

QUESTION 17

Acts Commanded by the Will

Next we have to consider acts that are commanded by the will (*de actibus imperatis a voluntate*). On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason? (2) Does commanding belong to brute animals? (3) What is the order between commanding and using? (4) Are act of commanding and the commanded act a single act or different acts? (5) Are acts of the will commanded? (6) Are acts of reason commanded? (7) Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded? (8) Are acts of the vegetative soul commanded? (9) Are acts of the body's exterior members commanded?

Article 1

Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason?

It seems that commanding (*imperare*) is an act of the will and not an act of reason:

Objection 1: To command to is to effect movement in something (*movere quoddam*); for Avicenna says that there are four sorts of movers, viz., “perfecting, disposing, commanding, and advising.” But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), it is the will's role to effect movement in all the other powers of the soul. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will.

Objection 2: Just as being commanded belongs to that which is subordinate (*subiectum*), so commanding seems to belong to that which is maximally free. But the root of freedom lies especially in the will. Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to the will.

Objection 3: A command (*imperium*) is immediately followed by an act. But an act of reason is not immediately followed by an act, since it is not the case that one who judges that something is to be done does it immediately. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will and not an act of reason.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa, along with the Philosopher, claims that “the appetite (*appetitivum*) obeys reason.” Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to reason.

I respond: Commanding is an act of reason, but one that presupposes an act of the will.

To see this clearly, notice that since acts of the will and acts of reason can be directed toward one another—for reason reasons about willing and the will wills to reason—it is possible for an act of the will to be preceded by an act of reason, and vice versa. And since the force of the prior act remains in the subsequent act, it is sometimes possible—as was explained above in the case of using (q. 16, a. 1) and choosing (q. 13, a. 1)—for an act to be an act of the will insofar as something of an act of reason remains virtually within it, and, conversely, it is possible for an act to be an act of reason insofar as something of an act of will remains virtually within it.

Now commanding is by its essence (*essentialiter*) an act of reason, since, by intimation or declaration (*intimando vel denuntiando*), the one who commands orders the one whom he commands to do something, and it is reason's role to order another in the manner of an intimation.

Now there are two possible ways in which reason intimates or declares something. In the first way, reason intimates or declares something *absolutely*, and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mode—as when someone says to another, “This is what you should do” (*hoc est tibi faciendum*). On the other hand, sometimes reason intimates something to someone *by moving him toward it*, and this sort of intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mode—as when someone says to another, “Do this!” (*fac hoc*).

Now as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), among the powers of the soul it is the will that is the first mover with respect to the exercise of an act. Therefore, since a secondary mover effects movement only in the power of the first mover (*secundum movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis*), it follows that the very fact that reason effects movement by its command accrues to reason from the will's power. Hence, it follows that commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will, in the power of

which reason effects movement by its command toward the exercise of an act.

Reply to objection 1: Commanding is not effecting movement in just any way at all; instead, it is effecting movement with a certain sort of intimation that declares something to another. This belongs to reason.

Reply to objection 2: The root of freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause. For it is because reason is able to have diverse conceptions of the good (*diversas conceptiones boni*) that the will is able to be directed toward diverse things. And so philosophers define free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) as reason's free judgment (*liberum de ratione iudicium*), in the sense that reason is a cause of freedom (*quasi ratio sit causa libertatis*).

Reply to objection 3: This argument reaches the conclusion that, as has been explained, commanding is not an act of reason absolutely speaking, but an act of reason along with a certain motion (*non sit actus rationis absolute sed cum quadam motione*).

Article 2

Does commanding belong to brute animals?

It seems that commanding belongs to brute animals:

Objection 1: According to Avicenna, "The power to command a movement is an appetitive power, as is the power to execute a movement in the muscles and nerves." But both of these powers are found in brute animals. Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

Objection 2: It is part of the concept of a servant that he receives commands (*quod ei imperetur*). But as *Politics* 1 says, the body is related to the soul as a servant is related to his master. Therefore, the body receives commands from the soul even in brute animals, which are composed of a body and a soul.

Objection 3: In giving a command a man effects an impulse toward acting (*facit impetum ad opus*). But as Damascene says, "An impulse toward acting is found in brute animals." Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason. But reason is not found in brute animals. Therefore, neither is commanding.

