

QUESTION 68

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit

We next have to consider the gifts. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do the gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Are the gifts necessary for salvation? (3) Are the gifts habits? (4) How many gifts are there, and what are they? (5) Are the gifts connected? (6) Do the gifts remain in heaven? (7) How are the gifts related to one another? (8) How are the gifts related to the virtues?

Article 1

Do the gifts differ from the virtues?

It seems that the gifts are not distinct from the virtues:

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory, in commenting on the passage from Job, “Seven sons were born to him,” says, “Seven sons are born to us when, through the conception of good thoughts, the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise within us.” And he cites the passage from Isaiah 11:2-3, “The spirit of understanding will rest upon him,” where the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are virtues.

Objection 2: In the book *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* Augustine, commenting on the passage from Matthew 12, “Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits,” says, “The seven vices are the contraries of the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit, i.e., the seven gifts.” But the seven vices are contrary to the commonly named virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not distinct from the commonly named virtues.

Objection 3: When the definitions of things are the same, the things are likewise the same. But the definition of a virtue belongs to the gifts, since each of the gifts is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, etc. Similarly, the definition of a gift belongs to the infused virtues, since, according to the Philosopher, a gift is an unreturnable donation. Therefore, the virtues and the gifts are not distinct from one another.

Objection 4: Several of the things counted among the gifts are virtues. For as was explained above (q. 57, a. 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues; again, counsel has to do with prudence, piety is a species of justice, and fortitude is a one of the moral virtues. Therefore, it seems that the virtues are not distinct from the gifts.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory distinguishes the seven gifts, which he says are signified by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which he says are signified by the three daughters of Job. And in *Moralia* 2 he distinguishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of the house.

I respond: If we are speaking of gifts and virtues as regards the definitions of the names, then in this sense they have no opposition to each another. For the definition of a virtue, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), is taken from the fact that a virtue perfects a man with respect to acting well, whereas the definition of a gift is taken from its relation to the cause from which it comes. And nothing prevents it from being the case that what comes from another as a gift should be perfective of someone with respect to his acting well—especially in light of our having explained above (q. 63, a. 3) that certain virtues are infused in us by God. Hence, on this score a gift cannot be distinguished from a virtue. And this is why some have claimed that the gifts should not be distinguished from the virtues.

However, they are left with the not insignificant difficulty of explaining why some of the virtues, but not all of them, are called gifts, and why some of the things counted as gifts are not counted as virtues, as is clear from the case of fear.

Hence, others have claimed that the gifts are to be distinguished from the virtues, but have not

given an appropriate account of the distinction, i.e., one which is common to all the virtues in such a way that it does not apply to any of the gifts, and vice versa.

For instance, some authors, taking into consideration that four of the seven gifts, viz., wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel, have to do with reason and that three of them, viz., fortitude, piety, and fear, have to do with the appetitive power, have claimed that the gifts perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of reason, whereas the virtues perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of the will. For they found just two virtues, viz., faith and prudence, in the intellect or reason, and the others in the appetitive or affective power.

However, if this distinction were appropriate, then all the virtues would have to exist in the appetitive power and all the gifts would have to exist in reason.

So others, taking into consideration that in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that “the gift of the Holy Spirit, which forms temperance, prudence, justice and courage in a mind that is subject to it, fortifies that same mind against particular temptations through the seven gifts,” have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well, whereas the gifts are ordered toward resisting temptations.

But this distinction does not seem adequate, either. For the virtues likewise resist the temptations that induce one toward sins contrary to those virtues, since everything naturally resists its own contrary. This is especially clear in the case of charity, of which Song of Songs 8:7 says, “Many waters could not extinguish charity.”

So others, taking into consideration that, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2-3, the gifts are spoken of in Sacred Scripture insofar as they existed in the Christ, have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well in general (*simpliciter*), but that the gifts are ordered toward conforming us to Christ—especially with respect to what He suffered, since it was in His passion that these gifts principally shined forth.

However, this distinction is likewise inadequate. For our Lord Himself leads us to conform to Him mainly through humility and meekness—this according to Matthew 11:29 (“Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart”)—and through charity—this according to John 15:12 (“Love one another as I have loved you”). And these virtues likewise shined forth especially in Christ’s passion.

