

QUESTION 10

How the Will is Moved

Next, we have to consider the way in which the will is moved. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the will moved naturally toward anything? (2) Is the will moved with necessity by its object? (3) Is the will moved with necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Is the will moved with necessity by its exterior mover, i.e., God?

Article 1

Is the will moved naturally toward anything?

It seems that the will is not moved naturally toward anything:

Objection 1: As is clear from *Physics* 2, natural agents are divided off against voluntary agents. Therefore, it is not the case that the will is moved naturally toward anything.

Objection 2: What is natural to a thing always exists in it, in the way that being hot exists in a fire. But there is no movement that always exists in the will. Therefore, there is no movement that is natural to the will.

Objection 3: A nature is determined to a single effect (*determinata ad unum*). But the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, the will does not will anything naturally.

But contrary to this: The will's movement follows upon an act of the intellect. But there are certain things that the intellect naturally understands. Therefore, there are likewise certain things that the will naturally wills.

I respond: As Boethius says in *De Duabus Naturis* and the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, 'nature' is said in many ways.

Sometimes it means an intrinsic principle in moveable things. And as is clear from *Physics* 2, nature in this sense is either matter or a material form.

In a second sense, a nature is any substance, or even any being. And in this sense what is said to be 'natural' to a thing is what belongs to it by reason of its substance (*secundum suam substantiam*); and this is what belongs to a thing *per se*. Now in the case of each thing, what does not exist in it *per se* is traced back to something that does exist in it *per se* as a principle. And so if we take 'nature' in this sense, then the principle of whatever belongs to a thing must always be natural.

This is manifestly clear in the case of the intellect. For the principles of intellectual cognition are naturally known.

Similarly, the principle of voluntary movements must likewise be something that is naturally willed. Now this is (a) the good in general (*bonum in commune*), which the will naturally tends toward in the way that every power likewise naturally tends toward its own object, and also (b) the ultimate end itself, which plays the role among desirable things that the first principles of demonstration play among intelligible things, and, in general, (c) all the things that are fitting by nature for the one who wills them (*omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundam suam naturam*). For by our will we desire not only what has to do with the power of willing, but also what has to do with each of our powers and with the whole man. Hence, a man naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also the other objects that belong to the other powers, e.g., the cognition of truth, which belongs to the intellect; and existing and living and other things of this sort, which relate to natural existence. All of these things are included under the will's object as certain particular goods.

Reply to objection 1: The will is divided off against nature in the way that one cause is divided off against another; for some things come to be naturally and some come to be voluntarily.

Now there is another mode of causing that is proper to the will, which is the master of its own act, and that goes beyond the mode that belongs to nature and that is determined to a single effect. But since the will is grounded in a certain nature (*fundatur in aliqua natura*), that nature's proper movement must

in some respect be shared by the will (*quantum ad aliquid participetur in voluntate*), in the sense that what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a posterior cause. For in each thing the *esse* itself, which is had through the nature, is prior to the act of willing, which is had through the will. And so it is that the will naturally wills something.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of natural things, what is natural in the sense of following just upon the *form* is always actual in the thing, in the way that being hot is natural to a fire. However, what is natural in the sense of following upon the *matter* is not always actual but sometimes exists only in potentiality. For a form is actuality, whereas matter is potentiality.

Now a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality. And so in the case of natural things, what pertains to a movement or follows upon a movement does not always exist in the thing; for instance, fire is not always moving upward, but moves upward [only] when it exists outside its proper place (*quando est extra locum suum*).

Similarly, the will, which is brought from potentiality to actuality when it wills something, does not have to be willing something at all times, but rather only when it exists in some determinate disposition.

However, God's will, which is pure actuality, is always actually willing.

Reply to objection 3: A nature always has a single corresponding effect, but it is an effect that is proportioned to the nature. For instance, something that is one in genus corresponds to the nature in its genus, and something that is one in species corresponds to the nature taken in its species, and some one individual corresponds to the nature as individuated.

Therefore, since the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, what corresponds to it naturally is something that is one and general, viz., *the good*—just as something that is one and general, viz., *the true* or *being* or 'what-ness' (*quid est*) corresponds to the intellect. But under the good in general (*sub bono communi*) there are many particular goods, and the will is not determined to any of them.

