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**“PSYCHOLOGIZED MORALITY”
AND ETHICAL THEORY, OR,
DO GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS?**

INTRODUCTION: FENCES AND NEIGHBORS

In this chapter we reconsider the boundary between ethics and moral development theory, and respond to recent challenges to our call for a “psychologized morality.” The boundary issue has a discernible historical arc. When much of American psychology was in the grips of behaviorism – during the first six or seven decades of the twentieth-century – its stance towards ethical terms was entirely in keeping with the epistemology of logical positivism. On this score ordinary moral language (“good”, “ought”, “values”) was useless for scientific investigation without “operational” translation into the constructs of behavioral science (“positive reinforcement”). Behavioral psychology thus staked out its claims against metaphysics, erecting a fence and extending a boundary against it.

But the autonomy of (behavioral) psychology from ethics was challenged by the rise of Kohlberg’s moral stage theory. Indeed, Kohlberg’s stage theory was a much better neighbor to ethical theory than was behavioral theory. Kohlberg’s embrace of the formalist ethical tradition as the starting point of his investigation essentially lowered the fence between ethical theory and moral development and effaced the boundary between them. This affirmed the autonomy of morality, but at the expense (we argue) of the autonomy of psychology. Our call for a psychologized morality is an attempt to revisit the boundary between ethical theory and developmental studies of moral functioning.

The boundary we have in mind calls for a greater sense of partnership across both sides of the fence, rather than the one-sided, unilateral respect of developmental studies for ethical theory. We take aim at the autonomy of morality by our embrace of ethical naturalism, and affirm the independence of psychological research, but we do so convinced that a new understanding of the boundary will encourage mutual respect and partnership and, indeed, make good neighbors of us all.

A Poetic Metaphor: The Mending Wall

A poetic metaphor best captures our understanding of the partnership between ethics and developmental psychology. We have in mind the famous line from Robert

Frost's great iconic poem, *The Mending Wall* – “good fences make good neighbors.”

This expression is familiar to most Americans, even if they don't always remember its source. Unfortunately, the expression is often misunderstood. The line usually is interpreted to mean that a good neighbor is one that we keep at arm's length, behind a fence. The good neighbor is one we never see, who does not intrude on us and minds his own business. The good neighbor leaves us alone. However, the actual poem comes to a completely opposite conclusion.

The poem begins:

*“Something there is that doesn't love a wall
That sends the frozen ground-swell under it
And spills the upper boulders in the sun
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.”*

The poem explains that no one has seen or heard the gaps being made, but there they are “at spring mending time.” The narrator informs his neighbor (“beyond the hill”) about the gaps in the wall. The neighbor comes down and together they walk the line “and set the wall between us once again.” They go about repairing the wall, wearing their fingers rough handling the boulders. And it amazes the narrator because all of this wall-building is quite unnecessary because when it comes down to it:

*“We do not need the wall
He is all pine and I am all apple orchard
My apple trees will never get across
And cut the cones under the pines, I tell him,
He only says: ‘Good fences make good neighbors.’”*

The poem reminds us that we need occasions to be and feel like neighbors, to work together on a common project, to walk the line together handling the rough stones mending the wall. A fence is “good” not because it keeps neighbors apart and distant but because the occasion of repairing it gives them reason to work together in partnership. A good fence does not keep people separated but brings them together in collaboration and fellowship, which in fact makes us (good) neighbors, and probably in some moral sense of good.

The point of the wall, then, is that it brings us together and does not separate us, it needs mending and we must cooperate in a common project. It is in this spirit that developmental psychologists walk the mending wall with ethicists, as we handle the rough stones repairing the gaps that have emerged in the boundary between ethics and psychology. Although the disciplines enjoy relative autonomy (“He is all pine and I am all apple orchard”), there are occasions for ethicists and psychologists to walk the line together for mutual benefit.