Therefore, in order to distinguish the gifts from the virtues, we must follow the way of speaking found in Sacred Scripture, in which the gifts are made known to us not under the name ‘gifts’ but rather under the name ‘spirits’; for Isaiah 11:2-3 says, “Upon him will rest the spirit of wisdom and understanding,” and so on. These words clearly convey that the seven spirits are enumerated here insofar as they exist in us by divine inbreathing (*inspiratio*). But ‘inbreathing’ signifies a movement from the outside. For note that in man there are two moving principles: the one is interior, and this is reason, while the other is exterior, and this is God, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4). The Philosopher likewise asserts this in the chapter on good fortune.

Now it is clear that anything that is moved must be proportioned to its mover, and the perfection of a movable thing *qua* movable is the disposition by which it is disposed to being moved in the appropriate way by its mover. Therefore, the higher the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition by which the movable thing is proportioned to the mover. For instance, we see that a student must be more perfectly disposed in order to grasp a deeper doctrine from his teacher.

Now it is clear that the human virtues perfect a man insofar as the man is apt to be moved by reason in the things he does interiorly and exteriorly. Therefore, there must exist in a man higher perfections in accord with which he is disposed toward being moved by God. And these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because through them a man is disposed toward becoming promptly movable by God’s inspiration—this according to Isaiah 50:5 (“The Lord has opened my ears, and I do not resist Him; I have not turned back”). Likewise, in the chapter on good fortune, the Philosopher says that for those who are moved by divine instinct it does not help to take counsel

according to human reason; rather, they should follow their interior inclination, since they are being moved by a principle that is better than human reason. And some put it this way: The gifts perfect a man with respect to acts that are higher than the acts of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Gifts of the sort in question are sometimes counted as virtues according to the ordinary meaning of ‘virtue’. However, they contain something that goes beyond the ordinary notion of a virtue, because they are divine virtues that perfect a man insofar as he is moved by God. Hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher likewise posits, over and beyond ordinary virtue, a certain sort of heroic or divine virtue in accord with which some men are called divine.

Reply to objection 2: To the extent that vices are contrary to the good of reason, they are contrary to the virtues, whereas to the extent that they are contrary to divine instinct, they are contrary to the gifts. For the same thing is contrary to both God and reason, since the light of reason is derived from God.

Reply to objection 3: The definition in question applies to virtue according to the ordinary mode of virtue. Hence, if we want to restrict the definition to the virtues insofar as they are distinct from the gifts, then we will stipulate that the phrase “by which one lives rightly” must be understood to concern that rectitude of life which accords with the rule of reason.

In the same way, a gift, insofar as it is distinct from an infused virtue, can be said to be that which is given by God in relation to His own promptings (*motio*), so that it makes a man follow God’s promptings (*instinctus*) in the right way.

Reply to objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, whereas it is called a gift insofar as it operates by divine prompting (*ex instinctu divino*). And the same thing holds for the other examples.

Article 2

Are the gifts necessary for human salvation?

It seems that the gifts are not necessary for human salvation:

Objection 1: The gifts are ordered toward a certain sort of perfection over and beyond the common perfection of virtue. However, it is not necessary for a man’s salvation that he should pursue perfection of the sort that goes beyond the ordinary state of virtue, since perfection of this sort falls under a counsel rather than a precept. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

Objection 2: It suffices for a man’s salvation that he act well in relation to both divine matters and human matters. But it is through the theological virtues that a man acts well in relation to divine matters, whereas it is through the moral virtues that he acts well in relation to human matters. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

Objection 3: In *Moralia 2* Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit gives wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.” But an adequate remedy for removing all these defects can be had through the virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

But contrary to this: Among the gifts the greatest seems to be wisdom, whereas the least seems to be fear. Yet both of these are necessary for salvation; for Wisdom 7:28 says of wisdom that “God loves only those who live with wisdom,” whereas Ecclesiasticus 1:28 says of fear that “if anyone lacks fear, he cannot be justified.” Therefore, the other gifts are likewise means that are necessary for salvation.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts are certain human perfections by which a man is

disposed toward following God's prompting (*divinus instinctus*) in the right way. Hence, it follows that in those matters for which human reason is not sufficient and the prompting of the Holy Spirit is necessary, a gift is necessary.

