062)**
Eastern Bloc	-0.450 (0.135)***	-0.701 (0.271)**	-0.238 (0.161)
Intercept	5.710 (2.440)**	9.217 (2.902)*	1.402 (1.510)
N	59,349	59,174	58,561
Nations	20	20	20
Variance explained	0.06	0.03	0.02

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † $p > 0.15$ * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 1A: Female-Male Differences in Political Activity (Adults)





Figure 1B. Female-Male Differences in Anticipated Political Activity (Adolescents)



Black bar = $p < 0.05$
 Grey bar = $p < 0.10$
 White = no statistically significant difference

Sources: Figure 1A, European Values Survey Figure 1B, IEA Civic Education Study
 Dependent variables have standard deviation of 1.0

Figure 2A. Political Discussion
European Values Survey (Adults)




Figure 2B. Political Discussion with Friends
Civic Education Study (Adolescents)




Figure 3A. Political Activity
European Values Survey (Adults)




Figure 3B. Anticipated Political Activity
Civic Education Study (Adolescents)




Figure 4A. Political Activity and Age
European Values Survey





Figure 4B. Political Activity and Age
European Social Survey



Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models

Reviewers' Appendix

Readers of “Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models” may be concerned about whether the reported results depend on the specification of the models, especially since we have a relatively low ratio of countries to country-level control variables. To address concerns about specification, this reviewers’ appendix presents a series of models which clearly demonstrate that our results hold under multiple specifications.

First, Figures RA1-RA4 display bivariate aggregate (country-level) relationships, as both scatterplots and bivariate regressions. The dependent variables are the female-male difference in political discussion and activity (or, in the case of the Civic Education Study, anticipated political activity). The differences are coded so that the females’ score is subtracted from the males’ score—a positive number thus means that, on average, females exceed males. In each case, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between % Women and the gender differences in discussion and activity/anticipated activity, meaning that more women in office correlates with a smaller gender gap.

In Tables RA1 – RA8, the presentation moves to the results from the individual-level hierarchical models. Each table follows the same pattern. Each model contains the complete set of individual-level variables included in the models reported in the paper, including the interaction terms that are our variables of theoretical interest. Moving from left to right across the table, each column reports results from a model with progressively more variables.²⁷ For example, the model in column 1 includes only % Women as a country-level variable. Column 2 then includes % Women, plus a small set of economic variables: Per Capita GDP, the Female Labor Force, and the Gender-Related Development Index. Column 3 retains all the variables in the two preceding variables, but adds a series of controls for the national political environment: Electoral System, Suffrage, Gender Ideology, % Left, and Quotas. Column 4 then adds another control for whether there was a national election parliamentary election during the period in which the survey in question was fielded (Election). Remember, though, that none of these surveys is an election study and so their political questions are not tied to an electoral contest. Finally, Column 5 then adds two regional variables, Eastern Bloc and Scandinavia, and is thus the same specification as reported in the paper’s models. The column 5 models do not include Quotas or Election because, in a few cases, the models will not converge when both regional variables, Quotas, and Election are included simultaneously. In order to maintain consistency across all of our datasets, therefore, we do not include Quotas or Election in any of the models we present in the paper. The fact that some models will not converge when all these variables are included in the same model is not surprising, given that Quotas and Election are almost constants (most nations have gender quotas of one sort or another, and very few nations held elections coincident with the surveys). More importantly, under no specification have we ever found the inclusion of Quotas and/or Election to change our substantive conclusions about the role model and socialization effects.²⁸

²⁷ See the paper for a detailed explanation and operational definition of each variable.

²⁸ The following nations had national parliamentary elections during the period in which the three surveys were administered.

The conclusion to draw from the tables below is that the coefficients for Female X % Women and, where applicable, Female X % Women X Age simply do not change regardless of the nation-level controls included in the equation.

Finally, Table RA9 displays the results when, instead of a factor score, an additive index is employed for the political activity index in the European Values Survey. Recall that the questions about political activity in the EVS ask whether the respondent has actually done, might do, or would never do each of the listed activities. For this index, a response of “I have actually done” is coded as 1, while either “might do” or “would never do” is coded as 0. Note that the use of this additive index provides results that parallel those when the factor score is used as the dependent variable. In the model testing the role model effect, the coefficient for Female X % Women is positive and significant, while in the socialization effect model, the coefficient for Female X % Women X Age is positive and has a p value of 0.16 (two-tailed).

