

QUESTION 26

Love

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) and withdrawal (*fuga*) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain or sadness (*dolor vel tristitia*) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the causes of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does love exist in the concupiscible power? (2) Is love a passion? (3) Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)? (4) Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*)?

Article 1

Does love exist in the concupiscible power?

It seems that love does not exist in the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: Wisdom 8:2 says, “Her,”—viz., Wisdom—“have I loved, and I have sought her out from my youth.” But since the concupiscible power is part of the sentient appetite, it cannot tend toward Wisdom, which is not comprehended by the sensory power. Therefore, love does not exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Love seems to be identical with every passion; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Love that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), while love that has and enjoys what is loved is delight (*laetitia*); love that flees from what is contrary to what is loved is fear (*timor*); and love that feels what is contrary to what is loved is sadness (*tristitia*).” But not every passion exists in the concupiscible power; instead, fear, which has just been enumerated here, exists in the irascible power. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification that love exists in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius posits a certain sort of “natural” love. But natural love seems rather to pertain to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore, love does not unqualifiedly exist in the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *Topics 2* the Philosopher says, “Love exists in the concupiscible power.”

I respond: Love is something that involves the appetite (*amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens*), since the good is the object of both of them. Hence, the distinction among the types of love follows the distinction among the types of appetite.

For instance, there is a certain type of appetite that follows another’s apprehension and not the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite; and an appetite of this sort is called a *natural appetite*. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), natural things have an appetite for what is appropriate for them according to their nature, and yet they have this appetite not because of their own apprehension, but because of the apprehension of the One who establishes their nature.

There is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite, but it follows that apprehension *by necessity* and not by a free judgment (*ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero*). This is the type of appetite that exists in *brute animals*, and yet in men this type of appetite has some participation in freedom to the extent that it obeys reason.

On the other hand, there is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the one who has the appetite in accord with free choice (*secundum liberum arbitrium*). And this type of appetite is a *rational or intellectual appetite*, which is called the will.

Now in each of these types of appetite, what is called ‘love’ is the principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved. In a natural appetite, the principle of this sort of movement is the connaturality between the thing that has the appetite and the thing toward which it tends; and this is called *natural love*. For instance, the very connaturality of a heavy body with a place at the center is due to gravity, and it can be called ‘natural love’. Similarly, the bond (*coaptatio*) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good—i.e., its being pleased with the good (*ipsa complacentia boni*)—is called ‘sentient love’ or ‘intellective (or rational) love’.

Thus, in the same way that intellective love exists in the intellective appetite, sentient love exists in the sentient appetite. And this sentient love belongs to the concupiscible power, since ‘love’ is predicated with respect to the good absolutely speaking and not with respect to the arduous good, which is the object of the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about intellective or rational love.

Reply to objection 2: It not by its essence but because of what it causes (*non essentialiter sed causaliter*) that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Natural love exists not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but in all the powers of the soul, as well as in all the parts of the body and, in general, in all things. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “The beautiful and the good are lovable to everything,” since each entity has a connaturality with what is appropriate to it, given its nature.

Article 2

Is love a passion?

It seems that love is not a passion:

Objection 1: No virtue (*virtus*) is a passion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, every type of love is “a certain sort of virtue.” Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, love is a certain sort of union or connection (*unio quaedam vel nexus*). But a union or connection is not a passion; instead, it is a relation. Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 3: In *De Fide Orthodoxa 2* Damascene says that a passion is “a certain sort of movement.” But ‘love’ implies not a movement of the appetite, which is desire (*desiderium*), but a principle of such a movement. Therefore, love is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Love is a passion.”

I respond: A passion is an agent’s effect within the patient. But a natural agent brings about two types of effect in the patient. For, first of all, it gives a form and, second, it gives the movement that follows upon that form. For instance, that which generates a body gives the body (a) heaviness (*gravitas*) and (b) the movement that follows upon heaviness. And it is the heaviness itself, which is a principle of the movement toward the place that is connatural to the body because of its heaviness, that can in a certain sense be called a *natural love*.

So, too, the desirable thing itself (*ipsum appetibile*) gives to the appetite, first of all, a certain bond with it (*dat quendam coaptationem ad ipsum*), which is the appetite’s being pleased with the desirable thing (*complacentia appetibilis*), and from this there follows a movement toward the desirable thing. For as *Ethics 3* says, “The appetitive movement goes in a circle.” The desirable thing moves the appetite and fashions itself in some way in the appetite’s tendency (*faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione*), and the appetite tends toward attaining the desirable thing in reality, so that the movement ends where it began (*ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium*).

Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is called *love*, which is nothing

other than the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and this movement is *desire*; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., *joy*.

So, then, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite effected by the desirable thing, it is clear that (a) love is a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it exists in the concupiscible power, and that (b) love is a passion, in a general and extended sense, insofar as it exists in the will.

Reply to objection 1: Since 'virtue' signifies a principle of movement or of action, Dionysius is calling love 'a virtue' insofar as it is the principle of an appetitive movement.

Reply to objection 2: Union is relevant to love insofar as, through its being pleased (*per complacentiam*), the loving appetite is related to what it loves in the way it is related to itself or to something that belongs to it. And so it is clear that love is not the very relation of union; rather, the union follows upon the love. Hence, Dionysius says that love is "a unitive power," and in *Politics 2* the Philosopher says that the union is the work of love (*unio est opus amoris*).

Reply to objection 3: Even though 'love' does not name the movement of an appetite that is tending toward a desirable thing, it nonetheless does name the movement of the appetite through which the appetite is changed by the desirable thing in order that the desirable thing might be pleasing to it.

Article 3

Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)?