I respond: Commanding is nothing other than ordering someone to do something, along with a certain intimating motion. But ordering is an act proper to reason. Hence, it is impossible for commanding to exist in any way in brute animals, given that they do not have reason.

Reply to objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command an action in the sense that it moves reason-as-commanding (*inquantum movet rationem imperantem*). But this occurs only in men. In brute animals, by contrast, the appetitive power does not properly command (*non est proprie imperativa*), unless 'to command' is taken in a broad sense for 'to effect movement' (*nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo*).

Reply to objection 2: In brute animals the body does, to be sure, have the wherewithal to obey, but the soul does not have the wherewithal to command, since it does not have the wherewithal to order. And so there is no such thing as commanding and being commanded in brute animals (*non est ibi ratio imperantis and imperati*); rather, there is only effecting movement and being moved.

Reply to objection 3: The 'impulse toward acting' occurs in one way in brute animals and in another way in men. For men 'effect an impulse toward acting' through reason's ordering, and so in men the impulse toward acting has the character of a command. By contrast, in brute animals the 'impulse toward acting' is effected by an instinct of nature in the sense that as soon as something pleasing or unpleasing is apprehended, their appetite is naturally moved toward pursuing it or fleeing from it. Hence, they are ordered by another toward acting, and they do not order themselves toward an action. And so in

brute animals there is an impulse, but no command.

Article 3

Does using precede commanding?

It seems that using precedes commanding:

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will. But as was said above (q. 16, a. 1), using is an act of the will. Therefore, using precedes commanding.

Objection 2: An act of commanding is one of the means that are ordered toward the end (*imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur*). But an act of using is directed toward the means to the end (*eorum quae sunt ad finem est usus*). Therefore, it seems that using is prior to commanding.

Objection 3: Every act of a power that is moved by the will is called an act of using, since, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), the will uses the other powers. But as has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason insofar as it is moved by the will. Therefore, commanding is a certain sort of using. But what is general is prior to what is particular (*commune est prius proprio*). Therefore, using is prior to commanding.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “The impulse toward acting precedes using. But the impulse toward acting is effected by the command. Therefore, commanding precedes using.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 16, a. 4), insofar as an act of using the means to an end exists in reason, which is directing that act toward the end, that act of using precedes the act of choosing. Hence, *a fortiori*, it precedes the act of commanding.

However, insofar as an act of using the means to the end is in the executing power, it follows the act of commanding, since the user’s using is conjoined with the act of that which he is using. For instance, it is not the case that someone uses a staff before he in some way acts through the staff.

By contrast, an act of commanding is not simultaneous with the act of that which receives the command; instead, the act of commanding is naturally prior, and sometimes also temporally prior, to the command’s being obeyed. Hence, it is clear that commanding precedes using.

Reply to objection 1: Not every sort of act of the will precedes that act of reason which is commanding. Some acts of the will, e.g., choosing, precede commanding and some, e.g., using, follow it. For after deliberation’s determination, i.e., after reason’s judgment, the will chooses; and after the choosing, reason commands that through which what is chosen is to be done; and then, finally, someone’s will begins the act of using by executing reason’s command. Sometimes the relevant will is that of another, as when someone issues a command to someone else; and sometimes it is the will of the one who issues the command, as when someone issues a command to himself.

Reply to objection 2: Just as acts are prior to powers, so too objects are prior to acts. Now the object of an act of using is the means to the end. Therefore, from the premise that the act of commanding is itself a means to the end one should conclude that the act of commanding is prior to the act of using rather than that it is posterior to the act of using.

Reply to objection 3: Just as the act of the will when it uses reason to issue a command precedes the act of commanding, so too one can claim that this act of using on the part of the will is preceded by some act of commanding on the part of reason, since the acts of these powers always reflect back on one another.

Article 4

Is the commanded act the same act as the very act of commanding?

It seems that the commanded act is not the same act (*not sit unus actus*) as the very act of commanding:

Objection 1: The acts of diverse powers are themselves diverse. But the commanded act belongs to one power and the act of commanding belongs to another power, since the power that commands is different from the power that receives the command. Therefore, the commanded act is not the same as the act of commanding.