In the next section we provide the background argument that motivated our call for a psychologized morality, and then note its key claims. We claim, for example, that a psychologized morality and naturalized ethics are “fellow travelers,” bound by a similar understanding of the mending wall between ethics and the social and

cognitive sciences. Insofar as we embrace naturalism in ethics, we clarify our intentions in this respect, and respond to recent criticism of our approach. Our concluding post-script brings us back to Kohlberg. Here we will argue that the naturalizing tendencies endorsed by our perspective have deep roots in Kohlberg's own project.

AT A CROSSROAD

Recently we argued that moral development research is at a crossroad (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). For nearly forty years Kohlberg's paradigm defined the terms of reference for the study of moral reasoning, yet there are unmistakable signs that it now sits on the margins of cognitive and social developmental research. The debates and issues that once swirled around the moral stage theory, and which provided an exciting momentum to research, now seem to hold little interest, and not because all the questions have been answered (Lapsley, 2006).

Certainly part of the story of the declining influence of Kohlberg's moral stage theory can be traced to the general decline of Piaget's approach in developmental psychology (Lapsley, 2006). Kohlberg's (1969) “cognitive developmental approach to socialization” traded on the prestige of the Piagetian paradigm, so that when Piaget's theory waned in influence, or was eclipsed by alternative conceptualizations of intellectual development, Kohlberg's theory became deprived of much of its paradigmatic support.

In retrospect the preoccupations of Kohlberg's research program seemed far removed from what is the overriding concern of parents and educators, which is how to raise children of a certain kind, that is, children who possess important moral dispositions, who possess traits that are desirable and praiseworthy and whose personalities are imbued with a strong ethical compass (Lapsley, in press). On these matters moral stage theory surprisingly is silent. It has relatively little to say about how to raise moral children. It provides little guidance for parents, let alone educators, for how morally-crucial dispositions are to be encouraged in young children, and, indeed, provides only a slight framework for understanding moral behavior in young children more generally (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).

Of course, this was not Kohlberg's project. He actively rejected any claim to address issues of character. Instead, his was an attempt to chart ontogenetic variation in how individuals resolve hard-case moral dilemmas. With increasing development individuals will call upon increasingly complex sets of sociomoral operations to sort out questions of fairness, adjudicate conflict, and justify decisions. They come to appreciate with increasing transparency and articulation the moral point of view as it is understood by formalist ethics.

These are not unimportant developmental achievements, yet it seems to pass by the ordinary moral experience of children and the overriding concerns of their parents. Moral stages do not, after all, classify individuals but rather the structural properties of reasoning. They permit no aretaic evaluation nor prompt reflection about the moral qualities of personhood. They say nothing about virtue or charac-

ter. They do not even describe moral stage development in *childhood*. Indeed, children rarely encounter the sort of moral dilemmas used in the typical assessments, and parents would find it odd to learn that the reasonable goal of moral socialization held out by moral stage theory is for adolescents to think about dilemmas (they would hardly encounter) in conventional ways.

This is not in any way to diminish the extraordinary significance of Kohlberg's theory. As we will note below, Kohlberg's remarkable contribution first raised the visibility of the moral domain, indeed, made it possible, in an era that was hostile to notions of cognitive structure and stage development. What's more, Kohlberg's research team scored significant empirical successes in its pursuit of moral stages in its restrictive domain of application (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983). Rest (1987) termed the validation results "spectacular" (p. 466) and noted that "for no other measurement procedure in the field have such strong confirmatory trends been reported" (p. 464). Moreover, the addition of moral discussion and just communities to the arsenal of the moral education is an enduring contribution of the Kohlberg team (e.g., Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989).