EVS: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal
ESS: Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia
CES: Estonia, Finland

Figure RA1. Political Discussion (Adults)
European Values Survey




Figure RA2. Political Activity (Adults)
European Values Survey




Figure RA3. Political Discussion with Friends (Adolescents)
Civic Education Study




Figure RA4. Anticipated Political Activity (Adolescents)
Civic Education Study




Table RA1. Results from the European Values Survey

Political Activity, Testing the Role Model Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.005 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)***
% Women	0.016 (0.005)***	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.0002 (0.006)
Female	-0.288 (0.044)***	-0.288 (0.044)***	-0.287 (0.044)***	-0.287 (0.044)***	-0.287 (0.044)***
Age	-0.007 (0.0008)***	-0.007 (0.0008)***	-0.007 (0.0008)***	-0.007 (0.0008)***	-0.007 (0.0008)***
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.128 (0.005)***	0.128 (0.005)***	0.128 (0.005)***	0.128 (0.005)***	0.128 (0.005)***
Married	0.025 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)
Unemployed	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.041)
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0006 (0.0008)	0.003 (0.0007)***	0.004 (0.0006)***	0.002 (0.0007)***
Gender Related Development Index		7.450 (1.944)***	1.739 (2.142)	2.267 (1.900)	2.932 (2.506)
Female Labor Force		0.010 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.011 (0.004)**	0.003 (0.012)
Electoral System			-0.102 (0.045)	-0.037 (0.061)	-0.127 (0.066)*
Suffrage			0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Gender Ideology			0.659 (0.196)***	0.471 (0.177)**	0.459 (0.210)**
% Left			0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.002)**	0.003 (0.004)
Quotas			0.171* (0.090)		
Election				-0.272 (0.086)***	
Scandinavia					0.181 (0.173)
Eastern Bloc					0.106 (0.415)
Intercept	4.629 (0.145)***	-2.156 (1.737)	-6.725 (8.409)	-6.309 (7.449)	-7.209 (8.412)
N	25,426	25,426	25,426	25,426	25,426
Nations	23	23	23	23	23
Variance explained	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

