The Development of Virtue
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The cognitive and neuro-sciences have made great strides in uncovering the nature of human psychobiology in recent years. Moral educators have yet to make much of their findings. The theories presented here capitalize on recent research that has implications for building moral personalities and cultivating morally adept citizens. The two theories presented in brief are the Integrative Ethical Education model, intended for educators of all levels, and Multi-Ethics Theory, a more comprehensive theory of moral development that has implications for moral education.

Approaches to education for moral character are typically divided into two opposing views (see Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006; Narvaez, 2006) which are rooted in different philosophical paradigms. One philosophical paradigm represents particularist claims regarding virtue with a focus on the agent and the deliberate cultivation of virtues or excellences (MacIntyre 1981). Of primary concern is the nature of a good life and the characteristics necessary to live a good life (e.g., Anscombe 1958; Hursthouse 1999; McDowell 1999). The individual takes on the responsibility for discovering the virtues and values inherent in the self, and cultivates these with the support of the community (Urmson, 1988). Moreover, nearly everything in a life has moral meaning, from friend selection to leisure activities. Traditional character education emerges from this view (Wynne & Ryan, 1993), although it seems to have misappropriated the nature of virtue cultivation (Kohn 1997a 1997b; Narvaez, 2006), resulting in minimal outcome success (Leming, 1997).

The contrasting view emphasizes universalist claims regarding justice and reasoning (Frankena 1973; Kant 1949), addressing what is *the right thing to do* in a particular moral situation (e.g., Hare 1963; Rawls 1971). Moral conduct is that which accords with applicable principles, derived from reasoning, for a particular situation but only in select slices of life. Few demands are made on individuals, leaving many life choices out of the moral realm. Moral obligation is reduced to that which can be formulated with respect to universal moral principles and becomes what is universally applicable (e.g., Kant's Categorical Imperative). "If what is right for anyone must be right for everyone in relevantly similar circumstances, then what is right must be such as can be recognized and acted upon by persons who possess very little in the way of developed moral character" (Norton, 1991, p. xi). Moral obligation is reduced to what a person with little moral character can accomplish. Approaches to moral education rooted in Kohlberg's work are typically anchored here. Not surprisingly, moral reasoning is the focus.

There has been a longstanding assumption adopted from philosophy that moral reasoning drives moral behavior (e.g., Blasi, 1980; Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932). Most famously, Kohlberg emphasized deliberative moral reasoning and its advancement through moral dilemma discussion (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975), what can be called rational moral education (Narvaez, 2006). The robust findings in moral judgment research notwithstanding (e.g., Rest et al., 1999), the centrality of deliberative reasoning in moral behavior is a fading paradigm. To be sure, extensive reasoned argument has been instrumental in shutting down discriminatory practices, such as slavery, and instituting more equitable practices, such as woman's suffrage. Despite the indisputable importance of moral reasoning, there is only a weak link between moral reasoning and moral action (Blasi, 1980; Thoma, 1994). In fact, the disparity between knowing and doing has become increasingly evident across psychological fields, instigating a paradigm shift in mainstream psychology (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

In the new paradigm based on research since the cognitive revolution in psychology, unconscious parallel processing becomes dominant whereas conscious, serial processing becomes secondary (Bargh, 1997). Most information processing is automatic (Bargh, 1999); most decisions are made without deliberation (Hammond 2000) and most activities are governed by preconscious, automatic processes (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson 2000). In other words, humans have two types of "minds" (e.g., Kahneman, 2003). The deliberative mind, based on explicit memory systems, processes information serially and consciously. The intuitive mind is comprised of multiple non-conscious, parallel-processing systems that learn implicitly from environmental patterns and behave automatically, often without awareness (Hogarth, 2001). The intuitive mind develops appropriate sensibilities and habitual responses from immersed experience and comprises the "habits" that are valued in traditional character education whereas the conscious mind cultivates the sophisticated moral reasoning valued by rational moral education.

Despite the perceived conflict between these two approaches to moral character education, they can be viewed as complementary (O'Neill 1996). The Aristotelian emphasis on intuition development evident in traditional character education is more empirically aligned with everyday human behavior. Yet it is deliberative reasoning that facilitates complex understandings of justice. Therefore, character education should not be approached as an Either/Or, as a choice between rational moral education and character education, or between deliberative reasoning and intuition development. Both systems are required for moral agency and moral personhood. The intuitive mind makes decisions and takes actions without conscious awareness most of the time. Yet the deliberative mind is vital for guiding intuition development and countering poor intuitions (Groopman, 2007; Hogarth, 2001). A person without one or the other is missing a critical tool for moral personhood.

