

QUESTION 94

The State of the First Man with respect to His Intellect

The next thing we have to consider is the state or condition of the first man, first with respect to his soul (questions 94-96) and then with respect to his body (questions 97-101). On the first point there are two things to be considered: first, the condition of man with respect to his intellect (question 94) and second, the condition of man with respect to his will (questions 95-96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Did the first man see God through His essence? (2) Was he able to see the separated substances, i.e., the angels? (3) Did he have knowledge (*scientia*) of all things? (4) Was he able to be mistaken or to be deceived?

Article 1

Did the first man see God through His essence?

It seems that the first man saw God through His essence:

Objection 1: Man's beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence. But as Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, "When the first man was living in Paradise, he had a life that was happy and rich in all things." And in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "If men had affections of the sort we have now, then how were they happy in that place of ineffable happiness, i.e., Paradise?" Therefore, in Paradise the first man saw God through His essence.

Objection 2: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The first man did not lack anything that a good will desires." But a good will can desire nothing better than the vision of God's essence. Therefore, the man saw God through His essence.

Objection 3: The vision of God through His essence is a vision by which God is seen directly and without any enigma (*sine medio et sine aenigmate*). But as the Master says in *Sentences* 4, dist. 1, man in the state of innocence "saw God directly." He also saw Him without any enigma, since 'enigma' implies obscurity and, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, obscurity was introduced through sin. Therefore, in his initial state man saw God through His essence.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 15:46 the Apostle says, "It is not what is spiritual that is first, but what is animal." But to see God through His essence is maximally spiritual. Therefore, in the initial state of animal life the first man did not see God through His essence.

I respond: The first man did not see God through His essence, given the general state of his life—unless, perhaps, one claims that he saw God in a rapture when "God cast a deep sleep over Adam" (Genesis 2:21). The reason for this is that since God's essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of one who sees the divine essence is related to God in the same way that every man is related to beatitude. But it is clear that no man can voluntarily (*per voluntatem*) turn away from beatitude, since he naturally and necessarily wills beatitude and flees from unhappiness. Hence, no one who sees God through His essence can voluntarily (*voluntate*) turn away from God, i.e., sin. Because of this, everyone who sees God through His essence is so stable in his love for God that he is unable to sin for all eternity. Therefore, since Adam sinned, it is clear that he did not see God through His essence.

However, he did have a certain higher cognition of God than we ourselves have, and so in a way his cognition stood midway between the cognition associated with our present state and the cognition associated with heaven, by which God is seen through His essence.

To see this clearly, note that the vision of God through His essence is distinct from the vision of God through a creature. Now the higher a creature is and the more like God, the more clearly God is seen through that creature—just as a man is more perfectly seen in a mirror in which his image is

reflected more distinctly. And so it is clear that God is seen much more prominently through His intelligible effects than through His sensible and corporeal effects. In his present state, man is kept from the full and lucid consideration of intelligible effects by the fact that he is distracted by sensible things and occupies himself with them. But as Ecclesiastes 7:30 says, “God made man upright (*rectus*).” And the rectitude of man, as he was instituted by God, consists in the fact that his lower powers were subject to his higher powers and that his higher powers were not impeded by his lower powers. Hence, the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and firm contemplation of God’s intelligible effects, which he perceived by the illumination (*irradiatio*) of the first truth, whether by natural cognition or graced cognition (*sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita*). Thus, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “Perhaps God earlier spoke with the first men in the way that He speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds with the unalterable truth itself, though not with so great a participation in the divine essence as the angels have.” So, then, through these intelligible effects of God’s, man had a clearer cognition of God than we now have.

Reply to objection 1: Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect beatitude to which he was going to be transported and which consists in the vision of the divine essence. Yet, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11, he had “a particular type of happy life” insofar as he had a certain natural integrity and perfection.

Reply to objection 2: A good will is a well-ordered will (*ordinata voluntas*). But the first man’s will would not have been well-ordered if he had willed to have in the state of merit what was promised to him as a reward.

Reply to objection 3: There are two types of medium (*duplex est medium*):

One of them is such that what is said to be seen through the medium is seen at the very same time in the medium, as when a man is seen through a mirror and is seen at the very same time as the mirror itself is seen.

The other type of medium is such that through our knowledge of it we arrive at something unknown, as is the case with the medium [or middle term] of a demonstration.

