

PROLOGUE TO PART 1-2

Since, as Damascene puts it, man is said to be made to the image of God insofar as ‘image’ signifies “what is intellectual and free in choosing and has power in its own right (*intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum*),” now that we have talked about the exemplar, viz., God (Part 1, Questions 1-43), and about the things that proceed from God’s power in accord with His will (Part 1, questions 44-119), it remains for us to consider His image, i.e., man, insofar as he himself is a principle of his own works in the sense of having free choice and power with respect to those works.

QUESTION 1

Man’s Ultimate End

Here we must consider first the ultimate end of human life (questions 1-5) and then the things through which man is able to arrive at that end or to deviate from it (questions 6-114); for it is on the basis of the end that one must ascertain the character of what is ordered to that end. And since the ultimate end of human life is beatitude, it is necessary first to consider the ultimate end in general (question 1) and then to consider beatitude (questions 2-5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does a man act for the sake of an end? (2) Is this peculiar to a rational nature? (3) Do a man’s actions take their species from the end? (4) Is there an ultimate end of human life? (5) Can one man have many ultimate ends? (6) Does a man order everything to his ultimate end? (7) Is the ultimate end the same for all men? (8) Do all other creatures share in that ultimate end?

Article 1

Does a man act for the sake of an end?

It seems that a man does not act for the sake of an end:

Objection 1: A cause is something that is naturally prior. But an end has the character of what is last (*rationem ultimi*), as the name ‘end’ itself suggests. Therefore, an end does not have the character of a cause. But what a man acts for the sake of is such that it is a cause of his action, since the preposition ‘for the sake of’ designates a relation to a cause. Therefore, a man does not act for the sake of an end.

Objection 2: That which is an ultimate end is not itself for the sake of an end. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, in some cases actions are the ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does all his actions (*omnia agit*) for the sake of an end.

Objection 3: It is when a man deliberates that he seems to be acting for the sake of an end. But there are many things a man does without deliberation; in fact, in some cases he does not think about them at all, as when he moves his hand or foot or strokes his beard while thinking intently about something else. Therefore, it is not the case a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

But contrary to this: Everything that is in a genus flows from the principle of that genus. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 2, the end is the principle in actions done by a man (*in operabilibus a homine*). Therefore, a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

I respond: Among the actions done by a man, the only ones that are properly called *human actions* (*actiones humanae*) are those that belong to a man insofar as he is a man. Now man differs from the non-rational animals in that he is the master of his own acts (*suorum actorum dominus*). Hence, the only actions that are properly called human actions are those that a man is the master of. But a man is the master of his acts through his reason and will; this is why free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is called a power (*facultas*) of the will and of reason. Therefore, the actions that are properly called human actions are those that proceed from a deliberate act of will (*ex voluntate deliberata*). By contrast, if there are

other actions that belong to a man, then they can be called the *acts of a man (hominis actiones)* but not properly human acts, since they do not belong to the man insofar as he is a man.

Now it is clear that all the actions that proceed from a given power are caused by it in accord with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Hence, all human actions must be for the sake of an end.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the end is the last thing to be executed (*sit postremus in executione*), it is the first thing to be intended by the agent (*primus in intentione agentis*).

Reply to objection 2: If any human action is itself an ultimate end, then it must be voluntary; otherwise, as has been explained, it would not be a human action.

Now there are two senses in which an action is said to be voluntary: first, because it is *commanded* by the will, e.g. to walk or to speak; second, because it is *elicited* by the will, e.g., the act of willing itself. It is impossible that an act elicited by the will should be an ultimate end. For the end is an object of an act of willing (*obiectum voluntatis*), in the same way that color is an object of an act of seeing. Hence, just as the first thing to be seen (*primum visibile*) cannot be the very act of seeing, since every act of seeing is an act of seeing some visible object, so too the first thing to be desired (*primum appetibile*), which is the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Hence, it follows that if any human action is an ultimate end, then that action must be *commanded* by the will. And so in the present context there is some action of the man's, at least the very act of willing, that is for the sake of an end. Therefore, whatever a man does, it is true to say that the man acts for the sake of an end, even when he does an action that is an ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: Actions of the sort in question are not properly human actions, since they do not proceed from the deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts. And so these actions have, as it were, a sort of imagined end (*finem imaginatum*), but not an end predetermined by reason.

