

QUESTION 128

The Parts of Fortitude in General

Next we have to consider the parts of fortitude. First, we have to determine what the parts of fortitude are (question 128) and, second, we have to discuss those parts one by one (questions 129-138).

The Only Article

Are the parts of fortitude appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the parts of fortitude are not appropriately enumerated:

Objection 1: In his *Rhetorica* Tully posits four parts of fortitude: *magnificence* (*magnificentia*), *confidence* (*fiducia*), *patience* (*patientia*), and *perseverance* (*perseverantia*). And it seems inappropriate to do this. For *magnificence* seems to belong to *generosity* (*liberalitas*), since both of them have to do with monetary wealth, and as the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics* 4, “The magnificent individual has to be generous.” But as was established above (q. 117, a. 5), generosity is a part of *justice*. Therefore, *magnificence* should not be posited as a part of *fortitude*.

Objection 2: *Confidence* seems to be nothing other than *hope* (*spes*). But *hope* does not seem to belong to *fortitude*; instead, it is posited as a virtue in its own right. Therefore, *confidence* should not be posited as a part of *fortitude*.

Objection 3: *Fortitude* makes a man behave well with respect to dangers. But in their definitions *magnificence* and *confidence* do not imply any relation to dangers. Therefore, they are not appropriately posited as parts of *fortitude*.

Objection 4: According to Tully, *patience* implies “bearing up under hardships (*importat difficilium perpressionem*),” which he also attributes to *fortitude*. Therefore, *patience* is the same as *fortitude* and not a part of it.

Objection 5: What is required in every virtue should not be posited as a part of any specific virtue. But *perseverance* is required in every virtue, since Matthew 24:13 says, “He who will have persevered to the end will be saved.” Therefore, *perseverance* should not be posited as part of *fortitude*.

Objection 6: Macrobius posits seven parts of fortitude, viz., *magnanimity* (*magnanimitas*), *confidence*, *security* (*securitas*), *magnificence*, *constancy* (*constantia*), *forbearance* (*tolerantia*), and *firmness* (*firmitas*). Andronicus likewise posits seven virtues that are joined to *fortitude*, viz., *eupychia*, *lema*, *magnanimity*, *virility* (*virilitas*), *perseverance*, *magnificence*, and *andragathia*. Therefore, it seems that Tully gave an inappropriate enumeration of the parts of *fortitude*.

Objection 7: In *Ethics* 3 Aristotle posits five types of fortitude. The first is *political fortitude*, which acts courageously *because of one’s fear of dishonor or punishment*. The second is *military fortitude*, which acts courageously *because of one’s skill and experience in matters of war*. The third is the fortitude that acts *from passion*, especially from the passion of anger. The fourth is the fortitude that acts courageously *because of one’s having become accustomed to victory* (*propter consuetudinem victoriae*). The fifth is the fortitude that acts courageously *because of one’s ignorance of the dangers*. None of the aforementioned divisions contains these types of fortitude. Therefore, the aforementioned enumerations of the parts of fortitude seem to be inappropriate.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 48), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, viz., *subjective* parts, *integral* parts, and *potential* parts.

Now fortitude, insofar as it is a specific virtue, cannot be assigned *subjective* parts. This is because it cannot be divided into many virtues differing in species, since it has a very specific subject matter.

However, *integral* and *potential* parts are indeed assigned to it: *integral* parts according to the things that have to come together for an act of fortitude, and *potential* parts insofar as what fortitude attends to in the case of the most difficult hardship, viz., the danger of death, certain other virtues attend

to in the case of less difficult subject matters. These virtues are adjoined to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue.

Now as was explained above (q. 123, aa. 3 and 6), there are two acts of fortitude, viz., *to attack* (*aggredi*) and *to endure* (*sustinere*).

Two things are required for *the act of attacking*:

(a) The first involves the *preparation of the mind*, so that one has a mentality ready for attacking. And it is on this score that Tully posits *confidence* (*fiducia*). Hence, he says that confidence “is that by which the mind has set up within itself a lot of confidence, along with hope, with respect to great and upright undertakings.”

(b) The second pertains to the *execution of the deed*, lest one should fail to execute those things that he has begun with confidence. And on this score Tully posits *magnificence* (*magnificentia*). Hence, he says, “Magnificence has to do with thinking about and managing”—i.e., executing—“great and lofty undertakings, with a capacious and noble purpose of mind”—so that management is not lacking for one’s capacious plans.

Therefore, if these two requirements are focused on fortitude’s proper subject matter, viz., the danger of death, then they will be *integral parts* of fortitude without which an act of fortitude cannot exist. On the other hand, if they are referred to other subject matters in which there is less difficulty, then they will be virtues that are distinct from fortitude in species and yet are adjoined to it as *secondary virtues* to the principal virtue—in the way that, in *Ethics* 4, the Philosopher posits *magnificence* for great undertakings, whereas he posits *magnanimity*, which seems to be the same thing as *confidence*, with respect to great honors.