Yet even on its own terms the moral stage theory seemed to turn in on itself as it wrestled with recalcitrant data. On Kohlberg's account the construct validity of moral stages rested on positive evidence regarding the holistic consistency of moral reasoning (*structure d'ensemble*) and its "invariant sequence" of development. But early evidence was not encouraging. Indeed, data generated by early scoring systems presented Kohlberg with a prima facie refutation of the moral stage theory. The research program did regroup and evolve new scoring systems to resolve the anomalous data, but at the price of purging Stage 6 as the endpoint, larding the sequence with sub-stages, and restricting the range of extension of a moral structure to something narrow and cramped — to only those data obtained from spontaneous interviews and not in any other way; and only on hypothetical justice dilemmas and not those that pull for other types of moral issues (Lapsley, 2006).

Of course, every research program must proceed in the face of anomalies, and there is always recalcitrant data with which to contend. "All theories are born refuted and die refuted," as (Lakatos, 1978, p. 5) put it. But progressive research programs deal with anomalies in content-increasing ways. Degenrating research programs do not. Degenrating research programs assume a strictly defensive posture by adopting a series of ad hoc stratagems that do more to protect its core claims than to anticipate novel facts (Lakatos, 1978). By these criteria it seems clear that we are met here at the crossroad with a degenrating research program in moral stage theory.

MORALIZED PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGIZED MORALITY

Progressive research programs that struggle with unruly evidence often look to other theories, constructs and traditions to explore the resources that meaningful integration might afford. But this option was not easily available to the Kohlberg paradigm, largely because its core assumptions and philosophical commitments re-

sisted easy commerce with contemporary psychological research. To see this consider what is arguably Kohlberg's greatest accomplishment: Kohlberg quite simply *moralized* psychology with his stage theory. He brought ethics to psychology, creating a field of study in the process. He used ethical theory to set the terms of reference for his investigations. Indeed, Kohlberg argued that the study of moral development must begin with certain metaethical assumptions that define a moral judgment (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983). Kohlberg's embrace of Kantian formalism allowed him to carve out a domain of study against the backdrop of psychoanalysis and behaviorism; and it provided a way to articulate and define the emerging cognitive developmental alternative (Kohlberg et al., 1983).

And from Kohlberg we learned a lesson about the division of labor between ethics and psychology: First, make certain ethical assumptions; use ethical theory to define the terms of reference, to define the domain of inquiry; and then, once this is done, get on with your psychological work. Kohlberg's instruction on this was so successful that it is now part of the received view that philosophical analysis must precede psychological work. Psychological explanations must be grounded by philosophical explanations (see e.g., Turel, 1998). Put tentatively, while ethics is autonomous psychology is not. Psychological research on moral functioning is to be constrained by ethical theory.

This cognitive developmental *rapprochement* with ethics raised many suspicions on both sides of the disciplinary boundary. Although philosophers seemed pleased that Kohlberg at least got his priorities straight — first come to terms with ethical theory then do psychology — they nonetheless wondered if he was committing the naturalistic fallacy or else got his formalist ethics wrong. Psychologists worried that by accepting a particular philosophical definition of morality as a starting point, one might be tempted 1) to narrow the scope of inquiry, 2) resolve philosophical problems with empirical data, or 3) use strictly philosophical criticism to trump the empirical claims of a theory (e.g., Blasi, 1990; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005).

We think the Kohlberg paradigm succumbed to the temptations of (1) and (2), but was largely the victim of (3). The scope of inquiry certainly was narrowly fixed on justice alone. It did attempt to resolve philosophical problems with empirical data, in this case the problem of ethical relativism (see below). And there were many who seemed to think that Kohlberg's developmental theory was wrong solely because of doubts about the adequacy of his philosophical commitments — a move we think illegitimate but perhaps inevitable given Kohlberg's moralization of psychology.

Kohlberg moralized psychology, then, in a double sense, not just by using formalist ethical theory to set the terms of reference, but to establish the very purpose of investigation. The purpose of Kohlberg's work was to provide the psychological resources to defeat ethical relativism. Ethical relativism is defeated at the highest stages of development, where the moral point of view commits us to seek moral consensus around rationally-grounded universal imperatives.