Article 2

Is acting for the sake of an end peculiar to a rational nature?

It seems that acting for the sake of an end is peculiar to a rational nature (*proprium rationalis naturae*):

Objection 1: Man, who acts for the sake of an end, never acts for the sake of an end that is unknown. But there are many things that have no cognition of an end—either because they lack cognition altogether, as in the case of non-sentient creatures, or because they do not apprehend the concept of an end, as in the case of brute animals. Therefore, acting for the sake of an end seems peculiar to a rational nature.

Objection 2: To act for the sake of an end is to order one's action toward that end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore, it does not belong to things that lack reason.

Objection 3: The good and the end are the object of the will. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. Therefore, to act for the sake of an end belongs only to a rational nature.

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher proves that not only an intellect, but nature as well, acts for the sake of an end.

I respond: It must be the case that all agents act for the sake of an end. For if, among causes that are ordered to one another, the first is taken away, then the others must be taken away. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter attains a form only insofar as it is moved by an agent, since nothing brings itself from potentiality into actuality; but an agent effects movement only because of its tendency toward an end (*nisi ex intentione finis*). For if an agent were not

fixed on some effect, then it would not do *this* rather than *that*. Therefore, in order for it to produce a determinate effect, it must be fixed on something specific (*determinetur ad aliquid certum*) that has the character of an end. Now just as this specification, when it occurs in a rational nature through a *rational appetite* (*per rationalem appetitum*), is called a *willing* (*voluntas*), so when it occurs in other things through a *natural inclination* (*per inclinationem naturalem*), it is called a *natural appetite* (*appetitus naturalis*).

However, notice that there are two ways in which something tends toward an end in its action or movement: (a) insofar as it *moves itself* toward the end, as a man does, and (b) insofar as it *is moved by something else* toward its end, in the way that an arrow tends toward a determinate target (*ad determinatum finem*) because it is moved by the archer, who directs its action toward the target. Thus, things that have reason move themselves toward an end, since they have dominion over their own acts through free choice, which is a power of will and reason (*facultas voluntatis et rationis*). By contrast, things that lack reason tend toward their end through a natural inclination, as if moved by something else and not by themselves; for they have no cognition of the concept of an end and so cannot order anything toward an end, but are instead ordered toward an end only by something else. For, as was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), the totality of non-rational nature is related to God as an instrument is related to its principal agent.

And so (a) it is peculiar to a rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of impelling or leading itself toward that end, whereas (b) it is proper to a non-rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of being impelled or being led by something else—either toward an apprehended end, as in the case of brute animals, or toward a non-apprehended end, as in the case of those things that lack cognition altogether.

Reply to objection 1: When a man acts on his own (*per seipsum*) for the sake of an end, he has cognition of that end. However, when he is impelled or led by someone else—for instance, when he acts at someone else’s command, or when he is moved by something else that impels him—he need not have cognition of the end. And this is the way it is with non-rational creatures.

Reply to objection 2: To order something toward an end belongs to one who impels himself toward that end. But what belongs to a thing that is impelled by something else toward an end is *to be ordered* toward that end; this is the condition that can belong to a non-rational nature, as long as it is ordered by something that has reason.

Reply to objection 3: The will’s object is the good and the end *in general* (*finis et bonum in communi*). Hence, things that lack reason and understanding cannot have a will, since they cannot apprehend a universal; instead, what exists in them is either a natural appetite or a sentient appetite that is fixed upon some particular good.

However, it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause, in the way that the ruler of a city, who intends the common good, effects by his commands all the particular functions within the city. And so everything that lacks reason must be moved toward particular ends by a rational will that stretches out to the universal good (*se extendit in bonum universale*); and this is God’s will.

Article 3

Do human acts take their species from their end?

It seems that human acts do not take their species from their end:

Objection 1: The end is an extrinsic cause. But each thing has its species from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, human acts do not take their species from their end.

Objection 2: That which confers the species must be prior. But the end is posterior in being.

Therefore, human acts do not have their species from their end.

Objection 3: One and the same thing can exist only within a single species. But it is possible for numerically the same act to be ordered toward diverse ends. Therefore, the end does not confer the species on human acts.