Now there are two ways in which human reason is perfected by God: (a) by its *natural* perfection, i.e., in accord with the natural light of reason, and (b), as was explained above (q. 62, a. 1), by a certain *supernatural* perfection through the theological virtues. Even though this second sort of perfection is greater than the first, nonetheless, the first is had by a man in a more complete way than is the second. For the first sort of perfection is had by a man as a full possession, as it were, whereas the second is had as an incomplete possession, since we know and love God in an incomplete way.

Now it is clear that if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) completely, then it can operate in its own right (*per se*) in accord with that nature or form (though this is not to exclude the operation of God, who operates interiorly in every nature and will). By contrast, if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) incompletely, then it cannot operate in its own right without being moved by another. For instance, because the sun possesses light in a complete way (*est perfecte lucidus*), it can give light in its own right, whereas the moon, in which the nature of light exists incompletely, does not give light without itself being illuminated. Likewise, a physician who has complete knowledge of the art of medicine can work in his own right, whereas a student of his who has not yet been completely instructed cannot work in his own right without being instructed by the physician.

So, then, with respect to what falls under human reason, i.e., in relation to man's connatural end, a man can operate through the judgment of reason. (Still, if a man is aided by God through a special inspiration even in these matters, then this will be from God's superabundant goodness. Hence, according to the philosophers, not everyone who has the acquired moral virtues also has the heroic or divine virtues.)

On the other hand, with respect to man's ultimate and supernatural end, toward which reason moves one insofar as it is formed in an incomplete way by the theological virtues, the movement of reason is not itself sufficient without the prompting and movement of the Holy Spirit from above—this according to Romans 8:14, 17 ("Those who act by the Spirit of God are the children of God; and if children, then heirs"). And Psalm 142:10 says, "Your good spirit leads me to the right land," i.e., because no one can enter into the inheritance of that land of the blessed without being moved and led by the Holy Spirit. And so in order to reach this end, a man must have the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: The gifts exceed the ordinary perfection of the virtues not with respect to the genus of the acts, in the way that the counsels exceed the precepts, but rather with respect to the mode of acting, insofar as a man is being moved by a higher principle.

Reply to objection 2: For the reasons already explained, a man is not perfected by the theological and moral virtues in such a way that he does not always need to be moved by the higher prompting of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the case that all things, or all possible things, are known by human reason—this regardless of whether reason is taken as perfected by its natural perfection or as perfected by the theological virtues. Hence, reason cannot repel all dullness or other defects of this sort that are mentioned in the objection. However, by moving us, God, to whose knowledge and power all things are subject, keeps us safe from all foolishness and ignorance and dullness and hardness of heart and the rest. And this is why the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow His promptings in the right way, are said to be given in opposition to these defects.

Article 3

Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit habits?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits:

Objection 1: A habit is a quality that persists in a man; for as it says in the *Categories*, a habit is a quality that is difficult to change (*qualitas difficile mobilis*). But as Isaiah 11:2-3 says, it is proper to the Christ that the gifts of the Holy Spirit should rest upon Him. Again, John 1:33 says, “The one whom you see the Spirit descend upon and remain over, He is the one who baptizes.” In commenting on this passage in *Moralia 2*, Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit comes to dwell in all the faithful, but it is only in the Mediator that He persists always in a unique way.” Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1-2), the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man insofar as he acts from God’s Spirit. But to the extent that a man acts from God’s Spirit, he is in some way an instrument with respect to God’s Spirit. But it is absurd that an instrument should be perfected by a habit; instead, it is the principal agent that is so perfected. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

Objection 3: Just as the gifts of the Holy Spirit come through divine inbreathing, so too does the gift of prophecy. But prophecy is not a habit, since the spirit of prophecy is not always present in the prophets—as Gregory explains in Homily 1 on Ezechiel. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits, either.