But it was the commitment to the anti-relativism project that led ultimately to the marginalization of moral stage theory, in our view. Kohlberg's attempt to transform

the study of moral behavior by appealing to a set of philosophical assumptions and definitions imported from ethics, along with his pursuit of an empirical basis to defeat relativism, had the unintended consequence of isolating moral psychological research from advances in other domains of psychology, effectively pushing it to the margins of contemporary psychological research. Entire lines of research were ruled out of bounds not for the usual scientific reasons but on the grounds that they might, in some way, give aid or comfort to ethical relativism. Hence research on selfhood and personality, the study of traits and dispositions, the language of virtues and character, and moral emotions, — all were deemed suspect, tangential or irrelevant to what was wanted most, which was a way to resolve the question of ethical relativism on empirical grounds.

We have complained, too, about other moral philosophical starting points, such as Kohlberg's insistence on a principle of phenomenalism for defining moral phenomena (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). This principle asserts that "moral reasoning is the conscious process of using ordinary moral language" (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983, p. 69). On this view the moral quality of behavior hinges solely on the subjective perspective, judgment and intention of the agent. A behavior has no particular moral status unless it is motivated by an explicit moral judgment. It implies "reference to conscious processes" (Kohlberg et al., 1983, p. 8). Phenomenalism is so deeply rooted in the cognitive developmental tradition that Blasi (1990) could assert that morality "by definition, depends on the agent's subjective perspective" (p. 59, our emphasis).

But the principle of phenomenalism is a mixed blessing. Kohlberg used it as a cudgel against behaviorism (which denied cognitivism) and psychoanalysis (which asserted the primacy of emotions and the unconscious). Moreover, it seems the guarantor of radical moral freedom to the extent that it frees behavior from "stimulus control" and places it instead under the command of rational calculation. Yet the principle of phenomenalism also closed off recourse to rich veins of contemporary research in social cognition — ruling out the legitimacy, for example, of recent research on tacit, automatic and implicit cognition for the moral domain. These philosophical roadblocks have essentially isolated moral development from the resources of other domains of psychology. As a result the study of moral development has been unaffected by developments in cognitive psychology, neuroscience and personality, although there are encouraging signs that this is now changing (e.g., Killen & Smetana, 2006; Narvaez, in press; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005; Walker & Henig, 1998).

Our remedy for the marginalization of moral development is for *more psychology* (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). That is, we suggested that the next generation of research would do well to *psychologize* morality, rather than pursue the moralized psychology advocated by the cognitive developmental tradition. By "psychologized morality" we mean an approach to inquiry that avails itself of the full range of psychological literatures, including personality and cognitive psychology, social cognition and motivation, evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences, among others. A psychologized morality asserts the autonomy of psychology in the study

of moral functioning. It jettisons a priori philosophical constraints and seeks integrative possibilities between moral psychology and other human sciences, including the neurosciences.

Moreover, we argued that the movement towards a psychologized morality converges with the "naturalized ethics" perspective that attempts to stake normative ethics to a defensible account of human nature. Indeed, psychologised morality and naturalized ethics are "fellow travelers" well-met at the crossroad of our disciplines, and pointing towards a common problematic, which is how to account for moral personality, selfhood and agency.

ETHICAL NATURALISM

We invoked the notion of a "psychologized morality" in the context of an historical reconstruction of the Kohlberg paradigm. We did so to call attention to the problem of boundaries between ethics and psychology. The Kohlberg team accepted a division of labor that not only respected the autonomy of morality but gave it certain prerogatives to constrain the psychological agenda — to establish its boundary, define its starting points, and rein in its explanations. Our call for a psychologized morality was a way to register our objection to this extraordinary arrangement. It was a way to assert the autonomy of psychology ("We keep the wall between us as we go") as we walk the mending wall with ethical theory.