On the other hand, as regards *the act of enduring*, which is the second act of fortitude, two things are required:

(a) The first is that *the mind not be broken by sadness because of the difficulty posed by imminent evils and fall away from its greatness*. And on this score he posits *patience* (*patientia*). Hence, [the Philosopher says in the same place], “Patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of uprightness or usefulness.”

(b) The second is that *a man not become fatigued by the extended suffering of difficulties to the point that he gives up*—this according to Hebrews 12:3 (“... so that you might not grow weary or become fainthearted”). And on this score he posits *perseverance* (*perseverantia*). Hence, he says, “Perseverance is the stable and continued persistence in a well thought out purpose.”

Again, if these two requirements are focused on fortitude’s proper subject matter, they will be *integral parts* of fortitude. On the other hand, if they are referred to just any difficult subject matter, then they will be virtues distinct from fortitude and yet adjoined to it as *secondary virtues* to the principal virtue.

Reply to objection 1: *Magnificence* adds to the subject matter of generosity a sort of magnitude that pertains to the notion of *the arduous*, which is the object of the irascible appetite, and it is the irascible appetite that *fortitude* principally perfects. And on this score *magnificence* belongs to *fortitude*.

Reply to objection 2: As was established above (q. 17, a. 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 3), the *hope* by which one has confidence in God (*de Deo confidit*) is posited as a theological virtue. By contrast, through the *confidence* which is now being posited as a part of fortitude a man has hope in himself, though as subordinated to God (*tamen sub Deo*).

Reply to objection 3: Attacking anything great seems to be dangerous, since it is very harmful to fail in such ventures. Hence, even if *magnificence* and *confidence* are posited as doing or attacking some other sort of great thing, they have an affinity with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply to objection 4: *Patience* holds up, without an excessive degree of sadness, not only under the danger of death, which is what fortitude has to do with, but also under any other sort of difficulty or danger. And on this score it is posited as a *virtue adjoined to fortitude*. However, insofar as it has to do with the danger of death, it is an *integral part of fortitude*.

Reply to objection 5: Insofar as *perseverance* implies continuing a good work to the very end, it can be a circumstance of every virtue. However, it is posited as a part of fortitude in the sense that has been explained.

Reply to objection 6: Macrobius posits the four aforementioned parts posited by Tully, viz., *confidence*, *magnificence*, *forbearance* (which he posits in place of *patience*), and *firmness* (which he posits in place of *perseverance*). But he adds three.

Two of the three, viz., *magnanimity* and *security*, are understood by Tully under *confidence*, but Macrobius instead distinguishes them by their special properties. For *confidence* implies a man's hope for great things. Now hope for anything presupposes an appetite for great things that is prolonged into a desire (*desiderium*), and this pertains to *magnanimity*; for it was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 7) that hope presupposes the love of and desire for the thing that is hoped for. Or, better, one can say that *confidence* pertains to the certitude of the hope, whereas *magnanimity* pertains to the greatness of the thing hoped for. Now firm hope cannot exist unless the contrary is removed; for at times someone, as far as he himself is concerned, would hope for something, but the hope is destroyed by the impediment of fear, given that, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 4), fear is contrary to hope. And this is why Macrobius adds *security*, which excludes fear.

He adds a third thing, viz. *constancy*, which can be included under *magnificence*, since it is necessary to have a constant mind in cases where someone is doing something magnificently (*in his quae magnifice aliquis facit*). And this is why Tully claims that magnificence involves not only "one's managing great things, but also the mind's thinking them through in a capacious manner." Again, *constancy* can pertain to *perseverance*, since one is said to persevere in light of the fact that he does not stop because of how long things are taking (*propter diuturnitatem*), whereas one is said to be constant in light of the fact that he does not stop because of any other sort of obstacle.

The things that Andronicus posits seem to amount to the same thing. For he posits *perseverance* and *magnificence* along with Tully and Macrobius, whereas he posits *magnanimity* along with Macrobius. Now *lema* is the same as *patience* or *forbearance*; for he says, "*Lema* is a habit that makes one ready to attempt whatever is necessary and to endure whatever reason dictates." On the other hand, *eupsychia*, i.e., *good boldness* (*bona animositas*), seems to be the same as *security*; for he says that it is "a strength of soul for completing its works." Again, *virility* seems to be the same as *confidence*; for he says, "Virility is a habit of being self-sufficient in acting in accord with virtue." To *magnificence* he adds *andragathia* in the sense of *virile goodness* (*virilis bonitas*), which can be called *strenuousness* (*strenuitas*) among us. For it pertains to *magnificence* not only that a man should be consistent in carrying out great works, which pertains to *constancy*, but also that he should carry them out with a virile prudence and care, which pertains to *andragathia* or *strenuousness*. Hence, he says, "*Andragathia* is the virtue of a man that dreams up shared works (*viri virtus adinventiva commnicabilium operum*).

And so it is clear that all parts of this sort are traced back to the four principal parts that Tully posits.

Reply to objection 7: The five things that Aristotle posits here fall short of the true nature of the virtue, since, as was established above (q. 123, a. 1), even if they agree in the *act* of fortitude, they nonetheless differ in their motives. And they are posited not as *parts* of fortitude, but instead as certain *modes* of fortitude.