Objection 2: If any two things can be separated from one another, then they are diverse, since nothing is separated from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separated from the act of commanding, since sometimes the act of commanding comes first and is not followed by the commanded act. Therefore, the act of commanding is different from the commanded act.

Objection 3: If any two things are related as prior and posterior, then they are diverse from one another. But the act of commanding is naturally prior to the commanded act. Therefore, they are diverse from one another.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher says, “Where there is one thing because of another, there is only one thing.” But the commanded act exists only because of the act of commanding. Therefore, they are one.

I respond: Nothing prevents things from being many in a certain respect and one in a certain respect. To the contrary, as Dionysius says in the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus*, all the many things are one in a certain respect. However, there is a difference that must be attended to, viz., that some things are many absolutely speaking and one in a certain respect, whereas other things are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect.

Now ‘one’ (*unum*) is said in the same way that ‘being’ (*ens*) is. But a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is a substance, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is an accident, or even a being of reason. And so if the things in question are one in substance, then they are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect. For instance, a whole in the genus of substance, composed of its integral or essential parts, is one absolutely speaking, since the whole is a being and a substance *absolutely speaking*; the parts, on the other hand, are beings and substances *within the whole*. By contrast, things that are diverse in substance and one in accident are diverse *absolutely speaking*—in the way that many men are one people and many rocks are one pile, i.e., with a oneness of *composition* or of *order*. Similarly, many individuals that are one in genus or one in species are many *absolutely speaking* and one in a certain respect, since to be one in genus or one in species is to be one *in thought* (*unum secundum rationem*).

Now just as, in the case of a genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form, in the way that a man is composed of soul and body, and yet is *one natural being* even though it has *many parts*, so too, in the case of human acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power’s moving it; for the act of the first mover is related as a form to the act of its instrument. Hence, it is clear that the act of commanding and the commanded act are *one human act*, in the way that a given whole is *one*, but *many in its parts* (*sicut quoddam totum est unum sed est secundum partes multa*).

Reply to objection 1: If the powers in question were diverse powers not ordered to one another, then their acts would be diverse absolutely speaking. But when one of the powers moves the other, then their acts are in some sense one, since, as *Physics* 3 says, “The act of the mover is the same as the act of what is moved.”

Reply to objection 2: From the fact that the act of commanding and the commanded act can be

separated from one another, it follows that they are many in the parts (*multa partibus*). For a man's parts can be separated from one another and yet they are one as a whole (*unum toto*).

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents things that are many as parts and one as a whole from being such that the one is prior to the other. For instance, the soul is in some sense prior to the body, and the heart is prior to the other members of the body.

Article 5

Are acts of the will commanded?

It seems that acts of the will are not commanded:

Objection 1: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the mind will, and yet it does not do it." But to will is an act of the will. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

Objection 2: Being commanded is fitting for that which understands the command. But it is not the will's role to understand commands, since the will differs from the intellect and it is the intellect's role to understand. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

Objection 3: If some act of the will is commanded, then by parity of reasoning all of them are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, then there must be an infinite regress. For, as has been explained (a. 1), an act of the will precedes the act of reason when reason commands, and, once again, if this act of the will is commanded, then the relevant act of commanding is preceded by yet another act of the* will*, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to proceed *ad infinitum*. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

But contrary to this: Everything that is within our power is subject to our command. But acts of the will are maximally within our power, since all our acts are said to be within our power to the extent that they are voluntary. Therefore, acts of the will are commanded by us.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), an act of commanding (*imperium*) is nothing other than an act of reason ordering that something be done, along with a certain movement. But it is clear that reason is able to give an order concerning an act of the will. For just as it is possible to judge it to be good to will a certain thing, so too it is possible to give an order by commanding that the man will that thing. From this it is clear that acts of the will can be commanded.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, when the mind *perfectly* commands itself to will, then it is already willing, whereas the fact that it sometimes commands and does not will stems from the fact it does not perfectly command. Now an imperfect command stems from the fact that reason is moved in conflicting directions to command or not to command. Hence, it fluctuates between the two and does not have a perfect act of commanding.