But contrary to this: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum* Augustine says, “Our works are blameworthy or praiseworthy insofar as their ends are blameworthy or praiseworthy.”

I respond: Each thing receives its species in accord with its actuality and not its potentiality. Hence, things composed of form and matter are constituted in their species by their proper forms.

We have to think like this in the case of proper motions, too (*etiam in motibus propriis*). For given that a motion is in some sense divided into an instance of *acting* and an instance of *being acted upon* (*distinguitur per actionem et passionem*), both of these receive their species from an actuality (*ab actu*). The instance of *acting* receives its species from the actuality that is the *principle* of acting, while the instance of *being acted upon* receives its species from the actuality that is the *terminus* of the motion. Hence, the instance of *acting* involved in the giving of warmth (*actio calefactio*) is nothing other than a certain movement that proceeds *from* heat, whereas the instance of *being acted upon* involved in the giving of warmth (*calefactio passio*) is nothing other than a movement *toward* heat—where the definitions make clear the nature of the species.

Now human acts take their species from their end in both of these ways, i.e., regardless of whether they are thought of as instances of *acting* or as instances of *being acted upon*. For human acts can indeed be thought of in both of these ways, because a man both moves himself and is moved by himself. Moreover, it was explained above (a. 1) that acts are called human acts insofar as they proceed from a deliberate act of willing (*a voluntate deliberata*). Now the object of an act of willing is the good and the end, and so it is clear that the *principle* of human acts, insofar as they are human acts, is their end. Likewise, the *terminus* of human acts is their end. For what a human act terminates in is what the will intended as an end—just as, among natural agents, the form of what is generated matches (*est conformis*) the form of what generates it. And since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, “Morals are properly called human,” moral acts properly take their species from the end. For *moral acts* are the same as *human acts*.

Reply to objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, since it is related to the act as either its principle or its terminus, and it is of the very nature of an act that (a) it is *from* something insofar as it involves an instance of *acting* and that (b) it is *toward* something, insofar as it involves an instance of *being acted upon* (*quantum ad passionem*).

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), insofar as the end pertains to the act of willing, it is prior in intention. And it is in this way that it gives a human or moral act its species.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as numerically the same act proceeds from an agent at any one time, it is ordered only toward a single *proximate* end, from which it has its species, even though it can be ordered to a plurality of *remote* ends, one of which is the end of another.

However, it is possible for an act that is one as regards its natural species (*species naturae*) to be ordered to diverse ends of the will. For instance, *killing a man*, which has a single *natural* species, can be ordered toward conserving justice as an end or toward satisfying anger as an end. Accordingly, the acts will be diverse as far as regards their *moral* species, since in the one case there will be an act of virtue and in the other an act of vice. For a movement takes its species only from what is a *per se* terminus (*terminus per se*) and not from what is an incidental terminus (*terminus per accidens*). But moral ends are incidental to a natural entity and, conversely, the natural character of an end is incidental to a moral entity. And so nothing prevents acts that are the same as regards their natural species from being diverse as regards their moral species, and vice versa.

Article 4

Is there some ultimate end of a human life, or is there an infinite procession of ends?

It seems that there is no ultimate end of a human life, but instead an infinite procession of ends:

Objection 1: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is by its nature diffusive of itself. Therefore, if what proceeds from the good is itself likewise good, then that good must issue in another good, and so the procession of the good goes on to infinity. But the good has the character of an end. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among ends.

Objection 2: What belongs to reason can be multiplied to infinity; this is why mathematical quantities can be increased to infinity. There are likewise infinitely many species of number, because given any number, reason can think of another greater number. But the desire for an end follows reason's apprehension. Therefore, it seems that one may likewise proceed to infinity in the case of ends.

Objection 3: The good and the end are the object of the will. But the will can reflect upon itself infinitely many times; for I can will something, and will that I will that thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among the ends of a human will, and there is no ultimate end of a human will.

But contrary to this: In *Metaphysics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Those who maintain an infinity undermine the nature of the good." But the good is what has the nature of an end. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of an end that there should be an infinite procession. Therefore, one must posit some one ultimate end.

I respond: Speaking *per se*, in the case of ends it is impossible to proceed to infinity from any perspective at all. For in all things that have a *per se* ordering with respect to one another, if the first is removed, then anything that is ordered to the first must be removed. Hence, in *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of moving causes, since otherwise there would not be a first mover, where a first mover is such that if it is removed, then the others cannot effect motion, since they effect motion only by being moved by the first mover.

