

QUESTION 95

Things Relevant to the First Man's Will, viz., Grace and Justice

The next thing we have to consider is what pertains to the first man's will. On this point there are two topics: first, concerning the grace and justice [or moral rectitude] of the first man (*de gratia et iustitia primi hominis*) (question 95) and, second, concerning the use of justice in his dominion over other things (question 96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Was the first man created in grace? (2) Did the soul have passions in the state of innocence? (3) Did the soul have all virtues in the state of innocence? (4) Were the first man's works as efficacious for meriting as our works are now?

Article 1

Was the first man created in grace?

It seems that the first man was not created in grace (*creatus in gratia*):

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle, distinguishing Adam from Christ, says, "The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit." But the spirit's life-giving occurs through grace. Therefore, it is peculiar to Christ that he was made in grace.

Objection 2: In *De Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, "Adam did not have the Holy Spirit." But whoever has grace has the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Adam was not created in grace.

Objection 3: In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "God ordered the lives of angels and men in such a way that He demonstrated in them, first, what their free choice was capable of and, second, what the gift of grace and the judgment of justice were capable of." Therefore, He first established men and angels with only their natural freedom of choice, and afterwards He conferred grace on them.

Objection 4: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 24 the Master says, "In creation man was given assistance through which he was able to hold his own but not able to make progress." But whoever has grace is able to make progress through merit. Therefore, the first man was not created in grace.

Objection 5: In order for someone to receive grace, consent is required on the part of the recipient, since a sort of spiritual marriage is thereby consummated between God and the soul. But the consent to grace can belong only to someone who already exists. Therefore, man did not receive grace at the first instant of his creation.

Objection 6: Nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is nothing other than consummated grace. But in man grace preceded glory. Therefore, *a fortiori*, nature preceded grace.

But contrary to this: Men and angels are equally ordered toward grace. But angels were created in grace; for in *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, "God was in them, simultaneously creating them and giving them grace." Therefore, man was likewise created in grace.

I respond: Some claim that the first man was not created in grace, but that instead grace was conferred on him later—though before he sinned, since many passages from the saints attest that man had grace in the state of innocence.

However, as others claim, the very rectitude of the initial state in which God made man seems to require that man was created in grace—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:30 ("God made man upright"). For this rectitude involved reason's being subject to God, the lower powers' being subject to reason, and the body's being subject to the soul, where the first sort of subordination (*subjectio*) was a cause of both the second and the third. For, as Augustine says, as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason.

However, it is obvious that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason

was not natural; otherwise, it would have remained after the sin, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. Hence, it is clear that the first sort of subjection, by which reason was subject to God, likewise did not stem from nature, but stemmed instead from the supernatural gift of grace, since it is impossible for an effect to be more potent than its cause. Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 13 Augustine says, “After they had committed the transgression against the precept, and after God’s grace had deserted them, they were ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies; for they sensed the urges of their disobedient flesh as a punishment that corresponded to their own disobedience.” From this we can see that if the flesh’s obedience to the soul was lost when grace deserted them, then it was through the presence of grace in their soul that the lower powers had been subject to the soul.

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle adduces these words in order to show that there is a spiritual body if there is an animal body, since the life of the spiritual body began in Christ, who is “the firstborn from the dead” (Colossians 1:18), just as the life of the animal body began in Adam. Therefore, the Apostle’s words imply not that Adam was not spiritual with respect to his soul, but rather that he was not spiritual with respect to his body.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine points out in the same place, it is not being denied that the Holy Spirit was in Adam in some way, just as He is in the rest of those who are justified. Rather, the claim is that the Holy Spirit “was not in Adam in the same way that He is now in the faithful,” who are admitted to the reception of their eternal inheritance immediately after death.

Reply to objection 3: On the basis of this passage from Augustine one may conclude not that angels or men were created in a natural freedom of choice before they had grace, but that He made manifest in them (a) what free choice was capable of before their confirmation [in the good] and (b) what they would attain afterwards through the assistance of confirming grace.

Reply to objection 4: The Master is speaking in accord with the opinion of those who claimed that man was created in a natural state only (*in naturalibus tantum*) and not in grace.

An alternative reply is that even if man was created in grace, he would still have had his ability to make progress through merit from the addition of grace and not from the creation of his nature.

Reply to objection 5: Since the will’s movement is not continuous, nothing prevents it from being the case that the first man consented to grace at the very first instant of his creation.

Reply to objection 6: We merit glory through an act of grace, but we do not merit grace through an act of nature. Therefore, the cases are not parallel.

Article 2

Did the passions of the soul exist in the first man?

It seems that the passions of the soul did not exist in the first man:

Objection 1: It is because of the passions of the soul that “the flesh lusts against the spirit” (Galatians 5:17). But this did not occur in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.

Objection 2: Adam’s soul was more noble than his body. But Adam’s body was impassible. Therefore, there were no passions in his soul, either.

Objection 3: The passions of the soul are suppressed (*comprimuntur*) by moral virtue. But in Adam there was perfect moral virtue. Therefore, the passions were totally excluded from him.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that [our first parents] had “an untroubled love for God” and certain other passions of the soul.