In light of the dual nature of the human mind and the importance of both reasoning and intuition, how should we approach moral character education? An approach that melds the paradigms is moral expertise development.

Moral Expertise as a Framework for Developing Moral Character

The two seemingly opposed approaches to learning and becoming a moral person are brought together in expertise development, which emphasizes the development of appropriate intuitions and sophisticated reasoning. Experts-in-training are immersed in environments that "train up" their intuitions while receiving explicit guidance as to how to think about solving problems in the domain. For example, a working chef practices under the watchful eye of the master chef who models, guides and advises.

What do we mean by expertise? Experts differ from novices in several key ways. They have more and better organized knowledge (e.g., Sternberg, 1998). They have declarative (explicit), procedural (implicit) & conditional knowledge. In short, they know what knowledge to access, which procedures to apply, how to apply them, and when. They

perceive the world differently, noticing underlying patterns and discerning necessity where novices see nothing remarkable (Johnson & Mervis, 1997). Expert behavior is often automatic and effortless (Vicente & Wang, 1998). Experts function as more complex adaptive systems in their approaches to solving problems in the domain whereas novices miss the affordances for action available in the circumstance (Neisser, 1976; Hatano & Inagaki, 1997). Experts have highly developed intuitions as well as explicit knowledge. Moreover, experts' sense of self is highly connected to their efficacy. They are motivated for excellence.

The proposal here is that we should treat moral virtue or excellence as a type of adaptive expertise (Narvaez 2006; Narvaez & Lapsley 2005), much like the ancients did (e.g., Aristotle, 1988; Mencius, 1970). A virtuous person is like an expert who has highly cultivated skills—sets of procedural, declarative and conditional knowledge—that are applied appropriately in the circumstance. In other words, moral exemplars in the fullest sense demonstrate moral (knowing the good) and practical wisdom (knowing how to carry it out in the situation). Moral expertise is applying the right virtue in the right amount at the right time. "A wise (or virtuous) person is one who knows what is good and spontaneously does it." (Varela 1999, p. 4)

Expertise is a set of capacities that can be put into action. Moral experts demonstrate holistic orientations (sets of procedural, declarative and conditional knowledge) in one or more of at least four processes critical to moral behavior: ethical sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical focus, and ethical action (Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest, 1983). Experts in Ethical Sensitivity are better at quickly and accurately discerning the nature of a moral situation and determining the role they might play. They take on multiple perspectives in an effort to be morally responsive to others. Experts in Ethical Judgment reason about duty and consequences, and apply personal and religious codes to solve complex problems. Experts in Ethical Focus cultivate self-regulation that leads them to prioritize and deepen commitment to ethical goals. Experts in Ethical Action know how to keep their spirit focused on the moral goal and implement the task step by step. They are able to step forward and intervene courageously for the welfare of others. Experts in a particular excellence have more and better organized knowledge about it, have highly tuned perceptual skills for it, have deep moral desire for it, and have highly automatized, effortless responses. In short, they have more *content* knowledge and more *process* knowledge, more moral wisdom and more practical wisdom.

As novices in virtually every domain including the moral, children are best taught using novice-to-expert instruction (Bransford et al., 1999). In domains of study, experts-in-training build implicit and explicit understandings about the domain, engaging both the deliberative and intuitive minds. Immersion in the domain occurs at the same time that theory is presented, cultivating both intuitions and deliberative understanding (Abernathy & Hamm 1995). Their practice is focused, extensive, and coached through contextualized, situation-based experience. The learning environment is well-structured, providing appropriate and accurate feedback (e.g., the chef-in-training gets feedback both from the physical results of food prepared and from the coach who judges it). Through the course of expertise training, perceptions are fine tuned and developed into chronically accessed constructs; interpretive frameworks are learned and, with practice, applied automatically; action schemas are honed to high levels of automaticity (Hogarth 2001). What is painfully rule-based as a novice becomes, with vast experience, automatic and quick for an expert (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990).

Nevertheless, there appear to be vastly different mindsets that influence perception and orientation in moral behavior. Multi-ethics theory seeks to name these disparate orientations and find their roots.