God was seen without this latter sort of medium, but not without the former sort of medium. For the first man did not have to arrive at a cognition of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as we ourselves have to. Instead, in his own way he had a cognition of God immediately in His effects, especially in His intelligible effects.

Similarly, one should note that there are two possible ways to understand the obscurity implied by the name ‘enigma’.

In one sense, each creature is somewhat obscure if it is compared with the immensity of God’s splendor (*ad immensitatem divinae claritatis*). And in this sense Adam saw God “in an enigma” (*in aenigmate*) because he saw God through a created effect.

In the second sense, one can mean the obscurity that follows upon sin; more specifically, man is impeded from the consideration of intelligible things by his occupation with sensible things. On this reading, it is not the case that [Adam] saw God “in an enigma.”

Article 2

Did Adam in the state of innocence see angels through their essence?

It seems that Adam in the state of innocence saw angels through their essence:

Objection 1: In *Dialogi* 4 Gregory says, “In Paradise man used to enjoy God’s words and, with cleanness of heart and loftiness of vision, to have commerce with the spirits of the holy angels.”

Objection 2: In its present state the soul is impeded from a cognition of separated substances by the fact that it is united to a corruptible body that “weighs down the soul,” as Wisdom 9:15 puts it. This is why, as was explained above (q. 89, a. 2), a separated soul is able to see separated substances. But the soul of the first man was not weighed down by his body, since his body was not corruptible. Therefore, he was able to see separated substances.

Objection 3: As it says in the *Liber de Causis*, one separated substance has cognition of another separated substance by having cognition of itself. But the first man’s soul had cognition of itself. Therefore, it had cognition of the separated substances.

But contrary to this: Adam’s soul was of the same nature as our souls. But our souls cannot now have intellective understanding of the separated substances. Therefore, neither could the first man’s soul.

I respond: The state of the human soul can be thought of in two ways:

(a) In one way, with respect to the *diverse modes of its natural esse*, and on this score the state of a separated soul is distinct from the state of a soul conjoined to a body.

(b) In the second way, the state of the soul is thought of in terms of *integrity and corruption*, while keeping its mode of natural *esse* fixed; and on this score the state of innocence is distinct from man’s state after the sin.

In the state of innocence, man’s soul was applied to perfecting and directing the body, just as it is now, and this is why the first man is said to have been made “a living soul” (Genesis 2:7), i.e., a soul giving life to a body and, more specifically, an animal soul. But as was explained above (q. 89, a. 1), [the first man] had integrity of life in the sense that his body was totally subject to his soul and in no way impeded it. And it is clear from what has gone before (q. 84, a. 7 and q. 85, a. 1) that because the soul is applied to directing and perfecting the body in its animal life, what belongs to our soul is a mode of intellective understanding that involves turning toward phantasms. Hence, this mode of intellective understanding likewise belonged to the soul of the first man.

Now given this mode of intellective understanding, there are, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, three levels of movement in the soul: In the *first* of them “the soul is gathered into itself and away from exterior things.” The *second* level occurs when the soul ascends to the point of “being united with the united higher powers,” viz., the angels. In the *third* level the soul “is led to the good that surpasses all goods, viz., God.”

Therefore, with the first movement of the soul, which is away from exterior things and toward itself, our cognition of the soul is brought to perfection. For as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the soul’s intellective operation has a natural ordering toward those things that lie outside itself, and so through the cognition of those things we can have a perfect cognition of our own intellectual operation, since an act is known through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself we can have a perfect cognition of the human intellect, since a power is known through its proper act.

By contrast, no perfect cognition is found in the second movement, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), an angel has intellective understanding not by turning toward phantasms, but in a far more eminent way. So the mode of cognition just explained, by which the soul has cognition of itself, is not sufficient to lead to the cognition of an angel.

A fortiori, the third movement does not lead to perfect knowledge, since even the angels themselves are not able, by having cognition of themselves, to attain to the cognition of the divine substance—and this because of its surpassing nature (*propter eius excessum*).

So, then, the first man’s soul could not have seen the angels through their essence. However, it nonetheless had cognition of them in a more excellent mode than we ourselves have. For its cognition was more certain and more fixed with respect to interior intelligible things than our cognition is. And it is because of this great eminence that Gregory says that the first man’s soul “had commerce with the spirits of the angels.”