I respond: The passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite (*in appetitu sensuali*), the object of which is good and evil. Hence, among all the passions of the soul, some, e.g., love (*amor*) and joy (*gaudium*), are related to good, and some, e.g., fear (*timor*) and sorrow (*dolor*), are related to evil. And since, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in the initial state (a) there was no evil that was either present or threatening and (b) there was no good which was absent and which a good will would at that time have desired to possess, none of the the passions that are related to evil, e.g., fear, sorrow, and others of this kind, existed in Adam, and, similarly, neither did those passions which are related to a good that is not had and yet should be had at present, e.g., an urgent desire (*cupiditas aestuans*).

However, those passions that can relate to a present good, e.g., joy and love, or to a future good to be had in its own time, e.g., a non-distressed desire or hope, did exist in the state of innocence—though otherwise than they exist in us. For in us the sentient appetite, in which the passions exist, is not totally subject to reason. And so the passions sometimes exist in us in a way that precedes reason’s judgment and impedes it, whereas sometimes they follow upon reason’s judgment, so that the sentient appetite obeys reason in some way. By contrast, in the state of innocence the lower appetite was totally subject to reason, and so the only passions in it were ones that follow upon the judgment of reason.

Reply to objection 1: The flesh “lusts against the spirit” in the sense that the passions fight against reason—something that did not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 2: In the state of innocence the human body was impassible with respect to those passions that undermine its natural disposition (*removent dispositionem naturalem*); this will be explained below (q. 97, a. 2). Similarly, the soul was impassible with respect to those passions that impede reason.

Reply to objection 3: Perfect moral virtue does not totally eliminate the passions, but instead orders them. For instance, as *Ethics* 3 says, “It belongs to the temperate man to desire what is necessary as is necessary.”

Article 3

Did Adam have all the virtues?

It seems that Adam did not have all the virtues:

Objection 1: Certain virtues are ordered toward constraining immoderation in the passions, in the way that immoderate desire (*immoderata concupiscentia*) is constrained by temperance (*temperantia*) and immoderate fear (*immoderatus timor*) is constrained by fortitude (*fortitudo*). But in the state of innocence immoderation in the passions did not exist. Therefore, neither did the aforementioned virtues exist.

Objection 2: Certain virtues have to do with passions that are related to evil—for instance, mildness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with instances of anger (*irae*) and fortitude has to do with instances of fear. But as has been explained (a. 2), such passions did not exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, neither did virtues of this type.

Objection 3: Repentance (*poenitentia*) is a virtue having to do with a previously committed sin; likewise, mercy (*miser cordia*) is a virtue having to do with unhappiness (*miseria*). But in the state of innocence there was neither sin nor unhappiness. Therefore, neither were there virtues of this sort.

Objection 4: Perseverance (*perseverantia*) is a virtue. But as his later sin demonstrated, Adam did not have this virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that he had all the virtues.

Objection 5: Faith (*fides*) is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an

enigmatic cognition (*importat aenigmaticam cognitionem*), which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the initial state.

But contrary to this: In one of his homilies Augustine says, “The prince of vices conquered Adam, who had been made to God’s image from the slime of the earth and who was armed with modesty (*pudicitia armatum*), restrained by temperance (*temperantia compositum*), and refulgent with splendor (*claritate splendidum*).”

I respond: There is a certain sense in which man had all the virtues in the state of innocence. This can be made clear from what has already been said. For it was explained above (a. 1) that the rectitude of the initial state was such that reason was subject to God and the lower powers were subject to reason. But the virtues are nothing other than certain perfections by which reason is ordered to God and by which the lower powers are disposed to following the rule of reason; this will become clearer when we discuss the virtues (*ST* 1-2, qq. 55-70). Hence, the rectitude of the initial state required that man in some sense have all the virtues.

However, note that certain virtues, e.g., charity and justice, are such that by their nature they involve no imperfection. Virtues of this sort existed absolutely speaking in the state of innocence, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

By contrast, there are some virtues that involve imperfection by their very nature, either on the part of their act or on the part of their matter. If the imperfection in question is not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then virtues of this sort could still have existed in the initial state. Examples are faith, which is of things that are not seen, and hope, which is for things that are not had. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to seeing God through His essence or to having Him with the enjoyment of final beatitude, and so faith and hope were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

But if the imperfection that has to do with the nature of a given virtue is incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then that virtue was able to have existed in the initial state with respect to its habit but not with respect to its act. This is clear, for instance, in the case of repentance, which is sorrow (*dolor*) for a sin that has been committed, and in the case of mercy, which is sorrow at the unhappiness of another; for sorrow, along with guilt and unhappiness, are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state. Hence, virtues of this sort existed with respect to their habits, but not with respect to their acts. For the first man was disposed in such a way that if he had previously sinned, he would be sorrowful, and, similarly, if he were to see unhappiness in another, he would dispel it as far as he was able to. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, “Shame”—which has to do with one’s own evil deeds—“occurs in a virtuous man only conditionally. For he is so disposed that he would feel shame if he were to commit some evil deed.”