Now there is a twofold ordering among ends, viz., the order of *intending* (*ordo intentionis*) and the order of *executing* (*ordo executionis*), and in each of these orderings something must be first. What is first in the order of intending is, as it were, the principle that *moves the appetite*, and so if this principle were removed, then the appetite would not be moved by anything. On the other hand, what is first in the order of executing is that with which the *operation* begins, and so if this principle were removed, then no one would begin to do anything.

Now the principle with respect to intending is the ultimate end, whereas the principle with respect to executing is the first of the means that are ordered toward that end (*primum eorum quae sunt ad finem*). So it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either case. For if there were no ultimate end, then nothing would be desired, no action would be terminated, and no intention of the agent's would be put to rest; and if nothing were first among the means ordered to an end, then no one would begin to do anything, and deliberation would proceed to infinity and never come to an end.

By contrast, there is nothing to prevent an infinity among things that do not have a *per se* ordering but are instead joined to one another incidentally (*coniunguntur per accidens*). For *per accidens* causes are indeterminate. And so in this way there can likewise be an infinity incidentally among ends and among means to an end (*infinitatem per accidens in finibus et in his quae sunt ad finem*).

Reply to objection 1: It is part of the nature of the good that something should flow from it, but not that it itself should proceed from something else. And so since the good has the nature of an end, and since the First Good is the ultimate end, the argument does not prove that there is no ultimate end, but instead proves that from a presupposed First End one may descend (*procedatur inferius*) to an infinity with respect to the means to that end.

And, indeed, this would hold if we were thinking just about the First Good's power, which is infinite. However, since the First Good has a diffusion that follows a plan (*habet diffusionem secundum intellectum*) according to which the good flows forth in a determinate way (*secundum aliquam certam formam*) into the things it causes, the outflow of goods from the First Good has a fixed mode in accord with which all the other goods participate in the diffusive power. And so the diffusion of goods does not proceed to infinity, but instead, as Wisdom 11:21 puts it, God disposed all things "in number, weight, and measure."

Reply to objection 2: Among those things that are *per se*, reason begins with naturally known principles and proceeds to some conclusion (*ad aliquem terminum*). Hence, in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher proves that there is no infinite regress among demonstrations by appeal to the fact that among demonstrations there is an ordering of things that are connected to one another *per se* and not *per accidens*.

However, among things that are connected *per accidens*, nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity. For it is possible to add a quantity (or a unit) to some preexistent quantity (or number) as such. Hence, in cases of this sort nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity.

Reply to objection 3: The multiplication of acts of the will as it reflects upon itself is related *per accidens* to the ordering of the ends. This is clear from the fact that it is with respect to one and the same end that the will reflects upon itself one or more times indifferently.

Article 5

Can one man's will be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends?

It seems that one man's will can be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that some have proposed four things as man's ultimate end, viz., "pleasure (*voluptas*), repose (*quies*), primary natural blessings (*prima naturae*), and virtue (*virtus*)." But these four are manifestly more than a single thing. Therefore, one man can set up the ultimate end of his will in many things.

Objection 2: Things that are not opposed to one another do not exclude one another. But there are many things in the world (*multa in rebus*) that are not opposed to one another. Therefore, if one thing is posited as the ultimate end, then other things are not thereby excluded.

Objection 3: The will does not lose its power of freedom when it sets up something as its ultimate end. But before it set up one thing, e.g., pleasure, as its ultimate end, it was able to set up other thing, e.g., riches, as its ultimate end. Therefore, even after someone has set up pleasure as an ultimate end of his will, he can simultaneously set up wealth as an ultimate end. Therefore, it is possible for a man's will to be simultaneously directed to diverse things as ultimate ends.

But contrary to this: A man's affections are dominated (*dominatur*) by what he reposes in as an ultimate end; for it is from this end that he derives the rules for his whole life. Hence, Philippians 3:19 says of the gluttonous, "Their god is their belly," viz., because they set up the delights of their belly as their ultimate end. But as Matthew 6:24 says, "No one can serve two masters (*duobus dominis*)," i.e., two masters that are not ordered to one another. Therefore, it is impossible for one man to have many ultimate ends that are not ordered to one another.