**Table RA2. Results from the European Values Survey
Political Activity, Testing the Socialization Effect**

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.013 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***
Female X % Women X Age	-0.0002 (0.00009)**	-0.0002 (0.00009)*	-0.0002 (0.00009)*	-0.0002 (0.00009)**	-0.0002 (0.00009)**
% Women	0.016 (0.005)***	0.013 (0.004)***	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)
Female	-0.342 (0.102)***	-0.336 (0.102)***	-0.334 (0.103)***	-0.335 (0.103)***	-0.335 (0.103)***
Age	-0.006 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.001)***
Female X Age	0.0010 (0.002)	0.0008 (0.002)	0.0009 (0.002)	0.0009 (0.002)	0.0009 (0.002)
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.127 (0.005)***	0.127 (0.005)***	0.127 (0.005)***	0.127 (0.005)***	0.127 (0.005)***
Married	0.018 (0.021)	0.018 (0.021)	0.018 (0.021)	0.018 (0.021)	0.018 (0.021)
Unemployed	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.039)
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0006 (0.0008)	0.002 (0.0006)**	0.003 (0.0006)***	0.002 (0.0007)**
Gender Related Development Index		9.327 (1.657)***	4.174 (1.881)**	4.878 (1.689)	4.965 (2.500)*
Female Labor Force		0.009 (0.006)	0.009 (0.004)	0.012 (0.004)**	0.007 (0.012)
Electoral System			-0.045 (0.041)	0.018 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.055)
Suffrage			0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Gender Ideology			0.579 (0.195)***	0.396 (0.189)*	0.444 (0.235)*
% Left			0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.002)*	0.003 (0.004)
Quotas			0.109 (0.106)		
Election				-0.242 (0.081)***	
Scandinavia					0.112 (0.176)
Eastern Bloc					0.015 (0.390)
Intercept	4.569 (0.147)***	2.863 (0.786)***	6.507 (3.712)*	-8.667 (7.145)	-9.821 (7.846)
N	25,426	25,426	25,426	25,426	25,426
Nations	23	23	23	23	23
Variance explained	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Table RA3. Results from the European Values Survey
Political Discussion, Testing the Role Model Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.003 (0.0009)***	0.003 (0.0009)***	0.003 (0.0009)***	0.003 (0.0009)***	0.003 (0.0009)***
% Women	0.004 (0.002)**	0.006 (0.002)**	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Female	-0.223 (0.021)***	-0.223 (0.021)***	-0.223 (0.021)***	-0.223 (0.021)***	-0.223 (0.020)***
Age	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.004 (0.0004)***
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.083 (0.004)***	0.083 (0.004)***	0.083 (0.005)***	0.083 (0.005)***	0.083 (0.005)***
Married	0.085 (0.012)***	0.084 (0.012)***	0.084 (0.012)***	0.084 (0.012)***	0.084 (0.010)***
Unemployed	-0.049 (0.021)**	-0.049** (0.022)	-0.049 (0.022)**	-0.049 (0.022)**	-0.054 (0.022)***
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0008 (0.0004)*	-0.005 (0.004)
Female Labor Force		0.006 (0.003)*	0.006 (0.003)*	0.007 (0.004)*	0.012 (0.008)
Gender Related Development Index		-2.146 (0.957)**	-1.697 (1.003)	-1.409 (1.135)	-2.966 (1.806)
Electoral System			0.038 (0.043)	0.054 (0.047)	0.054 (0.049)
Suffrage			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)**
Gender Ideology			0.019 (0.199)	-0.067 (0.194)	0.129 (0.221)
% Left			-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Quotas			0.133 (0.037)***		
Election				-0.087 (0.066)	
Scandinavia					-0.172 (0.123)
Eastern Bloc					-0.204 (0.249)
Intercept	1.276 (0.055)***	2.845 (0.781)***	7.069 (4.080)*	6.589 (3.989)	5.517 (4.399)
N	27,750	27,750	27,750	27,750	27,750
Nations	23	23	23	23	23
Variance explained	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