What is new, however, is the very notion that ethical theorists ever need to walk the mending wall with psychologists in the first place. The autonomy of morality, which is a presumption of the ethical tradition from Kant to Moore to Hare, renders such effort pointless. Morality is sui generis, it is asserted, and there is nothing about it that depends upon natural or social scientific knowledge. Ethical naturalism challenges this view. It asserts that the human sciences are not irrelevant for ethics. At its core ethical naturalism asserts that we live in a single natural world (Wong, 2006). Consequently normative ethics can make no appeal to non-natural entities or phenomena — no appeal to gods, to noumenal metaphysics, souls, free wills, rational moral agents, epistemic subjects, Platonic forms, and so on.

Of course, apart from its commitment to a "single natural world" ethical naturalism is not univocal, and different positions are possible with respect to it (e.g., Forrest, 2000; Garfield, 2000; Railton, 1989). Moreover, there are a number of ways of categorizing the different approaches to naturalized ethics. Indeed, a recent paper by Maxwell (2007) has criticized us for not specifying the sort of ethical naturalism that is most congenial to a psychologized morality, so getting this right is a matter of some importance to us.

Varieties of Ethical Naturalism

Casebeer (2003) sketches out three possible positions with respect to the relation between ethics and science. There are first of all "Separatists" who advocate ab-

stinnence... no intercourse is possible between the findings of science and the articulation of ethical norms. What *is* is irrelevant to what *ought* to be, from the perspective of Separatists. Here the boundary between ethics and science is fortified, and the fence is high and guarded. Then there are Confederates who are "mildly promiscuous": Confederates allow the findings of science to place limits on the demands that norms can place upon us; or else rule out some moral theories as inconsistent with our best natural knowledge. Put differently, Confederates insist that ethical theory satisfy strong (William, 1981) or weak (Flanagan, 1991) criteria of psychological realism. Confederates are mindful of the naturalistic fallacy but claim to evade it, and they are likely to make good neighbors insofar as they acknowledge the existence of a boundary wall that needs mending.

Finally there are Unionists. Unionists demand not simply that ethical theory be consistent with natural knowledge but that it reduces to more fundamental naturalized theories. They assert that the methodological and epistemological assumptions of the natural sciences should serve as the standard of ethical inquiry. Unionists are dismissive of the ("so-called") naturalistic fallacy; and see no need for a wall just because there are not two sides – there are not all pines on the one side and apples on the other – its just one big orchard of natural science.

Wong (2006) is a good Confederate. He argues that there are multiple true moralities, although there are natural limits on what can count as a true morality, given the realities of human needs, desires and purposes. His methodological naturalism is committed to an integration of morality "with the most relevant empirical theories about human beings and society, such as evolutionary theory and developmental psychology" (Wong, 2006, p. xiv). Indeed, psychology's role looms large in many accounts of ethical naturalism. As Flanagan put it: "...scientific psychology has the potential for destabilizing, as well as for developing and refining certain assumptions underlying traditional moral theory" (1991, p. 21).

Wong (2006) emphasizes two methodological themes. One is that philosophy "should not employ a distinctive a priori method for yielding substantive truth shielded from empirical testing" (p. 30). Another is that "there is no sharp boundary between epistemology and the science of psychology" (p. 30). His methodological naturalism does not rule out claims asserted on the basis of non-natural analytical, logical or conceptual analysis, or by non-empirical methods, just that "the deliverances of such methods cannot be taken as self-evident or permanent" (p. 30).

Maxwell (2007) identifies three varieties of ethical naturalism: normative, neo-Aristotelian and evidential. Naturalized normative ethics, following Flanagan (1991), is one that satisfies criteria of psychological realism. The norms and standards that ethics holds out must be a possibility for ordinary human beings. Neo-Aristotelian naturalism, following Hursthouse, (1999, 2003) and McKinnon (2005), justifies ethical prescriptions from the standpoint of the essential features of human nature. Evidential naturalism, following Doris (2002; Doris & Strich, 2005), is a methodological naturalism (like Wong's) that constrains ethical theory by the empirical findings of the social sciences.