I respond: One man's will cannot be simultaneously related to diverse things as ultimate ends. There are three possible ways to argue for this:

First, since each thing seeks (*appetat*) its own perfection, what someone desires as an ultimate end is what he wills as his own perfect and complete good. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "We now call it the end of goodness, not because it is consumed so as not to exist, but because it is

perfected so as to exist to the full.” Therefore, the ultimate end must fulfill all of a man’s desire in such a way that there is nothing outside of it that is left to be desired. But this cannot be the case if something extraneous to its fulfillment is required. Hence, it cannot be the case that there are two things an appetite tends toward in this way, i.e., as if each of them were its perfect good.

The second argument is that just as the principle in the process of reasoning is what there is a natural cognition of, so too the principle in the process of rational desiring, i.e., of willing, has to be what there is a natural desire for. But this must be a single thing, since nature tends only toward a single thing. Now the principle in the process of rational desiring is the ultimate end. Hence, what the will tends toward as an ultimate end (*sub ratione ultimi finis*) must be a single thing.

The third argument is that since, as was established above (a. 3), voluntary actions take their species from their end, they must take their genus from their ultimate end, which is common [to all of them]—just as natural entities are placed in a genus according to a formal general notion. Therefore, since everything desirable by the will belongs as such to a single genus, the ultimate end must be a single thing. This is so especially in light of the fact that in every genus there is some one first principle and, as has been explained, the ultimate end has the nature of a first principle. Now the ultimate end of *this* man is related to *this* man in the same way that the ultimate end absolutely speaking is related to the whole human race. Hence, this man’s will must be fixed upon a single ultimate end in the same way that there is by nature a single ultimate end that belongs to all men.

Reply to objection 1: The authors who posited the goods in question as the ultimate end took them all as the single complete good that is composed of them.

Reply to objection 2: Even if one proposed many things that do not oppose one another, it would still be opposed to the perfect good that something of the entity’s perfection should lie outside it.

Reply to objection 3: The will’s power is not such that it can make opposites exist simultaneously. But, as is clear from what has been said, this would happen if the will tended toward many disparate things as ultimate ends.

Article 6

Is everything a man wills such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end?

It seems that it is not the case that everything a man wills is such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end:

Objection 1: The means that are ordered toward the ultimate end are said to be ‘very serious’ (*seriosa*) in the sense that they are advantageous (*utilia*). But what is in jest (*iocosa*) is opposed to what is serious. Therefore, the things a man does in jest are such that he does not order them toward his ultimate end.

Objection 2: At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* the Philosopher says that the speculative sciences are pursued for their own sake. And yet one cannot claim that each of them is an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of an ultimate end.

Objection 3: If someone orders something toward an end, then he is thinking about that end. But it is not the case that a man is always thinking about his ultimate end in everything that he desires or does. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires or does is such that he desires it or does it for the sake of his ultimate end.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “The end of our good is such that other things are loved for its sake, whereas it itself is loved for its own sake.”

I respond: It is necessary that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of his ultimate end. This is clear from two arguments:

First, everything that a man desires is such that he desires it under the concept of the good. What is not desired as a perfect good must be desired as tending toward a perfect good, i.e., an ultimate end, since the beginning of something is always ordered toward its consummation. This is clear both in what is done by nature and in what is done by art. And so every beginning of perfection is ordered toward consummated perfection, which occurs through the ultimate end.

Second, when it moves an appetite, the ultimate end functions in the way that a first mover functions in other motions. But it is clear that secondary moving causes effect motion only insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Hence, secondary desirable things move an appetite only insofar as they are ordered toward the first desirable thing (*non nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile*), i.e., the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 1: Diversions (*actiones ludicrae*) are not ordered toward any extrinsic end, and yet, insofar as they are pleasant or restful (*delectantes vel requiem praestantes*), they are ordered toward the good of the man himself who engages in them (*bonum ipsius ludentis*). But a man's consummate good is his ultimate end.

