Japan became a rising world power with its victory in the 1905
Russo-Japanese War, but the country felt increasingly at a disadvantage
economically and politically as European powers and the United
States raced into China and other parts of Asia to establish colonies
and trade relationships. Japanese society turned more and more
militaristic and nationalistic, culminating in an invasion of
Manchuria in 1931 and brutal incursions into other parts of China
in 1937.
Franklin Roosevelt's administration responded in 1940 by placing
a scrap metal embargo against Japan followed by a supposed limited
oil embargo a year later. Strong evidence suggests that Assistant
Secretary of State Dean Acheson single-handedly implemented a
de facto total oil embargo while President Roosevelt was out of
the country. And by the time Roosevelt found out, it was too late
to reverse the action without losing credibility.
Japan could have escaped the embargoes simply by pulling out
of China. But the country's military leaders viewed acquiescence
as dishonorable and believed it would weaken the credibility of
the Empire and cause domestic political upheaval. A potential
replacement source of oil could have been had through conquest
of the Dutch East Indies, but the Japanese calculated that aggression
against the East Indies would spark war with the United States.
Japan knew it couldn't possibly conquer the United States, but
its leaders gambled that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would
leave Roosevelt in a weakened negotiating position on the embargoes.
The thinking was that a demoralized and isolationist American
public would prefer negotiation to prolonged war.
They were wrong.
Sources: Daniel Lindley, assistant professor,
political science,
Adam Shanko '04 and Jennifer Wiemer '03
* * *
March 2003