It seems that love (*amor*) is the same as elective love (*dilectio*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that love and elective love are related in the same way that "four and two times two are, and *rectilinear figure* and *figure having straight lines* are." But these signify the same thing. Therefore, 'love' (*amor*) and 'elective love' (*dilectio*) signify the same thing.

Objection 2: Appetitive movements differ from one another because of their objects. But the object of elective love is the same as the object of love. Therefore, they are the same.

Objection 3: If elective love and love differ in anything, they seem to differ in the fact that "'elective love' (*dilectio*) is used in the case of good things and 'love' (*amor*) is used in the case of bad things, according to some," as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 14. But they do not differ in this; for as Augustine points out in the same place, in Sacred Scripture both terms are used in the case of good things and in the case of bad things. Therefore, love and elective love do not differ from one another—and Augustine himself concludes in the same place that "It is not one thing to say 'love' (*amor*) and something else to say 'elective love' (*dilectio*)."

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It has seemed to some of the saints that the name 'love' (*amor*) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (*dilectio*).

I respond: There are four names that in one way or another point to the same thing (*ad idem quodammodo pertinentia*): 'love' (*amor*), 'elective love' (*dilectio*), 'charity' (*caritas*), and 'friendship' (*amicitia*). They differ from one another as follows:

Friendship (*amicitia*), according to the Philosopher in *Ethics 7*, is a sort of habit, whereas love (*amor*) and elective love (*dilectio*) are signified in the manner of an act or a passion, and charity (*caritas*) can be taken in either of these two ways. However, the acts are signified differently by these last three names. For *love* is common to the three of them, since every act of elective love or act of charity is an act of love, but not vice versa.

More specifically, 'elective love' adds to 'love' a previous act of choosing, just as the name itself suggests (*dilectio/electio*). Hence, elective love exists only in the will and not in the concupiscible power, and it exists only in a rational nature.

On the other hand, ‘charity’ (*caritas*) adds to love a certain perfection of love (*addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris*), insofar as that which is loved is thought of as having great worth (*id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur*), as the name itself (*carus/caritas*) suggests.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about love and elective love insofar as they exist in the intellectual appetite, since in that case love and elective love are the same thing.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love (*amor*) is more general than the object of elective love (*dilectio*), since, as has been explained, love extends to more things than elective love does.

Reply to objection 3: Love and elective love are not differentiated by the differences *good* and *bad*, but are instead differentiated in the way that has been explained.

And yet in the intellectual part of the soul, love and elective love are the same thing. And it is in this sense that Augustine is talking about love (*de amore*) in the passage in question. That is why he adds a little later, “An upright act of will is a good act of love, and a perverse act of will is a bad act of love.”

Yet those who assigned the differences *good* and *bad* had a plausible reason for doing so (*habuerunt occasionem*), because the love that is a passion of the concupiscible power inclines many individuals toward what is bad.

Reply to the argument for the contrary: Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name ‘love’ (*amor*) is more divine than the name ‘elective love’ (*dilectio*). The reason is that ‘love’ implies a certain passivity (*passio*), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love (*dilectio*) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God through love (*per amorem*), having been attracted passively in a certain way by God Himself, than he is able to be led to this by his own reason—which, as has been explained, is what is involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (*amor*) is more divine than elective love (*dilectio*).

Article 4

Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

It seems that love is not appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*):

Objection 1: Love (*amor*) is a passion, whereas friendship (*amicitiae*) is a habit, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8. But a habit cannot be a partition dividing a passion (*pars divisa passionis*). Therefore, love is not appropriately divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Objection 2: Nothing is divided by what is enumerated on the same level with it; for instance, *man* is not enumerated on the same level with *animal*. But *concupiscence* is enumerated on the same level with *love* as another passion that is distinct from love. Therefore, *love* is not divided by *concupiscence*.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, there are three types of friendship: (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) noble friendship (*amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesta*). But friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure both involve concupiscence. Therefore, *concupiscence* should not be used to divide *friendship*.

But contrary to this: Some things we are said to love because we desire them; for instance, as *Topics* 2 points out, “someone is said to love wine because of the sweetness he desires in it.” But as *Ethics* 8 says, we do not have friendship with wine or other things of that sort. Therefore, love of concupiscence is one thing and love of friendship is something else.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “To love is to will a good for someone.” Therefore, the movement of love tends toward two things: (a) the good which one wills for someone, either for himself or for another (*in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii*); and (b) the one he wills the good for (*illud cui vult bonum*). Thus, *love of concupiscence* is had with respect to that good which

someone wills for another, and *love of friendship* is had with respect to the one that someone wills a good for. Hence, this distinction is a distinction between what is prior and what is posterior. For what is loved by a love of friendship is loved absolutely speaking and *per se*, whereas what is loved by a love of concupiscence is not loved absolutely speaking and in its own right (*secundum se*), but is instead loved for the sake of another.

For just as a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is that which has *esse*, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is something that exists in another, so too *good*, which is convertible with *being*, is such that what is good absolutely speaking is that which itself has goodness, whereas what is good in a certain respect (*bonum secundum quid*) is that which is the good of another. As a result, a love by which something is loved in order that there be some good for it is loved absolutely speaking, whereas a love by which something is loved in order that it be the good of another is loved in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 1: *Love* is divided not by *friendship* and *concupiscence*, but by *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. For the one who is properly called a friend is he for whom we will some good, whereas we are said to desire (*concupiscere*) what we will for ourselves.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: In friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, someone wills some good for his friend, and to that extent the nature of friendship is preserved in these cases. However, since the good in question is directed further toward pleasure or usefulness for oneself, it follows that to the extent that friendship of utility or friendship of pleasure is drawn closer to the love of concupiscence, it falls short of the nature of genuine friendship.