**Table RA4. Results from the European Values Survey
Political Discussion, Testing the Socialization Effect**

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.004 (0.002)*	0.004 (0.002)*	0.004 (0.002)*	0.004 (0.002)*	0.004 (0.002)*
Female X % Women X Age	-0.00002 (0.00005)	-0.00002 (0.00005)	-0.00002 (0.00005)	-0.00002 (0.00005)	-0.00002 (0.00005)
% Women	0.004 (0.002)**	0.006 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Female	-0.145 (0.047)***	-0.144 (0.047)***	-0.143 (0.047)***	-0.144 (0.047)***	-0.143 (0.047)***
Age	0.005 (0.0006)***	0.005 (0.0006)***	0.005 (0.0006)***	0.005 (0.0006)***	0.005 (0.0006)***
Female X Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.081 (0.005)***	0.081 (0.005)***	0.081 (0.005)***	0.081 (0.005)***	0.081 (0.005)***
Married	0.078 (0.010)***	0.078 (0.010)***	0.077 (0.010)***	0.078 (0.010)***	0.078 (0.010)***
Unemployed	-0.051 (0.021)***	-0.052 (0.021)***	-0.052 (0.021)***	-0.052 (0.021)***	-0.052 (0.021)***
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0008 (0.0004)*	-0.007 (0.004)
Female Labor Force		0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)*	0.007 (0.003)*	0.010 (0.008)
Gender Related Development Index		-2.200 (0.950)	-1.753 (0.953)*	-1.483 (1.095)	-2.782 (1.835)
Electoral System			0.050 (0.037)	0.062 (0.043)	0.055 (0.046)
Suffrage			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Gender Ideology			0.017 (0.195)	-0.064 (0.192)	0.147 (0.221)
% Left			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Quotas			0.177 (0.044)***		
Election				-0.092 (0.064)	
Scandinavia					-0.171 (0.128)
Eastern Bloc					-0.130 (0.247)
Intercept					4.854 (4.264)
N	27,750	27,750	27,750	27,750	27,750
Nations	23	23	23	23	23
Variance explained	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Table RA5. Results from the European Social Survey
Political Activity, Testing the Role Model Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.0007 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)
% Women	0.019 (0.005)***	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.010)	0.006 (0.008)	0.007 (0.002)
Female	-0.068* (0.045)	-0.068 (0.039)*	-0.068 (0.039)*	-0.067 (0.040)*	-0.068 (0.045)*
Age	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0003)
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.058*** (0.005)	0.058 (0.005)***	0.058*** (0.005)	0.058 (0.005)	0.058*** (0.005)
Married	0.063*** (0.010)	0.063 (0.011)***	0.063*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.010)
Unemployed	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.024)
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0001)	0.001 (0.0009)
Female Labor Force		0.025 (0.022)	0.022 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.022)
Gender Related Development Index		6.618 (1.821)***	6.629 (5.067)	10.858 (3.283)***	10.635 (4.030)**
Electoral System			0.014 (0.133)	-0.192 (0.073)**	-0.157 (0.093)
Suffrage			0.0007 (0.005)	-0.0005 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.003)
Gender Ideology			0.044 (0.379)	-0.954 (0.344)**	-0.897 (0.380)**
% Left			-0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Quotas			0.050 (0.266)		
Election				0.093 (0.138)	
Scandinavia					1.019 (0.253)***
Election					
Eastern Bloc					0.047 (0.186)
Intercept	-0.126 (0.124)	-6.900 (2.058)***	-6.847 (4.827)	-7.331 (2.518)**	-7.548 (3.597)*
N	40,682	40,682	40,682	40,682	40,682
Nations	22	22	22	22	22
Variance explained	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table RA6. Results from the European Social Survey
Political Activity, Testing the Socialization Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Female X % Women X Age	-0.0002*** (0.00006)	-0.0002*** (0.00006)	-0.0002*** (0.00006)	-0.0002*** (0.00006)	-0.0002*** (0.00006)
% Women	0.019 (0.005)***	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.011)	0.005 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)
Female	-0.251 (0.089)***	-0.251 (0.089)***	-0.251 (0.089)**	-0.250 (0.089)**	-0.251 (0.089)**
Age	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Female X Age	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**
Individual-level Variables					
Education	0.058 (0.005)***	0.058 (0.005)***	0.058 (0.005)***	0.058 (0.005)***	0.058 (0.005)***
Married	0.062 (0.011)***	0.062 (0.011)***	0.062 (0.011)***	0.062 (0.011)***	0.062 (0.011)***
Unemployed	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		0.0004 (0.001)	0.0006 (0.0009)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0009)
Female Labor Force		0.020 (0.019)	0.023 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.016)
Gender Related Development Index		6.260 (2.798)**	7.401 (4.518)	11.593 (3.597)***	11.218 (3.547)***
Electoral System			0.095 (0.121)	-0.177 (0.062)**	-0.133 (0.058)**
Suffrage			0.003 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)
Gender Ideology			-0.198 (0.147)	-1.024 (0.342)***	-0.945 (0.300)***
% Left			-0.002 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Quotas			0.237 (0.150)		
Election				0.119 (0.125)	
Scandinavia					1.006 (0.221)***
Eastern Bloc					0.050 (0.078)
Intercept	-0.154 (0.120)	-6.419 (2.143)***	-7.959 (4.888)	-8.033 (2.680)**	-8.207 (2.778)**
N	40,682	40,682	40,682		40,682
Nations	22	22	22		22
Variance explained	0.05	0.05	0.05		0.05

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table RA7. Results from the Civic Education Study
Anticipated Political Activity, Testing the Role Model Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.006 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.002)***
% Women	-0.009 (0.002)***	-0.007 (0.003)*	0.012 (0.005)**	0.011 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.007)†
Female	-0.210 (0.044)***	-0.210 (0.044)***	-0.210 (0.044)***	-0.210 (0.044)***	-0.211 (0.044)***
Individual-level Variables					
Expected Education	0.058 (0.008)***	0.058 (0.008)***	0.058 (0.008)***	0.058 (0.008)***	0.058 (0.008)***
Books at Home	0.033 (0.007)***	0.033 (0.007)***	0.033 (0.007)***	0.033 (0.007)***	0.033 (0.007)***
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		-0.210 (0.233)	-1.505 (0.283)***	-1.542 (0.269)***	-1.492 (0.279)***
Female Labor Force		-0.203 (0.111)*	-1.127 (0.102)***	-1.116 (0.111)***	-0.786 (0.178)*
Gender Related Development Index		0.535 (2.019)	5.394 (1.859)**	5.776 (1.772)**	4.379 (1.848)**
Electoral System			0.182 (0.035)***	0.189 (0.035)***	0.194*** (0.031)
Suffrage			-0.345 (0.135)**	-0.314 (0.112)**	-0.330 (0.098)***
Gender Ideology			0.326 (0.162)*	0.324 (0.160)*	0.238 (0.149)
% Left			-0.012 (0.002)***	-0.013 (0.002)***	-0.012 (0.003)***
Quotas			0.005 (0.092)		
Election				-0.060 (0.091)	
Scandinavia					-0.157 (0.062)**
Eastern Bloc					-0.238 (0.161)
Intercept	1.376 (0.072)***	1.084 (1.683)	2.186 (1.454)	-2.510 (1.400)*	1.402 (1.510)
N	58,561	58,561	58,561	58,561	58,561
Nations	20	20	20	20	20
Variance explained	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Table RA8. Results from the Civic Education Study
Political Discussion with Friends, Testing the Role Model Effect