Multi-Ethics Theory

Multi-ethics theory (MET; Narvaez, 2008) is derived from psychological, evolutionary and neurosciences, emphasizing the importance of the limbic system, and related structures, for moral information processing and behavior. Most research in moral psychology has focused on the work of the neocortex (e.g., deliberate reasoning), often neglecting the motivational structures that lie beneath. MET has four goals (for more detail, see Narvaez, 2008). First, it emphasizes motivational orientations driven by unconscious emotional systems that predispose one to process information and react to events in particular ways. Second, MET seeks to explain individual differences in moral functioning. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence personality formation and brain wiring and in turn affect information processing. Third, MET suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development, the evolved developmental niche. Though it emerged over 30 million years ago with the social mammals and was slightly changed among humans, the characteristics of the evolved developmental niche for young children is no longer closely followed (e.g., naturalistic childbirth with no interference with timing, separation of mom and baby or induced pain; breastfeeding 2-5 years, nearly constant touch, responsiveness to the cues of the child, free play, positive social support and multiple adult caregivers), despite the data showing that all these practices positively influence child development (see Narvaez, forthcoming). These practices also influence moral development (Narvaez & Gleason, 2013). Fourth, MET offers an explanation for the power of situations in influencing moral responses. Although one's personality might have gelled around one ethic or another, situations can also influence which ethic will be put into play.

The moral self, moral identity or moral motivation is an area of increasing interest to researchers (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Blasi has suggested that a person with a moral identity has moral constructs central to the self (Blasi, 1985). The perspective proffered here contrasts with Blasi's view. Focusing on a person's subjective view, the central question is not whether a person has a moral identity but *what* moral identity they have. It is the nature of organisms to aim for what they perceive to be good in the moment so subjectively a person feels they are behaving moral (although reflection later may change opinion). All organisms are goal-driven, including humans (Bogdan, 1994). Persons select goals they think are the best in the circumstances, never consciously choosing goals they think are evil or bad. Even those who behave violently are motivated to right a wrong (i.e., revenge is felt as "good" in the brain; de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). Those who are impulsive feel that their goals are "right" in part because they feel them so strongly. So from the individual's viewpoint in the moment (the subjective perspective), the person is behaving morally. However, from an objective viewpoint self-centered behavior that harms or mistreats others is generally considered to be less moral. For example, although egoism and selfishness can be touted as moral (see Ayn Rand Nation by Gary Weiss), it is usually considered outside of many moral frames. However, MET does not dismiss some identities as non-moral but notes different types of moral identities (we will avoid the discussion of what personality is and whether there is such a thing—see Lapsley, this volume). The view here is that everyone has a subjective moral identity—one oriented

towards the perceived good. What varies, based on experience and situation, is the type of moral identity active at any given moment.

Multi-ethics theory identifies three basic attractors for moral functioning (Narvaez, 2008), based on brain evolution (MacLean, 1990). There are also subtypes (see Figure 1). The three basic orientations—Safety, Engagement, and Imagination—stem from different emotion systems and represent distinct moral mindsets. Each differentially affects perception, information processing, affordances (perceived action possibilities) and goals, propelling moral action on an individual or group level.

The first formation involves the R-complex (MacLean, 1990), or the extrapyramidal action nervous system (Panksepp, 1998). The R-complex relates to stereotyped behavior in many animals and several forms of behavior in mammals, including territoriality, imitation, deception, struggles for power, maintenance of routine and following precedent. The Ethic of Safety is based primarily in these instincts, which revolve around physical survival and thriving in context, instincts shared with all animals and present from birth. Primitive systems related to fear, anger reside here. Because they are primarily hardwired into the brain, these systems are not easily damaged, unlike those of the other two ethics, making these the default systems when trauma or neglect occur in early life. Excessive stress in early life can wire the brain for threat reactivity, leading to a greater propensity to use a safety ethic in social interactions (Narvaez, in preparation).

Like Kohlberg's preconventional stages, the safety ethic is very concerned with self preservation and personal gain, although it operates primarily implicitly. It can easily dominate thought and behavior when the person or group is threatened (MacLean 1990). When the safety ethic is triggered, defenses go up, in-group/out-group differences are emphasized, rivalry and the pecking order are stressed, and/or superorganismic (mob) thinking and behavior is set in motion (Bloom, 1995). A moral self that is dominated by the Ethic of Safety orients to flourishing through wealth, status and power. In the mind of the safety ethic, it is "right" to be dominant and maintain inequality. Moral systems are hierarchical and ordered. Self control, particularly of soft emotion or perceived weakness, is fundamental. It is moral to hold in contempt outgroup members or those who violate the moral rules. The virtues of the safety ethic are fortitude, loyalty (for protection, not out of love), and obedience.