But contrary to this: In speaking of the Holy Spirit in John 14:17, our Lord says to His disciples, “He will remain with you, and He will be within you.” Therefore, His gifts remain in men. Therefore, they are not only acts or instances of being acted upon, but also persistent habits.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are human perfections by which a man is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the right way. But it is clear from what has been explained above (q. 56, a. 4 and q. 58, a. 2) that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power insofar as it participates in some way in reason; more specifically, they affect the appetitive power to the extent that it is apt to be moved by reason’s command. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit bear to a man in regard to the Holy Spirit the same relation that the moral virtues bear to the appetitive power in regard to reason. Now the moral virtues are habits by which the appetitive powers are disposed to obey reason promptly. Hence, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are likewise habits by which a man is perfected with regard to promptly obeying the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory answers the objection in the same place by asserting that in the case of those gifts without which one cannot attain [eternal] life, the Holy Spirit remains in the elect at all times, whereas in the case of the other gifts He does not remain at all times. But as has been explained (a. 2), the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. Hence, as far as these gifts are concerned, the Holy Spirit remains at all times in those who are holy.

Reply to objection 2: This objection goes through in the case of an instrument whose role is not to act but only to be acted upon. But a man is not that sort of instrument; rather, he is acted upon by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he also acts, insofar he has free choice. Hence, he stands in need of a habit.

Reply to objection 3: Prophecy is included among the gifts that are for the manifestation of the Spirit, but it is not included among the gifts that are necessary for salvation. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 4

Are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated [in Isaiah 11:2-3]:

Objection 1: In this enumeration four of the gifts that are posited have to do with the intellectual virtues—viz., wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which has to do with prudence—but none is posited that has to do with art (*ars*), which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Similarly, the passage posits a gift having to do with justice, viz., piety, and a gift having to do with fortitude, viz., the gift of fortitude, but none of the gifts posited there has to do with temperance.

Objection 2: Piety is a part of justice. But in the case of fortitude what is posited is fortitude itself and not some part of fortitude. Therefore, justice itself should have been posited, and not piety.

Objection 3: The theological virtues order us toward God in the highest way. Therefore, since the gifts perfect a man insofar as he is moved toward God, it seems that some gifts pertaining to the theological virtues should have been posited.

Objection 4: Just as God is feared, so too He is loved, and one hopes in Him, and delights in Him. But love, hope, and delight are passions opposed to fear. Therefore, just as fear is posited as a gift, so too these other three should also be posited as gifts.

Objection 5: Joined to understanding is wisdom, which directs it, and joined to fortitude is counsel, which directs it, and joined to piety is knowledge, which directs it. Therefore, some directive gift should be added to fear.

Therefore, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated.

But contrary to this is the authority of Sacred Scripture, Isaiah 11:2-3.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts are habits that perfect a man so that he follows without delay the promptings of the Holy Spirit, in the same way that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey reason. But just as the appetitive powers are apt to be moved by reason's commands, so all the human powers are apt to be moved by the promptings of God as a higher power. And so just as there are virtues for all the human powers that can be principles of human actions, viz., reason and the appetitive powers, so too there are gifts for all those powers.

Now reason is speculative and practical, and in both speculative reason and practical reason there is (a) apprehension of truth, which pertains to discovery, and (b) judgment concerning truth. Thus, with respect to the apprehension of truth, speculative reason is perfected by *understanding*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *counsel*. And with respect to judging correctly, speculative reason is perfected by *wisdom*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *knowledge*.

On the other hand, in those matters that have to do with others, the appetitive power is perfected by *piety*, whereas in those matters that have to do with oneself, it is perfected by *fortitude* in the face of the fearful dangers and by *fear* in the face of a disordered desire for pleasant things—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“By the fear of the Lord all turn away from evil”) and Psalm 118:120 (“Pierce my flesh with your fear; for I fear your judgments”).

And so it is clear that these gifts extend to everything that the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend to.

Reply to objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man in those matters that pertain to living well; art is ordered not to this, but to exterior things that can be made. For as *Ethics* 6 says, art is right reason with respect to what can be made and not with respect to what can be done. On the other hand, one can claim that as far as the infusion of the gifts is concerned, art belongs to the Holy Spirit, who is the principal mover, but not to men, who are, as it were, the organs of the Holy Spirit for as long

as they are being moved by Him.