Article 2

Is the will moved with necessity by its object?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by its object:

Objection 1: As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the will's object is related to the will in the way that a mover is related to what it moves. But if a mover is a sufficient mover, then it moves the movable thing with necessity. Therefore, the will can be moved with necessity by its object.

Objection 2: Just as the will is an immaterial power, so too is the intellect, and, as has been explained (a. 1), both of these powers are ordered toward a universal object. But the intellect is moved with necessity by its object. Therefore, the will is likewise moved with necessity by its object.

Objection 3: Everything that someone wills is either an end or something ordered toward an end. But, it seems, one wills an end with necessity, since an end is like a principle among speculative things and we assent to principles with necessity. But an end is a reason for willing the means to that end, and so it seems that we likewise will the means to the end with necessity. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by its object.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, rational powers are open to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists "in reason." Therefore, the will is open to opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that it is moved with necessity to one of the opposites.

I respond: There are two ways in which the will is moved: (a) with respect to the *exercise* of its act, and (b) with respect to the *specification* of its act, which has to do with the *object*.

As regards the first way, the will is not moved with necessity by any object, since in the case of any object, one is able not to be thinking about any given object and, as a result, is likewise able not to be

actually willing it.

However, as regards the second sort of movement, the will is moved with necessity by some objects and not by others. For when a power is moved by its object, the aspect by which (*ratio per quam*) the object moves the power must be taken into account. For instance, what is visible moves the visual power under the aspect of an actually visible color. Hence, if a color is proposed to the visual power, it moves the visual power with necessity—unless the man averts his sight, which has to do with the *exercise* of the act. On the other hand, if what is proposed to the visual power were not actually colored in every respect, but only in some respects and not in others, then the visual power would not see such an object with necessity. For it would be possible to focus on a part of the object that was not actually colored and thus not see the object.

Now the good is the will's object in the same way that what is actually colored is the visual power's object. Hence, if an object that is good in every respect and from every perspective (*bonum universaliter et secundum omnem considerationem*) is proposed to the will, then the will tends toward it with necessity if it wills anything at all—for it will not be able to will the opposite. On the other hand, if an object that is not good in every respect is proposed to the will, then the will does not tend toward it with necessity. And since a lack of any good has the character of something not good (*habet rationem non boni*), only a good that is perfect and lacking in nothing, viz., beatitude, is a good of the sort that the will is not able not to will. Every other particular good, insofar as it is lacking in some good, is able to be thought of as not good, and in this respect it can be either rejected or accepted by the will, which is able to tend toward the same thing from different perspectives (*secundum diversas considerationes*).

Reply to objection 1: The only sufficient mover of a given power is an object that has the character of a mover in every respect (*totaliter habet rationem motivi*). But, as has been explained, if it is lacking in anything, then it will not effect movement with necessity.

Reply to objection 2: The intellect is moved with necessity by an object such that it is always true and true by necessity, but not by an object that is able to be true and able to be false, i.e., by a contingent object—as has likewise been explained for the case of the good.

Reply to objection 3: The ultimate end moves the will with necessity, since it is a complete good (*bonum perfectum*). The same holds for what is ordered to this end and such that the end cannot be had without it, e.g., existing and living and things of this sort. By contrast, the will does not will with necessity those other things without which the end can be had—just as someone who believes the principles does not believe with necessity those conclusions without which the principles can still be true.

Article 3

Is the will moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite:

Objection 1: In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”—which he says because of sentient desire (*propter concupiscentiam*), which is a passion. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by the passions.

Objection 2: As *De Anima* 3 says, “According as someone is, thus does the end seem to him.” But it is not within the will's power to immediately toss away a passion. Therefore, it is not within the will's power not to will what the passion inclines it toward.

Objection 3: A universal cause is applied to a particular effect only through the mediation of some particular cause; hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, even universal reason does not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular estimative judgment. But universal reason is related to a particular

estimative judgment in the same way that the will is related to the sentient appetite. Therefore, the will is never moved to will something particular except by the mediation of the sentient appetite. Therefore, if the sentient appetite is disposed toward something by a passion, then the will is not able to move in a contrary direction.

But contrary to this: Genesis 4:7 says, “Your lust shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it.” Therefore, it is not the case that man’s will is moved with necessity by the lower appetite.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 9, a. 2), a passion of the sentient appetite moves the will in that way in which the will is moved by an *object*, i.e., insofar as a man who is in some way disposed by the passion judges something to be fitting and good which he would not judge to be fitting and good if he were without the passion.