Reply to objection 1: It is incidental to temperance and fortitude to *repel* excessive passions; this occurs [only] to the extent that there are excessive passions in their subject. By contrast, what belongs *per se* to virtues of this sort is to *moderate* the passions.

Reply to objection 2: The passions related to evil are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state if, like fear and sorrow, they have a relation to the evil that exists in the one having the passion.

By contrast, passions that have a relation to an evil that exists in someone else are not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state; for instance, in the initial state man was able to have hated the malice of the demons in the same way that he loved the goodness of God. Hence, the virtues that have to do with such passions were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habit and with respect to their act.

However, the virtues that have a relation to evil in the same subject are such that, if they have to do only with passions of the sort in question, then they were able to have existed in the initial state only with

respect to their habit and not with respect to their act—as has been explained concerning repentance and mercy.

On the other hand, there are certain virtues that have to do not only with these passions but also with other passions—e.g., temperance, which has to do not only with types of sadness (*circa tristitias*), but also with pleasures (*circa delectationes*), and fortitude, which has to do not only with types of fear (*circa timores*), but also with audacity and hope (*circa audaciam et spem*). Hence, an act of temperance could have existed in the initial state insofar as it was moderating pleasures; and the same holds for fortitude insofar as it was moderating audacity or hope, though not insofar as it was moderating sadness or fear.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 4: ‘Perseverance’ is taken in two ways:

In one way, insofar as it is a *virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a habit by which someone chooses to persevere in the good. On this reading, Adam had perseverance.

In the second way, insofar as it is a *circumstance modifying a virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a certain continuity of virtue without interruption. On this reading, Adam did not have perseverance.

Reply to objection 5: The reply to the fifth objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Were the first man’s works less efficacious for meriting than our works are?

It seems that the first man’s work were less efficacious for meriting than our works are:

Objection 1: Grace is given out of God’s mercy, which grants more help to those who are more needy. But we ourselves need grace more than the first man did in the state of innocence. Therefore, grace is poured into us more copiously. Since grace is the root of merit, our works are rendered more efficacious for meriting.

Objection 2: A certain struggle and difficulty is required for merit. For 2 Timothy 2:5 says, “He who does not legitimately struggle will not be crowned,” and in *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Virtue has to do with the difficult and the good.” But there is more struggle and difficulty now. Therefore, there is also more efficacy for meriting now.

Objection 3: In *Sentences 2*, dist. 24 the Master says, “Man would not have merited by resisting temptation, but now one who resists temptation merits.” Therefore, our works are more efficacious for meriting than were works in the initial state.

But contrary to this: On this view, man would be in a better condition after the sin.

I respond: The quantity of merit can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, in terms of its *root* in charity and grace. And on this reading, the quantity of merit corresponds to the *essential* reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for someone who does something out of greater charity enjoys God more perfectly.

In the second way, the quantity of merit can be thought of in terms of the quantity of the *work*; and this is twofold, viz., *absolute* quantity and *proportional* quantity. For the widow who put two mites into the treasury did a lesser work in terms of absolute quantity than those who put in large sums, but in terms of proportional quantity the widow did more in our Lord’s view, because she exceeded her means to a greater degree (Mark 12:41, Luke 21:1). Still, both of these sorts of quantity of merit correspond to an *incidental* reward, viz., joy with respect to a created good.

So, then, one should say that the works of man were more efficacious for meriting in the state of

innocence than after the sin, if what is meant is the quantity of merit on the part of grace; for grace was more copious at that time, when no obstacle to it existed in human nature. The same thing holds if one considers the absolute quantity of the work. For since man had greater virtue, he did greater works.

However, if one considers proportional quantity, then more of the character of merit is found after the sin because of man's weakness. For a small work exceeds the power of someone who does it with difficulty to a greater degree than a great work exceeds the power of someone who does it without difficulty.

Reply to objection 1: After the sin man needed grace for more deeds than before the sin, but he did not have more of a need for grace. For even before the sin man needed grace to attain eternal life, which is the main reason why grace is necessary. But beyond this, after the sin man also needs grace for the remission of his sins and for support in his weakness.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, difficulty and struggle have to do with the quantity of merit in the sense of the proportional quantity of the works. For it is a sign of the will's promptitude that it tries to do what is difficult for it, and the will's promptitude is caused by the magnitude of its charity. However, it can happen that, because someone is prepared to do even something that is difficult for him, he does an easy work with as prompt a will as someone else does a difficult work. Still, insofar as the actual difficulty has the character of punishment (*inquantum est poenalis*), it also has the character of satisfying for sin.

Reply to objection 3: According to the opinion of those who hold that the first man did not have grace, it would not have been meritorious for him to resist temptation, just as this is not now meritorious for someone who does not have grace. But there is a difference here, since in the initial state there was nothing interior that impelled man toward evil, as there now is. Hence, man would have been able to resist temptation more easily without grace at that time than he is now .