Now the gift of fear corresponds in some sense to temperance. For just as it pertains to the virtue of temperance, in accord with its proper nature, that one draws back from evil pleasures for the sake of the good of reason, so too it pertains to the gift of fear that one draws back from evil pleasures for the sake of the fear of God.

Reply to objection 2: The name ‘justice’ is imposed because of the rectitude of reason, and this is why the name ‘virtue’ is more appropriate than the name ‘gift’.

By contrast, the name ‘piety’ connotes the reverence that we have for our father and for our homeland. And as Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 10, since the father of all is God, the worship of God is likewise called ‘piety’. And so it is appropriate to give the name ‘piety’ to the gift by which one does good to everyone out of reverence for God.

Reply to objection 3: The human mind is moved by the Holy Spirit only if it is united to Him in some way—just as an instrument is moved by a craftsman only through contact or through some other sort of union. Now the first union a man has [with the Holy Spirit] is through faith, hope, and charity. Hence, the gifts presuppose these virtues as the roots, so to speak, of the gifts. Hence, all the gifts have to do with these three virtues insofar as they are certain derivatives of these virtues.

Reply to objection 4: Love, hope, and delight have a good as their object. Now the highest good is God, and so the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues by which the soul is joined to God.

By contrast, fear has an evil as its object, and so it does not convey union with God, but instead conveys a withdrawal from certain things out of reverence for God. And so ‘fear’ is the name not of a theological virtue but of a gift that draws one back from evil in a more eminent way than a moral virtue does.

Reply to objection 5: It is through wisdom that both man’s understanding and man’s affections are directed. And this is why two things are posited as corresponding to wisdom in its directive role—viz., the gift of understanding to direct the intellect and the gift of fear to direct the affections. For the notion of the fear of God is based principally on a consideration of God’s excellence, which is what wisdom considers.

Article 5

Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit connected?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not connected:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 12:8 the Apostle says, “To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge through the same Spirit.” But wisdom and knowledge are numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to different men and are not connected with one another in the same man.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Most of the faithful do not have knowledge, though they do have faith.” But some of the gifts—at least the gift of fear—come along with faith. Therefore, it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected within one and the same man.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Wisdom counts for little if one lacks understanding; and understanding is altogether useless if it does not stem from wisdom. Counsel is worthless in one who lacks the work of fortitude, and fortitude is wholly undermined unless it is supported by counsel. Knowledge amounts to nothing if it does not have the advantage of piety, and piety is useless if it lacks

the discretion of knowledge. Also, fear itself does not rise up to any good action if it does not have those virtues.” From this it seems that one gift can exist without another. Therefore, it is not the case that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected.

But contrary to this: In the same place Gregory prefaces his remarks by saying, “It seems worth noting that in this feast of Job's sons they feed one another.” But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are signified by the “sons of Job” of whom he is speaking. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected by the fact that they reinforce one another.

I respond: The truth concerning this question can easily be inferred from what has been said. For it was explained above (a. 3) that all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts in relation to the Holy Spirit as a mover in the same way that the appetitive powers are disposed by the moral virtues in relation to the rule of reason. But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through charity—this according to Romans 5:5 (“The love (*caritas*) of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”)—in the same way that our reason is perfected by prudence. Hence, just as the moral virtues are connected with one another in prudence, so too the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with one another in charity, so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, none of which can be had without charity.

Reply to objection 1: One way in which wisdom and knowledge can be thought of is as gratuitous graces (*gratiae gratis datae*), i.e., in the sense that someone abounds in the cognition of divine and human matters to such an extent that he can instruct the faithful and refute adversaries. This is the sense in which the Apostle is speaking of wisdom and knowledge in the cited passage, which is why he makes explicit mention of the “word” (*sermo*) of wisdom and knowledge.

In a second sense, wisdom and knowledge can be thought of as gifts of the Holy Spirit. And in this sense wisdom and knowledge are nothing other than perfections of the human mind in accord with which one is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the cognition of divine and human matters. And in this sense it is clear that these gifts exist in all who have charity.

Reply to objection 2: In this place Augustine is talking about knowledge in commenting on the passage from the Apostle that was just cited. Hence, he is talking about knowledge understood in the way already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the fact that he adds, “It is one thing to know what a man must believe in order to attain the blessed life, which is nothing if not eternal life. But it is another thing to know how this very thing might be imparted to the pious and defended against the impious—and this is what the Apostle seems to be calling by the name ‘knowledge’ (*scientia*) in the proper sense.”