Which variety of ethical naturalism is a fellow traveler with psychologized morality? Maxwell (2007) is correct to note that our psychologized morality draws inspiration from all three of his varieties, but that it is evidential naturalism that is the best fit. Indeed, we admit to being Confederates (but with Unionist sympathies) and find Wong's (2006) methodological naturalism congenial with our own perspective about boundary issues.

In our view the findings of the human sciences already cast grave doubt on the plausibility of certain ethical notions. We nominate the "unity of the virtues" and Aristotle's conception of an ideal virtuous agent as two notions that run counter to the requirement of psychological realism. Flanagan (1991) nominated the putative distinction between character and moral character and the accuracy of first-person reports as philosophical notions (among others) made implausible by psychological realism. But we hasten to add that psychological research lends empirical support to several aspects of classical ethical theory, too. For example, that moral sensibility must be cultivated in context; that moral education requires the guidance of mentors until self-guidance takes over; that virtue cannot be taught like history but must emerge from lived experience, among others, these claims are well-grounded by developmental and educational psychology.

Is "Psychologized Morality" Based on a Fallacy?

But does psychologized morality run afoul of the "is-ought problem" (in violation of "Hume's Law")? Does it commit the "naturalistic fallacy" (Moore, 1903/1993)? The is-ought problem is traced to a section of Hume's (1740/2000) Treatise (Book 3, Part 1, Section 1) that cautions against moving from descriptive statements ("is" or "is not") to prescriptive statements ("ought" or "ought not"); or, alternatively, from non-moral premises to moral conclusions – "...for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it" (p. 302). The "naturalistic fallacy" is traced to G. E. Moore's (1903/1993) claim that ethical terms ("good") point to non-natural, indefinable properties (although we will recognize it when we encounter it) that cannot, on pain of incoherence, be reduced to natural properties (such as human needs, desires, emotions). For example, we can always ask of something: "Is x good?" – which suggests therefore that the property of being good cannot be identified with natural properties, it is an indefinable *sui generis* concept. For Moore, it is an "open question" for any natural property as to whether it is good (Casebeer, 2003). And to conflate good with natural properties is to fall prey to the naturalistic fallacy.

Taken together, "Hume's Law" and G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy appear to forbid grounding morality on non-moral foundations; or explicating ethical terms with natural properties. This builds a high wall between ethics and science and makes Separatists of us all.

The naturalistic fallacy is a specter that haunts ethical naturalism, although it

seems to frighten psychologists the most. The debate between ethical naturalism and anti-naturalism is longstanding and beyond our competence to resolve. But we would simply note here that ethical naturalism is not helpless in this debate. MacIntyre (1959) argued, for example, that Hume was not, in any event, asserting the autonomy of morals (because he did not believe in it); nor was he making a point about logical entailment of ought by is, because he never mentions it. In fact Hume's whole Treatise is an extended example of how to violate if Hume's Law." As MacIntyre (1959) noted, "if Hume does affirm the impossibility of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is,' then he is the first person to perform this particular impossibility" (p. 455). In MacIntyre's (1959) view, the movement from is to ought is a fallacy only if one believes that rational inference takes only one form, which is the form of a deductive syllogism. Moreover, as McKinnon (1999) points out, while descriptive facts may not determine normative prescriptions, they can certainly constrain them. What's more, the is-ought distinction and Moore's "open question" argument may be special cases of the analytical-synthetic distinction that Quine (1951) denounced as one of the dogmas of empiricism. — a "metaphysical article of faith" that cannot be sustained (Casebeer, 2003). Finally, Dewey's ethical theory provides a number of options for understanding the distinction between the desired and the desirable but in a way compatible with a broad commitment to naturalism. As Dewey (1922) put it, "a morals based on the study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology" (p. 12).