Providing a safe, secure environment where basic needs are met allows individuals to minimize triggering the safety ethic and emphasizes the ethics systems that better represent human aspirations (engagement and imagination). Control systems in the prefrontal cortex are not fully developed until the middle 20s (Giedd, Blumenthal, & Jeffries, 1999) and are easily overtaken by the hindbrain's self-protective impulsivity (Bechara, 2005) so that adults must still offer guidance at least until the brain is fully developed.

The Ethic of Engagement involves the emotional systems that drive us towards intimacy. These systems were identified as the locus of human moral sense by Darwin (1891; Loye 2002) because they are the root of our social instincts and affectionate parental care. Although evolution has prepared the human brain for sociality and moral agency, for optimal moral development early life care must follow the evolved developmental niche, a niche that includes breastfeeding, holding and carrying, prompt response to needs, natural childbirth, multiple adult caregivers and social support (Narvaez, Panksepp, Schore & Gleason, 2013). Proper care during early life is required for normal formation of brain circuitries necessary for successful social engagement. With adequate care, the Engagement Ethic develops fully and

leads to values of compassion, openness and tolerance in adulthood (Eisler & Levine, 2002). Interestingly, these characteristics develop together in early life, as love, trust and tolerance but require responsive caregiving so that the cognitive-affective systems are well-formed (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004). See Figure 2 for the layers of development provided by evolved caregiving practices. Care-deprived infants develop aberrant brain structures and brain-behavioral disorders which lead to greater hostility and aggression towards others (Kruesi, Hibbs, Zahn, Keysor, Hamburger, Bartko, & Rapoport, 1992). Inadequate care leads to deficiencies in the brain wiring, hormonal regulation and system integration that lead to sociality (Weaver, Szyf, & Meaney, 2002). The self in the present, in relationship, in emotional context, drives our relational moral orientation towards trust, love and reciprocity (engagement) or towards mistrust, uncertainty and shame (see Schore 1994).

An Engagement moral self has a greater capacity for meaningful relationships and a deeper sense of connection to others, along with a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). In fact when the safety ethic runs amok, the more humane engagement ethic may provide a counter pressure if awakened by particular events,

The third ethic is the Ethic of Imagination, which links primarily to these recently evolved parts of the brain, the neocortex, particularly the prefrontal cortex. In one way the Imagination Ethic has been studied extensively in moral psychology, at least in terms of deliberative reasoning. Deliberative reasoning, which resides in explicit memory and develops slowly through experience and training, was Kohlberg's focus of study and that of the cognitive developmental tradition more generally. However as noted above, many researchers in cognitive science have come to the conclusion that most human decisions and actions are carried out automatically and without conscious control (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Most of what is learned is learned implicitly, resides in tacit memory, and is not available to explicit description (Keil & Wilson, 1999). So a distinction has been made between the deliberative, conscious mind and the "adaptive unconscious" (Wilson, 2002) or intuitive mind. Multi-ethics theory suggests that the real work of moral judgment and decision making has to do with the coordination of these two "minds." That coordination is handled by the Imagination Ethic.

In the parlance of multi-ethics theory, the Imagination Ethic responds to and coordinates the intuitions and instincts of the Engagement Ethic and the Safety Ethic. The Imagination Ethic sorts out the multiple elements that are involved in moral decision making in a particular situation. The Imagination Ethic has two powerful tools. One is the ability to countermand instincts and intuitions with "free won't" (Cotterill, 1999), the ability that allows humans through learning and willpower to choose which stimuli are allowed to trigger emotional arousal (Panksepp, 1998). For example, an enraged parent can counter the instinct to beat up a disobedient child. The other powerful tool is the ability to explain behavior. The deliberative mind, largely through the brain's "interpreter" (Gazzaniga, 1985), is facile in explaining any behavior, sometimes unaware that it is "making things up." Typically, the interpreter adopts the narratives of a cultural, familial or affiliative group. The social narrative is further refined into a personal narrative, both of which also drive behavior (Grusec, 2002). Krebs (2005) reinterprets Kohlberg's stages through the glasses of evolutionary psychology, viewing the stages as social strategies reflecting the evolution of respect for authority, altruism, cheating, justice, and care.

Like the brain areas related to the Engagement Ethic, the development of brain areas related to the Ethic of Imagination requires a nurturing environment. The prefrontal

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cortex and its specialized units take decades to fully develop and are subject to damage from environmental factors both early (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999) and late in development (Newman, Holden, & Delville, 2005).

