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Current events in Latin America

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No one saw it coming. It may be the most significant political phenomenon of the 20th  century, but in the mid-1970s when democracies began popping up like dandelions in a spring lawn, the experts all were caught off guard. From east to west, one authoritarian regime after another toppled during a 15-year period from 1975 to 1990. The wave began in Spain, Portugal and Greece, then spread to Latin America, Asia and the former Communist nations of eastern Europe. For a few breathtaking moments in 1989 it even looked as if the movement might take root in Red China, as students erected a plaster statue of the Goddess Democracy in Beijing’s Tiannamen Square. Then, of course, the tanks rumbled. But by that time — even if China wasn’t among them — the number of democracies worldwide had doubled to 60, the greatest number ever.

The current surge in democracy is actually the third wave of the modern era. The first began in 1820, lasted about 80 years and produced 29 democracies. The second followed World War II and peaked in 1962, bringing the total to 36 democracies. The most recent stunning shift has given political scientists enough to chew on for a generation, arguing the whys, wherefores and what-nexts. The whys, of course, are key because they offer clues to the what-nexts, and that is what really intrigues. Why do countries make the jump to democracy and what do they need to keep from jumping back? Will the fledgling democracies stabilize, or are there jackboots waiting in the wings? Some common themes tell the tale.

Nowhere has this latest democratic surge played out more dramatically than in Latin America. In 1978 it was laughable to suggest that democracy one day would be South and Central America’s dominant form of government. Authoritarian regimes were firmly entrenched in 16 of the area’s 19 countries and it didn’t look like they were going anywhere any time soon.

Only three democracies resided on the continent: Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. Then, without warning, everything changed. First, the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic fell in1978, then the military dictatorship in Ecuador collapsed, then a democratic regime came to power in Peru. The sweep in Latin America has been so clean that by 1994 the only authoritarian regimes left were in Cuba and Haiti.

So why did so many countries make the jump? The man on the street says "it’s the economy, stupid" — and there may be some truth in that. Political scientists, in fact, have found a high correlation worldwide between per capita income and democracy, with wealthier countries more likely to be democratic. If nothing else, economic growth appears to set the stage for the democratic shift. In the period from 1950 to 1979, per capita income tripled in Brazil, doubled in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, and increased by at least 50 percent in all but a few countries on the continent.

Economic growth created alternate power brokers to the wealthy land owners who traditionally have been less than enthusiastic about majority rule, says Scott Mainwaring, director of Notre Dame’s Kellogg Institute for International Relations. The rising economy expanded the middle class, which generally favors democracy, and it increased the influence of organized labor which also traditionally has supported democracy.

In part because of economic considerations, however, many observers gave Latin American democracy just two chances to survive: the proverbial slim and none — and, as they say, slim just walked out the door. Even though most Latin economies rose, virtually all continue to have enormous gulfs between rich and poor and have weak democratic traditions — conditions that do not bode well for free and fair elections.

But the experts have been astounded and confounded by recent history. Apparently a robust economy isn’t the sole — or perhaps even the most important — determinant of democracy. In the 1980s the international debt crisis wreaked havoc on Latin America. At the same time, most countries shifted from government-led protectionist economic development policies to free trade, global market-oriented policies. The one-two punch was so devastating that essentially there was no gain in per capita income on the continent from 1980 to 1995. Yet somehow the new democracies survived.

"Bolivia’s democratic stability of the post-1982 period epitomizes the surprises," says Mainwaring. "Prior to 1982 Bolivia had been plagued by a long history of instability and chronic coups. The country had precarious democratic traditions, having never experienced democracy prior to 1982. . . . Inflation hit 8171 percent in 1985 and per capita income slid downward throughout most of the first decade of democracy."

Although Bolivia’s democracy had a precarious infancy, Mainwaring says by the mid-1990s it was remarkably stable. Argentina and Brazil also suffered through hyperinflation of 4,923 percent and 2,489 percent in 1983 without reverting to authoritarianism.

So economic growth alone doesn’t explain the phenomenon. Like cherries lining up in a slot machine, political scientists say historical trends involving education, attitudes, diplomacy and the Catholic Church also came together to form the democratic jackpot.

While economic growth is important, education appears to be equally crucial for a democratic turnaround. Literacy rates have climbed on the continent, jumping 40 percent in the case of Venezuela. Meanwhile several studies have found that an educated population is more likely to value democracy and be actively engaged in politics.

Then too, it seems the shift came about because there just was "something in the air." For many years, political scientists have speculated whether democracy can be spread by diffusion. Employing a complicated statistical analysis of "democratic indicators" of every country of the world from 1972 to1995 Kellogg Fellow Michael Coppedge has found that democracy really can be contagious. "There is evidence that countries that live in a ‘democratic neighborhood’ are more likely to become democratic themselves," the associate professor of government says. "But for the ‘contagion’ to spread, the country must be susceptible. It must be primed for a change by its own domestic influences."