Reply to objection 2: The same reply holds for the second objection, concerning speculative science. Speculative science is desired as a certain good of the man who pursues it (*bonum quoddam speculantis*); and it is included under that complete and perfect good which is the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: One need not always be thinking about the ultimate end whenever he desires something or does something. Instead, the force (*virtus*) of the first intention, which has to do with the ultimate end, remains in any desire for anything whatsoever, even if the ultimate end is not being thought about. In the same way, one who is travelling along a path need not be thinking about his destination (*de fine*) with every step.

Article 7

Is there a single ultimate end for all men?

It seems not to be the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men (*omnium hominum Uns finis ultimus*):

Objection 1: Man's ultimate end seems especially to be an immutable good (*incommutabile bonum*). But some men turn themselves away from the immutable good by sinning. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

Objection 2: A man's whole life is regulated by his ultimate end. Therefore, if there were a single ultimate end for all men, then it would follow that there are not diverse ways of living (*diversa studia vivendi*) among men. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: The end is the terminus of an action, and actions have to do with singular things. But even if men share in the nature of their species, they nonetheless differ in those things that pertain to the individuals. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says that all men agree in desiring the ultimate end, which is beatitude (*beatitudo*).

I respond: There are two ways in which we can talk about an ultimate end: (a) with respect to the concept of an ultimate end (*secundum rationem ultimi finis*) and (b) with respect to the thing which the concept of an ultimate end is found in (*id in quo finis ultimi ratio invenitur*).

Thus, as regards the concept of the ultimate end, everyone agrees in desiring an ultimate end, since everyone desires that his own perfection be fulfilled—and this, as has been explained (a. 5), is the concept of an ultimate end.

But as regards that which the ultimate end is found in, it is not the case that all men agree in their ultimate end. For some desire riches as their consummate good, some desire pleasure, and some desire

something else. In the same way, what is sweet is pleasurable to every sense of taste, but to some it is the sweetness of wine that is especially pleasurable, whereas to others it is the sweetness of honey or of some other such thing. Yet the sweet thing that is most pleasurable absolutely speaking must be that which someone with the best taste takes the most pleasure in. And, similarly, the good that is the most complete must be that which someone with well-disposed affections desires as his ultimate end.

Reply to objection 1: Those who sin turn themselves away from the thing which the concept of the ultimate end is truly realized in. However, they do not turn themselves away from intending their ultimate end, which they mistakenly seek in other things.

Reply to objection 2: Diverse ways of life are possible among men because of the diverse things in which the concept of the highest good is sought.

Reply to objection 3: Even if actions have to do with singulars, the first principle of acting within singular things is the nature, which, as has been explained (a. 5), tends toward a single thing.

Article 8

Do all other things share in man's ultimate end?

It seems that all other things share in man's ultimate end:

Objection 1: The end corresponds to the beginning (*finis respondet principio*). But that which is the principle of men, viz., God, is also the principle of all other things. Therefore, all things share in man's ultimate end.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward Himself as their ultimate end." But He is also man's ultimate end, since, as Augustine puts it, He alone is to be enjoyed (*solo ipso fruendum est*). Therefore, other things share in man's ultimate end.

Objection 3: Man's ultimate end is the object of his will. But the object of the will is the universal good (*bonum universale*), which is the end of all things. Therefore, other things must share in man's ultimate end.

But contrary to this: Man's ultimate end is beatitude (*beatitudo*), which, as Augustine says, everyone desires. But as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, "It does not befit animals that lack reason to be blessed (*beata*)."

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2 and *Metaphysics* 5, there are two senses of 'end' (*finis*), viz., (a) *finis cuius* and (b) *finis quo*—i.e., (a) *the thing itself (ipsa res)* in which the concept of the good is found and (b) *attaining (adeptio) or possessing (usus)* that thing. For instance, we say that the end of a heavy body's motion is either (a) a lower place (the thing) or (b) being in a lower place (possessing the thing); and we say that a greedy man's end is either (a) money (the thing) or (b) having money (possessing the thing).

Therefore, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *the thing itself* which is the end, then in this sense all other things share in man's ultimate end, since God is the ultimate end of man and of all other things.

By contrast, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *attaining* the end, then in this sense non-rational creatures do not share in man's end. For man and other rational creatures attain the ultimate end by knowing and loving God—something that does not belong to other creatures, which attain their ultimate end by participating in a certain similarity to God insofar as they exist, or insofar as they are alive, or even insofar as they have [sentient] cognition.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections is obvious from what has been said.