The Imagination Ethic provides for a greater moral sense than the other ethics. Although humans have evolved to favor face-to-face relationships and have difficulty imagining those not present (such as future generations), the work of the Imagination Ethic provides a means for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate relations. Indeed, a self grounded in the Imagination ethic is broadly aware of human possibilities, of the power of co-creation of community in the moment. Such a self is broadly reflective, demonstrating exquisite self command for envisioned goals. Humans are at their most moral, following Darwin's moral evolution (Loye, 2002), when the Ethic of Engagement is linked with the Ethic of Imagination. The virtues of the Imagination ethic are the ability to step back from the present moment, take multiple perspectives and imagine alternative futures.

As noted, the Safety Ethic is the default system when all else goes wrong. The other two ethics must be developed through proper nurturing and environmental support. Although parenting provides the most important context for early brain wiring for engagement and imagination, educators can have an influence on which ethic dominates the classroom. The Integrative Ethical Education model seeks to provide stepwise guidance to cultivating ethical expertise in the engagement and imagination ethics.

Step-By-Step Integrative Ethical Education

The Integrative Ethical Education model (IEE; Narvaez, 2006; 2007) provides an intentional, holistic, comprehensive, empirically-derived approach to moral character development. It is informed deeply by both ancient philosophy and current science about what contributes to cultivate human flourishing. As Aristotle pointed out, human flourishing necessarily includes individuals and communities, a perspective corroborated by the biological and social sciences. No one survives or flourishes alone. In fact, humans are biologically wired for sociality and love (Maturana & Verden-Zoller, 1996). With the proper care humans are deeply empathic, with ethics of high engagement and imagination (e.g., Dentan, 1968; Wolff, 1994).

The IEE model is presented in a step-by-step format. Ideally the steps take place simultaneously. It is recommended that new teachers plan to start at the beginning and add each step as they feel comfortable.

Step 1: Establish a caring relationship with each student.

Fundamental to any mentoring relationship is establishing a caring connection, the type of relationship that allows mutual influence for mutual benefit. Greenspan and Shanker (2002) describe how parental interaction with infants establish the cognitive propensities that child has for learning and being. A pleasurable relationship allows for open communication and for mutual enhancement. Ideally, the family home provides deep emotional nourishment for the child, but this has become increasingly difficult to achieve, due in part to both parents working and a variety of distracting activities. In a day when children are emotionally malnourished, much rides on the adults they see every day, educators. In fact the most important protective factors against poor outcomes for a child are caring relationships, first, with an adult in the family, and second, with an adult outside the family (Masten, 2003). Why is caring so vital? As mammals, we are primarily social-emotional creatures; we are evolutionarily prepared for the rewards of caring, emotionally-engaged relationships. The cool

logic of a non-emotional Dr. Spock is a sign of pathology, not health (Damasio, 1999). It is through caring relationships and supportive climates that we nurture an engagement ethic.

When students have good relationships with their teachers, they are more likely to feel welcome in the classroom and have a greater sense of belonging, which is related to higher motivation and achievement (Klem & Connell, 2004; McNeely, Nonnemaker, & Blum, 2002; Roeser, Midgley & Urdan, 1996). Teacher caring and support are related to increased student engagement in learning (Libbey, 2004), especially among at-risk students (Connell, Halpern-Felsher, Clifford, Crichlow & Usinger, 1995; Croninger & Lee, 2001). Teachers can individualize their care for students, like a good parent. Of course, this means getting to know the child, respectfully, as much as possible. Some students with troubled backgrounds require a longer warm-up period before they trust the teacher, requiring teacher persistence and patience (see Watson, 2003; this volume). It must be said that establishing a caring relationship is easier with some children than others, and is easier for elementary teachers than high school teachers who see many students relatively briefly. Nevertheless, as long as teachers maintain a humane classroom, students will be more likely to feel safe and engaged in learning, including moral learning (see Noddings, this volume).

Human minds and hearts are wired for emotional signaling and emotional motivation (Greenspan & Shanker 2004; Lewis, Amini & Lannon, 2000; Panksepp 1998). If these are ignored or mishandled by the educator, then the safety ethic will predominate. The students may spend much of their energy in self-protection, leaving little energy for openness to learning. The educator needs to establish healthy emotional signaling with each student in order to influence his or her emotional drive. An emotional connection provides the bridge for communication and influence. Without it, academic motivation is reliant on the residue of family motivation (which may be enough for many Asian Americans but not so well for other students in American classrooms, Steinberg, 1996; Li, 2005).