Reply to objection 3: Just as, in keeping with what was said above (q. 65, a. 1), one way of proving the connectedness of the cardinal virtues is by appeal to the fact that one of them is perfected by another, so Gregory wants to prove the connectedness of the gifts in the same way, by appealing to the fact that one of them cannot be perfect without another. Hence, he prefaces his remarks by saying, “If the one virtue does not support the other, then each of them is wholly destitute.” Therefore, his meaning is not that one gift can exist without another, but rather that understanding would not be a gift if it existed without wisdom—just as temperance would not be a virtue if it existed without justice.

Article 6

Do the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in heaven?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not remain in heaven:

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “With the seven gifts the Holy Spirit instructs the mind against every temptation.” But there will be no temptations in heaven—this according to Isaiah 11:9 (“They shall not harm or kill on all my holy mountain”). Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit will not exist in heaven.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits. But a habit is useless when the corresponding act cannot exist, and the acts corresponding to some of the gifts cannot exist in heaven; for in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Understanding makes one penetrate what one hears, and counsel keeps one from being rash, and fortitude keeps one from fearing adverse circumstances, and piety fills the inner heart with acts of mercy.” But these acts do not belong to the state of heaven. Therefore, gifts of the sort in question will not exist in the state of glory.

Objection 3: Some of the gifts, e.g., wisdom and understanding, perfect a man in the contemplative life, while others, e.g., piety and fortitude, perfect him in the active life. But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 6, “The active life ceases with this present life.” Therefore, not all the gifts of the Holy Spirit will exist in the state of glory.

But contrary to this: In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, “The city of God, that heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the flow of any earthly river; rather, proceeding from the font of life, the Holy Spirit, with whom we are filled in the present brief interval, seems to flow more copiously in those celestial spirits, boiling over in full measure with the flow of the seven spiritual virtues.”

I respond: There are two ways in which we can talk about the gifts:

In the first way, we can speak of the *essence* of the gifts, and in this sense the gifts exist most perfectly in heaven, as is clear from the passage cited from Ambrose. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind with respect to following the movements of the Holy Spirit, and this will take place in a special way in heaven, when God will be “all things in all things,” as 1 Corinthians 15:28 puts it, and when a man will be totally subject to God.

In the second way, we can consider the *matter* with respect to which the gifts act. And in this sense, the gifts have an action in our present state with respect to certain matters that they will not have any action with respect to in the state of glory. In this sense, they will not remain in heaven—just as was explained above (q. 67, a. 1) concerning the cardinal virtues.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage Gregory is speaking of the gifts insofar as they belong to our present state, since in this state we are *protected* by the gifts from the temptations to evil things. By contrast, in the state of glory, when all evils cease, we will be *perfected* in the good by the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of each gift, Gregory is, as it were, pointing out something that passes away with the present state and something that remains even in the future state.

For instance, he says that “wisdom remakes the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things”—where, of these two items, the hope passes away whereas the certainty remains.

With respect to understanding, he says that “in the mind it penetrates what is heard, remaking the heart, and it illuminates its shadows”—where what is heard passes away, since, as Jeremiah 31:34 says, “A man will not teach his brother,” while the illumination of the mind will remain.

As for counsel, he says that it “prevents him from being rash,” which is necessary in our present state, and again, that it “fills the mind with reason,” which is necessary even in the future state.

Concerning fortitude he says that it “does not fear adversity,” which is necessary in the present state, and, again, that it “sets before us the food of trust,” which remains even in the future state.

In the case of knowledge he posits just one thing, viz., that it “conquers the barrenness of ignorance.” But he does add “in the womb of the mind,” and this can be understood figuratively as the fullness of knowledge (*repletio cognitionis*), which pertains even to the future state.

As for piety, he says that “it fills the bowels of his heart with the works of mercy.” If we consider the words, this pertains only to our present state. But the inner affection for one’s neighbors, signified by “the bowels,” pertains likewise to our future state, in which piety will exhibit not the works of mercy, but the affection of communal joyfulness (*affectus congratulationis*).