	1	2	3	4	5
Female X % Women	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**	0.004 (0.002)**
% Women	-0.008 (0.005)*	0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)
Female	-0.191 (0.034)***	-0.191 (0.034)***	-0.191 (0.034)***	-0.189 (0.036)***	-0.191 (0.034)***
Individual-level Variables					
Expected Education	0.094 (0.010)***	0.094 (0.010)***	0.094 (0.010)***	0.093 (0.010)***	0.094 (0.010)***
Books at Home	0.046 (0.006)***	0.046 (0.006)***	0.046 (0.006)***	0.049 (0.006)***	0.046 (0.006)***
National-level Variables					
Per Capita GDP		-0.078 (0.366)	0.0002 (0.580)	0.090 (0.649)	-0.503 (0.461)
Female Labor Force		-0.616 (0.185)***	-0.590 (0.180)***	-0.613 (0.185)***	0.203 (0.352)
Gender Related Development Index		-4.260 (3.712)	-5.583 (3.943)	-5.890 (4.303)	-5.638 (3.474)
Electoral System			0.136 (0.067)*	0.187 (0.076)**	0.205 (0.068)**
Suffrage			-0.257 (0.213)	-0.028 (0.224)	-0.373 (0.169)**
Gender Ideology			1.085 (0.373)**	0.956 (0.404)**	1.034 (0.348)**
% Left			-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)
Quotas			-0.103 (0.131)		
Election				0.086 (0.095)	
Scandinavia					-0.486 (0.222)*
Eastern Bloc					-0.701 (0.271)**
Intercept	4.667 (0.131)***	8.675 (3.115)**	9.216 (3.151)**	5.325 (3.362)	9.217 (2.902)**
N	59,174	59,174	59,174	59,174	59,174
Nations	20	20	20	20	20
Variance explained	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Table RA9. Results from the European Values Survey
Additive Index for Political Activity

	<i>Political Activity</i>	<i>Political Activity</i>
Female X % Women	0.004 (0.001)***	0.010 (0.004)**
Female X % Women X Age		-0.0001 (0.00008)
% Women	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Female	-0.234 (0.044)***	-0.148 (0.086)*
Age	0.001 (0.0007)*	0.004 (0.001)***
Female X Age		-0.002 (0.002)
Individual-level Variables		
Education	0.133 (0.008)***	0.131 (0.008)***
Married	0.042 (0.023)*	0.029 (0.024)
Unemployed	-0.020 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.036)
National-level Variables		
Electoral System	-0.171 (0.048)***	-0.128 (0.042)***
Female Labor Force	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)
Per Capita GDP	0.004 (0.0004)***	0.004 (0.0004)**
Suffrage	0.007 (0.003)**	0.007 (0.003)**
Gender Ideology	0.905 (0.102)***	0.832 (0.111)***
Gender Related Development Index	1.949 (1.380)	3.495 (1.041)***
% Left	0.010 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***
Scandinavia	-0.037 (0.135)	-0.073 (0.132)
Eastern Bloc	0.511 (0.243)*	0.471 (0.214)**
Intercept	-17.606 (6.109)***	-19.800 (5.465)***
N	25,426	25,426
Nations	23	23
Variance explained	0.07	0.08

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses † p > 0.15 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01