

DUE: Wednesday, March 9

1. Consider a simple economy with one consumer whose “net” utility is $U(q) - D(a)$, where $U(q) = \mu q^{1/2}$ is utility from q units of a good, and $D(a) = \alpha a^3$ is damage from the amount a of effluent resulting from production of the good ($\mu > 0$ and $\alpha > 0$ are constants). The cost of production is $C(q, a) = \beta q^2 + \gamma(a^2 - 4a + 4)$, where ($\beta > 0$ and $\gamma > 0$ are constants).

- a. Determine the market equilibrium values of q and a .
- b. Determine the socially optimal values of q and a .
- c. Compare these and interpret the differences.
- d. Design a policy to achieve the social optimum.

2. Consider another simple economy with one consumer who maximizes net utility from driving. The benefit from driving is μs , where s is the size of the car, and $\mu > 0$ is a constant. The cost to the driver is βs^2 , and the damages to the road are γs^3 ($\beta > 0$ and $\gamma > 0$ are constants).

- a. What size of car is chosen by this driver?
- b. What is the socially optimal car size?
- c. Compare these and interpret the differences.
- d. Design a toll system that induces the driver to choose the socially optimal car size.

3. Now consider a market with two firms, 1 and 2, who produce electricity. The pollution abatement cost functions for these firms are αe_1^2 and αe_2^3 , where e_i is the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions by firm i and $\alpha > 0$ is a constant. The benefits from the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions are given by $B(e_1 + e_2) = \beta(e_1 + e_2)$, where $\beta > 0$ is a constant.

- a. What level of emissions does each firm choose?
- b. Determine the socially optimal levels of emissions.
- c. Design a policy to achieve the social optimum level of emissions.