Step 2: Establish a climate supportive of achievement and ethical character.

In simpler times, children learned morality through observation and direct contact with adults during the basic chores and activities of life at home and in the local community. Divorced from the everyday life of most adults and placed in the artificial learning setting of the school, children's social life revolves around the classroom and school. It is here they learn how to get along with peers, how to participate in group work and decision making, how to be a citizen, and many other skills they take with them into adulthood. "The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life" (Dewey, 1909/1975 p.14). As Dewey argues, the school should be constructed as a social institution that integrates intellectual and moral training.

Organizational climates and cultures shape perceptions and behavior (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989; Power & Higgins, this volume). In the broad sense the climate includes the structures of the social environment, the overt and hidden systems of rewards and punishment, the goals and aspirations of the social group, and the general discourse about goals. In the specific sense, climate has to do with how people treat one another, how they work together, how they make decisions together, what feelings are encouraged, and what expectations are nurtured.

Considerable research points to the importance of a caring classroom and school climate for optimal student outcomes. When classrooms have climates of mutual respect and caring—when the teacher fosters the EThica of Engagement in self and students, they feel

greater physical and psychological safety, leading to a greater sense of belongingness (Anderman, 2003; Ma, 2003). Bonding to school not only increases school engagement and commitment to learning among students (Goodenow, 1993), but growth in achievement (Libbey, 2004) and healthy development generally (Catalano et al., 2004, this volume). A caring classrooms and schools with high expectations for achievement and behavior are related both to high achievement and to moral behavior (Battistich, 2008; Zins et al., 2004). According to Solomon, et al. (2002), caring school and classroom communities have the following characteristics: Students are able to demonstrate autonomy, self-direction, and influence teacher decisions. Students interact positively with one another, collaborating and discussing course content and classroom policies. Students are coached on social skills. Teachers exhibit warmth towards and acceptance of students, providing support and positive modeling. The teacher provides multiple opportunities for students to help one another. A well-structured environment for teaching character has these characteristics. In a caring classroom, discipline is not punishment but is coached character development. Educators can emphasize both engagement and imagination ethics, asking "who should I be?" as well as "how can we show respect for one another?" and "How can we help one another feel cared for in the classroom?" Schools can establish programs that take up part of the burden for developing empathy and fostering compassion that families are unable to address (e.g., Roots of Empathy; Schonert-Reichl, Smith & Zaidman-Zait, 2005).

 Steps 1 and 2 are integral to best practice teaching, yet in an era where children have more negative than positive role models in popular culture, these two steps are no longer enough to help students develop moral character (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). The next three steps identify the deliberative practice that educators can employ for moral character cultivation in students.

Step 3: Teach ethical skills across the curriculum and extra-curriculum using a novice-to-expert pedagogy.

 As mentioned above, training for ethical expertise includes developing appropriate intuitions and sophisticated deliberations in at least four areas: Ethical Sensitivity, Ethical Judgment, Ethical Focus and Ethical Action. But what competencies can or should be emphasized in school? The Integrative Ethical Education model suggests skills and subskills for each of the four processes. These are skills critical for social and emotional intelligence and living a good life generally (see Elias et al, this volume). These skills are also important for active global citizenship. In a multipolar world, educators can help students minimize the safety ethic and develop engagement and imagination. See Table 1 for the suggested skills for each of the four processes.

 How should moral character education be structured? As in training for expertise, educators should instruct both the deliberative mind and the intuitive mind. The intuitive mind is cultivated through imitation of role models and the appropriate feedback from the environment. The deliberative mind can be coached in finetuning action and in how to select good environments for intuition development. By providing theoretical explanation and chance for dialogue, the deliberative mind builds understanding. By providing a grand prosocial narrative, the child internalizes a personal narrative and the deliberative mind's imagination is engaged in activities that bring it about.

 Learning involves an active and interactive process of transforming one's conceptual structures through selective attention and by relating new information to prior

knowledge (Anderson, 1989). Best practice instruction provides opportunities for students to develop more accurate and better organized representations and the procedural skills required to use them (ibid). In order to do this, children must experience an *expert-in-training pedagogy* for each skill that they learn. Teachers can set up instruction to help students develop appropriate knowledge by designing lessons according to the following four levels of activities (Narvaez, et al., 2004; Narvaez, 2005):

 Level 1: Immersion in examples and opportunities. Teachers provide models and modeling of the goal, draw student attention to the "big picture" in the subject area, and help the students learn to recognize basic patterns.