But we think much of this controversy elides our present concerns. As Confederates we walk the mending wall with ethical naturalists in our joint attempt to explain moral behavior. The explanation of moral behavior will retain the language of standards, norms and reasons, so there is no intention (or possibility) of eliminating evaluative language and replacing with non-evaluative terms (Wong, 2006). For example, Wong's (2006) shows how it is possible to explain moral evaluation "through evaluative terms that are *not irreducibly moral though still evaluative and normative in character*" (p. 36, emphasis in original). In other words, we seek an explanation of morality in terms of norms, standards and reasons but as these relate to human social and psychological needs, interests and purposes (Wong, 2006). As Wong (2006) puts it, "Such an explanation, in accordance with methodological naturalism, will be responsive to our best theories of human beings. It will not rely on a priori moral truths taken as self-evident and foundational or as derived purely from logical or conceptual analysis" (p. 36).

A CONCLUDING KOHLBERGIAN POSTSCRIPT

A psychologized morality stands, then, with a methodological naturalism that attempts to ground ethical theory by what is known about "human motivation, the nature of the self, the nature of human concepts, how our reason works, how we are socially constituted, and a host of other facts about who we are and how the mind operates."

(Johnson, 1993). It rejects the notion that morality is *sui generis* ; that moral properties are an irreducible part of the fabric of reality; or grounded by a priori methods or self-evident foundations (Wong, 2006). It rejects philosophical assumptions, such as the principle of phenomenalism, which chokes off access to the empirical literatures of psychology. It affirms that moral norms have regulative and functional work to do that is explicable in terms of the cultural evolutionary history of the species and the theoretical and empirical literatures of the human sciences.

We have only hinted at what the content of a psychologized morality might look like. Indeed, we are not wedded to the term, and we are not leading a movement. This is a discernible movement only in the sense that investigators are reflective about their commitment to naturalism in social science research on moral functioning. Our own work has explored the tacit, implicit and automatic aspects of moral behavior (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005); invoked the language of cognitive schemas to understand *phronesis* and the expertise literature to understand moral skill development (Narvaez, 2006); and linked moral dispositions to neurobiologically-rooted motivational tendencies afforded by the evolutionary development of the brain (Narvaez, in press). Those interested in moral development, whether theorists, researchers, or practitioners, ought to attend to the breadth of extant empirical research bearing on moral behavior and development.

But we would like to close by returning to Kohlberg's seminal contribution to moral development. We are mindful that our reconstruction of the historical evolution of moral stage theory and our diagnosis of the current state of things, indeed, our embrace of ethical naturalism as a remedy, will be controversial. Yet we are confident that our naturalizing tendencies are in keeping with Kohlberg's own best insights about boundary issues (Kohlberg, 1971).

Kohlberg, too, was a Confederate and he embraced a kind of philosophical naturalism. He understood, for example, the implications of Piaget's genetic epistemology—that the empirical data of child development is relevant for discerning criteria for evaluating progress in science, philosophy and mathematics (Piaget); or for deciding when some moral philosophies are inadequate or unworthy of us (Kohlberg). Just as Piaget appealed to developmental criteria to dispense with unstable and inadequate epistemological positions (empiricism, rationalism), so too did Kohlberg (1969) press developmental claims against inadequate meta-theoretical positions in psychology (maturationalism, associationism). And he understood that the study of development necessarily conflates descriptive claims about what is the case and evaluative claims about "good" development.

These features of Kohlberg's work are congenial with our understanding of naturalism and psychologized morality, and in this respect we claim him as a fellow traveler. Although there are surely features of our work that Kohlberg could not regard with favor, we don't think our embrace of naturalism is one of them.

"*Something there is that does not love a wall,*" the poet says, "*that wants it down.*" It is "spring mending time" in moral psychology, and we are confident of good neighbors as we walk the line of the common boundary between ethics and psychology.

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