Reply to objection 2: Just as, with the members of the body, each member operates for the whole body and not for itself alone—for instance, the eye sees for the whole body—so too with the powers of the soul. For the intellect engages in intellectual understanding not only for itself but for all the powers, and the will wills not only for itself but for all the powers. And so a man commands an act of willing for himself insofar as he understands and wills.

Reply to objection 3: Since commanding is an act of reason, an act that is commanded is one that is subject to reason. But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4), the first act of the will comes not from reason's ordering but from an instinct of nature or of a higher cause. And so it is not necessary to proceed *ad infinitum*.

Article 6

Are acts of reason commanded?

It seems that acts of reason cannot be commanded:

Objection 1: It seems absurd for something to command itself. But as has been explained (a. 1), it is reason that commands. Therefore, acts of reason cannot be commanded.

Objection 2: What is such-and-such by its essence is distinct from what is such-and-such by participation. But as *Ethics* 1 says, a power whose act is commanded by reason is itself reason by participation. Therefore, the power that is reason is by its essence such that its act cannot be commanded.

Objection 3: A commanded act is one that is within our power. But knowing and judging what is true, which is an act of reason, is not always within our power. Therefore, it is not the case that acts of reason can be commanded.

But contrary to this: What we do by free choice is such that it can be done at our command. But acts of reason are exercised through free choice; for as Damascene says, “It is by free choice that a man investigates and scrutinizes and judges and disposes.” Therefore, acts of reason can be commanded.

I respond: Since reason is self-reflective (*quia ratio super seipsam reflectitur*), it is able to order its own acts in the same way that it orders the acts of the other powers.

However, notice that there are two possible ways to think about an act of reason:

The first way is to think about the *exercise* of the act. And in this sense an act of reason can always be commanded—as, for instance, when someone is asked to pay attention and to use his reason.

The second way is to think about the *object* of the act, and on this score there are two sorts of acts of reason to be attended to:

The first sort of act is *apprehending the truth about something*. This sort of act is not within our power, since it occurs by either a natural or supernatural light. And so on this score, an act of reason is not within our power and cannot be commanded.

The second sort of act of reason is *assenting to what is apprehended*. Thus, if the things apprehended are such that, as in the case of first principles, the intellect naturally assents to them, then assent to or dissent from such things is not within our power but is instead part of the order of nature, and so, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. By contrast, there are other apprehended things that are not so intellectually compelling as to rule out the possibility of assenting or dissenting or at least of suspending assent and dissent for some reason (*non adeo convincunt intellectum quin possit assentire vel dissentire vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere propter aliquam causam*), and in such cases the assent or dissent is itself within our power and is subject to our command.

Reply to objection 1: Reason issues commands to itself in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 3), the will moves itself—viz., insofar as both powers reflect back on their own acts and on the basis of one act tend toward another.

Reply to objection 2: Because of the diversity of the objects that are subject to an act of reason, nothing prevents reason from participating in itself—in the way, for instance, that the cognition of the principles participates in the cognition of the conclusion.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 7

Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded?

It seems that acts of the sentient appetite are not commanded:

Objection 1: In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not,” and the Gloss explains that a man wills not to have sentient desire (*non concupiscere*) and yet has it. But sentient desire is an act of the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

Objection 2: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter obeys only God as far as its formal transmutation is concerned. But an act of the sentient appetite involves a certain formal transmutation of the body, viz., becoming hot or cold. Therefore, an act of the sentient appetite is not subject to human command.

Objection 3: The proper mover of the sentient appetite is something apprehended by the sensory power or by the imagination. But apprehending something by the sensory power or by the imagination is not always within our power. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “That which is obedient to reason is divided into two, the desirous and the irascible” (*desiderativum et irascitivum*)—and these belong to the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are subject to the command of reason.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 5), an act is subject to our command insofar as it is within our power. And so to understand how an act of the sentient appetite might be subject to reason’s command, we have to think about how it might be within our power.

Now note that the sentient appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which we call ‘the will’, in that the sentient appetite, but not the will, is a power of a corporeal organ. But every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on the soul’s power but also on the disposition of the corporeal organ, in the way that an act of seeing depends both on the visual power and also on the condition of the eyes (*ex qualitate oculi*), by which it is either aided or impeded. Hence, an act of the sentient appetite depends not only on the appetitive power but also on a bodily disposition.