The exact pathway of diffusion is unknown, Coppedge says. "It may be simply that ideas become fashionable. Democratic countries tend to be wealthy and successful, so it may be that leaders feel pressure to follow that model of success."

In Latin America, attitudes toward democracy among both left- and right-wing intellectuals began shifting in the mid-1980s. Just about the time the Soviet Union started collapsing, Mainwaring says leftist South American intellectuals concluded armed revolution was counterproductive, leading to repression rather than freedom. They swallowed hard at the idea of sharing power with the right, then extended the olive branch — a pragmatic move since rebel forces largely had been decimated.

"The left’s transformation in a more democratic direction fostered a similar trajectory on the right," the Notre Dame professor of government notes. The attitude shift then snowballed. "The growing willingness of rightist groups and governments to abide by electoral politics signaled to the left that some positive change — minimally the end to massive human rights violations — could occur through democracy," Mainwaring says. As a result of the rhetorical de-escalation, the upper class became more willing to accept majority rule.

Nonetheless political scientists see a downside. With the left at bay, the marginalized and disenfranchised have lost a strong advocate and are at the mercy of policies that may not be in their interests.

Guillermo O’Donnell, regarded by many as Latin America’s most distinguished political scientist and a founding fellow of the Kellogg Institute, is especially critical of those governments that have used strict neoliberal "balance the budget at all costs" economic policies to reduce deficits. While they have successfully stemmed inflation, he says the policies have swelled the ranks of the poor, noting, for example, that Argentina’s poverty rate climbed from 10 to 30 percent.

As important as the change in attitudes toward democracy within the countries has been, so has been the change in the outside world. In recent years, for instance, U.S. policy has become much more forceful in its support of democracy. Traditionally, the United States has treated dictators kindly when it believed it was in its strategic or economic interests to do so. That kid-glove policy was jettisoned under Jimmy Carter’s administration, which made a point of criticizing human rights violations, even if it meant criticizing allies. Also, Carter openly bolstered the first of Latin America’s Third Wave democracies, the Dominican Republic, with U.S. support.

Ronald Reagan stepped back from the Carter policy. Under Reagan, the United States adopted a schizophrenic stance, supporting democracy in stable countries but supporting authoritarian regimes in Communist-threatened countries. Under George Bush and Bill Clinton, the United States returned to a more consistent policy.

"The Bush and Clinton administrations promoted democratization in Haiti, criticized authoritarian involutions in Peru (1992) and Guatemala (1993), and applied pressure against coup mongers in Argentina (1987 and ‘88), Peru (1989), Venezuela (1992), and Paraguay (1996)," says Mainwaring.

In a dramatic restatement of policy last March, while on a trip through Central America, President Clinton apologized for earlier U.S. support for authoritarian governments in the region, acknowledged involvement in Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and said the United States would never again assist with repression. "We are determined to remember the past, but never repeat it," he said. Clinton also pledged the United States would attempt to offer assistance for political and economic development.

Along with increased U.S. pressure on behalf of democracy, international pressure has risen as well. In 1990, the United Nations and Organization of American States monitored elections in Nicaragua, the first time a U.N. member nation had its election monitored. On the basis of that success, the organizations also monitored elections and promoted peace talks in El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti.

The international economic carrot-and-stick also has been a powerful pro-democracy force. The International Monetary Fund, transnational economic agencies such as the European Union, and non-governmental aid organizations have thrown their weight behind democracy. For instance, if an authoritarian coup topples a democratic government, that country automatically is expelled from Mercosur, the common market serving the southern cone region of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). "It used to be that business leaders would think ‘this democratic government stinks, so let’s get rid of it,’" says Christopher Welna, associate director of the Kellogg Institute. "Now, they hesitate. They are very unlikely to support a coup knowing that business will be crippled."

The net result, Welna says, is that a worldwide norm disapproving authoritarianism has been created — and it has been effective. In the 1990s, authoritarian coup leaders in Paraguay, Guatemala and Venezuela dropped their plans to overthrow their respective governments when the international community threatened sanctions.

In Guatemala’s case, international pressure plus domestic efforts forced President Jorge Serrano to resign within two weeks. "The Organization of American States indicated that sanctions would be forthcoming and the U.S. promptly suspended aid to Guatemala. In an earlier age, when the reactions would have been less adverse and the mechanisms for implementing sanctions less developed, the coup probably would have succeeded," says Mainwaring.

Last, but not least of all the trends fostering democracy, the Catholic Church made a significant splash in the current wave. In fact, the surge has been called "The Catholic Wave" since nearly three-fourths of the new democracies have been in countries with dominant Catholic populations.

The Second Vatican Council’s emphasis on the gospel of social justice led the South American church to support democratic regimes over totalitarianism. The church was especially critical of authoritarian governments in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The only major exceptions to this were Argentina and Guatemala in the 1970s and ’80s.