In the case of fear, he says that “it presses the mind not to be proud in present things”—which pertains to our present state—and that “it strengthens us with the food of hope for future things”—which likewise pertains to the present state as far as the hope is concerned, but can also pertain to the future state as regards the strengthening with respect to things hoped for here and obtained there.

Reply to objection 3: This arguments goe through with respect to the matter of the gifts. For the works of the active life will not be the matter of the gifts. Rather, they will have all their acts with respect to things pertaining to the contemplative life, i.e., the blessed life (*vita beata*).

Article 7

Is the relative dignity of the gifts preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11?

It seems that the relative dignity of the gifts (*dignitas donorum*) is not preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11:2-3:

Objection 1: The most important among the gifts seems to be the one that God especially requires of man. But what God especially requires of man is fear. For Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than that you fear the Lord your God?” And Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am the Lord, then where is the fear of me?” Therefore, it seems that fear, which is the last gift enumerated [in Isaiah 11], is not the least of the gifts but instead the most important.

Objection 2: Piety seems to be a universal good; for in 1 Timothy 4:8 the Apostle says, “Piety is useful for all things.” But a universal good is preferable to a particular good. Therefore, piety, which is enumerated in the penultimate position, seems to be the most important of all the gifts.

Objection 3: Knowledge perfects man’s judgment (*iudicium*), whereas counsel perfects his deliberation (*inquisitio*). But judgment is more important than deliberation. Therefore, knowledge is a more important gift than counsel, and yet it is enumerated after counsel.

Objection 4: Fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, whereas knowledge pertains to reason. But reason is more eminent than the appetitive power. Therefore, knowledge is more eminent than fortitude, and yet fortitude is the first gift enumerated.

Therefore, the dignity of the gifts is not preserved by the order in which they are enumerated.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit, of which Isaiah speaks, fits in with these levels and assertions [mentioned in Matthew 5], except for the ordering. For there [viz., in Isaiah] the enumeration begins from the more excellent ones, whereas here it begins from the lesser ones.”

I respond: There are two possible ways to preserve the ordering of the gifts: (a) absolutely speaking, viz., in relation to their proper acts insofar as they proceed from their principles, and (b) relatively speaking, viz., in relation to their matter.

Now absolutely speaking, the principle of comparison among the gifts is the same as that among the virtues. For as was explained above (a.4), the gifts perfect a man with respect to all the acts of the soul’s powers. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence (*praeferuntur*) over the moral virtues, and just as, among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative virtues take precedence over the active virtues (for wisdom, understanding, and knowledge take precedence over prudence and art, yet in such a way

that wisdom takes precedence over understanding and understanding takes precedence over knowledge, just as prudence and good judgment (*synesis*) take precedence over good deliberation (*eubulia*), so too, among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel take precedence over piety, fortitude, and fear, and among the latter piety takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over fear, just as justice takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over temperance.

By contrast, as far as the matter is concerned, fortitude and counsel are preferred to knowledge and piety, since fortitude and counsel have a place in difficult matters, whereas piety and even knowledge have a place in more commonplace matters.

So, then, the dignity of the gifts corresponds to the order of enumeration (a) in part absolutely speaking, insofar as wisdom and understanding take precedence over all of them, and (b) in part according to the ordering of the matter, insofar as counsel and fortitude take precedence over knowledge and piety.

Reply to objection 1: Fear is especially required as a sort of prerequisite for the perfection of the gifts because “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” and not because it has more dignity than the other gifts. For in the order of generation a man must first recede from evil—which is accomplished through fear, as Proverbs 16:6 and 15:27 say, before doing good, which is accomplished through the other gifts.

Reply to objection 2: In this passage from the Apostle piety is being compared not to all the gifts of God but only to “the bodily toil,” of which he says before this that “it is useful for moderation.”

Reply to objection 3: Even though knowledge takes precedence over counsel by reason of its judgment, still, counsel takes precedence by reason of its matter. For as *Ethics* 3 points out, counsel has a place only in difficult matters, whereas the judgment of knowledge has a place in all matters.