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what was just said.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that the first man's soul fell short of an intellective understanding of the separated substances stemmed not from the body's weighing it down, but instead from the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of the separated substances. We ourselves, on the other hand, fall short for both these reasons.

Reply to objection 3: As was just explained, the first man's soul was not able through its cognition of itself to attain to a cognition of the separated substances. For even in the case of the separated substances, each has a cognition of other separated substances in a mode peculiar to itself (*per modum sui ipsius*).

Article 3

Did the first man have scientific knowledge of all things?

It seems that the first man did not have scientific knowledge of all things (*non habuerit scientiam omnium*):

Objection 1: Either (a) he had such knowledge through acquired [intelligible] species or (b) he had it through connatural species or (c) he had it through infused species. But not through acquired species, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, cognition of the sort in question is caused by experience, whereas he had not at that time experienced all things. Again, not through connatural species, since he had the same nature that we have and, as *De Anima* 3 says, our soul is "like a tablet on which nothing has been written." On the other hand, if he had such knowledge through infused species, then the knowledge he had of things was not of the same nature as our scientific knowledge, which we acquire from things.

Objection 2: The same mode of reaching perfection is present in all individuals of the same species. But other men do not at their inception have scientific knowledge of all things; instead, they acquire it in their own way over a period of time (*per temporis successionem*). Therefore, neither did Adam, immediately upon being formed, have scientific knowledge of all things.

Objection 3: The state of the present life is granted to man in order that his soul might make progress both with respect to cognition and with respect to merit; for this seems to be the reason why the soul is united to the body. But in that [initial] state man would have been making progress with respect to merit. Therefore, he would likewise have been making progress with respect to the cognition of things. Therefore, he did not have scientific knowledge of all things.

But contrary to this: He himself imposed names on the animals, as Genesis 2:20 says. But names have to fit the natures of things. Therefore, Adam knew the natures of all the animals and, by parity of reasoning, he had scientific knowledge of all other things.

I respond: In the order of nature, the perfect precedes the imperfect in the sense that actuality precedes potentiality; for what exists in potentiality is not led into actuality except by some actual being. And since things were originally instituted by God not only as they exist in themselves, but also as principles of other things, it follows that they were produced in a perfect state, in which they were able to be principles of other things.

Now man can be a principle of another not only through corporeal generation but also through instructing and governing (*per instructionem et gubernationem*). And so just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his body, so that he could immediately generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his soul, so that he could immediately instruct and direct others. But no one can instruct unless he has scientific knowledge. And so the first man was instituted

by God in such a way that he had scientific knowledge of all the things in which a man is apt to be instructed. And these are all the things which exist virtually in the first principles that are known *per se*—in other words, whatever a man can have natural cognition of.

Now what is required for governing his own life and the lives of others is not only cognition of those things that can be naturally known, but also cognition of things that exceed natural cognition. For man's life is ordered toward a supernatural end. Similarly, in our own case, in order to govern our lives we must have cognition of what belongs to the Faith. Hence, the first man received cognition of these supernatural matters to the extent that this was necessary to direct human life in his state.

However, the first man did not have cognition of other things which cannot be known by man's natural efforts and which are not necessary for governing human life, e.g., the thoughts of men, future contingents, and singular facts such as, for instance, how many pebbles there are in a stream, and other things of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: The first man had scientific knowledge of all things through species that were infused by God. And yet his knowledge was not different in nature from our knowledge—just as the eyes that Christ gave to the man born blind were not different in nature from the eyes which nature produced.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from what has been said, since Adam was the first man—something not true of the rest of men—it was fitting for him to have a modicum of perfection (*aliquid perfectionis*).

Reply to objection 3: In his scientific knowledge of naturally knowable things Adam made progress not with respect to the number of things known, but with respect to his mode of knowing them. For what he knew intellectually, he later came to know through experience.

On the other hand, as regards the supernatural things he had cognition of, he made progress, through new revelations, with respect to the number of things known, just as the angels make progress through new instances of enlightenment. However, progress in merit is unlike progress in knowledge, since it is not the case that one man is a principle of meriting for another man, whereas it is the case that one man is a principle of knowing for another man.

Article 4

Was man in his initial state able to be deceived?