Now that which depends on the appetitive power follows upon apprehension. But since the imagination’s apprehension is of the particular, it is regulated by reason’s apprehension, which is of the universal, in the way that an active particular power is regulated by an active universal power. And so, on the one hand, an act of the sentient appetite is subject to reason’s command. However, the condition and disposition of the body (*qualitas et dispositio corporis*) is not subject to reason’s command. And so this, on the other hand, prevents the movement of the sentient appetite from being *totally* subject to reason’s command.

It can also sometimes happen that the sentient appetite’s movement is suddenly aroused at an apprehension by the imagination or sensory power. And in such a case the movement is beyond reason’s command—even though it could have been stopped by reason if reason had foreseen it. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1 that reason presides over the irascible and concupiscible appetites not by “despotic rule” of the sort that a master has over his servant, but by “political or kingly rule” of the sort that a ruler has over free men who are not totally subject to his command.

Reply to objection 1: The fact that a man wills not to have a sentient desire for something and yet nonetheless desires that thing stems from a bodily disposition through which the sentient appetite is prevented from totally following reason’s command. That is why the Apostle adds in the same place (Romans 7:23), “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.” As has been explained, this likewise happens because of a sudden movement of sentient desire.

Reply to objection 2: The body’s condition (*qualitas corporis*) is related in two ways to an act of the sentient appetite: (a) insofar as it *precedes* the act, as when someone is in some sense disposed

because of his body to this or that passion, and (b) insofar as it *is subsequent to* the act, as when someone becomes heated up by anger.

Thus, a preceding condition is not subject to reason's command, since it stems either from nature or from a previous motion that cannot be put to rest immediately. By contrast, a subsequent condition follows reason's command, since it follows upon the local motion of the heart, which is moved in different ways by the different acts of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Since an apprehension by the sensory power requires an exterior sensible thing, it is not within our power to apprehend something by the sensory power unless that sensible thing is present; but its presence is not always within our power. For if its presence is within our power, then a man can use his sensory power when he wills to, unless there is some obstacle on the part of the relevant organ.

On the other hand, an apprehension by the imaginative power is subject to reason's command, depending on the imaginative power's strength or weakness. For the fact that a man cannot imagine what reason considers stems either (a) from the fact that the things in question are not imaginable, as in the case of incorporeal things, or (b) from a weakness in the imaginative power that derives from some indisposition on the part of the organ.

Article 8

Are acts of the vegetative soul subject to reason's command?

It seems that acts of the vegetative soul are subject to reason's command:

Objection 1: The sentient powers are more noble than the powers of the vegetative soul. But the sentient powers of the soul are subject to reason's command. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so are the powers of the vegetative soul.

Objection 2: A man is called "a miniature world" (*minor mundus*), since the soul in the body is like God in the world. But God is in the world in such a way that all the things that exist in the world obey His command. Therefore, all the things that exist in a man likewise obey reason, even the powers of the vegetative soul.

Objection 3: Praise and blame are possible only in the case of acts that are subject to reason's command. But praise and blame, as well as virtue and vice, are possible in acts of the nutritive and generative powers, as is clear from gluttony and lust and from their opposed virtues. Therefore, acts of these powers are subject to reason's command.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, "The nutritive and the generative are not subject to persuasion by reason."

I respond: Some acts proceed from natural appetite, whereas others proceed from animal appetite or intellectual appetite. For every agent in some way desires an end.

Now natural appetite does not follow upon any sort of apprehension in the way that animal appetite and intellectual appetite do. But reason commands in the manner of an apprehensive power. And those acts that proceed from either intellectual appetite or animal appetite can be commanded by reason, but not those acts that proceed from natural desire. The acts of the vegetative soul are of this latter sort, and this is why Gregory of Nyssa says that the nutritive and the generative are called 'natural'. Because of this, acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to reason's command.

Reply to objection 1: An act is more noble and more subject to reason to the extent that it is more immaterial. Hence, from the very fact that the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason, it is clear that they are very low-level powers (*apparet has vires infimas esse*).