 Level 2: Attention to facts and skills. As students practice subskills, teachers focus student attention on the elemental concepts in the domain in order to build more elaborate concepts.

 Level 3: Practice procedures. The teacher allows the student to try out many skills and ideas throughout the domain to build an understanding of how skills relate and how best to solve problems in the domain.

 Level 4: Integrate knowledge and procedures. The student finds numerous mentors and/or seeks out information to continue building concepts and skills. There is a gradual systematic integration and application of skills and knowledge across many situations.

 The expertise development approach was developed in the Minnesota Community Voices and Character Education project. In the final evaluation year, after being familiarized with the framework of skills and pedagogical approach, teacher teams determined which skills their students needed and which academic courses would integrate which skills. Using materials provided by the project designers and teacher-designed lessons, the skills approach had a significant effect on students in schools that implemented broadly over one year's time in contrast to a comparison group and to low implementing schools (see Narvaez, et al.,. 2004).

Step 4: Foster student self-authorship and self-regulation.

 Self-regulation (equilibration) has been a central, driving force of evolution and development within organisms (Darwin, 1871). Self-authorship (autopoesis) is what living systems do (Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 1974). Self authorship requires a coordinated partnership between the different minds (intuition and deliberation) in a type of reflective abstraction (Piaget's *prise de conscience*; Gruber & Voneche 1995), and among the different ethics (safety, engagement, imagination). As Aristotle pointed out, individuals need mentors for self-regulation and self-development (self-authorship) until they can guide themselves through the selection of virtuous friends and activities (Urmson, 1988). Plato understood human existence to be a problem to the self, "the problem of deciding what to become and endeavoring to become it" (Urmson, 1988, p. 2). In other words, the final responsibility for character development lies with the individual. In their choices and actions, orientations and time allocations, individuals address the question: Who should I be? Who are my role models and how do I get there? In an enriched moral environment, students are provided with tools for self-regulation and self-authorship in character formation.

 Individuals can be coached not only in skills and expertise, as noted previously, but in domain-specific self-regulation (Zimmerman, Bonner, & Kovach 2002). The most successful students learn to monitor the effectiveness of the strategies they use to solve

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problems and, when necessary, alter their strategies for success (Anderson, 1989). Coaching for self-regulation requires enlisting the deliberative mind to help the intuitive mind. Armed with theoretical knowledge, the deliberative mind, for example, plays a critical role in learning by selecting the environments from which the intuitive mind learns effective behaviors, thereby accelerating implicit learning (Hogarth, 2001). For example, different intuitions are developed when reading a good book than when playing violent video games. Teachers thinking aloud about solving challenging problems and their decision making processes provides students with examples of how to monitor progress during goal execution. Students can learn the metacognitive skills that moral experts have, such as guiding one's attention away from temptations, self-cheerleading when energy flags, and selecting or redesigning an environment to maximize goal completion (Zimmerman, 1998).

Step 5: Restore the Village: Asset-Building Communities and Coordinated Developmental Systems

It bears emphasizing that the good life is not lived in isolation. One does not flourish alone. IEE is implemented in and with a community. It is the community who establishes, and nourishes the individual's moral voice, providing a moral anchor, and offering guidance as virtues are cultivated. Indeed, both Plato and Aristotle agreed that a good person is above all a good citizen. Hunter (2000) suggests that we find the answers to our existential questions in the particularities that we bring to a civic dialogue: "Character outside of a lived community, the entanglements of complex social relationships, and their shared story, is impossible." (p. 227). It is in the community that students apply and hone their ethical competencies.

Truly democratic ethical education empowers all involved—educators, community members and students—as they form a learning community together, developing ethical skills and self-regulation for both individual and community actualization (Rogoff, Turkanis, & Bartlett, 2001). The purpose of ethical behavior is to live a good life *in the community*. Together community members work out basic questions such as: How should we get along in our community? How do we build up our community? How do we help one another flourish? Each individual lives within an active ecological context (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which, ideally, the entire community builds ethical skills together.

Overall, we can strengthen the connections among children's life spaces: home, school, and community at various levels. Children who live with coordinated systems are adaptationally advantaged (Benson, Leffert, Scales, & Blyth, 1998). The type of person a child becomes is determined in large part by the dynamic interaction among community, family and culture. Caring communities with high expectations and involved adults are more likely to raise morally-engaged citizens.

