Here are some papers I am (or was) working on. Drafts available on request. Papers currently undergoing blind review are not listed.


In Progress:

  • Presentism, Minkowski, and quantifier variance
    A new way for presentists to embrace Minkowskian special relativity.
  • Presentism and fatalism revisited
    Mike Rea argued in an AJP paper in 2006 that the conjunction of presentism, libertarianism and bivalence is inconsistent. But it's not. Or so I claim.
  • No epistemic norm of assertion
    I don't like the way with which counter-examples to accounts of the norm of assertion are dealt. In this paper, I explain why.

On the Backburner:

  • Simple persistence
    Mereological simples can't have temporal parts. I show what follows.
  • 'Ought implies can' implies indeterminism
    I argue that the following triad is inconsistent: determinism is true, ought implies can, and someone has done something she ought not to have done.
  • A new argument for divine temporality
    If God exists and the A-Theory of time is true, then God's beliefs change; therefore, if the A-Theory is true, God is intrinsically temporal.