It seems that man in his initial state was able to be deceived (*decipi potuisset*):

Objection 1: In 1 Timothy 2:14 the Apostle says, “The woman, having been deceived, was in sin.”

Objection 2: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 21, the Master says, “The woman was not afraid of the serpent who was speaking to her, because she thought that he had received from God the role of speaking.” But this was false. Therefore, the woman was deceived before the sin.

Objection 3: It is natural that the farther away something seems, the smaller it seems. But the nature of the eye is not changed because of sin, and so the same thing would have been true in the state of innocence. Therefore, a man would have been deceived about the size of something he saw, just as happens even now.

Objection 4: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that in a dream the soul clings to a likeness as if it were something real. But in the state of innocence man ate and, as a result, slept and had dreams. Therefore, he was deceived by clinging to likenesses as if they were real things.

Objection 5: As was explained above (a. 3), the first man did not know men's thoughts or future

contingents. Therefore, if someone had spoken falsely to him about these matters, he would have been deceived.

But contrary to this: Augustine says, “It is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of the damned, to take truths for falsehoods.”

I respond: Some have claimed that there are two things that can be understood in the name ‘deception’: (a) a sort of cursory judgment (*qualiscumque existimatio levis*) by which someone clings to something false as if it were true, but without assent to the false belief (*sine assensu credulitatis*), and (b) a firm false belief (*firma credulitas*). Thus, with respect to things Adam had scientific knowledge of, man could not, before the sin, be deceived in either of these ways. But with respect to those things he did not have scientific knowledge of, he was able to be deceived, taking ‘deception’ in the broad sense for a sort of judgment that does not involve assent to a false belief (*pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis*). They make this claim because judging falsely in such matters is not harmful to a man; nor is it culpable, since assent is not rashly given.

However, this position is not consonant with the integrity of the initial state; for as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in that state “there was a tranquil avoidance of sin such that, while the state remained, no evil at all could exist.” But it is clear that, as *Ethics* 6 explains, what is false is an evil for the intellect in the same way that what is true is its good. Hence, for as long as the state of innocence remained, it could not have been the case that man’s intellect should acquiesce in something false as if it were true. For just as there was a lack of a certain perfection, e.g., splendor (*claritas*), in the first man’s bodily parts and yet no evil could exist in him, so too in his intellect it was possible for there to be a lack of some sort of knowledge and yet there could not be any false judgment there (*nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi*).

The same point is also clear from the rectitude of the initial state. In accord with this rectitude, as long as the soul remained subject to God, man’s lower powers were subject to his higher powers and the higher powers were not impeded by the lower powers. But it is clear from what was said above (q. 85, a. 6) that the intellect always has truth with respect to its proper object. Hence, the intellect is never deceived in its own right; instead, every deception in the intellect stems from some lower power, viz., the imagination or some other such power. Hence, we see that as long as the power of natural judgment (*naturale iudicatorium*) is not rendered inoperative, we are not deceived by appearances; rather, we are deceived only when that power is rendered inoperative, as is clear in the case of those who are asleep. Hence, it is clear that the rectitude of the initial state is not compatible with any deception in the intellect.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the seduction of the woman preceded the sin of deed (*peccatum operis*), it was subsequent to a sin of interior elation. For in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “The woman would not have believed the serpent’s words if she had not already had in her mind a love for her own power and a proud presumptuousness regarding that power.”

Reply to objection 2: What the woman believed was that the serpent had received the role of speaking (*officium loquendi*) not through its own nature, but by some supernatural act.

In any case, it is not necessary to follow the Master’s authority on this point.

Reply to objection 3: If something had been represented to the first man’s sensory power or imagination otherwise than it was in reality, he would not thereby have been deceived; for he would have discerned the truth through his reason.

Reply to objection 4: What happens in a dream is not imputed to a man, since he does not at that time have the use of reason, which is man’s proper operation.

Reply to objection 5: When someone told a falsehood about future contingents or the thoughts of the heart, a man in the state of innocence would not have believed that it was so; instead, he would have believed that it was possible—and this would not have been to make a false judgment.

An alternative reply is that he was divinely assisted, lest he be deceived in matters that he did not have scientific knowledge of. Nor does it count against this, as some have asserted, that in the temptation he was not assisted in not being deceived, even though he especially needed to be assisted at that point. For a sin had already taken place in his mind, and he did not have recourse to God's assistance.