Now there are two ways in which this sort of effect on a man is had through a passion:

In one way, the man’s reason is *totally bound* in such a way that he does not have the use of reason, as happens in the case of those men who become furious or demented (*furiosi vel amentes fiunt*) because of vehement anger or sentient desire, in the same way that this might happen because of some other bodily disorder. For passions of this sort do not occur without bodily transmutations. And in such cases the argument is the same as in the case of brute animals, which follow the impetus of the passion with necessity. For in these animals there is no movement of reason and, as a result, no movement of the will, either.

However, sometimes reason is not totally absorbed by the passion, but instead the free judgment of reason remains in some respect. Therefore, to the extent that reason remains free and not subject to the passion, any remaining movement of the will does not tend with necessity toward what the passion inclines the man to.

So either (a) no movement on the part of the will remains in a man, but the passion alone dominates, or (b) if there is a movement of the will, it does not follow the passion with necessity.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the will is unable to prevent the movement of sentient desire from arising—this is what the Apostle is speaking of in Romans 7:15 when he says, “The evil which I will not, that I do,” i.e., that I desire—the will is still able not to will to have the desire or still able not to consent to the desire. And so it is not the case that it follows the movement of concupiscence with necessity.

Reply to objection 2: Even though there are two sorts of nature in man, viz., intellective and sentient, it is sometimes the case that a man whose whole soul is uniform in such a way that either (a) the sentient part is totally subject to reason, as happens in the case of virtuous men, or, conversely, (b) reason is totally absorbed by a passion, as happens in those who are demented (*in amentibus*).

At other times, however, even if reason is clouded by a passion, something in reason remains free; and, accordingly, one is able either to repel the passion altogether or, at least, to hold on to himself in such a way as not to follow the passion. For since, in this sort of condition, the man is disposed differently in the different parts of the soul, things seem one way to him in accord with reason and another way in accord with the passion.

Reply to objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good that is apprehended through reason, but also by the good that is apprehended through the sensory power. And so the will can be moved toward some particular good without any passion on the part of the sentient appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, through choice alone, as is especially clear in the case of those in whom reason resists the passions.

Article 4

Is the will moved with necessity by God?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by God:

Objection 1: Every agent that cannot be resisted effects movement with necessity. But since God is infinite in power, He cannot be resisted; hence, Romans 9:19 says, “Who resists His will?” Therefore, God moves the will with necessity.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), the will is moved with necessity toward what it naturally wills. But as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* 26, “It is natural to each thing that God operates in it.” Therefore, the will wills with necessity everything toward which it is moved by God.

Objection 3: The possible is such that if it is posited, then the impossible does not follow. But the impossible follows if it is posited that the will does not will what God moves it toward; for if this were so, then God’s action would be inefficacious. Therefore, it is not possible for the will not to will what God moves it toward. Therefore, it is necessary that it will it.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore, it is not the case that God moves man’s will with necessity.

I respond: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “It is the role of divine providence to preserve the nature of things and not to corrupt it.” Hence, all things effect movement in accord with their condition, with the result that through God’s motion effects follow with necessity from necessary causes and effects follow contingently from contingent causes. Therefore, since the will is an active principle that is not determined to a single effect but is instead open to many effects indifferently (*indifferenter se habens ad multa*), God moves it in such a way that (a) He does not determine it with necessity to a single effect and that (b) its movement remains contingent and not necessary—except in the case of those things toward which it is naturally moved.

Reply to objection 1: God’s will extends not only to something’s being done through the thing that He moves, but also to its being done in a manner that befits the thing’s nature. And so it would be more incongruous with God’s motion if the will were moved with necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely in the way that belongs to its nature.

Reply to objection 2: What is natural to each thing is what God does in it so that it might be natural to the thing; for something belongs to a thing in the way that God wills it to belong to that thing. However, it is not the case that He wills that whatever He does in things should be natural to them, e.g., that the dead should rise. Instead, He wills it to be natural to each thing that it be subject to the divine power.

Reply to objection 3: If God moves a will toward something, then it is not compossible with this assumption that the will not be moved toward that thing. But the will’s not being moved toward that thing is not impossible absolutely speaking. Hence, it does not follow that the will is moved by God with necessity.