TUNING MORAL PERCEPTIONS

"Who tells the stories of a culture really governs human behavior. It used to be the parent, the school, the church, the community. Now it's a handful of global conglomerates that have nothing to tell, but a great deal to sell." - George Gerbner

At no time in US history have children's minds been more shaped by advertisers who peddle dissatisfaction with self and the need for consuming an endless array of products (Halton, 2008). Brain research shows the effects of popular media on growing brains, and much of it is worrisome (Quart, 2003; Kasser, 2002). For example, playing violent videogames thwarts normal brain development, negatively influencing areas of the brain critical for moral and social behavior (Mathews, Kronenberger, Wang, Lurito, Lowe, & Dunn, 2005).

The effects can be seen in the manifestation of ethics today. The ethic of safety is activated by media from which we develop a 'mean world syndrome,' desensitization towards violence (it is fun and rewarding) and towards victims of violence, culminating in a general lack of trust in others (Cultivation Theory, Gerbner, 1994). The ethic of safety is aggravated when we see what others have that we do not ("affluenza," Hamilton & Denniss 2005), promoting addictive status seeking. The ethic of imagination is hijacked by these artificially-manufactured desires so that virtue is converted into being a good consumer. The ethic of engagement is twisted into interaction with electronic media, leaving individuals spending more time interacting with media than with their families or neighbors (Vandewater, Bickham & Lee, 2006).

Certainly children's goals, dreams, motivations, perceptions, sensibilities are significantly shaped by forces beyond the family and local community. But educators and parents can step in to offer a human counterinfluence to encourage aspirations that go beyond looks, fame, celebrity and materialism. Using methods that advertisers have borrowed from psychology, educators can foster discourse that draws attention to moral issues and can provide satisfying social experiences. Social-cognitive moral personality theory suggests that a moral personality is built from social and practical experiences that foster automatized moral schemas (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). In fact, making automatic the use of moral filters for social information processing is what moral "chronics" do (Narvaez, et al., 2006).

Hutto (2007) contends that children learn cultural narrative structures and when to use them through direct experience with stories that provide reasons for action (Narrative Practice Hypothesis). Competency with one's cultural narratives helps one understand self and others. The narratives in popular culture emphasize self-interest and ruthlessness to "have it your way." These narratives teach children to view themselves and others as selfish beings who compete for status and pleasure. Teachers can foster narratives to counter the hedonism and status-enhancing messages of popular media.

Teachers are, first and foremost, role models. They can model a moral orientation to life by thinking aloud about their own moral decisions, telling stories about striving for moral goals, reading stories that develop students' moral imaginations. Teachers can encourage students to construct their own moral goals and moral life story (e.g., how are you going to make the world a better place for everyone? What skills do you need for it?). Individuals operate according to the narratives they tell themselves (McAdams, 1993; Schank, 1999). Adults help structure personal narratives by the types of questions they ask (e.g., how did you help someone in school today? What positive actions did you take over vacation? What positive goals do you have for today?; see Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). Teachers (and adults in general) influence children's narratives by what they emphasize, expect, and encourage in the environments they design for children. Teachers can fill children's memories with positive concrete experiences in which they helped others and teachers can remind them of these times.

CONCLUSION

Educators play a large role in the moral character development of their students. The Integrative Ethical Education model encourages educators to take on an intentional, conscientious approach to cultivating moral character. Specifically, IEE informs educators how they can cultivate their students' expertise in Triune Ethic Theory's engagement and

imagination ethics. IEE's step-by-step, empirically-derived framework is intended to help educators actualize their important responsibility of developing their students' moral character.

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
Table 1. Ethical Skills

ETHICAL SENSITIVITY	ETHICAL JUDGMENTS
Understand emotional expression	Understand ethical problems
Take the perspectives of others	Using codes & identifying judgment criteria
Connecting to others	Reasoning critically
Responding to diversity	Reasoning ethically
Controlling social bias	Understand consequences
Interpret situations	Reflect on process and outcome
Communicate well	Coping and resiliency
ETHICAL FOCUS	ETHICAL ACTION
Respecting others	Resolving conflicts and problems
Cultivate conscience	Assert respectfully
Help others	Taking initiative as a leader
Being a community member	Planning to implement decisions
Finding meaning in life	Cultivate courage
Valuing traditions & institutions	Persevering
Developing ethical identity & integrity	Working hard

Figure 1. Multi-Ethics Theory Types and Subtypes

Figure 2. Baselines for Virtue Development Co-Constructed by Early Experience