Reply to objection 4: Directive goods, which pertain to reason, are more dignified than executionary goods if they are considered in relation to the acts insofar as they proceed from their powers; for reason takes precedence over the appetitive power in the way that what regulates takes precedence over what is regulated.

On the other hand, counsel is joined to fortitude by reason of its matter in the way that what directs takes precedence over what executes and, again, in the way that knowledge takes precedence over piety—viz., because counsel and fortitude have a place in difficult matters, whereas knowledge and piety also have a place in commonplace matters. And so by reason of the matter, counsel, along with fortitude, is enumerated before knowledge and piety.

Article 8

Should the virtues take precedence over the gifts?

It seems that the virtues should take precedence over the gifts:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine, in talking about charity, says, “There is no divine gift more excellent than this one. It alone is what divides the children of the eternal kingdom and the children of perdition. Other gifts are also given through the Holy Spirit, but without charity they count for nothing.” But charity is a virtue. Therefore, virtue is more important (*potior*) than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: Things that are naturally prior seem to be more important. But the virtues are naturally prior to the gifts of the Holy Spirit; for in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “In the mind subject to it, the gift of the Holy Spirit forms, before anything else, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and in

this way He soon strengthens the same mind with His seven virtues [i.e., seven gifts], giving wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.” Therefore, the virtues are more important than the gifts.

Objection 3: As Augustine says, “No one can make bad use of the virtues.” But someone can use the gifts badly; for as Gregory says in *Moralia* 1, “We offer up the sacrifice of our prayer, lest wisdom should puff us up; lest understanding, as it runs with subtlety, should lead us astray; lest counsel, as it multiplies itself, should confound us; lest fortitude, as it gives confidence, should become rash; lest knowledge, when it knows and does not love, should inflate us; lest piety, in inclining itself outside the bounds of rectitude, should become distorted; lest fear, as it justly makes us more fearful, should plunge us into a pit of despair.” Therefore, the virtues have more dignity than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

But contrary to this: As is clear from passage cited above (a. 2), the gifts are given to aid the virtues against defects, and so it seems that the gifts bring to perfection what the virtues are unable to bring to perfection. Therefore, the gifts are more important than the virtues.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 1), the virtues are divided into three kinds: some of them are theological virtues, some are intellectual virtues, and some are moral virtues. The theological virtues are those by which the mind is joined to God, the intellectual virtues are those by which reason itself is perfected, and the moral virtues are those by which the appetitive powers are perfected so as to obey reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are those gifts by which all the powers of the soul are disposed toward being subject to divine promptings.

So, then, the relation of the gifts to the theological virtues, through which man is united to the Holy Spirit as prompter, seems to be the same as the relation of the moral virtues to the intellectual virtues, through which reason, which moves the moral virtues, is perfected. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence over the moral virtues and regulate them, so the theological virtues take precedence over the gifts of the Holy Spirit and regulate them. Hence, in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “The seven sons [i.e., the gifts] do not come to the perfection of the number *ten* unless everything they do is done in faith, hope, and charity.”

On the other hand, if we compare the gifts to the other intellectual or moral virtues, then the gifts take precedence over the virtues. For the gifts perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit as prompter, whereas the virtues perfect either reason itself or the other powers in relation to reason. But it is clear that a movable thing must be disposed by a greater perfection in relation to a higher mover. So in this sense the gifts are more important than the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue, and we agree that it is more important than the gifts.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing is prior to another.

In one way, it is prior in the order of perfection and dignity, in the way that the love of God is prior to the love of neighbor. And in this sense the gifts are prior to the intellectual and moral virtues, though posterior to the theological virtues.

In the second way, something is prior in the order of generation or disposition, in the way that the love of neighbor precedes the love of God as far as the acts are concerned. And in this sense the moral and intellectual virtues are prior to the gifts. For by the fact that a man has the right relation to his own reason, he is disposed toward having the right relation to God.

Reply to objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and other things of this sort are gifts of the Holy Spirit insofar as they are informed by charity, which “deals not perversely,” as 1 Corinthians 13:4 puts it. And so no one can make bad use of wisdom or understanding or the others insofar as they are gifts of the Holy Spirit. But one gift is aided by another in order that they not withdraw from the perfection of

charity. And this is what Gregory intends to assert.