Reply to objection 2: The likeness in question is likeness in a certain respect, viz., that the soul

moves the body in the way that God moves the world. But it is not a likeness that holds in all respects. For instance, it is not the case that the soul created the body *ex nihilo* in the way that God created the world; yet it is because of this that the world is totally subject to His command.

Reply to objection 3: Virtue and vice, and praise and blame, are not appropriate in the case of the very acts of the nutritive and generative powers that constitute digestion or the formation of the human body. Instead, they are appropriate in the case of acts of the sentient part of the soul that are ordered toward those acts of the generative and nutritive powers, viz., acts of desiring the pleasures of food and sexual intercourse, and acts of using those powers either in a way that they ought to be used or in a way that they ought not to be used.

Article 9

Do the members of the body obey reason in their acts?

It seems that the members of the body do not obey reason in their acts:

Objection 1: It is clear that the members of the body are more distant from reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul. But as has been explained (a. 8), the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither do the members of the body.

Objection 2: The heart is the principle of animal movement. But the heart's movement is not subject to reason's command; for Gregory of Nyssa says, "What pulses is not subject to reason's persuasion." Therefore, the movement of the members of the body is not subject to reason's command.

Objection 3: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and undesired, whereas sometimes it fails the one who desires it, and even though desire glows in the mind, the body remains frigid." Therefore, the movements of the members do not obey reason.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the hand be moved, and the hand has such readiness that one can scarcely distinguish the command from the obedience."

I respond: The members of the body are certain instruments (*organa*) of the powers of the soul. Hence, the members of the body are related to obeying reason in the same way that the powers of the soul are. Therefore, since the powers of the sentient soul are subject to reason's command whereas the natural powers are not, all the movements of the members of the body that are moved by the sentient powers are subject to reason's command, whereas the movements of the members that follow the natural powers are not subject to reason's command.

Reply to objection 1: The members do not move themselves but are instead moved through the powers of the soul, some of which are closer to reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul.

Reply to objection 2: In cases that involve the intellect and will, one first finds that which comes from nature (*id quod est secundum naturam*) and from which other things are derived—in the way that the cognition of conclusions is derived from the cognition of naturally known principles, and in the way that the choice of the means to an end is derived from the willing of a naturally desired end. So, too, in the case of corporeal movements, the principle comes from nature (*principium est secundum naturam*).

Now the principle of the body's movements lies in the movement of the heart. Hence, the heart's movement comes from nature and not from the will, since it follows as a *per se* accident upon life, which itself arises from the union of the soul and the body. (In the same way, the movement of heavy and lightweight things follows upon their substantial form, and this is why, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, they are said to be moved by what generates them.) And it is because of this that the heart's movement is called a 'vital' movement.

Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that just as the generative and the nutritive do not obey reason, so neither does the pulsating, i.e., the vital. Now ‘pulsating’ names the heart’s movement, which manifests itself through the pulsating veins.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the fact that the movement of the genital members does not obey reason stems from the punishment for sin—so that, namely, for its disobedience to God the soul suffers the penalty of disobedience in that specific member through which original sin is handed down to posterity.

But since, as will be explained below (q. 85, a. 1), because of the sin of the first parent nature was left to itself (*natura est sibi relicta*) once the supernatural gift that had been conferred on man by God was taken away, one has come up with a natural explanation (*consideranda est ratio naturalis*) for why the movements of these specific members do not obey reason.

Aristotle gives a reason for this in *De Causis Motus Animalium*, when he claims that the movements of the heart and of the genital members are involuntary because these members are co-moved by some sort of apprehension; more specifically, they are moved insofar as the intellect and imagination make representations of certain things that give rise to those passions of the soul that are followed by the movements of these members. On the other hand, these members are not moved by the command of reason or of the intellect, because the movement of these members requires a natural alteration involving heat and cold, and this sort of alteration is not subject to reason’s command.

Now this happens in a special way with these two members because each of them is, as it were, a sort of separate animal (*quasi quoddam animal separatum*) to the extent that it is a principle of life, given that a principle is a ‘virtual whole’ (*virtute totum*). For the heart is the principle of the sensory powers, and the genital member is such that the seminal power, which is virtually the whole animal, comes forth from it. And so they have their own proper movements by nature (*naturaliter*), because, as was just explained, the principles have to come from nature (*principia oportet esse naturalia*).