A new wrinkle in all this has been the rise of the Pentecostal Church in Latin America, which historically has shied away from politics. In his book Religious Politics in Latin America, published by Notre Dame Press under the aegis of the Kellogg Institute, Brian Smith predicts that neither the Pentecostal church nor the Catholic church will attempt to subvert constitutional government. Most Catholic bishops are "wary of authoritarian political policies and statist [government controlled] economic policies," he says, and neither is there evidence of Pentecostal support for those policies. Further, although Catholics and Pentecostals share many of the same concerns, especially regarding public morality and family values, Smith believes a political alliance is unlikely.

As a result of all these trends, from involvement of the church to economics, democracy has prospered in the hemisphere — at least in some fashion. Unfortunately, all democracies are not created equal. While the quantity is way up, the quality is not always what it should be, varying markedly from one country to the next. "There are different ways of being democratic," Michael Coppedge says. "A country may be highly democratic in terms of direct participation in the political process, but not in terms of equal treatment under the law."

Political scientists say these flawed democracies have "good vertical accountability" in that elections are generally free and fair. But their "horizontal accountability" — the police, the courts, local officials, agencies that serve as checks and balances — leaves something to be desired. The result is "democracy" oxymoronically intertwined with human rights violations.

One pervasive problem in many countries is weak courts subject to the whims of corrupt officials and their cronies, especially outside the cities, says Kellogg fellow Frances Hagopian. The influence of the state is notably low in Brazil and Peru, where wealthy landowners often exert control like feudal lords. Out in the boondocks, old ways die hard and rule there is less than fully democratic. In some countries, more accurately described as semi-democracies, para-military groups ply their trade of fear and intimidation with impunity.

One form of semi-democracy identified by Guillermo O’Donnell is what he terms "delegative democracy." In this form, maximum power is delegated to the president of the country. In effect, the president becomes an elected dictator. The president is not accountable between elections and has maximum power to implement economic reform policies that are viewed as painful but necessary. O’Donnell warns, "If societal tensions are very high, and if ambitious leaders believe that they can usurp power without incurring major international costs . . . then delegative democracy may degenerate into thinly veiled authoritarianism."

He adds, "Both old-fashioned authoritarians and newfangled technocrats base themselves on the premise that those who occupy high office know better than the rest of society, and therefore have not only the right but the duty to impose their superior knowledge."

Ironically, the limited success of democracy could fuel a reverse wave of authoritarianism. "This is the longest period of democracy for the largest number of countries in the continent’s history," says Coppedge. With trelatively poor quality democracies, he notes, "eventually that could jeopardize stability."

Public opinion surveys indicate that Latin Americans are disenchanted with their democratic institutions — with the courts, legislature, president, political parties, Coppedge explains. "They are all held in very low esteem in almost every Latin American country."

O’Donnell worries that growing numbers of people have no stake in the system and therefore no allegiance to it. "If the simultaneous opening of politics and the economy in Latin America means to most people a demotion in their standard of living or even impoverishment, who needs it? That is the kind of attitude which will put Latin America’s democratic hopes in serious danger."

Coppedge is especially concerned about democracy’s immediate prospects in Venezuela where, in the name of eliminating corruption, President Hugo Chavez appears to be flirting with dictatorship. After taking office, the popular reformer temporarily shut down Congress and called for a new constitutional assembly in hopes of acquiring the power to disband Congress and the Supreme Court. The fact that the former army paratrooper led a failed coup attempt seven years ago and has installed 50 military officers in key government posts underlines the concern.

"Some time ago, I reasoned that there are two ways democracies perish: by a sudden or slow death," says O’Donnell. "Sudden death occurs by means of a civil war, coup d’etat or some other spectacular event that immediately attracts international attention and gives a precise date for a democratic demise. History is not lacking in examples of this kind of death. But a more subtle and safer method for the enemies of democracy is to terminate it slowly. This is accomplished through the gradual erosion of freedoms, guarantees and processes that are vital to democracy." It’s a tightening of the noose so gradual that the problem is hard to recognize, he says.

Mainwaring, however, is cautiously optimistic about the future of democracy in Latin America. "I personally think it would be a mistake to think that there will be a linear progression toward improved democracy. It could go either way," he says. "This is a new period in which patently authoritarian regimes have become the rare exception, and if the standard is Latin America’s past, it is remarkable. It is conceivable that we could see another wave of coups and military dictatorships in the future, but it’s not likely in the next half dozen years."

O’Donnell is pleased by the progress, but argues that matters of equity must be addressed for effective democracy to take hold. "Modern social nets will have to be built to accommodate the more rapid shifts in economies integrated into the world system through open trade; social spending will have to be increased and better targeted for the poor; educational systems will have to be revamped; infrastructure will have to be revamped, not neglected."

The political scientist from Argentina adds, "The fact of achieving democracy is not enough. We are a long way away from having a humane society."

David Pohl  illustration

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